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INTRODUCTION TO THE SPECIAL ISSUE OF THE WINDSOR 
YEARBOOK OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
 
TRANSNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: 
PAPERS FROM THE SIXTH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DISCUSSION 
FORUM, QUÉBEC CITY 
 
Russell Weaver,

 Denis Lemieux

 & Laverne Jacobs***  
 
On May 25 - 26, 2010, Université Laval, the University of Windsor Faculty of Law 
and the University of Louisville Brandeis School of Law, hosted the Sixth 
Administrative Law Discussion Forum.  These discussion fora, which have become 
an international academic success, have been held in a variety of venues in North 
America and Europe since the early 1990s.  They are an initiative of Russell Weaver, 
Professor of Law & Distinguished University Scholar at the University of Louisville. 
The fora provide an opportunity for thoughtful exchange among administrative law 
academics on contemporary issues that cut across national borders. 
 The discussions reflected in this collection of papers touch on a variety of major 
administrative law themes. In addition, they examine local aspects of problems that 
transcend regional and national borders, and show connections and preoccupations 
between jurisdictions and indeed between countries.  Because “transnational and 
comparative law” is a distinguishing theme of the University of Windsor, Faculty of 
Law, it was particularly appropriate to publish these papers in the Windsor Yearbook of 
Access to Justice. The conference organizers and participants were enthusiastic about 
the opportunity to do so.  
 This year‟s forum centred on two topics: “The New Regulation,” which included 
a variety of regulatory issues that affect not only Canada and the US, but also Europe; 
and “The Differences between Adjudicative Structures” which brought attention to 
European decision-making models and North American debates about internal and 
external structures of administrative adjudication.  Through the lens of these two 
broad themes flowed a rich and contextualized discussion of topics ranging from 
accountability and consultation in the regulatory context, to challenges posed by the 
structural role of decision-making agents and processes in an administrative state. The 
authors of this collection of papers are notable scholars in the field who have 
addressed these issues with perspicacity and candour. Offering both theoretical 
grounding as well as practical insight on a host of administrative law challenges, their 
work will prove of interest to academics, policymakers and practitioners alike. The 
following is a brief overview. 
 The collection opens with a look at administrative law judges and the structure of 
agency decision-making in the United States.  In “Neither Fish Nor Fowl:  
                                                          
  Professor of Law and Distinguished University Scholar, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law, University 
 of Louisville. 
  Professor, Faculté de Droit, Université Laval. 
***  Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Windsor. The authors wish to thank the Yearbook‟s 
 Editor and editorial staff for all their work in preparing this special issue. 
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Administrative Judges in the Modern Administrative State,” Russell Weaver and 
Linda Jellum examine the proposition that administrative law judges should possess 
greater independence in agency decision-making, including the power to render the 
final decisions in cases made by executive agencies.  At the heart of their discussion 
lies the difficult question of the extent to which the executive branch of government 
should be allowed to ensure that adjudicative decisions conform to agency policy and 
political concerns. Weaver and Jellum highlight the difficult trade-offs between 
independence, political control and accountability that exist in agency adjudication 
even with the reforms that were brought to formal administrative proceedings by the 
Administrative Procedure Act in 1946.  Their article discusses the advantages and 
disadvantages of various alternatives to the current system in order to explore the 
ability to import into a greater degree of judicial independence and impartiality to 
administrative decision-making in the United States.  
 In “The Merits of „Merits‟ Review: A Comparative Look at the Australian 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal”, Michael Asimow and Jeffrey S. Lubbers explore 
whether it would be beneficial for the United States to create a national appeals 
tribunal model like that used in Australia. After a thorough discussion of the 
Australian system, as well as a look at administrative adjudication in the UK, the 
authors conclude that an independent US Social Security Tribunal, similar to the 
Australian Social Security Appeals Tribunal could be helpful in addressing challenges 
that exist at the hearing stage of Social Security adjudication. These challenges 
include: an overwhelming caseload, problems surrounding efficiency, accuracy and 
consistency of the decision-making process, and issues related to the hiring and 
management of administrative law judges. 
 The issues of independence and its often cited counterpart, accountability, are 
addressed in detail in the subsequent three articles. In “A Wavering Commitment? 
Administrative Independence and Collaborative Governance in Ontario‟s 
Adjudicative Tribunals Accountability Legislation”, Laverne Jacobs examines a new 
piece of Ontario legislation designed to ensure the accountability of adjudicative 
tribunals through various forms of reporting while concurrently preserving their 
decision-making independence. Jacobs outlines the requirements of this unique 
statute and the concepts of independence and accountability as they are found in 
Canadian administrative law.  She argues that the legislature‟s goal of bringing the 
executive branch of government and tribunals together to achieve accountable, 
internal tribunal governance is laudable. However, the statute tends to favour the 
enforcement of accountability measures from the outside rather than fostering 
elements of internal tribunal culture that could lead to more authentic and durable 
measures of accountability. Moreover, the statute fails to address many contemporary 
concerns relating to accountability and independence, including the need for 
accountability on the part of the executive branch of government in order to ensure 
that the public is served adequately by adjudicative tribunals.  
 Continuing the discussion of independence and accountability, Herwig C.H. 
Hofmann examines these two values in the context of the European Union. In his 
article entitled, “Agency Design in the European Union”, Hofmann discusses the 
prolific creation of administrative agencies in the EU. He asserts that one of the main 
reasons for this “agencification” is so that agencies may assist in implementing EU 
vi
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policies within networks of EU and Member State actors. Hofmann notes that the 
independence of EU agencies is enabled by their expertise -- their ability to provide 
technical and/or scientific assessments.  Their expertise has also allowed them to be 
viewed as a means of providing high-quality decisions that transcend political 
influence. Yet, EU agencies remain accountable to political bodies of the EU and to 
Member States. Hofmann reflects on the variety of useful ways in which 
accountability may be demanded from EU agencies, including ex ante and ex post 
supervision, and increasing transparency. 
 Politics and political accountability are inescapable in any administrative state. In 
“Politics and Policy Change in American Administrative Law”, Richard Murphy 
explores the daunting question of the extent to which political preferences should be 
allowed to affect the discretionary judgment of agencies. Using the 2009 US Supreme 
Court decision of FCC v. Fox Television Stations Inc.
1
 as a point of departure, Murphy 
examines the contested relationship between the politicization of agency decisions 
and policy change. He asserts that political preferences should affect some regulatory 
choices but should not distort expert administrative judgments. 
 The next two papers address accountability and evaluation of administrative 
action from fresh new perspectives. Much overlooked in discussions of 
administrative agency accountability is their success or failure in achieving the policy 
purposes for which they were created. In their essay, “The Elusive Search for 
Accountability: Evaluating Adjudicative Tribunals”, Lorne Sossin and Steven 
Hoffman address this question. Using Ontario‟s health-related adjudicative tribunals 
as a case study, they reflect on the challenges involved in pursuing empirical inquiry 
to evaluate adjudicative tribunals -- challenges which become particularly acute when 
the goal is to assess their societal impact. Yet, as Sossin and Hoffman note, despite 
legal and methodological hindrances and the absence of empirical studies that 
evaluate the external impact of tribunals, empirical data is undoubtedly important. It 
may demonstrate performance benchmarks, ensure the appropriate use of public 
funds, ensure continuous quality improvement and identify reasons for reform. The 
authors conclude with an optimistic outlook, noting promising methodologies that 
have been used to evaluate specialized courts and possibilities for the measurement of 
outcomes. 
 In many jurisdictions, judicial review of administrative action is the most 
traditional accountability mechanism. Can judicial review keep up with the various 
regulatory reforms that have been brought about through the theory of new 
governance? In “Reinventing Regulation/Reinventing Accountability: Judicial Review 
in New Governance Regimes”, William D. Araiza analyzes this fundamental but 
underexplored issue. In his essay, Araiza notes the challenges that new governance 
principles raise for the determination of standing to challenge administrative action, 
looking to other jurisdictions for possible ways of addressing them. More broadly, 
Araiza argues thoughtfully for a reconceptualization of the notion of judicial review in 
order to provide adequate judicial supervision of forms of new governance 
regulations, such as ongoing agency management of public-private collaboration, 
without overstepping the realm of judicial competence. 
 Following these papers on accountability are a set of three papers focused on 
processes of public participation in the administrative state. In “Implications of the 
Internet for Quasi-Legislative Instruments of Regulation”, Peter L. Strauss explores 
                                                          
1  129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009). 
vii
  
 
 
viii 
 
the place that the Internet has started to occupy within agency rulemaking processes 
in American administrative law. Discussing initiatives such as enactment of the E-
Government Act 
2
 of 2002, emphasis on improving government transparency by the 
Obama Administration and the development of the new government portal 
regulations.gov, Strauss suggests that the Internet explosion has the potential to offer 
much greater input by the public in the consultation processes of agency rulemaking. 
 The theme of using consultation to improve the democratic legitimacy of 
executive branch regulations continues in the next article by France Houle. In 
“Implementing Consultation during Rule-Making:  A Case Study of the Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Regulation”, Houle presents the findings of an empirical study 
designed to find out more about civil servants‟ perceptions of mandatory consultation 
processes adopted pursuant to a federal Cabinet directive
3
 requiring consultation 
during the creation of regulations. In contrast to the United States, consultation 
during the rulemaking process is still at a relatively early stage of development in 
Canada. Houle conducted interviews with civil servants in 11 different divisions of 
Canada‟s federal Department of Citizenship and Immigration to gain a better 
understanding of their knowledge about stakeholders, how they approached 
consultation, the reasons underpinning consultation and of procedural aspects of the 
consultations. Houle‟s research findings lead her to suggest a re-examination of the 
federal government‟s current guidelines.  
 Hoi Kong rounds out this set of papers on designing effective consultative 
processes for the creation of regulations with a look at the municipal zoning bylaw 
context. In “The Deliberative City”, Kong asserts that concerns about the legitimacy 
and effectiveness of rulemaking gain special force when it comes to municipal law. 
On a theoretical level, he argues that developments in municipal consultation 
processes find their most appropriate normative foundation in a civic republican 
conception of legitimate state action. On a practical level, he examines the ward 
council – a municipal institution in Québec – and discusses the ways in which ward 
councils offer a civic republican response to the democratic deficit that can be noted 
in the consultative processes used in the development of zoning bylaws. 
 The last piece in this special issue is as much an invitation to further reading as it 
is a conclusion. In “Comparative Administrative Law: Outlining a Field of Study”, 
Susan Rose-Ackerman and Peter L. Lindseth discuss their new edited collection
4
 
which contributes to the renaissance of comparative administrative law. In this 
overview of their book, they highlight administrative law themes that offer points of 
connection across jurisdictions. Such themes include constitutional structures and 
administrative law; administrative independence; process and policy; administrative 
litigation; public-private relationships and transnational administration in the 
European Union. Rose-Ackerman and Lindseth state that their hope is that their 
                                                          
2  Pub. L. No. 107-347, 44 U.S.C.  
3  Cabinet Directive on Streamlining Regulation,  Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Cabinet Directive on 
 Streamlining Regulation, Section 2.0, online: Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat <http://www.tbs-
 sct.gc.ca/ri-qr/directive/directive01-eng.asp>. 
4  Susan Rose-Ackerman and Peter L. Lindseth, eds, Comparative Administrative Law (Cheltenham UK: 
 Edward Elgar, 2010). 
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book of essays will generate interest in the field of comparative administrative law. 
We are certain that it will do so.  
 In conclusion, the Sixth Administrative Law Discussion Forum was an 
opportunity for fruitful discussion on transnational and comparative administrative 
law themes. These themes, which are pervasive and uniting, included independence, 
transparency, politicization and consultation. They dealt with the effectiveness of a 
range of administrative law tools, places for improvement and means for providing 
such improvement. From a very successful conference, we are delighted to present 
this engaging set of essays which we are confident will make a valuable contribution 
to administrative law scholarship across jurisdictions. 
 
Russell Weaver     
Louisville, Kentucky  
 
Denis Lemieux  
Québec City, Québec  
 
Laverne Jacobs 
Windsor, Ontario 
 
Conference Organizers  
Sixth Administrative Law Discussion Forum 
May, 25-26 2010 
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NEITHER FISH NOR FOWL: ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGES IN THE 
MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
 
Russell L. Weaver  
Linda D. Jellum** 
 
This article examines the role of administrative adjudication in the United 
States constitutional system.  It begins by noting that such adjudication fits 
uncomfortably within a system of divided powers. Administrative judges, 
including administrative law judges [ALJs] (who have the highest level of 
protection and status), are considerably more circumscribed than ordinary 
Article III judges.  Indeed, administrative judges are usually housed in the 
agencies for which they decide cases, rather than in independent adjudicative 
bodies, and they do not always have the final say regarding the cases they 
decide.  In many instances, the agency can appeal an adverse administrative 
judge’s decision directly to the head of the agency, and the agency head retains 
broad power to overrule the administrative judge’s determinations.  In other 
words, the agency can substitute its judgment for that of the administrative 
judge regarding factual determinations, legal determinations, and policy choices.  
As a result, many administrative adjudicative structures involve difficult trade-
offs between independence, political control, and accountability.  This article 
examines issues related to the status and power of administrative judges, as 
well as the constraints that have been imposed on administrative adjudicative 
authority, and explores whether those constraints continue to serve the purposes 
for which they were originally imposed. 
 
Cet article examine le rôle du règlement de différends dans le domaine 
administratif dans le cadre du système constitutionnel des États-Unis. Il note 
d’abord qu’une telle façon de régler les différends cadre difficilement avec un 
système où les pouvoirs sont divisés. Les juges administratifs, y inclus les juges 
de droit administratif (qui jouissent du niveau le plus élevé de protection et de 
statut), sont considérablement plus restreints que les juges ordinaires sous 
l’Article III. En effet, les juges administratifs sont d’habitude logés dans les 
agences pour lesquelles ils décident les cas, plutôt qu’au sein d’organismes 
indépendants de règlement de différends, et ils n’ont pas toujours le dernier mot 
dans les cas qu’ils jugent. Dans bien des cas, l’agence peut porter en appel 
directement au chef de l’agence une décision défavorable d’un juge administratif, 
et le chef de l’agence possède de vastes pouvoirs pour annuler la décision du juge 
administratif. En d’autres mots, l’agence peut substituer son jugement à celui 
du juge administratif quant aux décisions de fait, aux décisions de droit et 
                                                          
  Professor of Law & Distinguished University Scholar, University of Louisville, Louis D. Brandeis 
 School of Law. This paper was originally written for and presented at the Sixth Administrative Law 
 Discussion Forum, Québec City, May 25-26, 2010.  The authors wish to thank the forum participants 
 for their comments, and especially to thank Professor Michael Asimow and Professor Jeffrey 
 Lubbers. 
**  Professor of Law, Mercer University School of Law.  We would both like to thank Troy Clark (J.D. 
 expected Mercer Law School 2010) for his help researching this article. 
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aux choix de politiques. Par conséquent, plusieurs structures de règlement de 
différends dans le domaine administratif comportent des compromis difficiles 
entre l’indépendance, le contrôle politique et l’obligation de rendre compte. Cet 
article examine des questions se rapportant au statut et au pouvoir de juges 
administratifs, ainsi qu’aux contraintes qui ont été imposées sur l’autorité de 
régler des différends dans le domaine administratif, et explore la question à 
savoir si ces contraintes continuent à servir les buts pour lesquels elles ont été 
imposées originellement. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Administrative adjudication has always rested uncomfortably in the United States 
constitutional system.  In theory, if not entirely in practice, the system includes 
separation of powers principles, as well as the concept of checks and balances, 
throughout the constitutional structure.1  For example, the Constitution vests 
legislative power in Congress,2 judicial power in the courts3 and executive power in 
the President.4  However, the lines of separation between the branches are not 
complete; and, there are many instances when power is divided between two 
branches of government.  For example, not only must both houses of Congress pass 
legislation, it must be presented to the President for signature or veto.5  
 Modern administrative agencies present significant challenges to the notion of 
separated powers because they frequently perform many functions committed to 
coordinate branches of government.  For example, many agencies “legislate” (in the 
sense of creating rules and regulations that can have the force and effect of legislative 
enactments),6 “adjudicate” (in the sense of deciding cases), and “administer” (in the 
sense of executing and administering the laws).7 Additionally, although most 
administrative agencies reside in the executive branch of government, Congress has 
limited the President‟s authority to remove the heads of some agencies and other 
executive officials,8 and thereby allowed those agencies to function relatively 
independently of presidential authority. 
                                                          
1  Political philosophers whose ideas influenced the writing of the United States Constitution include 
(but are hardly limited to) Montesquieu and Locke.  See Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, 
David Wallace Carrithers ed translated by Thomas Nugent, (London: Nourse, 1750; Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1977) at 202. “When the legislative and executive powers are united in 
the same person, or in the same body of magistracy, there can then be no liberty....”); John Locke, 
Two Treatises of Government, Peter Laslett, ed, 2d ed. ( London:  Cambridge University Press, 1690, 
1970)  at 380.  (“the legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands; for it 
being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it cannot pass it over to others.”). 
2  U.S. Const. art. I, § 1 (“[a]ll legislative Powers . . . shall be vested in a Congress of the United 
States…”). 
3  U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (“[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme 
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”).  
The framers founded an independent judiciary to rectify the mistake of the English Constitution, 
which made its judiciary subject to the control and pressures of Parliament. Irving R. Kaufman, “The 
Essence of Judicial Independence” (1980) 80 Colum L Rev 671 at 672-87. 
4  U.S. Const. art II, § 1 (“[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of 
America.”). 
5   U.S. Const. art. 1§ 7. 
6   See William F. Funk, Sidney A. Shapiro & Russell L. Weaver, Administrative Practice and Procedure: 
Problems and Cases, 4th ed, (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Company, 2010) at 517. 
7   Ibid. See also Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
8   See Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
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 One peculiarity of the U.S. administrative system is the fact that many agencies 
are allowed to hear and adjudicate cases.  Article III of the United States Constitution 
vests judicial power in the federal courts9 and provides Article III judges with lifetime 
tenure and substantial independence from the other two branches of government.  
Under the Constitution, Article III courts exercise broad power to “say what the law 
is”
10 and have sometimes rendered sweeping decisions that have reshaped society.11  If 
Congress wishes to override an Article III court‟s decision, Congress may have no 
choice but to try and amend the Constitution (a process that rarely succeeds). 
 Administrative courts and adjudicative structures12 function much differently.13  In 
contrast to Article III judges, the powers of administrative judges, including 
administrative law judges [ALJs] (who have the highest level of protection and 
status),14 are considerably more circumscribed.  Administrative judges are usually 
housed in the agencies for which they decide cases,15 rather than in independent 
adjudicative bodies.16  In addition, administrative judges do not always have the final 
say regarding the cases they decide.  In many instances, the agency can appeal an 
                                                          
9   U.S. Const. art. III. 
10   See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
11   See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
12   In the federal system, an adjudicative body can now be classified as an Article I, Article II, Article III, 
or Article IV court, in reference to the article of the Constitution from which the court‟s authority 
stems.  Article I courts are typically legislative courts. Some examples include the Social Security 
Administration's Office of Disability Adjudication and Review and the United States Court of 
Appeals for Veterans Claims. There are many others. Article II courts are generally established under 
the President's authority pursuant as Commander in Chief to maintain order and justice in military 
occupied territories and insular possessions. Some examples include Guantanamo military 
commission and High Court of American Samoa. The Article III courts include the Supreme Court 
of the United States and the inferior courts established by the Congress pursuant to its Article III 
powers.  U.S. Const.  art. III, § 1.  There are currently thirteen courts of appeals, ninety-four district 
courts, and the U.S. Court of International Trade. Article IV courts are tribunals established in 
territories of the United States by the Congress, pursuant to the Territorial Clause.  A few examples 
of the Article IV courts that still exist include the United States District Court for the Northern 
Mariana Islands, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands. 
13   Commentators have long discussed the lack of independence in this area.  For just a few examples, 
see Ron Beal, “The Texas State Office of Administrative Hearings: Establishing Independent 
Adjudicators in Contested Case Proceedings While Preserving the Power of Institutional Decision-
Making” (2005) 25 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 119; James F. 
Flanagan, “Redefining the Role of the State Administrative Law Judge: Central Panels and Their 
Impact on State ALJ Authority and Standards of Agency Review” (2002) 54 Admin L Rev 1355 at 
1382-85; Richard B. Hoffman & Frank P. Cihlar, “Judicial Independence: Can It Be Without Article 
III?” (1995) 46 Mercer L. Rev. 863; Harold J. Krent & Lindsay DuVall, “Accommodating ALJ 
Decision Making Independence with Institutional Interests of the Administrative Judiciary” (2005) 25 
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 1; L. Hope O'Keeffe, 
 “Administrative Law Judges, Performance Evaluation, and Production Standards: Judicial 
Independence Versus Employee Accountability”, Note, (1986) 54 Geo Wash L Rev 591. 
14   See 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2009); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.131 (2007). 
15   Administrative adjudicators have existed in the United States since the earliest times. See Louis G. 
 Caldwell, “A Federal Administrative Court” (1936) 84 U Pa L Rev 966 at 970  (“[U]nder a 
 bewildering medley of federal statutes, judicial functions galore have been lodged in the President, in 
 agencies directly responsible to the President, in the heads of government departments, in 
 subordinate officials and bureaus in those departments, and in the so-called independent boards and 
 commissions....”). As early as 1936, there were “about seventy-three administrative tribunals in the 
 federal government performing judicial functions in about 267 classes of cases.” Ibid at 970. 
16   See Russell L. Weaver, “Management of ALJ Offices in Executive Departments and Agencies” (1995) 
 47 Admin L Rev 303 [“Management of ALJ Offices”]. 
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adverse administrative judge‟s decision directly to the head of the agency.
17  If the 
decision is not appealed, it becomes the “decision of the agency.”18  Yet, if appealed, 
the agency retains broad power to overrule the administrative judge‟s determinations 
under the Administrative Procedure Act [APA]: “On appeal from or review of the initial 
decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have [had] in making the initial 
decision….”
19 In other words, the agency can substitute its judgment for that of the 
administrative judge regarding factual determinations,20 legal determinations, and 
policy choices. 
 As a result, many administrative adjudicative structures involve difficult trade-offs 
between independence, political control, and accountability.  Most administrative 
judges function as employees of the agencies for which they decide cases.  If 
independence is truly a core attribute of the American style of judging and if 
administrative judges are not truly independent, then administrative judges may be 
more accurately characterized as administrative functionaries with judge-like duties 
than as true judges.21 
 In this article, we examine issues related to the status and power of administrative 
judges. We begin by examining the history and development of existing 
administrative structures and the current status of the law.  From there, we explain 
the constraints that have been imposed on administrative adjudicative authority and 
explore whether those constraints continue to serve the purposes for which they were 
originally imposed.  We then examine some of the ideas that have been floated 
regarding how administrative judges (including ALJs) could be restructured and 
governed.  None of these ideas is entirely satisfactory.  However, given that the status 
quo is not entirely satisfactory either, it is worthwhile to re-examine some of these 
ideas and to explore some new ones. 
 
II. EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN ADJUDICATIVE STRUCTURE 
 
 Even though the modern administrative adjudicative system is imperfect, it is a vast 
improvement over the system that preceded it.  At the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, most adjudications were presided over by “examiners”22 who were appointed 
by the agencies themselves.23  These examiners were hardly independent, holding the 
status of “underling” or “subordinate”
24 in the sense that the agencies for which they 
worked controlled their assignments, their compensation, their promotions, and their 
retention.25  Indeed, some early examiners served completely at the pleasure of their 
                                                          
17   5 U.S.C. § 557(b).  Of course, the reason for allowing appeals to the agency is that the agency is 
 empowered to make law through adjudication. 
18   Ibid. 
19   Ibid. 
20  Agencies are somewhat limited in rejected ALJ findings of fact based on testimonial evidence.  
 Penasquitos Village v. Nat. Labor Relations Bd., 565 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1977).  
21   James E. Moliterno, “The Administrative Judiciary‟s Independence Myth” (2006) 41 Wake Forest L 
 Rev 1191 at 1197. 
22   The term "examiners" came into use in 1906.  3 Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Treatise  2d 
 ed. (San Diego: K. C. Davis Pub. Co., 1980) § 17.11, at 313. 
23   See Management of ALJ Offices, supra note 16, at 303. 
24   See Malcolm Rich, “Adapting the Central Panel System: A Study of Seven States” (1981) 65 
 Judicature 246 at 246 (“The agencies controlled the compensation and job tenure of their hearing 
 officers and could ignore their decisions and enter de novo rulings instead.”). 
25   Ibid at 303-04. 
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superiors and had no job security whatsoever.26  Hence, judicial “independence” and 
“impartiality” were not an assured part of the administrative equation. 
 By the 1930s, commentators began to raise serious concerns regarding the status 
of hearing examiners, as well as about their ability to decide cases fairly, 
independently, and impartially.27  In a 1934 report, the American Bar Association‟s 
[ABA] Special Committee on Administrative Law criticized the fact that some 
examiners exercised both prosecutorial and adjudicative functions.28  One member of 
the Committee summed up the concerns as follows: 
 
If there is anything of which we can be relatively sure after some 
hundreds, even thousands, of years of experience with judicial 
machinery, it is that no man can be trusted to be judge in his own 
case. And he is a judge in his own case if he is also the prosecutor 
or if he is also the legislator who made the rule he is asked to 
interpret and apply. Agency after agency in our federal government 
is authorized to wield all three powers of government at once. 
Wearing its legislative toga, a commission makes a regulation, on 
compliance with which John Doe's right to continue in business 
may depend. Having reason to believe that John Doe is guilty of 
violating the regulation, the commission doffs the toga and, taking 
up the executive sceptre, investigates and prosecutes him. With the 
sceptre still in its hand, the commission hurriedly dons the judicial 
ermine and proceeds to present itself at least two scintillas of 
evidence to prove that it was right in the first place. While care is 
sometimes taken to preserve the form of placing the burden of 
proof on the prosecutor, all the form in the world cannot disguise 
the fact that the burden is usually on John Doe to prove himself 
innocent before a commission that at least strongly suspects he is 
guilty. If John or his lawyer construes the regulation differently 
than does the commission, that is just unfortunate for John. The 
commission made the regulation and is confident that it knows just 
what it meant to say. And it is always free to change its mind. John 
is in the position of a man whose wife changes her system of 
bidding in the middle of a bridge game without notice. He is sure 
to lose and is equally sure to get blamed for it.29 
 
                                                          
26   Ibid. 
27   An ABA Report concluded that appointments to administrative tribunals are all too generally classed 
 as patronage and, it is to be feared, the decisions of some of them are occasionally dealt with as a 
 form of patronage. It is not easy to maintain judicial independence or high standards of judicial 
 conduct when a political sword of Damocles continually threatens the judge's source of livelihood. 
 While a few federal administrative tribunals have, in spite of all obstacles, preserved a high degree of 
 independence from political pressure and political considerations, unfortunately there are others 
 which have yielded and as a result the cause of justice has suffered. Special Report of the Special 
 Committee on Administrative Law, (1934) 59 American Bar Association 539 at 546 [ABA Special 
 Report]; See also Jeffrey S. Lubbers, “Federal Administrative Law Judges: A Focus on Our 
 Invisible Judiciary” (1981) 33 Admin L Rev 109 at 111. 
28   ABA Special Report, ibid at 545-46. 
29   Caldwell, supra note 15, at 973-74. 
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Separation of functions and status were not the only concerns.  Even had examiners 
been functionally separate from their agencies, their decisions were not final and 
could be overridden by agency superiors.30    
 During the debate, many suggestions were offered regarding how to reform the 
system.  Some argued that Congress should create a federal administrative court that 
would hear only administrative cases.31  Others suggested that Congress should create 
an independent administrative judiciary, a central panel of judges, to adjudicative 
administrative matters.32  Congress ultimately rejected both of these suggestions.  In 
1946, with the passage of the APA,33 Congress opted for a third approach that was 
unique to administrative law, but included a number of protective components.  First, 
Congress sought to prevent agency officials from acting as lawmaker, investigator, 
prosecutor, and jury in the same case.  Importantly, the APA provided that ALJs 
could not be responsible to, or subject to supervision by, anyone performing 
investigative or prosecutorial functions for an agency.34  To do so, the APA required 
agencies to separate the prosecuting functions of an agency from its adjudicating 
functions.35  Specifically, anyone who investigated or prosecuted a case could not 
supervise or direct those individuals who adjudicated the case.36  Additionally, those 
individuals who investigated or prosecuted could not be part of the decisionmaking 
process.37  Further, the APA limited some ex parte communications.38   
 The centerpiece of the APA reforms, however, involved a strengthening of the 
position and status of hearing examiners.39  The APA greatly improved the status of 
some, but not all, administrative judges by creating a new position, that of the ALJ 
                                                          
30   See Lubbers, supra note 27 at 111 (“Furthermore, the role of the presiding officer in an agency's 
 decisional process was often unclear; many agencies would ignore the officer's decisions 
 without giving reasons, and enter their own de novo decisions.”). 
31   John D. O'Reilly, Jr., “The Federal Administrative Court Proposal: An Examination of General 
 Principles” (1937) 6 Fordham L Rev 365; See also Attorney General's Committee on 
 Administrative Procedure - Majority and Minority Reports, (1941) 27 ABA J 91 at 93. 
32   See Rich, supra note 24 at 246 ("Yet the hearing officers were not granted complete independence 
 from the agencies, for the APA allowed them to be assigned exclusively to particular agencies."). 
33 5 U.S.C. § 551 et. seq. 
34   See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2) (2009).  Indeed, Congress created a unique system because of its concern 
about separating the adjudicatory function from other conflicting agency functions.  In 1970 and 
1977 respectively, Congress created the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission 
[OSHRC] and the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission [FMSHRC].  Both are 
independent, Executive Branch agencies located outside the Department of Labor.  Importantly, they 
have adjudicative authority only. “OSHRC determines whether regulations promulgated and 
enforced by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration have been violated. FMSHRC 
adjudicates violations of standards promulgated and enforced by the Mine Safety and Health 
Administration.”  Robin J. Arzt, “Recommendations for a new Independent Adjudication Agency to 
Make the Final Administrative Adjudications of Social Security Act Benefits Claims” (2003) 23 
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 267 at 281.  
35   5 U.S.C. § 554(d). 
36   Ibid. 
37   Ibid. There were, however, some exceptions. The APA provides that "[t]his subsection does not 
apply… to the agency or a member or members of the body comprising the agency." 5 U.S.C. § 
554(d)(2)(C).  As a result, "a member or members of the body comprising the agency" could be 
involved in prosecutorial, investigatory, and adjudicatory functions.  Ibid. 
38   5 U.S.C. § 554(d).  Congress later amended the APA to add another section designed to address ex 
 parte communications.  5 U.S.C. § 557(d). 
39   William S. Jordan, III, “Chevron and hearing rights:  An Unintended Combination, (2009) 61 Admin L 
 Rev 249 at 270 citing Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing 
 Company, 1951) at 309. 
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(initially, the APA referred to ALJs as “hearing examiners”),40 and by giving ALJs 
protections designed to bolster their independence.41  In particular, ALJs were to be 
certified by the Office of Personnel Management [OPM] and were not subject to a 
probationary period.42  OPM was directed to determine the minimum experience 
needed to be an ALJ and to evaluate applicants for the position (by conducting 
interviews, administering a test of writing ability, evaluating the experience of 
applicants, and ranking eligible applicants).43  Despite these improvements, agencies 
retained control over the choice of who was actually selected from OPM‟s register 
and who was actually hired into ALJ positions.44  In other words, the agencies retained 
control over the selection of ALJs who worked for them, even if the pool of available 
candidates was shrunk and controlled by OPM. 
 Once hired, ALJs enjoyed increased job protections and independence vis-a-vis 
pre-APA hearing examiners.  Although the APA did not grant ALJs the life tenure 
granted to Article III judges, ALJs could be removed only for cause or due to a 
reduction in workforce.45  In addition, the APA required that ALJs be assigned cases 
in rotation and that ALJs not perform duties inconsistent with their role as ALJs. 46  
Additionally, the APA required that ALJ compensation be determined based on 
length of service rather than based on performance evaluations.  As the Supreme 
Court concluded, these changes made a significant difference in the status of ALJs:  
 
There can be little doubt that the role of the modern federal 
hearing examiner or administrative law judge within this 
framework is “functionally comparable” to that of a judge. His 
powers are often, if not generally, comparable to those of a trial 
judge….  More importantly, the process of agency adjudication is 
currently structured so as to assure that the hearing examiner 
exercises his independent judgment on the evidence before him, 
free from pressures by the parties or other officials within the 
agency.47 
 
                                                          
40   Marvin H. Morse, “The Administrative Law Judge: A New Direction for the Corps?” (1983) 30 Fed 
 B News & J 398 at 401 n. 2 (“The APA ... initially referred to presiding officers as examiners, 
 colloquially referred to as hearing examiners. The title was administratively standardized to 
 Administrative Law Judge by the Civil Service Commission in August 1972. The ALJ title was ratified 
 by the Act of March 27, 1978, Pub. L. No.  95-251, 92 Stat. 183.”).  See also Paul R. Verkuil et al., 
 “The Federal Administrative Judiciary” 1992 Administrative Conference of the United States 771, 
 798 (1992).  In 1978, Congress amended the APA to official change the term from hearing 
 examiners to administrative law judges.  Pub. L. No. 95-251, 92 Stat. 183 (1978). 
41   See also Rich, supra note 24 at 246.  Congress, in its 1946 Administrative Procedure Act [APA] sought to 
 establish a corps of federal hearing officers that were more independent of the agencies. Hearing 
 officers were to be given career appointments and compensation was to be managed by the Office of 
 Personnel Management. Yet the hearing officers were not granted complete independence from the 
 agencies, for the APA allowed them to be assigned exclusively to particular agencies. 
42  OPM has been “exclusively responsible for the initial examination, certification for selection, and 
 compensation of ALJs.” Lubbers, supra note 27 at 112. 
43   Ibid. 
44   Ibid. 
45   5 U.S.C. § 7521; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.131 (2007). 
46   5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2009); 5 C.F.R. § 930.212 (2007). 
47   Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978). 
250  Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 2010 
 
As Michael Asimow and Jeffrey Lubbers have argued,48 the APA system is hardly 
perfect.  There are difficulties with selection criteria, as well as with the inability of 
agencies to conduct performance evaluations.  These concerns may be legitimate, but 
are beyond the scope of this article.  
 
III. DEPARTURES FROM THE ARTICLE III JUDICIAL MODEL 
 
 Even though the APA significantly altered the status and work of administrative 
judges, the APA departed from the Article III judicial model in important respects.  
Critically, the APA did not convert all administrative judges into “ALJs.” Indeed, the 
APA did not even require that all administrative adjudications be conducted by 
ALJs.49  Rather, the APA required only that ALJs be used for “formal,” as opposed to 
“informal,” hearings.
50  Today, informal adjudication is much more prevalent than 
formal adjudication as a consequence of the Supreme Court‟s decision in Florida East 
Coast Ry. v. United States51 (which created a presumption in favour of informality for 
rulemaking), and the lower courts‟ application of this principle to adjudication.
52 As a 
result, many administrative judges continue to decide cases without the status of an 
ALJ. 
 Even when the APA (or the agency‟s governing statute) requires an agency to use 
an ALJ, the APA limits the ALJs‟ power.  Specifically, the drafters of the APA chose 
not to give ALJs complete control over the cases they decided.  Thus, if an agency 
wished, the agency was free to decide the case itself or to have the case heard by one 
or more members of the body comprising the agency.53  If the agency did not choose 
one of those two options, however, the APA did require the agency to have one or 
more ALJs appointed to preside at the taking of evidence.54  But, even when an ALJ 
heard a case, the APA did not require the agency to allow the ALJ to render the final 
decision in the case.55  The agency could command “either in specific cases or by 
general rule, the entire record to be certified to it for decision.”56 In other words, the 
agency could direct the ALJ to act as no more than an information gatherer.   
                                                          
48   See Michael Asimow and Jeffrey S. Lubbers, “The Merits of “Merits” Review: A Comparative Look 
 at the Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal” (2010) 28:2 Windsor YB Access Just, for a more 
 detailed discussion of these issues [“The Merits of “Merits” Review”]. 
49   Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
50   Section 554 of the APA applies “in every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined 
 on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.” 5 U.S.C. § 554(a). 
51  410 U.S. 224 (1973) (suggesting that Congress must use relatively specific language in its enabling 
 statute to trigger formal rulemaking). 
52  Chemical Waste Mgm’t, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that Chevron deference 
 applies to an agency‟s decision regarding whether a formal rather than an informal adjudication was 
 required by the enabling statute).  But see Jordan, supra note 39, at 254 (arguing that the APA creates 
 a presumption that formal adjudication should apply unless Congress clearly provides otherwise); 
 Melissa M. Berry, “Beyond Chevron‟s Domain: Agency Interpretations of Statutory Procedural 
 Provisions, (2007) 30 Seattle UL Rev 541 (arguing that Congress did not intend to delegate this 
 decision to the agencies in light of concerns about agency self-interest and fairness); John F. 
 Stanley, “The „Magic Words‟ of § 554:  A New Test for Formal Adjudication Under the 
 Administrative Procedure Act”, Note, (2005) 56 Hastings LJ 1067 (suggesting that Skidmore 
 deference would be a better deference standard for review of agency decisions regarding the 
 formality of the procedure required by the APA). 
53   5 U.S.C. § 554(a). 
54   5 U.S.C. § 556(b). 
55  5 U.S.C. § 557. 
56   5 U.S.C. § 557(b). 
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 Perhaps most importantly, although the ALJ‟s decision would become the 
agency's final decision if it were not appealed to the agency, the agency retained broad 
authority to review the ALJ‟s decision and to substitute its own judgment for that of 
the ALJ.57   The net effect was that administrative judges were “subservient to their 
agencies in the permanency of their decisions.”58  Unlike Article III judges, who are 
immune from executive override (even Congress has limited authority to overrule 
their decisions retroactively), ALJs (at the agency‟s option) can be forced to play a 
minimal (advisory), even no, role in adjudication. 
 Hence, although the APA improved the administrative law judge‟s independence 
and impartiality59 in many ways, the reforms were not intended to and did not give 
administrative judges the status of Article III judges, nor completely shift the nature 
of the administrative adjudicative process. 
 
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
 
 For decades, commentators have suggested alternative models for administrative 
adjudication.  Of course, any suggested reform must deal with fundamental trade-
offs.  In other words, even if some might prefer to make administrative adjudication 
more independent and impartial, the question is whether and, if so to what extent, 
executive agencies should be allowed to ensure that adjudicative decisions conform to 
the policy and political concerns of agency administrators.  A number of suggestions 
have been made for how to resolve this fundamental conflict.  Below are a few 
options that other scholars have suggested along with a few new ideas. 
 
A. Expanding APA Protections to Administrative Judges 
 One solution to this problem would be to extend ALJ-like protections to more 
administrative judges.  It is difficult to deny that the APA has brought significant 
improvements to the status of those administrative judges denominated “ALJs.”  
However, it is also difficult to deny the fact that the APA left a variety of 
administrative judges without the benefit of ALJ status.  As we noted earlier, informal 
adjudications are much more common today than perhaps was originally envisioned 
by the APA drafters, and therefore many of the decisionmakers in these informal 
adjudications function with fewer protections than ALJs.  So, one possibility would 
be to require that more administrative adjudications be conducted as “formal” (rather 
than “informal”) proceedings.
60  If that were done, then the APA would require 
agencies to make greater use of ALJs (with, of course, greater protections than the 
administrative judges currently deciding their cases). 
                                                          
57   Ibid. 
58   Moliterno, supra note 21, at 1224. 
59  “Impartiality as a judicial trait is often confused with independence. Impartiality is about fair-minded, 
neutral decisionmaking.  Independence is created primarily by structural aspects of government. 
Impartiality is created primarily by the structure of the dispute resolution process. All judges are in 
systems that foster impartiality; some judges are in structures that foster independence.”  Moliterno, 
supra note 21, at 1199. 
60   This topic is beyond the bounds of this paper; however, for an excellent discussion of this issue, see 
 Jordan, supra note 39 at 254 (arguing that formal adjudication should apply unless Congress clearly 
 provides otherwise in the enabling statute); Michael Asimow, “The Spreading Umbrella: Extending 
 the APA‟s Adjudication Provisions to all Evidentiary Hearings Required by Statute” (2004) 56 Admin 
 L Rev 1003 (suggesting that some APA protections, e.g. ex parte prohibitions, should be accorded to 
 adjudications that while not formal under the APA distinction are very procedurally prescribed due 
 to statutory requirements). Accord, Berry, supra note 52, at 579-80 (suggesting that Congress did not 
 intend for agencies to choose whether formal or informal hearings were appropriate). 
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 The downside to this approach is that it may not be wise to unduly formalize the 
administrative process.  Formal procedures are more involved and burdensome, and 
require administrative agencies to provide greater process to litigants.61  However, 
more is not always better, and an enhanced process is not always preferable to an 
informal process.  For example, administrative agencies frequently conduct so-called 
“due process” hearings under the United States Supreme Court‟s decision in Goldberg 
v. Kelly.62  Under that decision, courts are required to grant hearings in a variety of 
contexts, not by virtue of a congressional mandate, but rather because a hearing is 
required under one of the due process clauses.63  Even though a due process hearing 
might be required in a given case, the Court does not require that the process be 
“formal” in the APA sense.  On the contrary, the Court has recognized that it is 
often permissible to allow agencies to utilize less involved procedures.  Indeed, in the 
Court‟s decision in Matthews v. Eldridge,64 the Court suggested that the amount of 
process required in a given case should depend upon a balancing of the need for 
enhanced procedures against the burden that the additional procedures would impose 
on the administrative process.  A shift to a widespread use of formal hearing 
procedures would necessarily impose a much greater burden on the agencies involved 
and might discourage agencies from granting hearings in more cases (and, 
correspondingly, may discourage courts from ordering more hearings). 
 
B. The Central Panel and Federal Administrative Court Systems 
 Denouncing the present system as one that hinders independence, many ALJs 
enthusiastically support the option of creating a central panel of administrative law 
judges (essentially, an independent administrative judiciary managed by a central 
administrator).65  ALJs were not the first to propose this option.  As noted earlier, 
prior to the enactment of the APA, some commentators argued for creation of a 
central panel system.66  During enactment of the APA, the idea was revived and 
discussed further.67  A variation of the central panel option would be to establish a 
single, federal administrative court.  The judges on such a court would hear only 
administrative cases.68   
 As noted, when Congress enacted the APA, it specifically rejected both the single 
panel and administrative court options, choosing instead to have ALJs work within 
the agencies for which they adjudicate and to have ALJs report to non-ALJs within 
those agencies.  As a result, instead “of establishing the examiners as an independent 
                                                          
61 See generally procedures in 5 U.S.C. §§ 556 & 557 (2009). 
62  397 U.S. 254 (1970) 
63  The Constitution contains two due process clauses; one located in the Fifth Amendment and one 
 located in the Fourth Amendment.   U.S. Constit. amend. V & XIV, § 1. 
64   424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
65   Moliterno, supra note 21, at 1227 (citing Victor W. Palmer, “The Administrative Procedure Act: After 
 40 Years, Still Searching for Independence” (1987) Judges‟ Journal at 34, 39.). 
66   See John D. O'Reilly, Jr., “The Federal Administrative Court Proposal: An Examination of General 
 Principles” 6 Fordham L Rev 365 (1937); See also Attorney General's Committee on Administrative 
 Procedure - Majority and Minority Reports, (1941)27 ABA J 91 at 93. 
67   Moliterno, supra note 21, at 1227 (citing Palmer, supra note 65, at 37 and Ralph F. Fuchs, “The 
 Hearing Examiner Fiasco Under the Administrative Procedure Act” (1950) 63 Harv L Rev 737 at 739 
 (“[C]orps of highly responsible hearing officers [was] originally put forward by the Attorney General's 
 Committee.”). 
68  While the two are similar, a federal administrative court would actually hear cases.  In contrast, a 
 central panel would manage the ALJs and assign them to hear cases within agencies (and within the 
 agency judicial structures).   
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corps, as recommended in the minority report, the responsibility for protecting 
critical elements in the employment of hearing examiners was entrusted to the Civil 
Service Commission.”
69   
 Despite Congress‟s rejection of the central panel option, support for that idea has 
never entirely disappeared.  In 1983, “[t]he Judicial Administration Division passed a 
resolution … favoring the passage of legislation to establish federal administrative law 
judges as an independent corps.”
70  Some scholars have made similar 
recommendations,71 and central panels have been used successfully in a number of 
states.72 
 There are a number of advantages to the central panel and federal administrative 
court options.  First, both systems would increase efficiency by allowing for 
centralized organization and management of ALJ offices.  Rather than having lots of 
judges scattered among a variety of agencies, there would be one large judicial 
structure.  Second, impartiality, or at least the appearance of impartiality, would 
increase as administrative judges would be located outside of the agencies for which 
they decide cases.  Under the current system, litigants (especially pro se litigants) may 
be uncertain about the impartiality of administrative judges who work for the agency 
that the litigants are appearing before.73 
 One primary concern—judicial independence—would likely increase as well.   As 
Justice Scalia has recognized, the “problem of improper influence would … be solved 
by implementing proposals for establishment of a unified ALJ corps, headed by an 
independent administrator.”
74  At least one commentator agreed with Justice Scalia 
when he stated that the “basic purpose of the central panel system is to give ALJs a 
certain amount of independence from the agencies over whose proceedings they 
preside.…”
75  As these comments suggest, judicial independence is less achievable 
when administrative judges are employees of the agencies for which they decide cases, 
and a federal administrative court separates litigants from their agencies. 
 But proposals to create either a central panel system or a federal administrative 
tribunal are not without disadvantages as well.  Indeed, in a 1992 study prepared by 
the Administrative Conference of the United States, the idea of a central panel system 
                                                          
69   Palmer, supra note 65 at 37. 
70   Ibid at 39. 
71   See e.g. Hoffman & Cihlar, supra note 13, at 878; See also Jim Rossi, “Overcoming Parochialism: 
 State Administrative Procedure and Institutional Design” (2001) 53 Admin L Rev 551 at 568 (“[T]he 
 central panel promotes independence ... [b]y removing ALJs from the managerial auspices of the 
 agencies whose matters they adjudicate ....”). 
72   Palmer, supra note 65 at 39.  See e.g. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-1092.01; Ga. Code Ann. § 50-13-40; 
 Md. Code Ann., State Gov't § 9-1602 (LexisNexis); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 2003.021 (Vernon); 
 Yvette N. Diamond, “OAH - What's It All About?” Maryland Bar Journal Jan. /Feb. 2006, at 4, 6 
 (identifying the Office of Administrative Hearings in Maryland as “a centralized panel of ALJs in a 
 separate and independent agency under the executive branch of the Maryland state government”). See 
 generally James F. Flanagan, “An Update on Developments in Central Panels and ALJ Final Order 
 Authority” (2005) 38 Ind L Rev  401  
73   The system might seem strange to the uninitiated for any number of reasons.  First, one of the 
 litigants in front of the administrative judge is often the judge's employer. Second, opposing counsel 
 may be the administrative judge‟s co-worker. Third, the agency‟s experts may also be co-workers of 
 the judge.  Finally, the administrator of one of the litigants will control the judge's budget.  Moliterno, 
 supra note 21 at 1195. 
74   Antonin Scalia, “The ALJ Fiasco—a Repris” (1979) 47 U Chicago L Rev 57 at 79. 
75   Allen C. Hoberg, “Administrative Hearings: State Central Panels in the 1990s” (1994) 46 Admin L 
 Rev 75 at 76). 
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was rejected.76  Moreover, despite the language quoted above, Justice Scalia is more 
opposed to the option than in favour of it.77  Why?  Some scholars question whether 
administrative judges need or require greater independence.  The Constitution 
granted Article III judges life tenure in order to ensure that they could function 
independently of the executive and legislative branches and, therefore, could provide 
a check on the powers of those branches.78  Administrative judges do not perform 
that same function.79  As one commentator noted, “administrative judges are meant to 
make impartial decisions, but not to be independent… in the sense of that word that 
connotes the usual judge‟s attribute. They were meant to be impartial decisionmakers 
and advancers of agency policy, not independent ones.”
80   To some degree, the 
central panel and federal administrative court options attempt to transform ALJs into 
Article III judges who are free to police the executive branch and either advance or 
even hinder executive policies.81  “[I]nsofar as [these options] further the rupture of 
the administrative judiciary from the executive branch, they are an undesirable 
development in the law.”
82 
 Another disadvantage of these options would be that some regulatory schemes 
are highly specialized, and ALJs may need special expertise to adjudicate effectively 
under those schemes.  In other words, it is not clear that an ALJ could hear an 
Environmental Protection Agency case one day, a Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
case the next, and a Securities and Exchange Commission case on the third day and 
rule competently in each.  The current system allows ALJs to work within their 
particular areas of expertise.  Having said that, we note that there is no similar 
concern with Article III judges exercising expertise in a variety of regulatory areas.  
For example, the D.C. Circuit regularly hears all kinds of administrative law cases, yet 
it has no special expertise in any of the underlying substantive areas.83 
                                                          
76   Verkuil et al., supra note 40. 
77   He argued that the central panel would only be valuable if it did not alter the role of the 
 administrative judiciary.  Scalia, supra note 74 at 79. 
78   Moliterno, supra note 21 at 1215 (“Congress intended that the provisions of the [APA] secure a 
 certain amount of independence for administrative judges as a means toward impartiality of 
 decisionmaking, whereas for Article III judges it is a means both for impartiality and the 
 maintenance of a separate branch of government.”). 
79  Ibid at 1191.   
80   Ibid at 1210-11, 1232 (“Administrative judges are not meant to be checks on out-of-bounds exercises 
 of legislative and executive power.”). 
81   Ibid at 1230. 
82   Ibid at 1230. 
83   Chief Justice John Roberts talked about the expertise of the D.C. Circuit before he joined the 
 Supreme Court: 
The first decision to give administrative jurisdiction to the D.C. Circuit in 1870, as 
well as a handful of similar decisions in the early twentieth century, became 
prototypes for a succession of legislative grants of authority to re-view decisions of 
the FCC, the Federal Power Agency (later FERC), the EPA, the NLRB, the FTC, 
and the FAA. Whatever combination of letters you can put together, it is likely that 
jurisdiction to review that agency‟s decision is vested in the D.C. Circuit. Even 
when the jurisdiction is concurrent, as it often is—decisions of the NLRB, for 
example, can be reviewed in the D.C. Circuit, in the circuit where the petitioner 
resides, or in the circuit where the events giving rise to the matter took place—
lawyers frequently prefer to litigate in the D.C. Circuit because there is a far more 
extensive body of administrative law developed there than in other circuits. 
 John G. Roberts, Jr., “What Makes the D.C. Circuit Different? A Historical View” (2006) 92 Va L 
 Rev 375 at 388-89. 
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 There remains a more fundamental problem with the central panel option, which 
might not be true of the federal administrative court option:  the agency would still be 
the final decisionmaker under the APA and could freely substitute its judgment for 
that of the ALJ.  If the agency retains the final say in the case, there is perhaps less 
reason to be concerned about the need for administrative judges to function 
independently since they are simply rendering the initial decision.  Of course, the 
APA could be altered to vest final decisionmaking authority in administrative judges 
rather than in the head of the agency.  However, if that change were made, 
administrative judges would assume a much greater policy role within the agency than 
they have currently.  As they interpret and apply regulatory provisions, they would 
assume greater responsibility for “saying what those provisions mean,” and, 
therefore, give content to the scheme itself.  As a result, the agency would have less 
control over its regulatory scheme and its regulatory law. 
 In addition, establishing a federal administrative court, in particular, would likely 
be very expensive and require a complete change to the current system.  Thus, while 
the central panel and federal administrative court options have some advantages, 
ultimately, neither approach provides a panacea to the deficiencies of the present 
system.   
 
C. Establishing More Article I Courts 
 Another option would be for Congress to create more Article I courts.  Article I, 
or legislative, courts are created by Congress pursuant to its Article I powers,
84
 and 
Congress has created such courts to review the final administrative decisions of some 
agencies.  Two such examples include the Tax Court,
85
 which hears appeals from 
Internal Revenue System‟s tax decisions, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans 
Claims, which hears appeals of benefits decisions made by the Board of Veterans 
Appeals.
86
  These courts take many forms and vary in their level of independence 
from the executive and legislative branches.   For example, judicial protection is 
generally limited.  While Article III judges enjoy lifetime tenure and protected salaries, 
Article I judges are not subject to these protections.  Yet most, if not all, Article I 
courts are both separately located from their agencies and have the power to issue 
final decisions. 
                                                          
84  The legitimacy of Article I courts has been controversial and subject to challenge.  See e.g. American 
 Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511 (1828) (holding that a territorial court established under 
 Article I of the Constitution could not exercise federal judicial power because the judges did not have 
 lifetime tenure; therefore, the law that placed admiralty cases within their jurisdiction was 
 unconstitutional).  But that battle appears to be over.  The Supreme Court has held that Article I 
 courts are constitutional; however, their power is limited.  When there is an allegation regarding the 
 potential deprivation of an interest in life, liberty, or property, Article I court decisions must be 
 subject to review by an Article III court. Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 
 (1982). 
85   The Tax Court was established to address both independence and impartiality: [I]t would never be 
 possible to give to the taxpayer the fair and independent review to which he is of right entitled as 
 long as the appellate tribunal is directly under, and its recommendations subject to the approval of, 
 the officer whose duty it is to administer the law and collect the tax.  As long as the appellate tribunal 
 is part and parcel of the collecting machinery it can hardly maintain the attitude essential to a judicial 
 tribunal.  Report of Tax Simplification Board: Hearing on H.R. Rep. No. 68-103, at 4 (1st Sess. 1923). 
86   The U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims was created by Congress in 1988 to exercise exclusive 
 jurisdiction over the decisions of the Board of Veterans' Appeals on the motion of claimants.  The 
 Court has a very heavy caseload.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has limited 
 appellate review. 
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 There are advantages to a decision to create more such courts.  First, judicial 
independence and impartiality would both increase; as with central panels and the 
federal administrative law court, administrative judges would be housed outside of the 
agencies for which they work and would not be subject to agency oversight.  
Additionally, Article I judges would be the final agency decisionmakers.  While their 
decisions are appealable to Article III courts, agencies would have no ability to 
overrule the Article I court‟s decision.  Importantly, however, unlike these other 
options, expertise would not be sacrificed; Article I judges would have expertise 
within their assigned areas and would likely make better decisions in areas that are 
legally complex and that involve highly technical facts. 
 But the potential costs in establishing many more Article I courts would likely be 
staggering, likely even more so than establishing one, federal administrative court 
system.  Another potential disadvantage would be that agencies would no longer be 
able to formulate policy via adjudication;87 rather, all policy would have to be made via 
legislative and non-legislative rulemaking.88  Under current case law, agencies have 
discretion about whether to articulate new policy legislatively or adjudicatively.89  
While some commentators criticized this legal development,90 the choice has remained 
the agency‟s for more than sixty years.  Certainly, agencies should strive to articulate 
broadly applicable policy via rulemaking rather than adjudication, but choice furthers 
flexibility.91  Even if agencies wanted to articulate all policy by using rulemaking 
procedures, it would be impossible for them to do so; case-by-case development is a 
necessary and inevitable part of administrative policymaking.92  Hence, any change to 
the adjudicative structure that would effectively require agencies to articulate policy 
exclusively via legislative procedures would be undesirable. 
                                                          
87   S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); See generally, Russell L. Weaver & Linda D. Jellum, 
 “Chenery II and the Development of Federal Administrative Law” (2006) 58 Admin L Rev 815 
 (arguing that agencies should have the choice of whether to develop law via rulemaking or 
 adjudication). 
88   Arzt, supra note 34 at 280-81 (“When an agency no longer formulates policy through its adjudication 
 function but does so only through rulemaking … supervision of the appellate administrative 
 adjudicators and review of their decisions by policy-making political appointees has no reason to 
 continue. At that point, there is no reason to keep the adjudicatory function within the agency.”). 
89  S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., supra note 87.  
90  See e.g. Arthur E. Bonfield, “The Federal APA and State Administrative Law” 72 Va L Rev 297, 325-
 34 (1986) (suggesting that states should choose rulemaking over formal adjudication); Cornelius J. 
 Peck, “The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor Relations Board” (1961) 70 Yale 
 LJ 729 at 730  (criticizing the National Labor Relations Board [NLRB] for not exercising its 
 rulemaking powers enough); Glen O. Robinson, “The Making of Administrative Policy: Another 
 Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform” (1970) 118 U Pa L Rev 
 485 at 486  (recognizing broad concern that agencies engage in adjudication at the expense of 
 rulemaking); David L. Shapiro, “The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of 
 Administrative Policy” (1965) 78 Harv L Rev 921 at 922 (questioning agencies' choice of weapons in 
 making policy); Peter L. Strauss, “Rules, Adjudications, and Other Sources of Law in an 
 Executive Department: Reflections on the Interior Department's Administration of the Mining Law” 
 (1974) 74 Colum L Rev 1231 at 1233 (reviewing the Department of Interior's choices between 
 rulemaking and adjudication in implementing the General Mining Law); Russell L. Weaver, “Chenery 
 II: A Forty Year Retrospective” (1988) 40 Admin L Rev 161 at 161; J. Skelly Wright, “The Courts 
 and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review” (1974) 59 Cornell L Rev 375 at 376 
 (suggesting that agencies must engage in rulemaking and not adjudication when Congress has adopted 
 a regulatory solution).  
91  For a more thorough discussion of this topic, See generally, Weaver & Jellum, supra note 87 (arguing 
 that Chenery II was rightly decided). 
92  Ibid at 826-27. 
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 Finally, the more the new system looks like the old Article III system, the more 
likely the new system will become more adversarial, more expensive, and more 
protracted for litigants and agencies.    
 Professors Michael Asimow and Jeffrey Lubbers have argued for a slightly 
different formulation of this idea.93  They suggest creation of “a single adjudicating 
tribunal, referred to as a Benefits Review Tribunal [BRT]” which would handle 
benefits review cases from Social Security, the Veterans Administration, and perhaps 
benefits programs administered by the Department of Labor.  Their proposed system 
finds its roots in the Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal.  In the abstract, the 
proposal might draw strong support from ALJs because it places them outside of the 
agencies for which they adjudicate cases and helps ensure their independence.  
However, ALJs would be subject to the governing agencies “hard” law and “soft” 
law.  In other words, at least in theory, the ALJs in this new tribunal would not be 
expected or allowed to “make law.”  We suspect that ALJs will strongly oppose the 
proposal because professors Asimow and Lubbers hope that the new tribunal would 
exercise greater control over ALJ hiring, supervision, compensation, case-assignment, 
evaluation, and discharge.  For example, they suggest a peer review procedure for 
evaluating work product, and many ALJs object to the notion of performance 
reviews.  In addition, we are not certain that this new tribunal will be able to 
successfully decide benefits cases without venturing into the arena of policy creation.   
 
D. Changing the APA Process 
 Another possibility would be to alter the APA review process to prohibit agencies 
from reviewing the decisions of administrative judges.  Currently, the head of an 
administrative agency serves as the court of last resort for the administrative process 
and has the power to issue the agency‟s final decision.
94  Hence, the agency reviews all 
ALJ findings de novo. 
 The current system could be altered in a variety of ways.  First, Congress could 
amend the APA and mandate that the head of the agency be more deferential to the 
administrative judge‟s decision.  For example, Congress might provide that the agency 
head can only review the administrative judge‟s findings for “clear error” or for an 
“abuse of discretion.” This higher standard could apply to all ALJ findings or just to a 
subset of findings such as findings of fact.  Currently, the agency head should give 
some weight to credibility findings based on demeanour, but may review all other 
findings of fact de novo.95  In contrast, Article III courts can set aside lower court 
findings of fact only when those findings are “clearly erroneous.”
96  A higher standard 
of review for factual findings would give ALJs greater independence and authority.  If 
the standard for reviewing agency policy and legal decisions remained the same -de 
novo- then the agency would retain its ability to formulate policy and interpret statutes 
while ALJs would play a role more like that of a trial judge.  The disadvantages of this 
change are not readily apparent.  But the change would be so minor, it may not be 
worth the effort to amend the APA. 
 A second approach would be to provide for finality of ALJ (and, for that matter, 
administrative judge) decisions.  This approach is popular among those who support 
                                                          
93   See Asimow & Lubbers, supra note 48. 
94  5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2009) (“On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the 
 powers which it would have in making the initial decision….”). 
95  Penasquitos Village v. Nat. Labor Relations Bd., 565 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1977). 
96  Fed. Rule Civ. Pro. 52(a)(6). 
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the central panel system, which usually includes the idea of finality.97  While finality is 
not an essential attribute of a central panel system, the model act creating a state 
central hearing agency specifically provides that administrative judges can issue either 
initial or final decisions.98  An advantage of this option would be that administrative 
judges could play a much stronger, more independent, and final role in the 
adjudicative process.  Indeed, the decisions of administrative judges (and ALJs) would 
become the final decision of the agency and would not be subject to reversal by the 
agency litigant.   
 The disadvantage of this second approach would be that agencies heads, who are 
both politically accountable and often experts in the field, would lose control over 
their agencies‟ decisions, which can create agency policy.  Giving ALJs finality would 
transform administrative judges into something like Article III judges, meaning that 
ALJs would be able to render judgments on the actions of the executive branch 
without any review from that branch.  “That is not the role for which administrative 
judges were created.”
99   As one commentator noted, 
 
Administrative judges, unlike Article III judges, exist in order to 
further the policies of the executive branch, specifically the agency 
for which they judge, through the impartial adjudication of 
disputes. Allowing administrative judges final authority over policy 
and perhaps even over fact findings, however, would thwart that 
end…. Administrative judges would be rendered cAPAble of 
deciding cases in contradiction with the stated policies of the 
executive branch.100 
 
Additionally, inconsistencies could be created between an agency‟s articulated policies 
and ensuing adjudications.  This might create uncertainty in the law, result in loss of 
political accountability, and nullify agency experience in formulating policy under its 
statutory mandate.101  Adjudicative policymaking is inherent in an effective regulatory 
regime.   
 An additional problem might result from a lack of flexibility for policy-making.  
As we mentioned earlier, agencies can choose to articulate regulatory policy either 
legislatively or adjudicatively.102  At times, case-by-case policy development is the best 
choice.103  To the extent that this change could preclude agencies from articulating 
policy via adjudication, then it is less than ideal. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
                                                          
97  Moliterno, supra note 21 at 1231. 
98  Christopher B. McNeil, “The Model Act Creating a State Central Hearing Agency: Promises, Practical 
 Problems, and a Proposal for Change” (2001) 53 Admin L Rev 475 at 497. 
99   Moliterno, supra note 21, at 1231 (quoting Flanagan, supra note 13, at 1388.  “Another argument made 
 in support of ALJ finality is that it protects ALJ independence.  The argument that ALJ finality 
 enhances ALJ independence is true, in the sense that final order authority does make the ALJ 
 completely independent of the agency. The argument, however, confuses the means with the end.  
 ALJ independence is an important factor in administrative adjudication when it eliminates improper 
 agency influence, but certainly, it is not the purpose of agency adjudication to make ALJs 
 independent.”).  Ibid.  (footnotes omitted). 
100   Ibid at 1226. 
101   Ibid at 1227. 
102  S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., supra note 87. 
103  Weaver & Jellum, supra note 87 at 826-27. 
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 Is there a better way to structure the modern administrative adjudicatory system?  
Probably, but the way is not clear.  While, the APA‟s ALJ protections could be 
expanded to include more administrative judges, it would certainly be unrealistic, and 
likely counter-productive, to elevate all administrative judges to ALJ status.  Cases 
such as Goldberg v. Kelly104 and Goss v. Lopez105 greatly expanded the number of hearings 
agencies must now provide.  With more formality comes added expense and delay, 
for both sides.  As the Supreme Court made clear in Mathews v. Eldridge,106 the interest 
of litigants in more procedure and formality must be balanced against the agency‟s 
interest in quicker, more streamlined, and less expensive procedures.  Yet, the current 
system favors expediency over judicial independence.  Including more administrative 
judges within the umbrella of protection might tilt the balance back.   
 Additionally, altering the deference standard would similarly increase judicial 
independence in a relatively small way, but at little cost to the agency.  So long as the 
agency remains free to decide policy issues de novo, perhaps even legal issues, the 
agency retains its ability to formulate policy.  But even combined, these two changes 
are likely only to have a minimal impact on improving judicial independence.  And 
while creating more Article I courts would increase independence more dramatically, 
this option would be unduly expensive and unlikely to garner much support in 
Congress during these tough economic times.  While an Article I court could be 
structured like the Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal, as professors Asimow 
and Lubbers suggest, that proposal is likely to draw intense ALJ opposition. 
 The remaining options present a more fundamental question: whether the 
administrative adjudicative structure should be fundamentally reshaped.  These 
proposals (the central panel system, the notion of ALJ finality, and the idea for an 
administrative court) all contemplate that administrative judges would play a much 
greater role in shaping and formulating agency policy.  Through their decisions, 
administrative judges would construe and apply regulatory provisions.  And at least 
some of the proposals contemplate that there should be no review of these decisions 
within agencies.  Long ago, Congress decided that this loss of control would be 
undesirable.  The choice remains a reasonable one. 
 Thus, while it might be time to reform our current administrative adjudicatory 
system, it is not clear which, if any of these options, would best balance the 
competing interests and further the administrative agenda. 
 
                                                          
104  397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that the recipient of certain government benefits (welfare) must receive 
 a hearing before they can be deprived of such benefits). 
105  419 U.S. 565 (1975) (holding that a public school must conduct a hearing before suspending a 
 student). 
106  424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
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THE MERITS OF “MERITS” REVIEW: A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT 
THE AUSTRALIAN ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL 
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Jeffrey S. Lubbers** 
 
This article compares several systems of administrative adjudication.  In the 
U.S., adjudication is typically performed by the same agency that makes and 
enforces the rules. However, in Australia, almost all administrative 
adjudication is performed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal [AAT], a 
non-specialized adjudicating agency, and several other specialized tribunals 
that are independent of the enforcing agency.  These tribunals (which evolved 
out of concerns about separation of powers) have achieved great legitimacy. In 
the U.K., recent legislation [the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement 
Act] merged numerous specialized tribunals into a single first-tier tribunal 
with much stronger guarantees of independence than previously existed.  An 
upper tribunal hears appeals from the first tier and largely supplants judicial 
review.  The article concludes by asking whether the U.S. could learn anything 
from the Australian and U.K. experience and suggests that a single tribunal 
to adjudicate federal benefits cases might be a significant improvement over the 
existing model.  
 
Cet article compare un certain nombre de systèmes de règlement judiciaire de 
différends dans le domaine administratif. Aux Etats-Unis, typiquement, le 
règlement de différends est effectué par la même agence qui établit les règles et 
qui les met en application. Toutefois, en Australie, presque tous ces règlements 
sont effectués par le Administrative Appeals Tribunal [AAT], une agence 
non-spécialisée de règlement de différends, ainsi qu‟un certain nombre d‟autres 
tribunaux spécialisés qui sont indépendants de l‟agence qui met les règles en 
application. Ces tribunaux (qui émanent de préoccupations au sujet de la 
séparation des pouvoirs) ont atteint un niveau élevé de légitimité. Au 
Royaume-Uni, une loi récente [la Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement 
Act] a fusionné plusieurs tribunaux spécialisés en un seul tribunal de 
première instance ayant des garanties d‟indépendance bien plus fortes 
qu‟auparavant. Un tribunal supérieur juge les appels des décisions du tribunal 
de première instance et supplante largement la révision judiciaire. L‟article se 
termine en posant la question à savoir si les Etats-Unis pourraient apprendre 
quelque chose de l‟expérience australienne et britannique et suggère qu‟un seul 
tribunal pour juger les cas de bénéfices fédéraux pourrait constituer une 
amélioration importante par rapport au modèle existant. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Modern governments have to decide many disputes arising out of regulation or 
benefit schemes. There are various models of administrative dispute resolution 
available. The disputes can be adjudicated by a national court system or within the 
agency that made the initial decision but subject to judicial review.  A third way is 
adjudication by specialized courts or tribunals.  The United States relies heavily, but 
not exclusively, on adjudication within its agencies, while Australia and the United 
Kingdom rely on national administrative appeal tribunals.  This article discusses these 
different approaches. 
 
II. U.S., AUSTRALIAN AND U.K. APPROACHES TO ADMINISTRATIVE 
ADJUDICATION 
 
A.  Administrative Adjudication in the U.S. 
 At the federal level, the U.S. has generally avoided establishing specialized courts, 
although a few have been created and some continue to exist.1  Most disputes 
involving the government are resolved within regulatory and benefit agencies, not by 
courts.  The U.S. Supreme Court upheld administrative adjudication in 1932,2 and in 
1946 Congress responded by enacting the Administrative Procedure Act [APA].  At that 
time, administrative adjudication was viewed largely as the vehicle for agency 
implementation of regulatory statutes such as those relating to energy, transportation, 
communications, securities, or labour law. Such policy-oriented adjudication still 
continues, although most of it has been supplanted by agency rules that resolve the 
issues across-the-board rather than through case-by-case decisionmaking.  Today, the 
great majority of federal agency adjudication relates to benefit statutes such as social 
security. 
 The APA contains provisions for trial-type procedures for on-the-record agency 
hearings required by statute.  Specially qualified, quasi-independent adjudicators, who 
are now called administrative law judges [ALJs], preside over these formal 
adjudications.3 The APA calls for separation of functions between decisionmakers 
and agency prosecutors or investigators.  Although the rules of evidence are relaxed 
and cross-examination may be limited, these hearings resemble courtroom trials.  The 
ALJ writes the initial decision in the case but there may be internal agency appellate 
review (by the agency head or a delegate of the agency head).  Judicial review (on 
legal, factual, and discretionary issues) is available in the federal courts, but such 
review is deferential and is based on the administrative record, not on a new record 
made in court.  In this manner, a fair hearing is provided inside the agency.  
 Federal agencies also conduct a vast range of “informal” adjudication that is not 
governed by the APA.  Some of it (such as immigration disputes) entails relatively 
formal trial-type hearings that are presided over by an administrative judge [AJ], 
                                                          
1  See Paul R. Verkuil & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, “Alternative Approaches to Judicial Review of Social 
 Security Disability Cases” (2003) 55 Admin L Rev 731 at 744-48 (discussing past and existing 
 specialized courts). 
2  Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), discussed further at text accompanying notes 54-55. 
3  As of September 2008, there were 1469 federal ALJs, 1219 of them employed by the Social Security 
 Administration. Office of Personnel Management chart, “CDPF Status Report as of September 
 2008,” on file with the authors. 
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rather than an ALJ.  Even in informal adjudication, agencies generally craft “some 
kind of hearing”
4 and judicial review proceeds in a similar way. 
 
B.  Administrative Adjudication in Australia 
1.  Internal Review 
 In Australia, adjudication by Commonwealth ministries and agencies is not 
governed by an APA-like code, but instead by provisions in individual statutes and by 
the common law principles of “natural justice,” roughly similar to U.S. due process.  
As with U.S. informal adjudication, the variety of first-level decisions is so great that 
it makes any generalization about the application of natural justice principles difficult. 
 Commonwealth agencies maintain a variety of different systems of internal review 
of decisions unfavorable to private parties under regulatory or benefit statutes.5  Most 
(but not all) of the internal review systems are provided for by statute.  Generally, 
agencies provide an opportunity for an internal merits review by an official who was 
not involved in the initial decision.  The review process often furnishes an 
opportunity for written submission and sometimes involves an opportunity for an 
oral contact in person or over the phone between the private party and the reviewer, 
although not a formal hearing.  In addition, reviewers usually contact the primary 
decisionmaker to discuss the facts and reasons for the decision.  Reviewers will 
inform the private party of the outcome of the review decision and of the availability 
of external review.  In many cases, it is necessary for the private party to exhaust the 
internal review process before seeking external review before a tribunal.  
 For example, in social security cases, claimants are encouraged (but not required) 
to request reconsideration from the primary decisionmaker.  If that fails, they must 
seek review of the disputed decision by the Authorized Review Officer [ARO] before 
proceeding to a tribunal – in this case the specialized Social Security Appeals Tribunal 
[SSAT]. Review by the ARO generally involves a meeting (or at least a phone 
conversation) with the applicant, the opportunity to submit additional evidence, and a 
statement of the reasons why the ARO has refused to change the decision.   
 
2.  External Review in Tribunals6 
 Australian administrative tribunals at the federal level are independent of the 
primary decisionmaker.  Their task in conducting “merits review” is to “examin[e] 
whether a decision is substantively correct, after consideration of all relevant issues of 
law, fact, policy and discretion.”7  Merits review means that the tribunal “stands in the 
                                                          
4  See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S 565, 579 (1975) (“some kind of hearing” required before short-term 
 suspension of student from school).  A fair hearing is required by the due process clause of the Fifth 
 Amendment whenever agency action deprives a person of life, liberty or property. 
5  The material in this paragraph and the following one is drawn from:  Administrative Review Council, 
 Report to the Attorney General:  Internal Review of Agency Decision Making (Report No. 44, Nov. 2000).  
6  For useful authorities see Peter Cane, Administrative Tribunals and Adjudication (Oxford and Portland, 
 Oregon: Hart, 2009); Peter Cane, “Understanding Administrative Adjudication” in Linda Pearson, 
 Carol Harlow & Michael Taggart, eds, Administrative Law in a Changing State  (Portland: Hart, 2008) 
 273 [Cane chapter]; Linda Pearson, “Fact-Finding in Administrative Tribunals” in Administrative Law 
 in A Changing State 301; Robin Creyke, “Administrative Tribunals” in Matthew Groves & H.P. Lee 
 eds, Australian Administrative Law:  Fundamentals, Principles, and Doctrines (Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press, 2007) 77; and Robin Creyke & John McMillan, Control of Government Action:  Text, 
 Cases and Commentary (Sydney: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2005) at 114-179.  For an early description, 
 see Mark Aronson & Nicola Franklin, Review of Administrative Action (Sydney: Law Book, 1987) at 221-
 240. 
7  Creyke & McMillan, ibid at 114. 
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shoes” 
8 of the agency and is empowered to substitute the “correct or preferable”9 
decision for that of the agency.  Its power extends to substituting decision on issues 
of fact, law, and discretion.  “Correct” in this formula refers to situations in which the 
tribunal considers that there is only one acceptable decision, and “preferable” refers 
to situations where it considers that there is more than one acceptable decision. 10  
Tribunal review often entails creation of a fresh evidentiary record including evidence 
of facts arising after the original agency decision and it allows the tribunal to reweigh 
the relevant factors in exercising discretion.11 
 At the federal level, the “peak” merits review tribunal is the Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal [AAT] created in 1976.12 However, there are more specialized 
tribunals in the area of benefits and immigration, including the SSAT, the Veterans‟ 
Review Board [VRB], the Migration Review Tribunal [MRT], and the Refugee Review 
Tribunal [RRT].13 In addition, in the economic regulatory area, the Takeovers Panel 
reviews decisions by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission involving 
corporate takeovers14 and the Australian Competition Tribunal [ACT, formerly the 
Trade Practices Tribunal] reviews decisions of the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission.15 
 The AAT “falls within the portfolio of the Attorney General,”16 while the 
specialized tribunals are within those of the relevant department ministers.  Most of 
the states have an AAT counterpart and some specialized tribunals as well.17 
 
 
 
                                                          
8  The oft-used “stands in the shoes” metaphor was expressed by Smithers, J. in an important Federal 
 Court decision. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v. Pochi, (1980) 31 ALR 666, 671.  
9  Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 2 ALD 60; 24 ALR 577 (Bowen C.J. and 
 Deane J.) 149. 
10  Cane, supra note 6 at 149. 
11  Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority, (2008) 248 ALR 390, 397-403 (Kirby J), is typical of cases 
 that spell out the principles of merits review [Shi].  Shi was a professional license revocation case.  It 
 held that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal [AAT] is permitted to consider new evidence and 
 determine the “correct or preferable” result based on a fresh factual record including facts arising 
 after the Authority‟s decision.  Moreover, the AAT is empowered to exercise its discretion as to the 
 appropriate sanction (rather than to remand to the Authority for reconsideration of the sanction).  In 
 Shi the AAT decided to “caution” the licensee rather than revoking his license.  It also imposed a 
 scheme of probation; the power to impose the probationary condition on the caution arose from an 
 amendment to the statute enacted after the date the Authority acted but before the AAT acted.  Ibid  
 at 403-07.  
12  It was created by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, current version available online:  
 Comlaw <http://www.com-law.gov.au/Com-Law/management.nsf/current/by-title/54DB-
 558856AEE672CA256F-710006F886?OpenDocument>. 
13  See Creyke & McMillan, supra note 6 at 121.  There is also a National Native Title Tribunal, whose 
 function is to determine initial eligibility and then provide a forum for mediation of applications for 
 native title that have been filed in federal court. If no agreement is reached, the application may have 
 to be determined by the court following a trial.  See online: National Native Title Tribunal 
 <http://www.nn-tt.gov.au/What-Is-Native-Title/Pages/Approaches-to-Native-Title.aspx>. 
14  See online:  Australian Government <http://www.takeovers.gov.au/about.aspx#role>; Attorney-
 General v. Alinta Ltd. (2008)233 CLR 542, discussed in infra note 76 [Alinta]. 
15  See online: Australian Government <http://www.competitiontribunal.gov.au/>; Tasmanian Breweries 
 decision, discussed in infra notes 69, 75. 
16 See “About the AAT” online:  Australian Government <http://www.aat.gov.au/About-The-
 AAT/Introduction-ToTheAAT.htm>.   
17  Creyke & McMillan, supra note 6 at 123-26. 
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(a) The AAT 
 As of January 27, 2010, there were 89 “Members” of the AAT, representing a mix 
of part-time and full-time judges, lawyers and lay persons with “expertise in a range of 
areas, including accountancy, aviation, engineering, law, medicine, pharmacology, 
military affairs, public administration and taxation.”
18  There were 154 staff persons 
serving the AAT as of June 30, 2009.  The AAT President must be a judge of the 
Federal Court.  There are nineteen other part-time “Presidential Members” – eight 
Federal Court judges and five judges of the Family Court of Australia, and six full-
time Deputy Presidents who must have been enrolled as legal practitioners for at least 
five years.  There were 63 other members, some of who were senior members and 
most of whom were part time.  Not all of the non-judicial members need be lawyers.  
The AAT achieves some specialization because it is split up into four divisions.19 
 Formally, appointments to the AAT are made by the Governor-General (the 
Queen‟s representative in Australia), though in practice they are made on the advice 
of the Attorney General.20  The appointments process is based primarily on informal 
and largely unregulated consultation within government and between departments 
and tribunals.  Federal tribunal members serve for fixed terms of three, five or seven 
years with possibility of reappointment.  The informal appointments process and the 
relative shortness of terms obviously have a bearing on the independence of the 
tribunals.  AAT members may be removed by Parliament “for „proved misbehavior 
or incapacity‟ and must be dismissed for bankruptcy” and salaries are set “by an 
independent remuneration tribunal.” This mix of provisions leads Professor Cane to 
conclude that the independence of the members of the AAT is better protected than 
that of members of the specialist federal merits review tribunals, but much less well 
protected than that of court judges.21  AAT members are also less well protected than 
U.S. ALJs, although better protected than most U.S. AJs. 
 The AAT can review a decision only if a statute so provides but there are over 
400 such enactments.22  The AAT received 6226 applications for review in the 2008-
09 year.23  During that period, it provided 1393 hearings.  Of these, 390 decisions set 
aside the decision appealed from, 96 varied the decision, and 907 affirmed the 
decision.24  The most important of the AAT‟s jurisdictions are second-tier hearings in 
                                                          
18  The material in this paragraph is drawn from “About the AAT,” supra note 16.   
19  The divisions are the General Administrative, Security Appeals, Taxation Appeals, and Veterans‟ 
 Appeals Divisions. Presidential members can exercise powers in any of the Tribunal‟s divisions, 
 while other Senior Members and Members may exercise powers only in the division or divisions to 
 which they have been assigned. 
20  The material in this paragraph is drawn from Cane, supra note 6 at 100, 111-12. 
21  Cane points out that originally immigration cases were in the bailiwick of the AAT, but 
 “[g]overnment dissatisfaction with the patterns of immigration decision-making by the AAT in the 
 1980s” led to the creation of the two specialist immigration-related tribunals with no right of appeal 
 to the AAT. Moreover, these tribunals are “more closely integrated into” the department of 
 immigration, “a greater proportion of the members lack legal training than is the case in the AAT,” 
 and their work is “actively managed (by the imposition of performance targets, for instance) in a 
 way that the work of the members of the AAT is not.”  Cane chapter, supra note 6 at 298-99. 
22  See online: Australian Government <http://www.a-a-t.gov.au/Legislation-And-Jurisdiction/
 Jurisdiction-List.htm>. 
23 AAT, 2008-09 Annual. Report, ch. 3, online:  AAT <http://www.a-a-t.gov.au/Corporate 
 Publications/annual/Annual-Report-2009.htm>. The vast majority of the cases lodged with 
 the AAT are resolved without a hearing through a negotiated settlement or a successful ADR 
 proceeding (usually a pre-hearing conference with the judge) or because the applicant chose to 
 discontinue them or the AAT dismissed the case.  See text infra notes 109-13. 
24  Ibid. 
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Social Security and veterans‟ benefits cases (after such matters were heard initially in 
the SSRT and VRB) as well as workers‟ compensation and tax disputes.
25 
  There are a number of specialized adjudicatory tribunals whose decisions cannot 
be reviewed by the AAT (including the MRT, RRT, ACT, Takeovers Panel, and 
National Native Title Tribunal).26  
 Although not a court, the AAT functions like one with a full array of prehearing, 
ADR, and, if necessary, hearing processes.27  At the “hearing” stage, while the parties 
can agree to a decision “on the papers,” there is a right to a formal adversarial 
proceeding, with testimony under oath and a right to be represented by lawyers.  
While the tribunal may perform some research on legal issues, it relies on the parties 
to elicit the facts, rather than on its own research.28  However, the ordinary rules of 
evidence do not apply, neither party bears the burden of proof, and the respondent 
agency must forward a statement of reasons and all relevant documents to the 
tribunal.  Decisions are supposed to be based on the civil standard “the balance of 
probability,” similar to the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in the U.S.29  The 
AAT can set decisions aside for error of law (subject to judicial review).  Tribunal 
decisions on legal issues do not constitute binding precedent in subsequent tribunal 
cases.  However, the managerial staffs of tribunals circulate such decisions and strive 
for consistency.30  On the other hand, with respect to fact findings, issue estoppel may 
apply if an earlier court or tribunal made a final ruling on an issue of fact.31  
 Finally, section 44 of the AAT Act specifies that “[a] party to a proceeding before 
the Tribunal may appeal to the Federal Court of Australia, on a question of law, from 
any decision of the Tribunal in that proceeding.”32  This means, of course, that either 
party may appeal.  After 1999, some of these cases may be transferred first to the 
lower Federal Magistrates Court.33  A further appeal is possible to the High Court if 
special leave is granted.34 
 
(b) The SSAT 
 The largest specialized Commonwealth tribunal is the SSAT, a statutory body that 
conducts merits review of administrative decisions made under the social security law, 
                                                          
25  Together these four areas comprise about 85% of the cases heard by the AAT.  Ibid.  Although the 
 AAT provides hearings under about 400 different statutes, most of them give rise to very few actual 
 cases lodged with the AAT.  
26  See text accompanying supra note 13.  
27  See online:  AAT <http://www.aat.gov.au/ApplyingToTheAAT/ApplicationProcess.htm>.   
28  See Creyke & McMillan, supra note 6 at 156. 
29  See text at notes 107-09. 
30  See Creyke & McMillan, supra note 6 at 175. 
31  See ibid at 176. 
32  AAT Act para. 44(1). 
33  However, an amendment to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act, para. 44AA, provides that the 
 Federal Court may not transfer an appeal from the AAT to the Federal Magistrates Court if the 
 appeal is from a Tribunal decision by a member or a panel containing a member who was a 
 Presidential Member. See Australian Government <http://www.f-m-c.gov.au/servi-ces/html/ 
 administrative.html>. 
34  The scope of judicial review is a complex issue that is far beyond the scope of the present article.  
 Suffice it to say that review is usually limited to questions of law or violations of procedural norms; 
 however, the entire absence of evidence to support the determination is considered to be an error of 
 law as is a completely irrational decision.  For an excellent discussion of these complexities, see 
 Pearson, supra note 6. 
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the family assistance law and other related laws.35  The SSAT operates as the first tier 
of external merits review in the social security appeals system.  Further rights of 
appeal for all parties to a social security appeal include a full merits review by the 
AAT as well as judicial review.36  
 On June 30, 2009, the SSAT had 230 members (41 full-time and 189 part-time).37  
Most hearing panels consist of two members depending on the nature and complexity 
of the application.  “The SSAT is „inquisitorial‟ in its approach.  Each SSAT panel 
takes a fresh look at the matter, including the consideration of events which might 
have occurred since the decision being appealed was made.”38  
 Applications to the SSAT in 2008-09 totaled 16,319 lodged and 16,668 finalized.  
About 25-30% of all appeals lead to a reversal or change.  Average time for decision 
was about 10 weeks.  Appeals to the SSAT are free and travel and accommodation 
costs are borne by the Tribunal, with a total average cost per applicant of nearly 
$32,700AUS. 
 
3.  Contrast to the U.S. 
 In summary, there is a sharp contrast between the U.S. and Australian systems of 
administrative adjudication.  The U.S. generally provides a hearing inside the agency 
that made the initial determination, often but not always before an ALJ.  The final 
administrative decision is usually reserved to the head of the agency or to an appellate 
body within the agency.  In contrast, Australian adjudication is provided by an 
internal review procedure, followed by a merits review consisting of a trial-type 
hearing provided outside the adjudicating agency.  Most such hearings are provided by 
the SSAT, VRB, RRT, MRT, or the AAT.  The AAT is a centralized administrative 
tribunal providing review of the decisions of hundreds of agencies (and which 
provides a second tier review of SSAT and VRB decisions).  Both countries provide 
for judicial review of agency or tribunal adjudicatory decisions, but in Australia 
judicial review is generally limited to questions of law.  
 
C.  Administrative Adjudication in the U.K. 
 The design of the Australian tribunal system (prior to its redesign in 1976) closely 
resembled the U.K. tribunal system.  Administrative tribunals date from the dawn of 
the British welfare state in the early years of the Twentieth Century (particularly the 
National Insurance Act 1911).39  Policymakers felt that resolution of the huge number of 
                                                          
35  See the SSAT‟s home page online:  SSAT <http://www.ssat.gov.au>. 
36  Most SSAT appeals are now heard by the Federal Magistrates Court.  See accompanying text supra 
 note 33. 
37  Material in this paragraph and the following one is drawn from Social Security Appeals Tribunal, Annual 
 Report 2008-2009, available online: SSAT <http://www.s-s-a-t.gov.au/iNet/ ssat.nsf/1a2f57-
 b7c6453c8fca-256cb6001-c5def/cdc071f19d8533b3ca25770a000b9831/$FILE/SSAT-%20AR-
 %202008-09.pdf>. This comprehensive report, along with those from previous years, is on the SSAT 
 website, supra note 35. 
38  SSAT Annual Report, ibid at 19. 
39  See R. E. Wraith & P. G. Hutchesson, Administrative Tribunals (London, Allen & Unwin, 1973) at 33-
 42; Paul Craig, Administrative Law 6th ed (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 2008) at 64-69.  In fact, 
 various forms of ad hoc tribunals have existed for centuries in British law.  During the 1800s, some 
 combined-function agencies emerged, but they mostly evolved into tribunals whose only 
 responsibility was to adjudicate disputes arising out of regulatory legislation.  Wraith & Hutchesson, 
 at 17-28.  Yet some still remain that have administrative tasks along with adjudicatory ones. See 
 Craig at 61 (describing the Gaming Board which has substantial rulemaking and law enforcement 
 functions along with adjudication of licensing disputes), and ibid. at 72 (describing the Civil Aviation 
 Authority, which is mostly an administrative body but also adjudicates licensing issues). 
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disputes arising out of this legislation should not be assigned to the courts, both 
because of the sheer numbers of cases and because the courts were perceived as 
being hostile to social legislation.40 Instead, the dispute resolution function was 
assigned to tribunals, meaning administrative units engaged exclusively in adjudication 
and outside the regular court system. These tribunals were often staffed with a mix of 
lawyers, specialists, and lay people and their proceedings tended to be quite informal.41  
 In general, British tribunals have always provided a form of merits review, 
meaning that they conduct a de novo hearing of a matter under dispute and issue a 
decision on the merits with little or no deference to the prior departmental decision 
(or lower level tribunal decision).  Unsurprisingly, Australian lawyers, judges, and 
policymakers, who were steeped in British practice, followed suit when they came to 
organize their own system of administrative adjudication.  It seemed most natural to 
them to follow the British practice by creating a new tribunal to deal with the 
adjudication generated by each new regulatory or welfare program.  
 This adaptation from existing British institutions illustrates the “path 
dependence” phenomenon in which institutions are built to resemble those already in 
existence.42  It is often more natural and efficient to copy what already exists and 
seems to be working tolerably well than to redesign and rebuild institutions from 
scratch.  This is true even if the older model evolved more or less serendipitously and 
the older model is decidedly suboptimal.  
 In most cases, the disputes adjudicated by British tribunals arose from the 
decisions of a specific department of government.  Prior to the recent amendments 
discussed below, most tribunals were organizationally part of the department whose 
decisions they reviewed. The tribunals thus were reliant on that department for 
services and other resources. Nevertheless, tribunal members typically regarded 
themselves as independent of the department and they did not engage in functions 
other than adjudication.   
 Each new piece of welfare or regulatory legislation created a new tribunal.  The 
result was a hodgepodge of different tribunals with varying jurisdictions, each with its 
own system of appointment of members and procedures.  Especially after World War 
II, the number of specialized tribunals continued to increase rapidly with little 
attempt to achieve consistency either in the organization or procedures of the 
tribunals or in the details relating to judicial review of their decisions.43  
 In 1955, the Franks Committee took a fresh look at tribunals.44  It recommended 
the establishment of a Council on Tribunals and also promoted a judicialized model 
of tribunal procedure as well as openness, fairness, and impartiality of tribunal 
decisionmaking.  It recommended that tribunals be required to state reasons for their 
decisions.  And it favored appeal to a superior tribunal and judicial review on points 
                                                          
40  The experience with assigning disputes over workers‟ compensation to the courts in the 1890‟s was 
 quite unsuccessful.  See Wraith & Hutchesson, ibid at 28. 
41  Ibid at 129-31.   
42  See generally Oona A. Hathaway, “Path Dependence in the Law:  The Course and Pattern of Legal 
 Change in a Common Law System” (2001) 86 Iowa L Rev 601 at 606-22.  Path dependence is often 
 referred to as the “qwerty” phenomenon.  Although the traditional layout of the typewriter and now 
 computer keyboard is undoubtedly suboptimal, the costs of switching to a new one outweigh the 
 benefits of doing so.  Moreover, someone who introduces a new and much superior keyboard will fail 
 if customers refuse to adopt the innovation (because the existing keyboard works well enough) and 
 other competitors make the rational decision to stick with the old keyboard on their products.  Ibid at 
 611-13.  
43  See Wraith & Hutchesson, supra note 39 at 43-44.  
44  See Craig, supra note 39 at 259-61. 
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of law. The Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1958 implemented many of the 
recommendations of the Franks Committee; although it applied only to certain 
tribunals and left many unregulated, it improved tribunal procedure and adopted a 
requirement that tribunals give reasons for their decisions.  The Tribunals and Inquiries 
Act created the Council on Tribunals, which conducted studies of tribunal procedures 
and issued numerous recommendations.  Meanwhile, the courts began to intensify 
judicial review of tribunal decisions.45  This created a generally satisfactory situation 
which remained stable until the close of the century.   
 The movement toward centralization and upgrading of the U.K. tribunals took a 
great leap in 2007 with the enactment of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 
[TCEA],46 an epochal event in the history of British administrative law.  The TCEA 
must have been significantly influenced by the successful Australian experiment with 
a single centralized administrative tribunal, although it did not go as far in that 
direction as the Australian model.   
 Under the TCEA, the existing tribunals were brought under a single Tribunals 
Service.  The Tribunals Service provides the necessary resources (such as engaging 
staff and acquiring property), thus breaking the long-standing pattern of dependence 
of tribunals on the departments whose decisions they reviewed.47  The TCEA requires 
that the Judicial Appointments Commission recommend the appointment of judges 
and lay members of tribunals; the actual appointments are made by the Lord 
Chancellor.  This appointment system thus supplants the prior practice under which 
appointments to tribunals were made by departments or ministers.  The TCEA also 
protects the independence of tribunal members and provides for a Senior President 
of Tribunals, a position to be held by a judge who represents the views of tribunal 
members to Parliament and the various ministers responsible for specific 
departments. The Senior President also is empowered to promulgate practice 
directions.  
 The TCEA grouped the jurisdictions of many (though not all) of the formerly 
free-standing specialized tribunals into several “chambers.”  These chambers are 
referred to as “first-tier tribunals.”48 The first-tier tribunals adjudicate disputes 
between private parties and government under a wide range of regulatory and welfare 
statutes.  First-tier tribunals can reconsider and correct their own decisions on their 
own initiative or on petition of a party. 
 The TCEA also provide for an Upper Tribunal (which is treated as a court of 
record) and is also divided into chambers.  The Upper Tribunal provides for appeals 
on a point of law from first-tier tribunals (with leave from either the first-tier tribunal 
or the Upper Tribunal).49 The Upper Tribunal can reconsider its own decisions and 
                                                          
45  See Wraith & Hutchesson, supra note 39 at 44-45. 
46  Most of the important innovations of the TCEA were recommended by the Leggatt Report of 2000.  
 See Craig, supra note 39 at 261-63.  Craig provides an excellent and complete discussion of the TCEA 
 reforms.  Ibid at 263-283.  
47  The Tribunal Service maintains an excellent website, <http://www.tribunals.gov.uk>.  Along with a 
 wealth of information and updates, it contains the text of the TCEA.  In 2010, Asylum and 
 Immigration chambers were established at both the first-tier and Upper Tribunal levels, in place of 
 the former Asylum and Immigration Tribunal.  The Tribunal Service also administers the 
 Employment Tribunals which are otherwise not within the first and upper tier structures.  
48  There are, at present, five chambers (most consisting of several “jurisdictions”).  See website, ibid.  
 The Upper Tribunal has four chambers.  
49  The Upper Tribunal has first-instance jurisdiction in complex cases and cases raising issues of general 
 significance.  In British practice, the term “point of law” covers unreasonable applications of law to 
 fact as well as procedural violations and also may well cover unfair and unreasonable factual and 
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grant judicial review of tribunal decisions in the form of a prerogative writ.  It can 
also award monetary damages.50 The TCEA provides for a further appeal on an 
important point of principle from the Upper Tribunal to the Court of Appeal (but 
only if the Upper Tribunal or the Court of Appeal gives leave to appeal).51   
 The TCEA thus brings tribunals and courts into a single integrated adjudicatory 
system for the dispensation of procedural justice in administrative law.  It severed the 
connection between tribunals and the departments whose decisions they review.  For 
all practical purposes, the TCEA seems to abolish any distinction between tribunals 
and courts. In this respect, the TCEA goes much further than Australia in integrating 
its tribunals into the judicial system; as we are about to see, Australians would raise 
serious constitutional objections to such a move.  On the other hand, the Australian 
AAT centralizes adjudicatory power into a single adjudicating entity (as opposed to 
the multiple chambers that remain under the TCEA).  
 
III. SEPARATION OF POWERS UNDER THE AUSTRALIAN 
CONSTITUTION 
 
 Australia chose a tribunal model of adjudication, rather than a combined-function 
model, largely because it was heavily influenced by British practice.  However, 
another reason for the development of the Australian tribunal system was the 
approach taken by the Australian High Court to constitutional separation of powers.  
The Australian constitution drew heavily on the separation-of-powers provisions of 
the U.S. constitution (while preserving British-style parliamentary supremacy).  For 
that reason, Australia might have chosen to follow the American “combined 
functions” model for administrative adjudication. However, Australia did not and 
could not adopt the combined-function model because it maintains a much stronger 
version of separation of powers than does the U.S.  Under the Australian approach to 
separation of powers, the judicial branch cannot exercise executive functions 
(sometimes referred to as “administrative functions”) and the executive branch 
cannot exercise judicial functions.52 Of course, the terms “executive,” 
“administrative,” and “judicial” are hardly self-defining and the application of these 
vague criteria has caused much difficulty.   
 
A.  The American Approach toward Delegation of Adjudicatory Power to Non-
Article III Judges 
 American constitutional law takes a more pragmatic approach to separation of 
powers than does Australian law.  American doctrine tolerates statutory arrangements 
by which the powers of the three branches are shared with the others, but guards 
against statutes that enable Congress to broaden its own powers at the expense of 
other branches or that unduly impair the ability of other branches to carry out their 
assigned functions.  
                                                                                                                                     
 discretionary decisions as well. Craig, supra note 39 at 269-71; see also Sir William Wade  Christopher 
 Forsyth, Administrative Law 10th ed. (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2009) at 793-800. Further 
 explication of the scope of review by the upper Tribunal and by the courts is beyond the scope of this 
 article. 
50    See Craig, supra note 39 at 271-73; Wade & Forsyth, ibid. at 780. 
51  See Timothy Endicott, Administrative Law (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2009) at 435-38, 451-52. 
 In addition, there is the possibility of judicial review through prerogative writ in the High Court if 
 appeal to the Court of Appeal is denied.  
52  R v. Kirby; Ex Parte Boilermakers‟ Society of Australia, (1956) 94 CLR 254, 271 [Boilermakers‟], aff‟d by 
 Privy Council, Attorney General (Commonwealth) v The Queen (1957) 95 CLR 529. 
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 Thus it has long been clear that Congress can delegate judicial power to an 
administrative agency, at least with respect to so-called “public rights.”  Broadly 
speaking, “public rights” involve disputes between private parties and the United 
States.53  Typical public rights disputes involve claims to government benefits or 
enforcement of the tax laws, as well as federal law enforcement against private parties 
and enforcement of the immigration laws.  
 In the leading case of Crowell v. Benson,54 the Supreme Court upheld the delegation 
to a federal agency to adjudicate a case of “private rights,” meaning a private-versus-
private dispute.  Crowell involved an employee‟s claim against the employer for 
workers‟ compensation in a maritime dispute.55  This was a statutory right of action as 
opposed to a traditional common law claim.  It remained unclear whether Congress 
could assign the adjudication of such traditional tort or contract claims to a non-
Article III adjudicator.  In Northern Pipeline, the Court held that the adjudication of a 
traditional private-versus-private contract dispute could not be delegated to a non-
Article III adjudicator.56  Clearly, the Court was concerned that Congress might strip 
the federal courts of large portions of their traditional jurisdiction by assigning broad 
swatches of it to agencies or other non-Article III bodies and might even preclude 
judicial review of their determinations.   
 Northern Pipeline was swiftly undermined by later decisions.  In Thomas, the Court 
upheld a system of agency-operated binding arbitration of claims by a prior pesticide 
registrant for compensation arising out of the use by a later registrant of the prior 
registrant‟s data.
57  The key was that the private right was newly created and closely 
integrated into a public regulatory scheme.  Finally, in Schor, the Court approved a 
delegation to an agency of the power to decide a contract counterclaim that was 
ancillary to a statutory system of reparations in favour of customers who claimed that 
their brokers had violated the rules.58  If the agency could not adjudicate the contract 
counterclaim asserted by the broker, the entire system of reparations would have 
collapsed.  The language of the Schor decision stresses pragmatism and the balancing 
                                                          
53  However, it may be that “public rights” include “a seemingly „private‟ right that is so closely 
 integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with 
 limited involvement by the Article III judiciary.”  Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 54 
 (1989).  
54  Supra note 2. 
55  Crowell also held that “jurisdictional” facts determined by the agency in a private-rights case were 
 subject to de novo redetermination in federal court.  Within short order, however, this portion of the 
 Crowell decision was quietly abandoned, although it has never been formally overruled.  See Reuel E. 
 Schiller, “The Era of Deference:  Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal Administrative 
 Law” (2007) 106 Mich L Rev 399 at 410-12, 438-39.  
56  Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).  The statute assigned the 
 trial of all issues in a bankruptcy case, including breach of contract issues, to bankruptcy judges who 
 lack life tenure.  Subsequently, the Court applied the Northern Pipeline ruling to a case challenging the 
 constitutionality of bankruptcy court jurisdiction to adjudicate preferential transfer claims.  
 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).   
57  Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985). 
58  Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).  In Schor, the statute empowered an 
 agency to award reparations to customers from commodity brokers for violations of the statute or 
 regulations.  The agency adopted regulations providing that brokers could submit counterclaims 
 against their customers when the customer sought reparations. An alternative ground for the 
 decision in Schor is that the customer waived the right to have the counterclaim tried in federal court.  
 Ibid at 849-50. 
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of all factors in determining whether the assignment of a particular type of private 
right claim is improper.59 
 
B.  Australian Agencies Cannot Exercise Judicial Powers  
 In the remarkable Wheat case of 1915,60 the High Court of Australia firmly 
committed the country to strict separation of judicial and executive powers.  The 
Australian Constitution of 1900 provided for an Inter-State Commission [ISC] to 
regulate trade between the states and it explicitly provided that the ISC would have 
“such powers of adjudication and administration as the Parliament deems 
necessary.”
61  The American Interstate Commerce Commission (created in 1887) was 
clearly one of the models for the ISC along with some British regulatory agencies.  
However, the High Court held that the ISC could not exercise judicial power.  If an 
agency could not be given judicial powers by an explicit constitutional provision, 
Parliament certainly lacked authority to delegate such powers by a statute.  The Wheat 
case sounded the death knell in Australia for the combined function approach to 
administrative adjudication.62 
 In the leading Boilermakers‟ case,63 the Court made clear that judicial and non-
judicial powers could not be combined in the same body.  The case concerned the 
Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, a labor arbitration body created by Parliament 
under a specific constitutional authority.64  The High Court held that the Court of 
Conciliation and Arbitration could render arbitral awards, as arbitration is not a 
judicial function.65  However, that Court could not be given the power to enforce its 
own awards through an injunction or a contempt order, since enforcement of an 
arbitral award against a union is a judicial function.66  Apparently the court that is 
called upon to enforce an arbitral award is not expected to retry the merits; the 
arbitral decision established the “factum” on which judicial enforcement depends.
67   
 Wheat seemed to rule out adjudication by a combined-function agency and 
Boilermakers indicated that an agency could not be given power to enforce its own 
decisions.  As a result, Australian legislators designed specialized adjudicatory tribunals 
that are independent of the department that made the underlying disputed decision 
                                                          
59  The Court stated “we have also been faithful to our Article III precedents, which counsel that bright-
 line rules cannot effectively be employed to yield broad principles applicable in all Article III 
 inquiries. . . .  Rather, due regard must be given in each case to the unique aspects of the 
 congressional plan at issue and its practical consequences in light of the larger concerns that underlie 
 Article III.” Ibid  at 857.  For discussion of the incoherence of the U.S. law relating to delegation of 
 adjudicatory powers, see Richard E. Levy & Sidney A. Shapiro, “Government Benefits and the Rule 
 of Law:  Toward a Standards-Based Theory of Judicial Review” (2006) 58 Admin L Rev 499 at 507-
 24; Richard Fallon, “Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III” (1988) 101 Harv 
 L Rev 916 at, 918-33.  
60  New South Wales v Commonwealth, (1915)20 C.L.R. 54.  
61  Australian Constitution. paras.101, 102.  
62  Cane remarks that the Australian version of separation of powers effectively prevented the creation 
 of combined function agencies. As a result, adjudication by agencies engaged in regulatory functions 
 is unknown in Australia. Cane, supra note 6 at 58. 
63  Supra note 52. 
64  See Australian Constitution. para. 51(xxxv) (empowering Parliament to make laws with respect to 
 “Conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending 
 beyond the limits of any one State”). 
65  See Waterside Workers‟ Federation of Australia v JW Alexander Ltd. (1918)25 CLR 434, 464-65. 
66  Similarly, see R v Davison, 90 CLR 353 (1954), holding that the decision that a person is bankrupt is a 
 judicial function that cannot be delegated to the registrar of the bankruptcy court.   
67  See Boilermakers‟, supra note 52.  
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and that lack enforcement power.  After Boilermakers, Australian courts had to decide 
precisely what executive agencies could not do.  As Boilermakers suggests, an agency 
cannot have the power to enforce its own judgment through the normal process of 
judicial execution.  The clearest authority to this effect is the Brandy case involving 
anti-discrimination law.68  Under the law prior to 1992, the Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission [HREOC] could adjudicate discrimination cases but its 
decisions were not legally enforceable.  A victim of discrimination had to make a 
fresh application to the Federal Court which, after a rehearing, could make such 
orders as it thought fit.  In 1992, Parliament amended the Act so that HREOC‟s 
determination could be “registered” with the Federal Court.  If the losing party 
sought review, the court “may review all issues of fact and law” but no new evidence 
could be introduced.  If the losing party did not seek judicial review (or if the Federal 
Court affirmed HREOC‟s decision), the HREOC decision (which might call for 
monetary damages or specific relief) became enforceable like any other judgment.   
 In  Brandy, the High Court invalidated these amendments, holding that a 
proceeding is inevitably judicial if the tribunal that renders it has the power to enforce 
it by execution or otherwise.69  Consequently, the case would have to be retried in 
federal court before the decision could be enforced.  The Brandy decision 
immobilized Australian anti-discrimination law and, if it were read broadly, could 
have cast doubt on the constitutional validity of other administrative adjudicatory 
tribunals whose decisions are more or less self-enforcing.  
 To an American reader, the Brandy decision seems hopelessly formalistic.  Given 
that Boilermakers accepted the idea that an executive arbitral decision could be the 
factum on which judicial enforcement rested, the rejection of HREOC‟s registration 
mechanism seems unfounded.  The Brandy decision appears to reflect a judicial 
distaste for anti-discrimination law (or perhaps doubts about the impartiality of 
HREOC) and it may reflect judicial disinclination to part with jurisdiction over a type 
of case that resembles traditional tort litigation.   
 Both before and after Brandy, the High Court has repeatedly been forced to 
answer the question of whether a particular package of adjudicatory and enforcement 
powers delegated to a particular agency adds up to an exercise of judicial power.70  
This unfortunate result is inevitable, since the decisions are defending a distinction 
that does not exist.  The realities of modern administration have forced the High 
Court to retreat steadily from the absolutist separation of powers rhetoric of cases 
like Wheat, Boilermakers and Brandy.  In the contemporary world, government agencies 
are empowered to adjudicate a huge range of regulatory and welfare disputes between 
private parties or between private parties and government.  Administrative 
adjudication of such disputes is clearly necessary to the functioning of modern 
society.71  Courts could not remotely handle this enormous body of adjudicatory 
                                                          
68  Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, (1995)183 CLR 245.  
69  183 CLR at 267-71 (rejecting the argument that the registration provision should be interpreted so 
 that the decision subject to enforcement was made by the Federal Court rather than HREOC).  
70  As the Court remarked in the Tasmanian Breweries decision:  “The uncertainties that are met with arise, 
 generally if not always, from the fact that there is a „borderland in which judicial and administrative 
 functions overlap” . . . so that for reasons depending upon general reasoning, analogy, or history, 
 some powers which may be appropriately be treated as administrative when conferred on an 
 administrative functionary may just as appropriately be seen in a judicial aspect and be validly 
 conferred upon a federal court.”  R v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex Parte Tasmanian Breweries Proprietary 
 Ltd.,(1970) 123 CLR 361, 373 (op. of Kitto, J).  
71  As the High Court recognized in 1926, “[I]f a legislative provision of the present nature [for a 
 taxation tribunal] be forbidden, then a very vast and at present growing page of necessary 
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work.  Administrative decisions are largely self-enforcing but the enforcement 
process sometimes requires judicial assistance.  Given this array of administrative 
dispute settlement and enforcement mechanisms, it is impossible to say which 
adjudicatory decisions are “administrative” and which are “judicial.”   
 Notwithstanding cases like Boilermakers and Brandy, the High Court has in fact 
approved various administrative adjudication schemes that are largely self-enforcing.  
Some of these cases involve schemes in which the primary agency decision is in 
question; others involve merit review schemes.  But all of them are enforceable 
(either against private parties or against government) without the need for de novo 
judicial consideration.  Thus agencies can remove a trademark from the registry of 
trademarks.72  They can adjudicate tax disputes.73  They can adjudicate pension 
disputes.74  They can establish child support obligations.75  Most importantly, 
administrative tribunals can invalidate contracts or order relief against unfair business 
practices such as monopolization.  Under the Trade Practices Act, the ACT can declare 
a contract unenforceable or restrain a practice if the contract or practice is “contrary 
to the public interest” and such decisions have the force of law.76  The Takeovers 
Panel can invalidate a corporate acquisition.  Courts are prohibited from affording 
judicial remedies but have jurisdiction to enforce the Panel‟s decisions.
77  At this 
point, an outside reader is baffled; how, if at all, are such responsibilities and 
enforcement powers different from those involved in Brandy or Boilermakers?  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
 constitutional means by which Parliament may in its discretion meet . . . the requirements of a 
 progressive people, must, in my opinion, be considered as substantially obliterated. . . .”  Federal 
 Commissioner of Taxation v Munro, (1926) 38 CLR 153, 178 [Munro] (opinion of Isaacs, J. upholding the 
 validity of the taxation Board of Review), affirmed by Privy Council sub. nom. Shell Co. of Australia Ltd. 
 v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1930) 44 CLR 530. 
72  R v Quinn; Ex Parte Consolidated Foods Corp. (1977)138 CLR 1, 12.  
73 Munro, supra note 71.  Only a year earlier the High Court had invalidated a very similar tax tribunal.  
 Parliament immediately acted to create a new tribunal.  The primary difference between them 
 was that no “appeal on law points” to the High Court was provided for.  Thus, Parliament 
 managed to transfer tax adjudication from the judicial to the administrative branch by reducing 
 the ability of taxpayers to obtain judicial review of the tribunal‟s decision.  
74  Attorney-General v Breckler, (1999)197 CLR 83, 110-12.  The decision turned on several factors.  The 
 pension plan provided that the trustees would be bound by a decision of the Superannuation 
 Complaints Tribunal, so it was not necessary to rely on judicial enforcement.  Moreover, it was 
 possible to collaterally attack the tribunal‟s decisions in court.   
75  Luton v Lessels, (2002) 210 CLR 333, 360 (the administrative determination of liability creates a 
 “factum” by reference to which the statute creates rights for the future which then are enforced by 
 resort to courts).  
76  Tasmanian Breweries, supra note 69, at 372-78 (Kitto, J. – the “public interest” standard is too 
 subjective to be characterized as judicial); 401-03 (Windeyer, J. – the public interest standard is 
 remote from standards courts apply, relying on American authorities upholding judicial delegations to 
 agencies) 408-09; (Owen, J. - Tribunal lacks enforcement powers).  
77  Alinta, supra note 14.  Although the High Court was unanimous in this case, there are six separate 
 opinions that rely on an uneasy combination of different reasons for finding the Panel‟s power to be 
 non-judicial.  These include the fact that the Panel takes account of policy considerations that are 
 different from the kind of policy determinations made by common law courts; that the Panel‟s order 
 creates “new rights and obligations;” that historical analysis shows that it would be inappropriate for a 
 court to undertake review of takeovers; that the displacement of contract rights from a takeover 
 agreement is different from what happens in a contract case in court; that the Panel‟s order provides 
 the “factum” which courts would then be required to enforce; and numerous other factors 
 that strike an outside reader as wholly lacking in analytical substance.  
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C.  Australian Courts Cannot Exercise Executive Power 
 As discussed above, Australian executive departments cannot exercise judicial 
power.  Just as importantly, a federal court cannot exercise executive power.  
Providing merits review of the factual or the discretionary aspects of a government 
decision is considered an executive power.  Consequently, a court is precluded from 
providing such review.  Australians believe that it would be deeply improper for a 
court to interfere in the substance of executive decisionmaking by substituting its 
judgments about factual or discretionary matters for the judgment of an agency.  Yet 
it is plain that some form of merits review of the factual and discretionary basis of the 
adjudicatory decisions of government agencies must be provided.  Since courts 
cannot supply merits review of factual or discretionary determinations because of 
separation of powers constraints, such review must occur within the executive 
branch.  
 The epochal Kerr Committee report of 1971 explicitly determined courts could 
not provide merits review of administrative decisions. Consequently, it recommended 
adoption of a peak merits review tribunal and the creation of the AAT implemented 
that recommendation.78  
 
IV. THE AAT IN PRACTICE  
 
 The Australian AAT is an attractive model.  It has attained a high degree of 
legitimacy in Australia, as shown by the spread of tribunals in both the 
Commonwealth and in the Australian states.  Before considering whether the 
Australian model might be transplanted to the U.S., a more detailed examination of 
the pros and cons of the AAT is in order.  
 
A.  The AAT’s Procedures 
 The AAT‟s organic statute states that “[i]n carrying out its functions, the Tribunal 
must pursue the objective of providing a mechanism of review that is fair, just, 
economical, informal and quick.”
79  Of course, as Professor Creyke has pointed out, 
“[c]omplying with this litany of adjectives has created difficulties...not least because 
they are internally inconsistent.”
80  The procedures are supposed to be “conducted 
with as little formality and technicality, and with as much expedition, as the 
requirements of this Act and of every other relevant enactment and a proper 
consideration of the matters before the Tribunal permit”; moreover, “the Tribunal is 
not bound by the rules of evidence but may inform itself on any matter in such 
manner as it thinks appropriate.”
81  But as the famous Mathews v. Eldridge balancing 
test for measuring due process in the U.S. implicitly acknowledges, accuracy, fairness 
and efficiency values are often at odds.82 
                                                          
78  See Cane, supra note 6 at 60-67, 145-49.  He argues that the Kerr Commission missed the mark, 
 because the vast majority of administrative decisions do not involve determinations of policy or 
 applications of discretion. Instead, they involve application of specific detailed and formal 
 principles to the facts.  In that respect, they are just the same as the kinds of decisions courts make 
 and review all the time.  So judicial review of the vast majority of administrative decisions would not 
 have offended separation of powers.  When the AAT does confront important issues of policy, it 
 generally defers to the executive, which further undercuts the reasoning of the Kerr Committee.  See 
 discussion in the text, infra, at notes 118-24.  
79  AAT Act para. 2A. 
80  Creyke, supra note 6 at 94. 
81  AAT Act paras. 33(1)(b)&(c). 
82  See 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
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1.  AAT’s Mix of Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures 
 As mentioned before, the AAT provides a blend of adversarial and inquisitorial 
process,83 while the specialized tribunals tend to be closer to the inquisitorial end of 
the spectrum.84 
 
(a) Pro-activity in Obtaining Evidence 
 One issue is whether the AAT sufficiently uses its inquisitorial powers to require 
submission of material documents from the parties or even to gather other 
information, especially where the applicant is unrepresented.85   
 Professor Cane concludes that the AAT could do more:  “on the whole...it seems 
that Australian merits tribunals rarely obtain information other than from or through 
the applicant and the decision-maker.”  In part, as he acknowledges, this is a resource 
issue, and without the availability of staff to find witnesses or information not 
produced by the parties, “the most that tribunals are likely to do is to invite, 
encourage, or perhaps, require, parties to provide additional evidence.”
86  At any rate 
the law does not require more at this point:  although Creyke and McMillan point to 
several tribunal decisions that have been held invalid for failing to consider whether 
additional evidence was needed, or seeking clarity on matters deemed unclear or 
obscure,87 they conclude that “the settled principle is...that there is no general legal 
duty on a tribunal to conduct inquiries.”88  A discussion paper for the Australian Law 
Reform Commission proposed an amendment to the AAT Act to require the tribunal 
to be take a more proactive investigative role in cases involving unrepresented parties, 
but the proposal was never formally recommended.89  
                                                          
83  See the High Court‟s description in of the AAT‟s procedures in Bushell v Repatriation Commission (1992) 
 175 CLR 408, 424-5: 
Proceedings before the A.A.T. may sometimes appear to be adversarial when the 
Commission chooses to appear to defend its decision or to test a claimant‟s case but 
in substance the review is inquisitorial.  Each of the Commission, the Board and the 
A.A.T. is an administrative decision-maker, under a duty to arrive at the correct or 
preferable decision in the case before it according to the material before it.  If the 
material is inadequate, the Commission, the Board or the A.A.T. may request or 
itself compel the production of further material.  The notion of onus of proof, 
which plays so important a part in fact-finding in adversarial proceedings before 
judicial tribunals, has no part to play in these administrative proceedings. 
84  Examples of inquisitorial practices in the specialized tribunals include the RRT‟s research unit, which 
 compiles “country information” reports, briefings prepared by the MRT‟s “case officers,” and the 
 appointment to the SSAT of medical specialists and former departmental officials.  Creyke & 
 McMillan, supra note 6 at 156.  For a concise discussion of the differences between adversarial and 
 inquisitorial processes, see Margaret Allars, “Neutrality, the Judicial Paradigm and Tribunal 
 Procedure” (1991) 13 Sydney L Rev 377 at 381-85.  For a comparison of adversarial and 
 inquisitorial approaches in environmental assessment of land development, see Andrew Edgar, 
 “Participation and Responsiveness in Merits Review of Polycentric Decisions: A Comparison of 
 Development Assessment Appeals” (2010) 27 Environmental & Planning Law Journal 36. 
85  See the AAT Act, paras. 37, 38(describing the Tribunal‟s powers to require the submission of 
 documents and other materials). 
86  Cane, supra note 6 at 241.   
87  Creyke & McMillan, supra note 6 at 163, citing Azzi v Minister of Immigration and Multicultural 
 Affairs (2002) 125 FCR 48, and Budworth v Repatriation Commission (2001) 33 AAR 48. 
88  Creyke & McMillan, supra note 6 at 163, citing Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Singh (1997) 
 44 ALD 487.  See also Creyke, supra note 6 at 93 (“Courts, too have been slow to impose an 
 obligation on a tribunal to undertake independent inquiries, even given tribunals‟ ostensible 
 inquisitorial role.”). 
89  Ibid., citing “Managing Justice”, Report No 89, 2000, paras. 9.53-9.55. 
Vol. 28(2)   The Merits of “Merits” Review 277 
 
 
(b) Handling of Expert Evidence  
 Since it is not a court, the AAT can be more flexible in its receipt of expert 
evidence.  Some tribunal members obviously have expertise of their own, and “it is 
generally accepted that tribunal members should be freer than judges to draw on their 
own personal knowledge and to „take notice‟ of information not presented by the 
parties.”
90  However, parties need to be given a chance to object to the taking of 
official notice or information obtained from third parties.91  This is no different from 
the APA‟s rules on ALJ hearings in the U.S.92  However, tribunals sometimes have 
been creative in arranging for concurrent presentation of expert evidence in so-called 
hot tubs; instead of experts presenting evidence individually, a number of experts are 
brought together in one session at which areas of agreement and difference can be 
explored and developed by discussion and questioning between the experts 
themselves.93 
 
(c) Other Rules of Evidence 
 The AAT Act states that “the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence, but 
may inform itself in such manner as it thinks appropriate”
94 – a standard that is even 
more unrestrictive than that of the U.S. APA.95  
 
(d) New Evidence  
 It is commonplace for new evidence to arise during the period between the 
agency decision and the tribunal hearing.  Merits review tribunals review the facts as 
they exist at the time of the review, not at the time of the agency decision.96  This 
“contemporaneous review” presents its own set of problems.  By the time of the 
review, the agency may have changed its “administrative outlook,” but, in contrast to 
the U.S., the agency cannot revise its decision, because it has already become the 
responsibility of the tribunal.97  Or the facts may have changed, and in many cases the 
applicant can produce new evidence that was not before the decisionmaker below.  
This “open record” concept also exists in U.S. social security and veterans‟ benefit 
cases, and it has been criticized for creating incentives to hold back evidence.  The 
                                                          
90  Cane, supra note 6 at 240, n.114, citing J.A. Smillie, “The Problem of „Official Notice‟:  Reliance by 
 Administrative Tribunals on the Personal Knowledge of Their Members,” (1975) Public Law 64. 
91  See Pearson, supra note 6 at 311 (“Procedural fairness requires the disclosure of information coming 
 from [a tribunal member‟s expertise] where the tribunal proposes to reach a conclusion based on the 
 knowledge of a member of a particular fact, or relying on a particular expertise.”).  She cites Tisdall v 
 Health Insurance Commission [2002] FCA 97, for this proposition, but adds that “It is troubling to note 
 that this does not always occur.”  Ibid at n. 47. 
92  See 5 U.S.C. para. 556(e). 
93  Cane, supra note 6 at 243-244 (citing a survey of AAT members that indicated satisfaction with the 
 procedure, An Evaluation of the Use of Concurrent Evidence in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Nov.
 2005), available online: AAT <http://www.a-a-t.gov.au/Speeches-Papers-And- Research/
 Research/AAT-Concurrent-Evidence-ReportNovember2005.pdf.>) 
94  AAT Act, para. 33(1)(c). 
95  The APA‟s provision states:  “Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but the agency as 
a  matter of policy shall provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or repetitious evidence.”  5 
 U.S.C. para. 556(d). 
96  See Creyke & McMillan, supra note 6 at 144; Shi, supra note 11. 
97  Ibid. 
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same concerns have been raised about the tribunals‟ open record policy.
98  It should 
be noted that intervening changes in the law may or may not be applied by the 
tribunal, depending on whether the law itself states whether the change applies to 
pending proceedings.99   
 
2.  Role of the Agency Decisionmaker as a Party before the AAT 
 The responding agency must provide a statement of findings and reasons for its 
decision and disclose any other document that it has (or controls) that is relevant to 
the review.100  Somewhat surprisingly, its overall responsibility is to “assist the 
Tribunal to make its decision,” not to act in an adversary fashion.
101  This is consistent 
with the AAT‟s merits review responsibility to make the “correct or preferable” 
decision, but it must be difficult for the agency representative to undergo this 
“attitudinal adjustment.”   
 On the other hand, in Hayes the Federal Court overturned an AAT ruling in a 
workers‟ compensation case that a subsequently discovered agency video of the applicant 
should have been disclosed to the applicant prior to its introduction in the hearing so 
as to allow sufficient time to prepare for cross-examination.102 Subsequent decisions of 
the AAT, however, have distinguished this Federal Court decision, one of which 
commented that “the principal of trial by ambush … has never held sway in this 
Tribunal and I hope it never will.103 
 
3.  Burden-of-Proof Considerations 
 Given the roles of the parties, how do burden-of-proof considerations factor into 
the AAT‟s decision?  Even though, “as a practical matter...it is in the interest of a 
party to [present] evidence to persuade the tribunal,”
104 it seems to be the case that 
with respect to the tribunals, “it is not appropriate to talk in terms of a formal onus 
or burden of proof,” unless an underlying statute contains one.
105  This is because “the 
AAT is required...to make its own decision in place of the administrator.”
106   
 But this rationale tends to beg the question, and Professor Pearson explains that 
the question of how tribunals “proceed when left in a state of uncertainty” is that 
they generally “turn to the applicable legislation, which will usually be worded in 
terms requiring the decision-maker to reach a state of satisfaction on a particular 
issue...”
107 Evaluating whether this requirement has been met obviously requires the 
                                                          
98  Ibid at 145 (suggesting that “an agency is likely to be disgruntled where a decision is set aside, or a 
 hearing is held unnecessarily, as a result of fresh evidence that might as easily have been presented to 
 the decision-maker”). 
99  Ibid  at 146.  See also Shi, supra note 11 (holding that the AAT is permitted to consider new evidence). 
100  AAT Act para. 37 (1AAA). 
101  Ibid at para. 33(1AA).  See also Cane, supra note 6 at 244.  In the SSAT and MRT, the government 
 does not appear as a party (similar to many U.S. benefits adjudications).  Creyke, supra note 6 at 92. 
102  Australian Postal Commission v Hayes (1989) 23 FCR 320; excerpted in Creyke & McMillan, supra note 6 
 at 164-65.  The court determined that the AAT Act para. 37 requirement that all relevant material be 
 disclosed before the hearing did not require the disclosure of subsequently discovered evidence 
 that was not before the decisionmaker.   
103  Re Taxation Appeals NT94-281-NT94-291 (1995) 21 AAR 275, excerpted in Creyke & McMillan, supra 
 note 6 at 166. 
104  Ibid  at 171. 
105  See Pearson, supra note 6 at 309. 
106  McDonald v Director-General of Social Security (1984) 1 FCR 354 excerpted in Creyke & McMillan, supra 
 note 6 at 172). 
107  See Pearson, supra note 6 at 309-10. 
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tribunal to give careful attention to the findings and reasons provided by the 
decisionmaker, but it can be especially difficult for the tribunal to “balance 
assessment of credibility based on oral evidence with what might at first appear to be 
more „reliable‟ documentary material such as...information prepared by government 
agencies.”
108  In the end, the “balance of probability” standard is “ordinarily the 
appropriate standard to be applied by an administrative tribunal.”109 
 
4.  Alternative Dispute Resolution [ADR] Techniques 
 The AAT and other tribunals rely heavily on techniques to avoid formal hearings.  
To begin with, occasionally the tribunal may determine that the papers filed by the 
respondent agency allow for a favorable decision for the applicant “on the papers.”
110  
The AAT may also decide to proceed on the papers with both parties‟ consent.
111   
 Many cases also settle, through party conferences with an AAT member, or 
through other ADR processes such as mediation.112  In 2008-09, the AAT resolved 
5838 cases without a hearing and provided only 1393 hearings.113  Thus only 19% of 
the cases lodged in the AAT actually resulted in a hearing.  But the AAT must agree 
to the disposition because “[o]nce an application for review has been made, the AAT 
alone can bring the proceedings to an end.”
114  This also prevents an agency from 
trying to “pull back” an appeal.   
 
5.  Decisionmaking and Opinion-Writing 
 The AAT‟s decisions from 1976 to the present are available on line on the 
Australasian Legal Information Institute website.115  According to Professor Creyke, 
decisions of the AAT, because it is not a court, are not precedential.116  However, 
issues of consistency and following precedent can occur with respect to prior tribunal 
rulings on both legal and factual questions.  Although AAT decisions on legal 
interpretation questions are subject to judicial review, sometimes a case will involve a 
legal issue that has been decided in an earlier unappealed AAT case.  The AAT‟s 
Deputy President has opined that in that situation the AAT should follow the 
decision in the earlier case, especially if the decision was made by a presidential 
member, although the member deciding the later case could note his or her 
disagreement with the result.117   
 
6.  Generalized vs. Specialized Expertise 
 Given that over 400 statutes provide for AAT jurisdiction, and that its members 
are a mix of lawyers and non-lawyers and full-timers and part-timers, one might 
legitimately wonder whether the Tribunal can handle cases from agencies that present 
difficult and technical issues.  This objection has also been leveled at federal judges in 
                                                          
108  Ibid at 311. 
109  Creyke & McMillan, supra note 6 at 171. 
110  Ibid at 157. 
111  AAT Act, para. 34J.   
112  Ibid at para. 34A. See also Cane, supra note 6 at 246-49. 
113  AAT Annual Report 2008-09, App. 3, supra note 22.  
114  Cane, supra note 6 at 246-47. 
115  See online:  Australasian Legal Information Institute <http://www.aust-lii.edu.au/au/ca-
 ses/cth/A-A-T-A>. 
116  See Creyke, supra note 6 at 98. 
117  See Re Ganchov and Comcare (1990) 19 ALD 541 (Decision of Deputy President Todd), excerpted in 
 Creyke & McMillan, supra note 6 at 176. 
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the United States who hear appeals from a multitude of agencies.  But the difference 
is that U.S. judicial review of disputes about fact findings and exercises of discretion 
is limited to a “reasonableness” form of review (the substantial evidence test for 
formal adjudication and the arbitrary and capricious test for informal adjudication).  
Similarly, in the U.S., judicial review of questions of law is also usually quite 
deferential to the agency‟s interpretation of statutes and of its own regulations.  
 The literature on Australia‟s tribunals does not appear to view this as a serious 
concern even though AAT members are not provided with legal or technical 
assistants.  Perhaps the AAT‟s ability to call on the decisionmaking agency for 
additional documents and to call upon the agency‟s counsel to assist the tribunal in 
making the “correct or preferable” decision is regarded as giving the AAT members 
the tools they need.  In addition, the AAT does not review tribunal decisions relating 
to takeovers and trade practices that might present issues beyond the ken of many 
AAT members118nor does it review most decisions relating to immigration and refugee 
policy, which may reflect political considerations.  Finally, note that several high 
volume specialized tribunals (the SSAT and VRB) siphon many cases away from the 
AAT (although the AAT provides merits review of challenged SSAT and VRB 
decisions that are unfavorable to the applicant).  
 
7.  Following Governmental Policy 
 Whether tribunals must follow agency policy presents an important and recurring 
issue.  This is also a question that confronts U.S. ALJs.  In Australia, an influential 
AAT decision, Drake No. 2119 held that the AAT should apply a presumption in favour 
of relevant government policies (assuming that the “policy” does not conflict with 
“hard law” such as a statute or regulation).  The AAT should depart from policy only 
for “cogent reasons,” such as injustice in an individual case, but not because it 
disagrees with the policy in general.  One reason for deference to policy is to achieve 
consistency between unappealed decisions and AAT decisions.120  Another is to keep 
the AAT out of politics and avoid clashes with government departments; its job is to 
adjudicate, not set government policy.121 
 These generalities leave open questions about whether the tribunal‟s duty to 
depart from government policy only for cogent reasons is affected by the level of the 
policymaker (ministerial, departmental, or lower) or the procedure used to issue the 
policy (after public consultation or not).  Andrew Edgar has focused on the 
distinction, often suggested by academic commentators and found in case law, 
between “high” and “low” policy.  High policy comes from the minister, is subject to 
“ministerial responsibility” and is scrutinized by Parliament; Drake 2 requires the 
AAT to follow high policy.  Low policy, on the other hand, comes from soft law 
issued by the department.  The AAT either ignores or considers but feels free to 
redetermine low policy.  Edgar criticizes this distinction and suggests that the AAT 
should defer to both high and low policy, because the failure to defer to soft law 
results in inconsistent decisionmaking by different AAT panels and the substitution 
                                                          
118  See accompanying text in supra note 33. 
119  Drake and Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (No. 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634.  Drake No. 2 was written 
 by High Court Justice Brennan sitting as AAT president. 
120  See Andrew Edgar, Tribunals and administrative policies:  Does the high or low policy distinction 
 help” (2009) 16 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 143  
121  See Cane, supra note 6 at 169 (suggesting that reweighing factors in reviewing a discretionary decision 
is  something the AAT does cautiously as it could be seen as making policy and creating conflict with 
 government departments).  
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of a less informed for a more informed determination of appropriate policy.122  He 
argues that the AAT lacks the relevant information to make proper judgments about 
policy because often the rationale for the policy is not articulated in the department‟s 
decision, which is specific to the facts of the case.  Moreover, he contends that lack of 
deference produces an accountability problem because the AAT‟s decision on policy 
is not reviewable either in court or as a political matter (other than through 
parliamentary legislation). 
 Nor is Edgar any more enamored of a distinction based on whether or not the 
policy was developed after public consultation.  He observes that where consultation 
has taken place, agencies can “cherry-pick” from among the comments that are 
“consistent with their pre-determined view and ignore other submissions,” and that 
tribunals would not know when this sort of “charade” had taken place.123  He also 
opines that some agency policies promulgated without consultations (including 
interpretive rules) are quite legitimate and should be followed by tribunals.   
 Professor Cane takes a more positive view of tribunal review of policy that is only 
reflected in soft law.  He believes that these policies are certainly relevant 
considerations for the tribunal, but they are not binding.  More broadly, in his view, 
the AAT is entitled to refuse to apply a lawful policy not only because the policy leads 
to injustice in the particular case but also because the AAT believes the policy is not 
sound or wise.  Moreover he goes on to say the AAT would also be “entitled to 
enunciate a new policy, inconsistent with an existing policy, as the basis for varying a 
decision or making a substitute decision.”
124  He bases this conclusion on the fact that 
the power to undertake merits review includes the power to substitute a correct or 
preferable decision, and that must encompass the power to act inconsistently with 
government policy.  But he tempers his point by suggesting that the differences 
between high and low policy or policies developed with and without consultation are 
appropriate factors for the Tribunal to consider.125  
 
V. WOULD THE AUSTRALIAN TRIBUNAL MODEL WORK IN THE 
U.S.?  
 
 Could the U.S. borrow from the Australian experience?  We believe that 
something like the Australian tribunal model might work in the area of federal 
benefits adjudication.  These are mass justice systems in which decisionmakers must 
deal with a heavy caseload of individual cases that largely turn on medical and 
vocational issues and are not used as vehicles for the announcement of policy.   
 For purposes of this article, we limit our proposal to an independent U.S. Social 
Security Tribunal [SST], which would be similar to the Australian SSAT.  However, 
we also believe that policymakers should consider whether the SST might be 
expanded to cover adjudication arising under some or all of the other federal benefit 
programs, including schemes administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs 
and the Department of Labor.  If that were to occur, the result would be a federal 
benefits tribunal of generalized jurisdiction, much like the AAT.  Our discussion does 
                                                          
122  See Edgar, supra note 120 at 149, 150-51.  Interestingly, on this point, he invoked K.C. Davis‟s 
 criticism of merits review, ibid at 150, citing K.C. Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry 
 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969) at 142. 
123  Ibid at 146. 
124  Cane, supra note 6 at 159. 
125  Ibid at 160. 
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not include the judicial review stage, but we also believe that policymakers should 
consider establishing a Social Security Court to review SST decisions.126   
 The hearing stage of the social security adjudication system has encountered deep 
problems. Most importantly, it struggles with an overwhelming caseload. A 
combative atmosphere between the Social Security Administration [SSA] and its ALJs 
has lingered for years.  SSA must manage its ALJs to improve the efficiency, accuracy, 
and consistency of the decisionmaking process.  In the past, however, some of these 
management decisions were explicitly (and wrongly) designed to reduce the number 
of beneficiaries on the disability rolls and to reduce the percentage of ALJ decisions 
in favor of claimants.127  This has given ALJs and lawyers that represent claimants a 
basis for condemning SSA management initiatives as subversive of ALJ 
independence.128  
 On the other hand, it must be recognized that many of the problems of SSA 
adjudication arise out of problems with the ALJ program itself.  The general process 
by which ALJs are hired and managed has often been criticized.129  Under the APA, 
ALJs are hired without a probationary period and receive indefinite tenure.  
Application of the veterans‟ preference laws effectively excludes many non-veterans 
and creates gender and racial disparities.  The Office of Personnel Management 
[OPM] runs the hiring process which is cumbersome and bureaucratic; OPM has 
often neglected or mismanaged this task.  The system requires a hiring agency to 
choose from among the top three on the list offered to it by the OPM, thus 
foreclosing any exercise of judgment by the agency.  This rigid ALJ selection system 
is circumvented by many agencies which cherry-pick from the judges already working 
for the SSA.  Alone among all federal civil servants, ALJs are exempt from 
performance evaluations and it is extremely difficult to discipline or discharge them, 
especially for low productivity.  
 The ALJ selection and disciplinary protections arise from explicit provisions of 
the APA.  The APA struck many political compromises, one of which was to leave 
the judges housed within agencies for which they decide cases while constructing a 
set of protections for their independence within that agency.  However, if the ALJs 
functioned within a tribunal separate from the agency that made the decision under 
review, many of those protections would become unnecessary.130  
                                                          
126  Lubbers has written in favour of a specialized Social Security court to remove the vast number of 
 Social Security appeals from federal district courts.  Lubbers & Verkuil, supra note 1.  The newly 
 created English Upper Tribunal, which is treated as a court of record and provides for an appeal of 
 the decisions of first-tier tribunals, is a move in the direction of a specialized court that the U.S. 
 would do well to study.  See accompanying text at notes 48-50. 
127  See Ass‟n of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C.1984), amended 1985 WL 
 71829 (July 2, 1985) (finding SSA program of reviewing decisions of administrative law judges with 
 high rates of allowing disability benefit claims to be of dubious legality). 
128  See generally Richard E. Levy, Social Security Disability Determinations:  Recommendations for 
 Reform, (1990) BYUL Rev 461 at 497-502.  
129  See e.g. Paul R. Verkuil, Daniel Gifford, Charles Koch, Richard Pierce, & Jeffrey Lubbers, “The 
 Federal Administrative Judiciary” 1992 Reports and Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the 
 U.S. 773; Paul R. Verkuil, “Reflections Upon the Federal Administrative Judiciary” (1992) 39 UCLA 
 L Rev 1341; Jeffrey S. Lubbers, “The Federal Administrative Judiciary:  Establishing an Appropriate 
 System of Performance Evaluation for ALJs” (1994) 7 Admin L J Am U 589. 
130  Many have urged procedural reforms of Social Security adjudication and judicial review.  Levy, for 
 example, proposes legislation that would remove Social Security ALJs from the SSA and make them 
 an independent corps; he also proposes replacing federal district court review of ALJ decisions with 
 an Article I court of disability appeals that is similar to the Court of Veterans‟ Appeals.  See Levy, 
 supra note 128 at 528-37.  Similarly, Lubbers & Verkuil propose an Article I Social Security Court, 
 supra note 1 at 778-82.  This article takes no position on whether the existing system of judicial review 
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 An SST would be independent of the SSA.131  Its judges could continue to provide 
informal, inquisitorial methods when that is appropriate.  At present, the SSA is 
unrepresented in disability cases, so the ALJ wears multiple hats (making sure that 
both the SSA and applicant‟s position is properly presented, then deciding the case).  
Of course, the SST judges would be required to follow SSA regulations as well as 
properly issued soft law policy statements or interpretations propounded by the 
Commissioner.  Decisions by the SST would be final administrative decisions.132  The 
next step would be judicial review, possibly limited to questions of law.  Of course, 
both the applicant for benefits and SSA could seek judicial review of SST decisions.  
 Creation of the SST would enable a reconsideration of the various management 
issues currently plaguing the system of social security adjudication.  Judges would 
work for the SST, not for the SSA.  As a result, there would be no need for the 
APA‟s rigid controls on the hiring, supervision, compensation, evaluation, and 
discharge of ALJs.  The SST could hire its own judges using a rational, judgment-
based scheme to get the very best people available, as opposed to the wooden system 
now used by the OPM.133  There could be probationary employment, to weed out 
unsuitable judges early in their career.  Judges‟ terms would be lengthy but not 
indefinite and they could be removed only for good cause.  There could be a series of 
grades, so judges could work toward promotion and higher compensation.  More 
difficult cases could be assigned to more experienced judges.  Some form of peer 
review might be instituted to evaluate the work product of the judges.  The chief 
judge of the SST would manage the evaluation process.  And if that evaluation 
established that judges fell below reasonable standards of productivity, misbehaved 
on the bench, or systematically ignored agency policies, appropriate remedial 
measures could be put into place from mentoring or performance agreements, all the 
way to dismissal after an appropriate hearing.   
                                                                                                                                     
 of benefits decisions should be altered, but the creation of a Social Security court should be seriously 
 considered.  
131  About half of the states and a number of large cities have adopted the central panel model.  See Chris 
 Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, & Andrew Wistrich, “The „Hidden Judiciary‟:  An Empirical Examination of 
 Executive Branch Justice (2009) 58 Duke L J 1477 at 1484 n. 29.  Under that approach, the judge 
 hearing a case is independent of the agency that brings it. The judges are hired, assigned, managed, 
 and evaluated by an independent central panel agency. Our impression is that central panels have 
 worked well and are considered by the public and by lawyers to be more legitimate than 
 administrative judges embedded in the agency that is a party to the dispute.  The central panel has 
 often been proposed and just as often rejected at the federal level, largely because of doubts that 
 central panel judges could effectively handle technical and difficult regulatory problems from 
 numerous agencies.  See e.g. Jeffrey Lubbers, “A Unified Corps of ALJs:  A Proposal to Test the Idea 
 at the Federal Level” (1981) 65 Judicature 266. However, we are proposing a centralization of 
 adjudication only for Social Security, so that the judges would need to master the law and practice 
 only from a single benefit program.  Were the SST to be expanded to other federal benefit agencies, 
 such as those run by the VA and DOL, there would be an additional learning curve, but all of these 
 cases come down to medical and vocational issues, so any competent judge should be able to decide 
 cases accurately under any of the benefit schemes with only modest additional training.  
132  In considering this proposal, Congress should decide whether to provide for an administrative appeal 
 of SST decisions, such as the AAT provides for SSAT decisions, the Upper Chamber provides in the 
 U.K., or the Appeals Council presently provides for a relatively small fraction of ALJ decisions in 
 Social Security cases.  Our preliminary assessment of this issue is that a single administrative decision 
 by an independent ALJ is sufficient and a second level of administrative hearings absorbs resources 
 and causes delay without sufficient countervailing advantage.  See Charles H. Koch & David A. 
 Koplow, “The Fourth Bite at the Apple:  A Study of the Operation and Utility of the Social Security 
 Administration‟s Appeals Council” (1990) 17 Fla St U L Rev 199 at 296-98.  
133  For obvious practical reasons, the existing ALJs working for the SSA would be grandfathered into the 
 new system. However, the existing ALJs would be subject to the new scheme of performance 
 evaluation.  
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 This proposal presents important issues of scale.  Obviously the U.S. SST would 
require a vastly larger corps of judges than the Australian AAT (with its 89 members) 
or SSAT (with its 230 members).  Yet the judges who would staff the SST are already 
in place – the approximately 1200134 skilled, experienced and conscientious Social 
Security ALJs.  They would be the nucleus of the SST.   
 The issue of consistency of decisions is always problematic in mass justice 
situations.  As Mashaw pointed out long ago, the only way to achieve reasonable 
consistency of decisions among vast numbers of judges in a mass justice situation is 
through management initiatives, not through an appeals council or through judicial 
review of the procedure or the substance of such decisions.135  Those management 
initiatives would be far more practicable and acceptable to the judges if they came 
from an independent SST rather than from the SSA.  For example, the SSA would 
have to issue more regulations and high-level policy statements than it does today to 
furnish guidance to SST judges.  In addition, the SST might designate important 
decisions by SST judges as precedent decisions that judges in later cases would be 
required to follow.   
 The political feasibility of this proposal can be questioned.  It is certainly possible 
that ALJ organizations would dig in their heels against it, opposing anything that 
might diminish their APA protections, or reduce the number of ALJs in their ranks.  
Yet many ALJs have favored the creation of a federal, central panel that would 
remove them from control of the agency that is party to the dispute.  The SST would 
produce exactly that form of independence, but it could be achieved only if the ALJs 
were willing to accept a change to a new status as SST judges with whatever tailored 
protections seemed most salient to that position. 
 Needless to say, many practical issues would arise in so radically changing the 
structure of federal benefits adjudication, and there will be many compromises along 
the way.  Of course, the hearing process is just one step in a complex state/federal 
process of disability claim adjudication and cannot be viewed in isolation from all the 
other stages.  This briefly sketched proposal does not address the details or the entire 
process from state examiner scrutiny of a disability claim through federal court of 
appeals review.  We seek only to point out the advantages of an independent tribunal 
structure in addressing some of the pathologies of the existing system of social 
security adjudication.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
 The Australian model shows that a generalized or specialized merits-review 
tribunal can work efficiently and achieve legitimacy.  It can command the respect of 
all parties.  It presents a successful alternative approach to the U.S. system of 
embedded adjudicators.  The fact that the U.K. has adopted a close variant of it is 
evidence of its success.  Whether the tribunal system could be adapted to the U.S. is 
obviously debatable.  However, in the area of mass adjudication of social benefits 
programs, where policy matters rarely arise in individual cases, a centralized and 
independent tribunal provides an intriguing and possibly adaptable model.  This 
experience should be carefully considered by American policymakers as they address 
the seemingly intractable problem of federal benefits adjudication. 
   
                                                          
134  See Office of Personnel Management chart, supra note 3. 
135  Jerry Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice:  Managing Social Security Disability Claims (New Haven: Yale University 
 Press, 1985) at 104-06, 148-49, 185-90. 
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A WAVERING COMMITMENT? ADMINISTRATIVE INDEPENDENCE 
AND COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE IN ONTARIO’S 
ADJUDICATIVE TRIBUNALS ACCOUNTABILITY LEGISLATION 
 
Laverne Jacobs 
 
In December 2009, the Ontario Legislative Assembly enacted the 
Adjudicative Tribunals Accountability, Governance and 
Appointments Act, 2009 [ATAGAA]. This new legislation offers a 
unique approach to ensuring that adjudicative tribunals in the province are 
transparent, accountable and efficient in their operations while preserving their 
decision-making independence.  This approach aims to bring the executive 
branch of government and tribunals together in achieving effective and 
accountable internal tribunal governance.  Through the use of illustrative cases, 
the author argues, however, that the statute does not address many of the 
contemporary concerns about administrative independence and accountability 
that tribunals experience on the ground. She argues further that the legislation 
is inconsistent in its underlying commitment to the concept of accountability 
itself as it fails to contemplate the importance of government accountability to 
tribunals and overlooks opportunities to foster sustained internal cultures of 
accountability. Finally, the approach taken by the legislation must be 
channeled properly to avoid disintegrating from one of collaborative governance 
to one of command and control. 
 
En décembre 2009, l’Assemblée législative de l’Ontario a adopté la Loi de 
2009 sur la responsabilisation et la gouvernance des tribunaux décisionnels et 
les nominations à ces tribunaux. Cette nouvelle loi présente une approche tout 
à fait particulière pour assurer que les tribunaux décisionnels de la province 
sont transparents, tenus de rendre compte et efficaces dans leur fonctionnement 
tout en préservant leur indépendance décisionnelle. Cette approche vise à 
rapprocher l’autorité exécutive du gouvernement et les tribunaux pour en 
arriver à une gouvernance interne efficace et responsable des tribunaux. En 
utilisant des cas pour l’illustrer, l’auteure soutient, toutefois, que la loi 
n’aborde pas plusieurs des préoccupations contemporaines au sujet de 
l’indépendance administrative et l’obligation de rendre compte dont les 
tribunaux font l’expérience sur le terrain. Elle soutient de plus que la loi est 
inconsistante dans son engagement sous-jacent envers le concept lui-même de 
l’obligation de rendre compte puisqu’elle ne contemple pas l’importance de tenir 
le gouvernement responsable envers les tribunaux et néglige les occasions de 
favoriser des cultures internes soutenues de rendre compte. Finalement, 
l’approche que prend la loi doit être dirigée convenablement pour éviter de se 
                                                          
  Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Windsor. An earlier version of this article was 
 presented at the Sixth Administrative Law Discussion Forum, Québec City, May 25-26, 2010 and at 
 the 6th Annual National Forum on Administrative Law and Practice, Osgoode Hall Law School, York 
 University, October 18-19, 2010. I am grateful to the participants of the two conferences for their 
 valuable feedback, to Windsor Law students, John Brennan and Melissa Kwok, for their excellent 
 research assistance and to the Law Foundation of Ontario for its generous financial support.  
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désintégrer d’une approche de gouvernance collaborative en une de 
commandement et de contrôle. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Adjudicative Tribunals Accountability, Governance and Appointments Act, 20091 
[ATAGAA] forms part of a modernization initiative of the current Ontario Liberal 
government. This initiative aims to strengthen Ontario's laws, regulations and systems 
by increasing transparency, accountability and efficiency within the province without 
compromising administrative independence.2 The statute is unique in Canada.  
Ontario is the only jurisdiction that has attempted to address the major public 
concerns about the accountability of administrative tribunals through one 
comprehensive, tailored statute.3 
 This paper offers a critique of ATAGAA. Through it, I suggest that the 
legislation has opened the door to certain avenues of ensuring accountability that are 
potentially quite promising. Specifically, the statute shows an approach to tribunal 
governance that is collaborative in nature, by providing room for input on a range of 
tribunal accountability matters from the tribunals that are being governed.   
ATAGAA fails, nevertheless, to address many critical contemporary concerns 
relating to tribunal accountability and independence, especially those regarding the 
accountability of the executive branch of government to administrative tribunals to 
ensure that the public is adequately served. Of equal concern is that ATAGAA 
presents an underlying philosophy to accountability that is inconsistent. Despite its 
attempt at promoting a collaborative governance approach, the statute tends to 
favour the idea of enforcing accountability from the outside rather than fostering 
elements of internal tribunal culture that could lead to more authentic and durable 
measures of accountability. 
 This paper proceeds in three parts.  Part II provides an overview of ATAGAA, 
highlighting its most salient aspects. Accountability and independence are often 
interwoven in Canadian administrative law. Because their relationship is at the heart 
of the discussion in this paper, Part III defines these two concepts and discusses the 
connection between them, placing them within the broader context of the Canadian 
administrative state. Part IV outlines some of the most significant concerns about 
administrative accountability that have surfaced in Canadian legal academic literature 
and recent case law.  In this part, I take a focused look at ATAGAA. I examine the 
                                                          
1  S.O. 2009, c. 33 Schedule 5 [“ATAGAA,” “the Act”].  ATAGAA received Royal assent on 
 December 15, 2009.  It has been coming into force in stages since then. At the time of writing, only
 the provisions relating to clustering had come into force and no general proclamation date had been 
 set for the rest of the provisions. 
2  See Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Ontario Hansard, 179 (27 October 2009) at 1520 (Hon.  
 Christopher Bentley). See also Ontario Attorney General, Press Release, “McGuinty Government 
 Increasing Transparency, Accountability And Effectiveness,” (October 27 2009) online: Government 
 of Ontario <http://www.news.ontario.ca/mag/en/2009/10/modernizing-provincial-laws.html>.  
 See also ATAGAA, ibid. s. 1. 
3  This is not to discount the existence of other statutes in Canada that address, as part of a larger 
 collection of administrative law issues, specific questions of accountability. Of note is Québec's An act 
 respecting administrative justice, RSQ 1998 c J-3, which speaks to certain questions of ethics and 
 accountability. In particular, Title III, ss. 165 – 198, deals with the establishment of a council (Le 
 Conseil de la Justice Administrative) that is responsible for creating a code of ethics for members of the 
 Administrative Tribunal of Québec, for receiving and investigating complaints against members of 
 the Tribunal and for examining issues constituting a lapse in the exercise of administrative office 
 which may lead to the removal of Tribunal members or the Tribunal’s President. 
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statute’s possibilities and limitations with respect to its ability to address 
contemporary concerns about accountability without encroaching on the equally 
important value of administrative independence. 
 
II. ATAGAA: - AN OVERVIEW    
 
 Outside of provisions dedicated to introductory and general matters, ATAGAA 
addresses the following four main topics:4  a) the creation of public accountability 
documents by adjudicative tribunals and amendments to these documents, b) the 
creation of governance accountability documents by adjudicative tribunals, c) 
ensuring merit-based appointments and d) adjudicative tribunal clustering.   The 
following is an overview of how the legislation deals with each of these four topics.  
Overall, one sees a definite shift towards a sharing of governance between the 
executive branch of government and adjudicative tribunals.  This is a positive step:  if 
properly channelled, it can open the door to allowing for input by a broader spectrum 
of interests including those of the adjudicative tribunals involved and through them, 
their users.  At the same time, the collaborative governance approach taken by the 
legislation evidences important gaps that may have an impact on its effectiveness. 
 
A. Public Accountability Documents  
 The Public Accountability Documents part of the statute is dedicated to the 
public face of the adjudicative tribunal. It is concerned with: how the tribunal will 
conduct itself on a day-to-day basis with the public it serves, how it will handle public 
complaints, its mission and mandate statements, its ethics plan, and its financial, 
staffing and training arrangements.   These are issues that affect public confidence in 
how efficiently an administrative tribunal will function and, more indirectly, in the 
tribunal’s adjudicative capacity.  
 Under ATAGAA, every adjudicative tribunal is required to develop a mandate 
statement and a mission statement, both of which must be approved by the tribunal's 
responsible minister. However, there is no definition of these statements, no specific 
content identified for inclusion and there are no guidelines for developing them. 
Similar provisions are outlined for: 
 
 the tribunal  to create a policy for consultation with the 
public when changing its rules or policies;5  
 the creation of a service standard policy which indicates 
the tribunal’s intended standard of service and the 
process for making and responding to complaints about 
tribunal service;6  
                                                          
4  Although it addresses only four main topics, ATAGAA comprises six parts. These six parts are:   
 "Public Accountability Documents" (ss.  3 - 7); "Publication, Amendment and Review of Public 
 Accountability Documents” (ss. 8-10); "Governance Accountability Documents" (ss. 11 - 13); 
 "Appointment to Adjudicative Tribunals" (s. 14); “Tribunal Clustering" (ss. 15 - 19) and "General 
 Matters" (ss. 20 - 22). The legislation ends with a section entitled "Regulations"(ss. 23-25), in which 
 one finds provisions dedicated to the creation of regulations by the Lieutenant Governor in Council 
 and to housekeeping matters such as the coming into force date and short title.  The statute, which is 
 short,  can be accessed online: Service Ontario e-laws <http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/ statutes/ 
 english/elaws_statutes_09a33_e.htm>. 
5  ATAGAA, supra note 1 at s. 4. 
6  Ibid at s. 5. 
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 the development of an ethics plan, which must be 
approved by the public service’s Conflict of Interest 
Commissioner;7 and  
 the establishment of a member accountability 
framework.8  
 
 The last of these, the member accountability framework, would appear to be one 
of the most onerous statements to prepare.  It requires the tribunal to provide a 
description of the functions of all members, vice-chairs and the chair of the tribunal, 
their skills, knowledge, experience, other attributes and qualifications and that it 
create a code of conduct for tribunal members.   It does not specify what will happen 
if the code of conduct is breached. It is possible that the tribunal may create its own 
sanctions, but this is not clear from the statute. The code of conduct requirement is 
revisited more closely below. 
 Once drafted, all documents created under the Public Accountability Documents 
portion of the statute can be amended by the tribunal and must be reviewed every 
three years by the tribunal to determine if amendments are required.9 The Public 
Accountability Documents part of the statute does not provide explicit rationales or 
discussion of the underlying goals to be satisfied by each of the various documents 
required. This is unfortunate as it may render the experience of creating these 
documents a chore, delegated to the administrative management of the tribunal, 
rather than a consensus-building exercise among the members and staff of the 
tribunal. 
 
B. Governance Accountability Documents 
 The Governance Accountability Documents provisions of the statute deal with 
the development of memoranda of understanding between the tribunal and its 
responsible minister, as well as the creation of business plans and annual reports. 
ATAGAA requires every adjudicative tribunal to enter into a memorandum of 
understanding with its responsible minister.10  The memorandum should address both 
the tribunal’s internal governance matters and its external relationship with the 
responsible minister.  With respect to internal matters, the memoranda aim to seek 
agreement between tribunal and minister on questions relating to the financial, 
staffing and administrative arrangements, committee structure and the recruitment 
and training of tribunal members.11  Such issues are typically left to the discretion of 
the administrative tribunal. Problems can arise, however, if the executive branch of 
government interjects without welcome on the tribunal’s understanding of how to do 
things best.  One can therefore see how maintaining a pre-established set of guiding 
norms through a memorandum of understanding can be useful in navigating or 
avoiding conflicts between tribunals and the executive branch of government.  As for 
the tribunal's external relationship with its responsible minister, ATAGAA merely 
specifies that the accountability relationships of the tribunal, including its duty to 
                                                          
7  Ibid at s. 6. 
8 Ibid at s. 7. 
9  Ibid at ss.  9, 10. 
10  Ibid at ss. 11 (1). 
11   Ibid at ss. 11 (2) (a), (c), (d). (e). 
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account to its responsible minister should be addressed in a memorandum of 
understanding.12   
 The preparation of business plans and annual reports are similarly subject to this 
part of the statute.  Every adjudicative tribunal is required to develop a business plan 
for the public, the contents of which will be prescribed and/or found in a directive of 
the Management Board of Cabinet13 (a committee of the Executive Council which is 
charged with efficient running of the public service in the province14).  As for annual 
reports, ATAGAA sets out the timeframe within which annual reports must be 
submitted to the tribunal's responsible minister, indicates their contents and that they 
will be tabled in the Legislative Assembly.15 Interestingly, the executive branch of 
government, by way of the Management Board of Cabinet, is able to specify 
additional matters that should be included in almost every document to be produced 
by the tribunal in relation to public and governance accountability under the statute.   
 
C. Appointments to Adjudicative Tribunals 
 Undoubtedly in response to persistent concerns about partisanship appointments 
in the administrative justice system, this part of the statute outlines criteria for 
ensuring meritorious appointments to adjudicative tribunals.  Candidates will be 
assessed for any tribunal-specific qualifications indicated in enabling legislation, as 
well as for their experience and knowledge of the law and subject matter, their 
aptitude for impartial adjudication and their aptitude for applying any alternative 
adjudicative practices and procedures that may be set out in the tribunal's rules.  The 
recruitment requirements and selection process will be made public.16 The chair of the 
tribunal will be consulted for his or her assessment of a candidate’s qualifications and 
recommendation of appointment.  The chair also plays a prominent role in 
reappointments:  he or she will be consulted for an evaluation of current members’ 
                                                          
12  Ibid at ss. 11 (2) (b). 
13  Ibid at s. 12. 
14  See Management Board of Cabinet Act, RSO 1990, c M.1 [Management Board of Cabinet Act]. The main 
 purpose of the Management Board of Cabinet is to ensure the efficient operation of the public 
 service in Ontario. The duties of the Management Board of Cabinet are: a) to approve organization 
 and staff establishments in any part of the public service; b) to establish, prescribe or regulate any 
 policies and procedures that the Board considers necessary for the efficient and effective operation of 
 any part of the public service; c) to initiate and supervise the development of management practices 
 and systems for the efficient operation of any part of the public service; and d) to report to the 
 Executive Council on matters concerning general administrative policy in any part of the public 
 service, either on its own initiative or because the matter has been referred to it by the Executive 
 Council  (See Management Board of Cabinet Act, ss. 3(1)). The public service is defined broadly to 
 include all Ministries, Crown agencies, corporations owned, operated or controlled by the Crown and 
 all other boards, commissions, authorities or unincorporated bodies of the Crown. Administrative 
 tribunals are generally understood to be independent of the Crown, and at arm’s length from 
 central government (which would include ministries of the executive), it is therefore unusual that 
 Management Board, which is fundamentally responsible for Crown operations, would be responsible 
 for creating the directives to guide administrative tribunals in this context. One can certainly surmise 
 that there may be important differences in the way that the regular public service and an arm’s 
 length administrative tribunal deal with many of the matters over which Management Board of 
 Cabinet has directive making power. These matters include tribunal mandate and mission 
 statements, public consultation policies, service standard policies, ethics plans and member 
 accountability frameworks.   
15  ATAGAA also indicates that if there is a conflict between it and another statute respecting the 
 tabling of annual reports for a particular tribunal, the tribunal-specific statute should prevail.  See 
 ATAGAA, supra note 1 at s. 13. 
16  See Ibid at s. 14. 
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performance of duties and reappointments will only be made upon the chair's 
recommendation.17     
 
D. Tribunal Clustering 
 The idea for tribunal “clustering” in Ontario first emerged as part of a study done 
in 2007 sponsored by the Ministry of Government and Consumer Services. 18 
"Clustering" is defined in the study as a way of sharing best practices among tribunals 
that work in related areas and deal with related subject matter.  The study sought to 
examine how tribunals could maximize their existing pools of resources to provide 
the highest level of public service while strengthening individual tribunal mandates.  
While clustering is not a means of merging or integrating different tribunals into one 
generic agency and although the aim is not cost-cutting, clustering was seen to be a 
valuable tool for preserving scarce public resources while retaining specialized 
expertise.  The study looked into the feasibility of clustering certain tribunals dealing 
with a land use. In 2009, the first tribunal cluster in Ontario was established, the 
Environment and Land Use Planning cluster. This cluster includes the Assessment 
Review Board, the Board of Negotiation, the Environmental Review Tribunal and the 
Ontario Municipal Board. 
 Through ATAGAA, the government has furthered the foundational basis of 
clustering by setting out guidelines for the designation, governance structure and 
accountability of clusters.  The statute provides that two or more adjudicative 
tribunals may be designated as a cluster if the Lieutenant Governor in Council (i.e. 
Cabinet) is of the opinion that they can operate more effectively and efficiently in that 
way.19   No consultation with the affected ministries or tribunals is contemplated in 
the Act.  The Act has provision for an executive chair to be appointed who would be 
responsible for the entire cluster, as well as for the appointment of various associate-, 
alternate- and vice-chairs.20 The executive chair possesses all of the powers, duties and 
functions of the chair of each tribunal within a cluster.21 As for accountability, the 
tribunals in a cluster are to participate jointly in the creation of the public and 
governance accountability documents required under ATAGAA.   
 
E. Challenges Arising from ATAGAA's Choice of Tools and Actors 
 With the exception of the tribunal clustering provisions, ATAGAA clearly shows 
a shift towards a shared model of governance in which both the executive branch of 
government and administrative tribunals participate in the goal of holding 
adjudicative tribunals accountable. However, the central question of whether the 
statute will accomplish its task of assuring the accountability of adjudicative tribunals 
raises doubts. There are significant gaps in the legislation that reveal conflicting 
approaches to the legislation’s underlying philosophy of collaboration. Four aspects 
of the legislation reveal its shortcomings.  These aspects all centre around the 
presence or absence of appropriate tools and agents for realizing the statute’s 
objectives.  
                                                          
17  See Ibid at ss.  14 (4). 
18  Final Report of the Agency Cluster Facilitator for the Municipal, Environment and Land Use Planning Tribunals 
 (Toronto: Agency Cluster Project, August 22, 2007) (Facilitator: Kevin Whitaker), online: 
 Ministry of Government and Consumer  Services<http://www.gov.on.ca/mgs/graphics/166283 
 .pdf> [Ontario Agency Cluster Report].  
19  See ATAGAA, supra note 1 at s.  15. 
20  See Ibid at ss. 16, 17. 
21  See Ibid at s. 17(1). 
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 The weaknesses in the legislature's choice of tools and agents of governance 
appear most readily in the instruments adopted for achieving accountability.  These 
instruments include the public accountability documents and the governance 
accountability documents. How exactly will the mandate and mission statements, 
consultation policies, service standard policies, and member accountability 
frameworks work to ensure that litigants, users and other concerned citizens will be 
able to hold adjudicative tribunals to account? Many of these instruments are merely 
descriptive in nature. For example, the mission statements, consultation policies, and 
member accountability frameworks primarily provide a means for the tribunal to 
outline functions, skills and policies.  Missing are tools that would allow a person 
alleging that the tribunal has not been accountable to push for some sort of corrective 
action.  It is not clear if these documents are simply bureaucratic instruments or 
whether they will provide for change. 
 Even where the legislation does provide instruments that could theoretically 
engender change, the legislation is silent as to the concrete steps that are to be used to 
move a tribunal to become more accountable.  Discussed briefly above, the 
provisions requiring adjudicative tribunals to create a code of conduct are illustrative 
of this shortcoming. Left unstated in ATAGAA is what will happen if a code of 
conduct, once developed, is breached by a tribunal member.  It may be that, in an 
effort to respect tribunal independence, the legislature has been silent, intending to 
allow each tribunal to determine whether sanctions should be imposed at all.22 If 
corrective action is contemplated, it is not clear whether the code of conduct is to 
work with sanctions enforced by an external body such as the responsible minister or 
the province’s Conflict of Interest Commissioner, or to implement penalties 
developed by the tribunal itself.  Some may argue that self-sanctioning is not an 
effective method; others may suggest that only those within the realm of expertise of 
the administrative tribunal are in a position to understand well the industry and its 
workings and to fashion effective disciplinary measures.  A final argument might be 
that the source of any type of penalty is a matter best addressed on a case-by-case 
basis depending on the nature of the tribunal and the issue in question. All of these 
options are possible but it is necessary for these and other debates to take place about 
their merits. ATAGAA does not indicate, however, if or how such discussions will fit 
into the tribunal's creation of a code of conduct; it merely indicates that a code of 
conduct must be produced.  Finally, sanctions contemplated for noncompliance with 
the code may be introduced by way of regulation.23 If the government chooses to 
create such regulations, it may be helpful for it to provide tribunals with at least some 
programmatic guidance on implementation of sanctions, after consultation with the 
tribunals concerned. 
 A third shortcoming of the legislation is found in the lack of express rationales for 
the accountability documents that ATAGAA requires.  As mentioned briefly earlier, 
                                                          
22  Legislation that provides remedial or disciplinary measures for tribunal member misconduct may, 
 alternatively, provide for an independent mechanism to deal with sanctions. Under the Canadian 
 Human Rights Act, for example, the Chair of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal may request the 
 Minister of Justice to decide if a tribunal member should be subject to remedial or disciplinary 
 measures for pre-specified issues of misconduct. The Minister of Justice’s options under the statute 
 include holding a public inquiry led by a Superior Court judge and mediation.  See the Canadian 
 Human Rights Act, R.S., 1985, c. H-6, s. 48.3. 
23  Subsections 23 (h) and 23(i) provide that the Lieutenant Governor in Council may make regulations 
 that prescribe other matters to be addressed or included in any public accountability documents or 
 governance accountability documents, and regulations that prescribe the form and format of these 
 two types of documents. 
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such rationales would be useful for any tribunal as it goes about determining how to 
reach outcomes in developing these instruments.  One would hope that the best way 
to ensure accountability would be to seize the moment when the tribunal has to think 
through its mandate, mission, service standards etc. and use this moment to foster a 
consensus-building, reflective exercise among those in the tribunal itself. This would 
be helpful in encouraging an ethos of accountability among the members of a given 
tribunal, which could lead to more durable change. If those who must be accountable 
do not have a meaningful way to engage with the underlying purpose of the 
accountability instruments they are creating, then the exercise may be a lost 
opportunity in terms of its resonance within the tribunal itself.  Explanations of why 
the various documents required are necessary may assist in fostering authentic 
dialogue within the administrative tribunals themselves and in capitalizing on 
opportunities for the development of an ethos of accountability. As it currently 
stands, the lack of express rationales comes across as top-down and formalistic, in 
sharp contradistinction to the collaborative governance philosophy of most of the 
statute. 
 It is clear that the legislature’s tools of governance leave some quizzical gaps. The 
same is also true of the choice of agents used to assure ATAGAA’s functioning.  
Every public accountability or governance accountability document that the tribunals 
are required to produce is subject to additional directives by the Management Board 
of Cabinet. Moreover, the responsible minister’s approval is required for all 
documents. These two oversight mechanisms present the opportunity for an unusual 
amount of control by the executive branch of government. Why does this possibility 
for executive control exist? One falls into a dichotomous conceptual gap in answering 
this question, as the premises animating the statute's design are difficult to identify. In 
creating this statute, was the legislature's intention to touch on matters over which it 
saw itself capable of legislating or simply to facilitate closer policing of daily tribunal 
activities in an attempt to prevent and remedy accountability gaps more quickly? 
Backed with legislative intent, both approaches may be seen to be legally valid. If the 
main goal, however, is to bring about greater scrutiny over areas that are usually 
within the administrative control of tribunals then regardless of whether it is legally 
valid, the statute will suffer from concerns about its legitimacy within the 
administrative tribunal community.   
 There are ten main documents that ATAGAA requires tribunals to prepare.24 An 
examination of the language surrounding each one suggests that the legislature still 
views some of the matters with which the documents deal as areas governed by 
tribunal discretion, irrespective of the statute’s oversight. For instance, each 
adjudicative tribunal to which ATAGAA applies is required to indicate the standard 
of service "that the tribunal intends to provide"25. Similarly, it is difficult to see how a 
tribunal mission statement26 could be created by the legislature, as mission statements 
are generally auto-reflective documents that project the values and aspirations 
developed at the tribunal level.27 These elements of ATAGAA suggest that the statute 
                                                          
24  These are the : mandate statement (ss. 2(a)), mission statement (ss. 2(b)), consultation policy (s. 4), 
 member accountability framework (s. 7), service standard policy (s. 5), ethics plan (s. 6), business 
 plan (s. 12), annual report (s. 13), memorandum of understanding (s. 11) and review and amendments 
 to the public accountability documents (ss. 9-10).  
25  See ATAGAA, supra note 1 at ss. 5(2). 
26  See Ibid at ss. 3(2)(b). 
27  Similarly, the consultation policy required by the tribunal is dependent on the tribunal chair’s opinion 
 as to who should be consulted. See Ibid at ss. 4(2). 
Vol. 28(2)  Ontario’s Adjudicative Tribunals Accountability Legislation  293 
 
aims to preserve areas of tribunal discretion that fall commonly within the realm of 
administrative independence28 while simultaneously permitting responsible ministers 
the right to supervise these discretionary realms.29 In light of this, it is not surprising 
that concerns have already been raised by members of the administrative justice 
community.30 
 Caution should therefore be taken so that approval by the responsible minister, 
which is required for most of the accountability instruments, does not disintegrate 
into a command and control exercise over the tribunal’s internal governance.  Many 
of the spheres that the statute has now entered were previously fully within the 
tribunal's administrative control at common law.  These include its decisions relating 
to staffing, training, codes of conduct, service standards and many others.  It can be 
useful to have ministerial input, particularly where this might bring about a more 
levelled approach to accountability issues among the various adjudicative tribunals in 
the province.31 There may be administrative tribunals who currently have few 
accountability mechanisms in place and others who have already put much time and 
effort into transparency and accountability.  It would be encouraging, however, to see 
more of a legislated commitment to guard against the possible collapse of the 
collaborative governance approach proposed in the statute into one of close executive 
control. 
 Finally, although ATAGAA aims to make administrative tribunals more 
accountable, it does not address the countervailing question of the accountability of 
government to adjudicative tribunals.  This accountability is important so that 
adjudicative tribunals can adequately serve the public. This is a particularly 
                                                          
28  Within the realm of administrative independence, it is administrative control - that is, a tribunal’s 
 decision over the daily activities its operation, including managing resources and caseload – which 
 figures most prominently here. For a discussion of the concept of administrative control, see R. v. 
 Valente [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673. 
29  The legislature clearly has left room for the tribunal’s discretion (or the discretion of the tribunal 
 chair) yet also required ministerial approval for the following documents: the service standard policy 
 (see, in particular ss. 5(2) (a)), the consultation policy (s. 4), review and amendment of public 
 accountability documents (ss. 9-10). By contrast, the legislatures are quite unequivocal in indicating 
 the documents for which contents shall be prescribed. These are: the ethics plan (s.6), the business 
 plan (s. 12) and the annual report (s. 13). For these documents, it seems clear that the legislature 
 believes that it could have created legislation on the matter. Finally, there is a gray zone of 
 subjects over which the legislature could take full responsibility but it is not clear from reading the 
 statute that it intended to do so. These include the mandate statement (s. 3) and the member 
 accountability framework (s. 7). The memorandum of understanding (s. 11) is by nature a document 
 of shared responsibility between the tribunal and the responsible minister. 
30  See e.g. Ontario Bar Association, “Adjudicative Tribunals Accountability, Governance and Appointments Act, 
 2009-Cause for Concern: The Independence Issue” (August 25, 2010), online: Ontario Bar 
 Association <http://www.oba.org/En/publicaffairs_en/Submissions/Submissions.aspx>. The 
 author discloses being a member of the committee that drafted the report. Some may argue that a 
 responsible minister should have the control of items such as mission statements and consultation 
 policies as part of his or her portfolio. It is hard to reconcile this view of the minister's role, however, 
 with the understanding of an administrative tribunal as an arm's-length agency that is independent  of 
 government. As an independent, arm's-length body, the tribunal has been removed from the 
 departments of the executive government and charged with overseeing the management of an 
 industry or sector through its understanding of its enabling statute and its expertise. Documents such 
 as a mission statement or consultation policy emerge from an understanding of the legislation and the 
 day-to-day dealings with the industry or sector that develop over time. Given that the minister is 
 removed from this day-to-day work, it is hard to see how his or her view of documents emerging 
 from a mixture of statutory interpretation and daily tribunal operation can be more appropriate 
 than the perspective of the tribunal itself. 
31  ATAGAA currently applies to 37 tribunals in Ontario. The tribunals are listed in the regulation: 
 General O. Reg. 126/10. 
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unfortunate failing of the accountability statute.  Many concerns about government 
accountability to administrative tribunals speak directly to tribunal independence.  If 
the legislation had engaged with concerns such as the removal of appointees and 
budgetary resources, it would have shown a much stronger commitment to balancing 
accountability and independence in the often politicized operational context of the 
administrative state.  I turn next to a more detailed discussion of the nature of the 
Canadian administrative state, the values of accountability and independence, and the 
tense relationship between them, in an effort to show where ATAGAA needs to be 
strengthened in order to be a truly effective accountability statute. 
 
III. DEFINING ADMINISTRATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
INDEPENDENCE  
 
A. Institutional Framework - The Canadian Administrative State 
 To situate the discussion, it is useful to have a better sense of the bodies with 
which ATAGAA is concerned.   Broadly speaking, the Canadian administrative state 
refers to the collection of administrative boards, agencies, commissions, tribunals and 
other similar bodies established at arm’s length from the federal, provincial or 
territorial executive branch of government. These bodies generally receive their 
mandates through legislation32 and their purpose is to help implement government 
policies and programs.  The administrative state aims to “provide a forum that is 
more specialized, less costly and easier to use than the courts.”33  
 Administrative bodies are said to be "independent" because of the absence of 
close control over their decision-making by the executive branch of government. 
"Independence,” however, does not indicate a total lack of connection to the 
executive or legislative branches of government.  On the contrary, administrative 
bodies usually have a designated Minister of Cabinet who is responsible for reporting 
on their activities to the legislature.  The responsible minister also tends to be 
involved in the appointment of members of the administrative agency and its chair.  
With respect to legislative connections, administrative bodies are susceptible to 
having their mandates, structures, and other aspects of their work modified through 
the legislative process. They may even be abolished through legislative enactment or 
repeal.34  
 One thing that is clear about the Canadian administrative state is that the term 
“administrative body” can refer to a wide variety of administrative actors.  These 
actors may vary in their decision-making output.  For example, they may produce 
binding orders (e.g. human rights tribunals), non-binding recommendations (e.g. 
provincial ombudsman), policy reports (e.g. Royal Commissions) or no reports at all 
                                                          
32  Non-statutory administrative bodies also exist although they are less common. An example is the 
 Anishinabek Police Services, which is an autonomous, self-governing First Nations police service 
 created by agreement among the federal government, the Ontario Government and a number of First 
 Nations groups (the Anishinabek Police Service Agreement 1992). See the discussion of the 
 Anishinabek Police Service in McDonald v. Anishinabek Police Service (2006), 53 C.C.E.L. (3d) 126. Non-
 statutory administrative bodies are generally described as being created through Crown (executive) 
 prerogative. 
33  Ontario, Everyday Justice: Report of the Agency Reform Commission on Ontario’s Regulatory and Adjudicative 
 Agencies (Toronto:  Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 1998) at 3. 
34  See e.g. Wells v. Newfoundland, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 199 in which a member of a public utilities board lost 
 his position and pension rights when the Newfoundland government restructured the board and 
 terminated his appointment. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the member was entitled to 
 compensation from the government for the breach of its obligations. 
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(e.g. a body with no statutory duty to give reasons may refrain from doing so35).  
Administrative bodies are also not distinguished by the nature of the disputes they 
hear. They hear disputes between private parties (e.g. labour boards), between 
individuals and government (e.g. social benefit tribunals) or larger polycentric matters 
that address issues such as government planning and energy distribution. External 
structure is yet another factor that is not consistent among administrative bodies.  
Although most are created as extensions of the executive branch of government, 
some are agents of the legislature.36  Similarly, the structure of administrative bodies 
may range from multimember organizations to a single cabinet minister.37  The 
appointment process and terms of appointment may also cover a broad range of 
options, varying as to whether all of the political parties have a say in the appointment 
of the chair or members or whether it is an appointment by the government of the 
day; whether the appointment is for a fixed length of time or is an appointment at the 
pleasure of the government; and whether there is a statutory procedure for removing 
an appointee.38  As for the internal structure of administrative tribunals, this element 
often depends on the discretion of the chair of the agency in conjunction with those 
who work there.  The internal organization of administrative bodies (e.g. how many 
departments there are, how the departments will divide the work, etc.) is not uniform, 
owing largely to the differences in function of various tribunals. Even tribunals with 
similar policy goals across the country may have very different internal structures.  
Empirical evidence shows that the internal structure and internal culture (the norms 
or ethos that guide the work that is done at the tribunal) similarly manifest themselves 
in large variety.39                                                                                                          
 Finally, the procedures of administrative bodies may be vastly different. Some 
administrative bodies have court-like processes, others may decide disputes in a much 
less formal manner, still others may provide the opportunity to be heard through a 
written hearing and some employ inquiry powers.    Reflective of this broad and 
seemingly unwieldly array is that among the many official names for administrative 
actors, one will find “agencies,” “boards,” “commissions,” and “tribunals” although 
no one name denotes any particular mixture of decision-making output, nature of 
dispute, structure  or procedure.   
                                                          
35  However, the common law duty to give reasons may apply if the decision will have a significant 
 impact on the individual(s) affected. See Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 
 [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817. 
36  The most typical examples of administrative actors that have been established as officers of the 
 legislature are the ombudsman, which exist in nine of the provinces and territories, and access to 
 information and privacy commissioners which exist in eleven provinces and territories as well as at 
 the federal level.  See e.g. the Ontario Ombudsman Act R.S.O. 1990, c. O.6 and the Freedom of 
 Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 165. 
37  See generally on the wide definition of the term “administrative actor,” W. A. Bogart, "The Tools of 
 the Administrative State and the Regulatory Mix" in Colleen M. Flood & Lorne Sossin eds., 
 Administrative Law in Context (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2008) [Administrative Law in Context]. 
38   Terms of appointment and removal may require a formal review by Parliament or the legislature and 
 approval by a percentage of Parliament or the legislature.  See e.g. An Act respecting Access to documents 
 held by public bodies and the protection of personal information, RSQ c A-2.1, ss. 104, 107 which indicates that 
 a member of Québec's access to information and privacy commission may be appointed and 
 dismissed only on a resolution of the legislature that is approved by not less than two-thirds of the 
 Québec legislative assembly. Most administrative contexts do not require such formal review.   
39  Laverne Jacobs, Fashioning Administrative Independence at the “Tribunal” Level: An Ethnographic Study of 
 Access to Information and Privacy Commissions in Canada (Ph.D. dissertation, York University, Osgoode 
 Hall Law School, 2009) [unpublished] [Fashioning Administrative Independence]. 
296 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 2010  
  
 A few distinct responses to the diversity of the administrative state have emerged 
in administrative law theory.  The courts, certain legal academics and some 
commentators have developed a classification of administrative bodies according to 
their degree of resemblance to the courts.  This school of thought proposes that 
administrative bodies should be conceived as running along a spectrum. 40   
Considered to be at the adjudicative end of the spectrum are administrative actors 
that make decisions affecting individual rights, that serve primarily to determine a lis 
between parties by adjudicators who are appointed by government and then chosen 
by the chair to preside alone or on panels, and that employ procedures that are quasi-
judicial nature (i.e. that involve oral hearings, the exchange of evidence, submission of 
legal argument, etc.).  The spectrum theory maintains that adjudicative bodies should 
provide the highest degree of procedural fairness for the parties who appear before 
them.41 Some also maintain that the expression “tribunal” be reserved for bodies that 
fit this end of the spectrum.42  At the opposite end of the spectrum are administrative 
bodies that primarily produce governmental policy.  These bodies may hear from a 
multitude of perspectives in determining how government should act in cases that are 
not individual but systemic.  Individuals appearing before policy oriented bodies are 
said to require less procedural fairness.  Between the two polar ends of the spectrum 
run a range of tribunals that vary in their mixture of policy and adjudicative functions. 
The spectrum approach to categorizing the actors of the administrative state has 
captured the attention of certain policymakers. Indeed, in some jurisdictions such as 
Ontario, these concepts have been adopted as organizational tools. The Public 
Appointments Secretariat of Ontario, for example, classifies agencies into eight 
different types, drawing distinctions, among other things, between “advisory 
agencies" which create policy and "adjudicative agencies" which are quasi-judicial 
dispute resolution bodies.43  
 The spectrum school of thought has been challenged by those who argue for a 
less disaggregated understanding of the work of administrative bodies.  In its most 
robust form, the theory put forth by these scholars maintains that instead of focusing 
on what appears to be the most dominant function that an administrative body 
performs, a more authentic understanding of the administrative state would 
                                                          
40  See e.g.  David J. Mullan, “Administrative Tribunals:  Their Evolution in Canada from 1945 to 1984” 
 in Ivan Bernier and Andrée Lajoie, eds,  Regulations, Crown Corporations and Administrative Tribunals 
 (Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, vol. 48) 
 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985); Canadian Bar Association, Task Force Report, 
 Independence of Federal Administrative Tribunals and Agencies in Canada (Ottawa:   Canadian Bar 
 Association, 1990) (Chair:  Edward Ratushny, Q.C.); Bell Canada v. Canadian Telephone Employees 
 Association, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 884 [Bell Canada]. That the notion of a spectrum underpins much 
 administrative law theory can be gleaned from authors who seek to build upon the theory such as S. 
 Ronald Ellis, "The Justicizing of Quasi-Judicial Tribunals Part I” (2006) 19 Can J Admin L & Prac 
 303, and others who denounce the theory such as Roderick A. Macdonald, “The Acoustics of 
 Accountability: Towards Well-Tempered Tribunals” chapter 6 in András Sajó (ed.) Judicial Integrity 
 (Leiden:  M. Nijhoff Publishers, 2004) at 141-180.  
41  See e.g. the Supreme Court of Canada’s assertions to this effect in Bell Canada, ibid. and in
 Newfoundland Telephone Co. v. Newfoundland (Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 623. 
42  See e.g. the use of the term in Kaye Joachim, "New Models in Administrative Hearings: The Human 
 Rights Tribunal of Ontario" in Ronalda Murphy & Patrick A. Molinari, eds, Doing Justice: Dispute 
 Resolution in the Courts and Beyond (Montréal: Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice, 2009) 
 at 87-110. 
43  See "What Is an Agency" online: Ontario Public Appointments Secretariat <https://www.pa s.gov.
 on.ca/scripts/en/general-Info.asp>. Similarly, in Québec, the word "tribunal" is reserved for 
 designated entities including "any person or agency exercising quasi judicial functions.”  
 See Charter of human rights and freedoms R.S.Q., c. C-12 at ss. 56.  
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acknowledge that every administrative body performs a range of tasks, often 
incorporating some form of decision-making, policy-making and many other 
functions such as investigation, education, auditing etc..44   The implications of this 
approach are felt most significantly when considering the issues of procedural fairness 
and accountability.  Those who critique the spectrum approach, are generally wary of 
associating degrees of procedural fairness and accountability with only the most 
dominant function of an administrative body. Instead, they propose that issues such 
as procedural fairness and accountability are best addressed through a close 
understanding of the nature and work of each individual agency. Most recently, there 
has also been emerging literature which posits that each agency's internal culture and 
informal normative order can play a significant role in establishing barometers for 
fairness and accountability.45 
 Quite in conformity with Ontario’s general adoption of the spectrum theory, 
ATAGAA’s focus is on adjudicative tribunals.  The statute itself does not define 
"adjudicative tribunals;" rather, the administrative bodies to which it applies are 
named in a schedule.46   
 
B. The Concepts of Administrative Accountability and Independence   
 The aim of the ATAGAA, 2009 is to strike an appropriate balance between 
accountability measures imposed on adjudicative tribunals and non-interference with 
the tribunal’s decision-making. The desire to strike this balance is reflected in the 
Act’s first section which reads: 
 
The purpose of this Act is to ensure that adjudicative tribunals are 
accountable, transparent and efficient in their operations while 
remaining independent in their decision-making.47 
 
The public and the administrative tribunal community have expressed an enormous 
amount of concern over the accountability and independence of administrative 
actors.48 Accountability speaks to the requirement that an agency and its members 
show responsibility for their actions.  A general understanding is that there should be 
some way to ensure that administrative actors are not misusing public funds and that 
they are using their resources efficiently.  The notion of administrative accountability 
extends past financial and timeliness concerns, however, to address other qualitatively 
important areas such as the ethics, subject-matter competency and performance 
results of appointees.  The central questions surrounding accountability are:  to whom 
should an administrative body and its members be held accountable? For what 
                                                          
44  See Macdonald, supra note 40. 
45  See Macdonald, ibid.; Jacobs, Fashioning Administrative Independence, supra note 39.   
46  See ATAGAA, supra note 1, s. 2 and Ontario Reg. 126/10. 
47  ATAGAA, supra note 1. 
48  There have been numerous reports written on reforming the administrative justice system that touch 
 on accountability and independence. In Ontario, these reports include: Directions:  Review of Ontario’s 
 Regulatory Agencies (Report prepared for the Management Board of Cabinet) (Toronto:  Queen’s 
 Printer for Ontario, 1989) (Chair:  Robert Macaulay) and Everyday Justice, supra note 33.  There have 
 also been documents produced by tribunal member  associations dedicated to professionalization and 
 professional development that address these issues from a tribunal perspective. See e.g. British 
 Columbia Council of Administrative Tribunals, Report on Independence, Accountability And Appointment 
 Processes In British Columbia Tribunals, British Columbia Council of Administrative Tribunals Policy and Research 
 Committee Report by Philip Bryden and Ron Hatch, 2009, online: British Columbia Council of 
 Administrative Tribunals <http://www.bccat.net/assets/downloads/indrep.pdf>. 
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activities should they be held accountable? And through what mechanisms should 
accountability be measured?     
 Ensuring that the tools used to garner accountability do not simultaneously 
infringe on the administrative actor’s independence is another crucial concern that 
arises often in the context of Canadian administrative law and policy. The concept of 
administrative independence refers to safeguarding decision-makers from improper 
interference or influence. The theory goes that by ensuring this freedom, there is a 
greater likelihood that decisions will be based solely on the law and evidence.  
Independence is therefore a tool for guaranteeing impartiality.  Placed in the context 
of arm’s length administrative bodies, independence is usually considered in light of 
the degree to which adjudicators have the promise of security of tenure, financial 
security, institutional control and freedom in their adjudicative deliberations.  
Interference by the executive branch of government, another tribunal member, staff, 
litigants or any other entity is held to arise when a reasonable person would perceive 
one or more of these factors to be compromised.49   Regardless of what the reality 
may be, the reasonable person test requires only that a reasonable perception of lack 
of independence exist for there to be a breach of procedural fairness.50  As well, while 
the factors of security of tenure, financial security, institutional control and 
adjudicative independence are similar for both the judiciary and administrative bodies, 
a key distinction between judicial and administrative independence is that the degree 
to which independence is required for administrative bodies can vary, depending on 
the intention of the legislature and the institution’s nature and functions.
51 
 
IV. EXPLORING TENSIONS BETWEEN ADMINISTRATIVE 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND INDEPENDENCE: ILLUSTRATIVE CASES 
 
 Situations in which accountability and independence conflict often stem from the 
de facto development of on-the-ground relationships between the administrative body 
and the branch of government to which it is required to report; they may also arise 
between members of the administrative body itself.  To demonstrate how conflicts 
between accountability and independence emerge, I use the three central questions 
identified earlier – namely, “accountability to whom?” “accountability for which 
activities?” and “accountability  through what measures?” as a framework for 
examining illustrative examples  of problems  that have occurred recently in the 
jurisprudence or on the ground.  These illustrations also serve as a backdrop to my 
analysis of ATAGAA’s potential as an administrative accountability tool.  I argue 
that ATAGAA could be a statute of greater impact if it were to draw on lessons 
learned from these past situations.        
 
 
                                                          
49  See the seminal cases of R. v. Valente, supra note 28 at paras. 24-26 and Beauregard v. Canada, [1986] 2 
 S.C.R. 56 at para. 21. On the test for reasonable perception of partiality, see Committee for Justice and 
 Liberty v. National Energy Board [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369 at 394-5. The test, although formulated in dissent, 
 has since been applied consistently by the Supreme Court as the appropriate approach to be taken. 
50  For greater discussion of the concept of independence, see Laverne Jacobs, “Independence, 
 Impartiality and Bias” in Administrative Law in Context, supra note 37 and Laverne Jacobs, “Tribunal 
 Independence and Impartiality: Rethinking the Theory after Bell and Ocean Port Hotel: A Call for 
 Empirical Analysis” in Laverne A. Jacobs & Justice Anne L. Mactavish., eds., Dialogue Between Courts 
 and Tribunals: Essays in Administrative Law and Justice (2001-2007) (Montreal: Les Éditions Thémis, 
 2008) at 43-66. 
51  See Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v. British Columbia (Gen. Manager Liquor Control), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 781. 
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A. Administrative Accountability: Accountability to whom? 
 Administrative actors are generally said to be accountable to four entities: to the 
branch of government through which they report to the legislature,52 to the legislature 
itself, to the public, and to themselves.  The first of these contexts has offered the 
most challenge in the jurisprudence and on the ground.  
 
1. Accountability to the executive branch of government   
 As for accountability to government, ATAGAA’s framework does not capture 
some of the most problematic situations.  Such circumstances of accountability have 
arisen when the executive branch of government has attempted to assume control 
over the administrative body’s decisions. These instances raise the delicate question: 
to whom is the agency rightfully accountable? In these cases, authority for the 
interference by the minister or the executive branch of government can seldom be 
linked legitimately to a legislative enactment.  Frequently, legislation has been misused 
in a thinly disguised attempt to assert executive control; alternatively, the 
inappropriate situation arises simply from an informal, on-the-ground relationship 
that an agency and the executive have developed. 
 One of the sharpest examples of attempted executive control occurred in 2007 
when the President of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Linda Keen, was 
removed from her position following a decision that had plainly displeased the 
Minister of Natural Resources.53  The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission regulates 
all nuclear facilities and activities in Canada with the purpose of ensuring their 
compliance with health, safety, security and environmental standards as well as 
fulfilment of Canada's international obligations.54 In 2007, the Commission decided to 
keep closed a nuclear power plant that had been temporarily shut down for routine 
maintenance because of its failure to meet safety standards. This nuclear reactor, 
however, was also a primary source for the production of medical isotopes used in 
health care in the country and around the world.  The closure therefore caused a 
shortage of isotopes.  Eventually, in order to circumvent the effects of this decision, 
Parliament enacted legislation reopening the reactor. This was an appropriate legal 
avenue to take given the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy.  This legislative step 
was taken, however, only after the Minister had attempted to use other means to 
influence the President and Commission’s decision. 
 The chronology set out by the Federal Court in Keen indicates that the Minister 
participated in a Saturday conference call with the President and members of the 
Commission in which he requested a hearing be convened immediately in order to 
approve the restart of the reactor.55  This followed a prior conference call between the 
Minister, the Commission and the operators of the reactor at which the Minister 
urged the Commission and the licensee to work together to resolve the issue.  Finally, 
the Minister took advantage of a directive power provided in the Commission's 
enabling statute to craft a directive that appeared specifically tailored, by its wording 
and timing, to force the Commission to decide in favour of the licensee. Under the 
enabling statute, the directive power allows only for directives of "general application 
                                                          
52  I will use the term "legislature" to denote both provincial legislatures and the federal parliament for 
 ease of convenience.    
53  See Keen v. Canada (Attorney General), [2009] F.C.J. no.  402 [Keen]. 
54  See Nuclear Safety and Control Act, S.C. 1997, c. 9, s. 9. More information about the Canadian Nuclear 
 Safety Commission can also be found online: Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 
 <http://www.nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/>.  
55  See Keen, supra note 53. 
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on broad policy matters" to be issued to the Commission.56 Yet, this directive, which 
was prepared by the Minister two days after the Saturday conference call, required the 
Commission to take into account “the health of Canadians who, for medical 
purposes, depend on nuclear substances produced by nuclear reactors” in the course 
of its regulation.57  In light of the ongoing live litigation, one could argue that it was 
invalidly created. The Bill requiring the reactor to be reopened was enacted the next 
day and was enacted before the President of the Commission had even received the 
directive. 
 About two weeks after all of these events had occurred, the Minister wrote to the 
President of the Commission, asking her to explain why certain evidence had not 
been taken into account in the Commission's decision-making and why the directive 
issued by his office had been ignored.58  He also expressed disappointment in her 
leadership of the Commission and indicated a loss of confidence in her abilities.  
Finally, his letter indicated that he was considering asking for her removal as 
President before her term was up.59  This, in fact, is what eventually happened.  
Although she responded to the Minister's letter, Ms. Keen was removed by Order-in-
Council before she had an opportunity to respond to the concerns at a Parliamentary 
investigation set up for this purpose.  Her removal was upheld on judicial review in 
the Federal Court.60  
 Overall, the Minister's interaction with Ms. Keen was set in tones that revealed a 
strong misperception of the relationship between his office and the Commission.  
While the Minister is responsible for reporting to Parliament on behalf of the 
Commission, the Commission as an arm’s length independent body is not responsible 
for accounting to the Minister for the decisions that it makes. One of the reasons for 
the establishment of administrative tribunals was to remove political influences on 
decision-making, leaving decision-making to those with expertise in a particular 
subject matter.  Even if the Commission's decision had inappropriately overlooked 
evidence, that was a matter for judicial review, not for review by the executive branch 
of government.  There were no provisions for any type of review by the executive in 
the Commission's enabling statute. Finally, it is plain that there may be situations 
where it is in the public interest to remove the head or a member of an administrative 
tribunal. It would be more appropriate, however, for the parameters surrounding 
                                                          
56  With respect to directives from Cabinet to the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, s. 19 is the 
 relevant provision.  It reads: 
 
DIRECTIVES 
19.  1) The Governor in Council may, by order, issue to the Commission 
 directives of general application on broad policy matters with respect to 
 the objects of the Commission. 
 (2) An order made under this section is binding on the Commission. 
 (3) A copy of each order made under this section shall be 
  (a) published in the Canada Gazette; and 
  (b) laid before each House of Parliament. 
 
57  See Keen, supra note 53 at para. 25. 
58  See Letter from Minister Lunn to Linda Keen (on file with author) and partial reproduction of the 
 letter in Keen, ibid at para.  29. 
59  See Keen, ibid. 
60 Ibid. The Federal Court held that Ms. Keen’s appointment as President was an at pleasure 
 appointment and that her opportunity to respond to the minister's letter satisfied any procedural 
 fairness obligation that may have been owed to her. 
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removal to be governed clearly by legislation or memoranda of understanding that 
has put a process in place proscriptively.  
 In Keen, the Minister simply took it upon himself to get involved in the 
Commission's decision-making process on this one particular file. This is an example 
of what I earlier described as a de facto relationship that developed on the ground. It is 
not the only instance in which there has been a clash between the executive branch of 
government and an administrative body over decisions made by a tribunal.61 
Unfortunately, these improper callings to account undermine confidence in the 
government of the day and generate confusion over what is and is not appropriate 
behaviour for the tribunal (i.e. should the President of the Nuclear Safety 
Commission have had medical treatment as a top priority in considering what to do 
about the unsafe reactor?) which can also affect public confidence in the 
administrative justice system.  
 If a situation like this were to occur in Ontario, ATAGAA might offer some 
recourse but only if management at an astute tribunal had found a way to incorporate 
preventive measures in a memorandum of understanding that gained approval by the 
responsible minister. What is clear is that the legislative branch of government in 
Ontario has not taken it upon itself to flag this type of behaviour as an issue.  It has 
not highlighted possible attempts by the executive branch of government to interfere 
with tribunal decision-making under the guise of tribunal accountability to the 
executive as a concern – even though the stated purpose of the Act is to increase 
administrative accountability while avoiding conflict between accountability and 
independence.   
 
2. Accountability of the executive branch of government to administrative 
tribunals 
 In what ways can a lack of accountability by the executive branch of government 
hinder the work of administrative tribunals? Accountability on the part of the 
executive branch of government implies respecting the express or implied 
commitments that host ministries have towards their arm’s length agencies and 
fulfilling them in good faith. The ultimate concern that the public be adequately 
served by administrative tribunals depends on the fulfillment of such commitments. 
Building on the discussion of removals from the last section, one should note that 
even in circumstances when a chair or member of a tribunal has been statutorily 
removed through non-renewal of his or her term of appointment, one may wonder if 
ministerial discretion has been exercised in good faith.  An example that speaks well 
to this idea deals with the Military Police Complaints Commission, an administrative 
body which has been prominent in the media of late.62 A second example examines 
the detrimental effects of providing insufficient budgetary resources through a look at 
a recent situation with the Commission for Public Complaints against the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police [RCMP]. 
 
 
                                                          
61  See generally Lorne Sossin, "The Puzzle of Independence" (2009) 26 NJCL 1 in which he discusses 
 some of the major incidents in recent years. 
62  Another example that deals with the removal of tribunal members relates to the Saskatchewan 
 Labour Relations Board. However, in the Saskatchewan case, legislation had been enacted that 
 explicitly allowed for the changing of tribunal members upon the election of a new government.  See 
 Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan (Attorney General, Department of Advanced Education, 
 Employment and Labour) 2010 SKCA 27, aff’g 2009 SKQB 20. 
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(a) Military Police Complaints Commission 
 The Military Police Complaints Commission [MPCC] is a federal adjudicative 
administrative tribunal.  Its mandate is to provide civilian oversight of police matters 
by investigating complaints made about the conduct of military police, to hold public 
hearings, to report on its findings, and make recommendations to senior officers in 
the Canadian Forces, the Deputy Minister of National Defence and/or the Minister 
of National Defence.63 
 Peter Tinsley chaired the MPCC from September 12, 2005 to December 12, 2009.  
When his appointment, which was for a four-year term, ended, it was not renewed. 
During the time of his appointment, he was instrumental in having an investigation 
started into the question of whether the Canadian Forces had transferred detainees to 
Afghanistan despite the risk of torture.  The federal government, which was a 
respondent to the allegations, refused to cooperate in providing the relevant 
documents for the hearing to proceed, claiming national security privilege.  This led 
to a protracted ongoing debate.64 A new chair, Glenn Stannard, was appointed to 
continue the hearing.  Yet, his appointment raised questions about continuity of the 
process as he had not participated in the initial part of the proceedings.65 He also did 
not have the legal background that the former chair possessed. 
 The fact that the government of the day was both in charge of the appointment 
and removal process for members of the MPCC and concurrently appearing as a 
party before the MPCC, cast doubt over the neutrality of Cabinet in replacing Mr. 
Tinsley.  Even if Cabinet’s actions were legal under the enabling legislation, a 
reasonable person who takes into account the battle that the MPCC has had to obtain 
the relevant documents from the government party, including being taken on judicial 
review, may have a reasonable apprehension of bias. Circumstances seem even more 
unusual, when one takes into account that the new chair has no legal training, in 
contrast to Mr. Tinsley.   
 It seems that in cases such as these where the independence of the decision-
making body has the potential to be influenced indirectly, it would be best to have a 
mechanism put in place that helps neutralize the reappointment process.  In this 
regard, ATAGAA shows a positive, first step.  One recalls that ATAGAA requires 
the executive to seek the chair’s recommendation of members who are up for 
reappointment.  In this way, ATAGAA shows a commitment to shared governance 
in the appointments process.  However, a fuller commitment would also provide the 
tribunal with the opportunity to give input when the executive branch of government 
is considering whether to reappoint the current chair. This input could be given by a 
                                                          
63  See National Defence Act, R.S., 1985, c. N-5, Part IV. More information about the Military Police 
 Complaints Commission can also be found online:  Military Police Complaints Commission 
 <http://www.mpcc-cppm.gc.ca>. 
64  At the time of writing, hearings had resumed with a new Chair at the helm. As for the history of the 
 proceedings, on Oct. 30, 2008, the government filed for judicial review, arguing that the MPCC did 
 not have jurisdiction over general military operations but only over “policing duties and functions.”  
 It argued that transferring detainees was a general military operation and therefore not subject to 
 scrutiny by the Commission. On March 24, 2010, the Commission ruled that the hearings would 
 continue.  The new Chair, Glenn Stannard, who had been interim chair after Peter Tinsley's 
 appointment was not renewed, was appointed to this position on May 14, 2010.  A parallel 
 proceeding in Parliament is also taking place which currently has led to the sharing of the relevant 
 documents amongst a contingent of members of Parliament who represent all parties in the House of 
 Commons. 
65  See transcript of proceedings, October 14, 2009, which lists those present at the hearings, available 
 online: Military Police Complaints Commission <http://www.mpcc-cppm.gc.ca/300/afghan/index-
 eng.aspx>. 
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designated committee of the tribunal and could be offered automatically whenever a 
chair's term faces the possibility of renewal under the enabling legislation. A further 
useful procedure could be to require that reasons be given by the executive branch of 
government on the replacement or reappointment of the chair.  This would offer 
greater transparency and accountability to the process. Reasons would also assist if 
judicial review were sought of the executive’s decision.  Again, while ATAGAA 
shows the beginning of a collaborative governance approach, strengthening the 
legislation in this way would provide a more engaged commitment to accountability 
by both the tribunals and the executive branch of government. It may also stave off 
some of the ill-effects that have already occurred to the public’s confidence in the 
administrative state. 
 
(b) Commission for Public Complaints against the RCMP 
 A second brief example relating to the accountability of the executive to 
administrative tribunals concerns the obligation to provide sufficient funding for 
tribunals to do their work.  Although it may seem obvious, situations have occurred 
in which funding has been removed part way through a project, causing the project to 
be disbanded.  This occurred recently to the Commission for Complaints against the 
RCMP [Commission] which is a federal oversight body that takes complaints against 
the RCMP. The Commission conducts investigations and also has research and 
policy-making functions.66 After several tragic incidents had occurred involving the 
use of conducted energy weapons (or "tasers") by RCMP officers, the Commission 
initiated an inquiry into taser use by the RCMP.  It received money from the 
government for a long-term study and produced two reports. However, its funding 
was cut quite suddenly in 2009. Some commentators have linked the funding cut to 
the critical stance that the Commission has taken of the RCMP.67 Regardless of 
whether some sort of reprisal might have been involved, the point is that by not 
living up to its funding commitment and not explaining itself, the government 
engendered a loss of public confidence in the administrative justice system.  
 ATAGAA may not speak directly to the specifics of ensuring budgetary 
resources but it does require the "financial, staffing and administrative arrangements 
for the tribunal"68 to be addressed in a memorandum of understanding with the 
responsible minister. This is definitely a useful step that can be further developed by 
tribunals and ministers on a case-by-case basis.  It will be up to the tribunals to ensure 
that they have sufficient resources and it would be wise for them to create measures 
that allow them to receive additional resources easily should they find themselves 
short in the middle of a fiscal year.  Ideally, having a clear and transparent mechanism 
in place should also avoid potential apprehensions of inappropriate contact, especially 
when the government is a party before the tribunal or somehow subject to the 
tribunal’s scrutiny. 
 
 
                                                          
66  See Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act R.S.C., 1985 c. R-10, Part VI. Section 45.32 of the RCMP Act 
 addresses the duties of the commission.  However, these duties are set in very broad parameters.  
 There is no specific indication of all duties in the statute. 
67  See e.g. “Report slams RCMP in airport Taser death,” CBC News (8 December 2009) online: CBC 
 news <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/british-columbia/story/2009/12/08/bc-kennedy-vancouver-
 airport-taserreport.html#ixzz0iwj7uv4d>. 
68  ATAGAA, supra note 1. ss.11 (2). 
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B. Administrative Accountability: Accountability for what Activities?69 
 Do administrative tribunals have an obligation to provide feedback to the 
executive branch of government about how the legislation it administers has been 
faring?  This question speaks to the very nature and purpose of administrative 
tribunals.  In Ocean Port Hotel, the Supreme Court of Canada held that administrative 
tribunals exist primarily to implement the policies of the executive branch of 
government.  As Chief Justice McLachlin held in discussing the distinction between 
administrative tribunals and courts, "[a]dministrative tribunals, by contrast, lack this 
constitutional distinction from the executive. They are, in fact, created precisely for 
the purpose of implementing government policy.”
70  
 If tribunals are created to further the policies of the executive branch of 
government as set out in legislation, it would seem sensible that establishing channels 
of feedback to the executive on the success and challenges of the legislation should 
not be problematic.  However, this issue came to a head in 2004 when the Alberta 
government sought the input of the Alberta Labour Relations Board on legislative 
amendments that it was making to the Alberta Labour Relations Code.71 In the case of 
Communications, Energy and Paper Workers Union of Canada, Local 707 v. Alberta (Labour 
Relations Board)72 several unions and the Alberta Federation of Labour applied for 
judicial review alleging that there had been inappropriate contact between the 
executive branch of government and the labour board.  The unions believed that the 
legislative changes had a negative impact on collective bargaining rights.  Further 
complicating matters was that the legislation had been developed by the government 
in what seemed to be a shroud of secrecy, as there was no consultation with the 
unions. 
 The fact that the executive branch of government had consulted with the labour 
board during the creation of the legislative amendments was not revealed directly to 
the unions.  The unions and the Federation of Labour discovered what had occurred 
by way of freedom of information requests.  The scope of the application for judicial 
review was also unusual - the applicants sought certiorari of all current and future 
decisions pertaining to the legislation. The ground of review invoked was reasonable 
perception of insufficient independence and impartiality on the part of the Board vis-
à-vis the executive. 
 The Alberta Queen's Bench held that the consultation did not give rise to a 
reasonable apprehension that the Board lacked independence or impartiality in its 
decision-making.  The court fixed particularly on the fact that there were no live cases 
dealing with the legislation taking place at the time of the consultation.  This was not 
enough for the Alberta Federation of Labour, however, which understandably 
suffered a grave loss of confidence in the Alberta labour relations regime. In the end, 
the Labour Board developed guidelines setting ground rules for any future legislative 
consultations it may have with the executive.73  The guidelines touch both on the 
                                                          
69  This section draws from an earlier work – see Laverne Jacobs, "Reconciling Independence and 
 Expertise within the Expert Multifunctional Tribunal" (unpublished paper). 
70  Ocean Port Hotel, supra note 51 at para. 24.  See also Bell Canada, supra note 40, in which the Supreme 
 Court of Canada attempted to classify certain tribunals as having greater or lesser policy-making 
 functions. 
71  R.S.A. 2000, c. L-1. 
72  2004 ABQB 63. 
73  See Alberta Labour Relations Board, Labour Relations Board Guidelines for Consultation on Legislation (29 
 March, 2007). 
Vol. 28(2)  Ontario’s Adjudicative Tribunals Accountability Legislation  305 
 
process that will be taken in its relationship with the executive and to the ways in 
which affected parties will be notified. 
 There is certainly a legitimate role for administrative tribunals to play in the 
ongoing development of the legislation they administer. Nonetheless, they should be 
accountable to their public users for the manner in which they interact with the 
executive branch of government on legislative consultations. Lessons can be learned 
from the guidelines developed by the Alberta Labour Relations Board. The guidelines 
stress the importance of using legislated channels, such as any provisions that may 
exist in enabling legislation allowing for the Minister to ask the tribunal to conduct 
research on a specific matter, before turning to informal contact.74 The guidelines also 
emphasize transparency and provide that consultation responses will be made 
publicly available.75 The fact of consultation will equally be revealed by any member 
who was involved at the beginning of a hearing in which the legislation is at issue so 
that the parties may decide if the board member’s recusal is necessary.
76 At the 
moment, ATAGAA deals only with consultation between a tribunal and public users 
with respect to changes in policies and procedures.  Given that the enabling 
legislation for various tribunals may be piecemeal in addressing the concerns that 
arise around consultation between the executive branch of government and an 
administrative tribunal on legislative changes, it would be helpful for ATAGAA to 
incorporate some of the guidance from the Alberta Labour Relations Board 
experience.  
 
C. Administrative Accountability: Through what Measures? 
 The discussion thus far has looked at the potential misuse of de facto relationships 
that develop between a tribunal and the executive branch of government.  This final 
section considers de facto relationships of accountability that may emerge between the 
chair of the tribunal and tribunal members and considers ways to safeguard against 
the encroachment on adjudicative independence that could arise.  A particular way 
that this challenge has occurred in Canadian administrative law jurisprudence is 
through the use of internal performance evaluations. 
 Outside of asking for reasons for a decision, there has been an increased interest 
in evaluating the performance of members through performance assessments. At 
present, some tribunal chairs conduct internal assessments of individual members, 
although there is no uniform approach to the issue.  ATAGAA speaks of an 
assessment to be done by the chair at the time when members’ appointments are up 
for renewal. This information is shared with the responsible minister. Indeed, 
reappointment cannot take place unless the chair has done this assessment and 
provided a positive recommendation to the minister.   
 However, problems relating to independence have occurred in the context of 
member performance evaluations. The leading case on this issue in Canada is Barreau 
de Montréal v. Québec (Procureure Générale)77 which dealt with mandatory performance 
evaluations for members of the Administrative Tribunal of Québec [TAQ] that once 
existed under the Québec Act respecting administrative justice.78  TAQ is an adjudicative 
                                                          
74  Ibid at s. 6. 
75  Ibid at s.  5. 
76  Ibid at s. 4. 
77  [2001] R.J.Q 2058 [Barreau de Montréal].  
78 R.S.Q, c. J-3 [ARAJ].  The requirement for performance evaluations before renewal has since been 
 repealed.   Members of TAQ are currently appointed for life during good behaviour and can only be 
 removed, after an inquiry, for specific reasons such as loss of qualification or permanent disability. 
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administrative appeals tribunal that hears appeals from a large number of tribunals in 
Québec. At issue was whether the performance evaluation method provided in 
TAQ’s enabling legislation contravened the requirements of an independent and 
impartial decision-making process under the Québec Charter.79  The evaluation was to 
be conducted by a committee of tribunal members that included the President of 
TAQ as well as a representative of the executive branch of government.  
 It was argued that the requirements for members of TAQ to undergo a 
performance evaluation in order to receive salary increases raised a reasonable 
perception of infringement on their security of tenure.  The concern was that having 
the head of the tribunal involved in performance evaluations could result in members 
deciding cases to please the chair instead of deciding cases in good conscience.  It was 
further argued that the presence of a government representative as a member of the 
committee responsible for conducting the appraisal gave rise to a reasonable 
apprehension that the government could interfere in the adjudicative independence of 
the members.  The government is always a party before TAQ and one might perceive 
that members whose decisions do not please the government could end up being 
evaluated poorly. The court agreed with these arguments, emphasizing not only the 
apparent lack of independence, but also the fact that the statute did not provide 
members under evaluation an opportunity to be heard about the recommendations 
put forward by the committee. 
 Viewed in light of the approach adopted in ATAGAA which requires all 
members up for renewal to be evaluated by the chair, it would seem wise to take heed 
of the cautionary tale provided by the Barreau de Montréal case.  The requirement for 
an assessment before renewal should remain.  Having the tribunal's input on whether 
to renew members is obviously important to assure that competent individuals are 
appointed. At the same time, it is difficult to think of a method that can guarantee 
against members under evaluation seeking to please the evaluator. Possibly, having 
evaluations performed by an external independent body (as is currently done with 
TAQ80) may assist with the perception that decision-makers are deciding 
independently when one party before them has a connection to the evaluator.  I 
believe, however, that the most important lesson that can be taken from the Barreau de 
Montréal case is that having an opportunity to respond to recommendations to renew 
can lend accountability and transparency to the process in much the same way as was 
discussed above in relation to the removal of tribunal chairs. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 The Good Government Act, of which ATAGAA forms a part, was developed after 
consultation with 22 government ministries.  There is no evidence, however, that 
administrative tribunals themselves were consulted in the creation of the statute. 81 
                                                                                                                                     
 See ARAJ, ss. 51-54. An excellent overview of the history of TAQ is provided in France Houle, "A 
 Brief Historical Account of the Reforms to the Administrative Justice System in the Province of 
 Québec" (2009) 22 Can J Admin L & Prac 47. 
79   Section 23 of the Québec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C-12, applies to all quasi-
 judicial bodies in Québec.  This section reads:  “Every person has a right to a full and equal, public 
 and fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, for the determination of his rights and 
 obligations or of the merits of any charge brought against him.” 
80  See Houle, supra note 78 at 70-71. 
81  Both the debates in the legislative assembly as well as the background press material released by the 
 Attorney General referred to consultation with 22 government ministries.  There is no indication of 
 consultation with adjudicative tribunals. 
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Perhaps it is not surprisingly, then, that ATAGAA could have been strengthened 
through a stronger engagement with the on-the-ground concerns of administrative 
tribunals. 
 Many of the contemporary conflicts between the values of accountability and 
independence stem from de facto relationships that were developed inside 
administrative tribunals or between tribunals and government. These relationships 
have either gone wrong or there is a reasonable perception that they have gone 
wrong.  ATAGAA attempts to address the question of accountability solely by 
requiring tribunals to account to government.  ATAGAA’s failing, however, is that it 
ignores the concomitant obligation on government to be accountable to 
administrative tribunals and, by extension, to the public.82  Questions relating to the 
removal of appointees, budgetary resources, legislative consultation and performance 
evaluations are all issues for which ATAGAA shows little or no appreciation. Yet, 
they are administrative justice issues that have caused the public to lose confidence in 
the recent past.  As well, while ATAGAA is strong on sending directions to 
administrative tribunals to account, it is weak on facilitating methods for tribunal 
accountability to be fostered as an ethos at the tribunal level.  Finally, there are no 
safeguards to protect the collaborative governance approach that ATAGAA 
proposes from collapsing into one that functions through executive control. Until 
these aspects are fixed, ATAGAA will remain only a wavering commitment to the 
very concept of accountability that it promotes. 
 
                                                          
82  One could also mention that ATAGAA does not address the concern of whether administrative 
 tribunals achieve their intended purpose, an issue that is explored by Lorne Sossin and Steven 
 Hoffman in their contribution to this special issue. See "The Elusive Search for Accountability:  
 Evaluating Adjudicative Tribunals” (2010) 28:2 Windsor YB Access Just. 
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AGENCY DESIGN IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
Herwig C.H. Hofmann* 
 
This article gives a brief overview of the main features, functions and future 
perspectives of agencies in the European Union [EU].  It highlights the 
specific notion of the EU’s highly integrated, multi-level legal system as an 
explanatory factor for the specificities of agency design. The article looks at 
agencies in the EU through the lens of the structural and procedural 
arrangements for their independence and their accountability. The article comes 
to the conclusion that, generally speaking, accountability and independence are 
defined by and adapted to the position of an agency within the structure of 
administrative networks implementing EU law and policy. Their raison d’être 
is usually to coordinate Member State implementing activities rather than 
taking on these responsibilities themselves. 
 
Cet article présente un bref aperçu des caractéristiques principales, des fonctions 
et des perspectives d’avenir d’agences au sein de l’Union Européenne [UE]. Il 
met en évidence la notion particulière que les spécificités de la façon dont les 
agences sont structurées s’expliquent par le fait que le système juridique de 
l’UE est hautement intégré et à niveaux multiples. L’article examine des 
agences de l’UE dans la perspective des arrangements structuraux et 
procéduraux en vue de leur indépendance et de leur obligation de rendre 
compte. L’article conclut que de façon générale l’obligation de rendre compte et 
l’indépendance sont définies par, et adaptées à, la position d’une agence dans le 
cadre des réseaux administratifs qui appliquent la loi et les politiques de 
l’EU. Leur raison d’être est généralement de coordonner les activités 
d’application des États Membres plutôt que d’être chargées elles-mêmes de ces 
responsabilités. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The “agencification” of the European Union [EU] is continuing with full force. 
Currently, one might be forgiven for the impression that there is hardly a policy 
initiative in the EU which would not suggest the creation of an EU agency or the 
upgrading of an existing EU administrative structure to become an agency. The EU 
administrative landscape, as EU public law in general, remains radically 
experimentalist, transforming itself continuously, albeit often below the radar of the 
non-specialist public. The question therefore arises, what these agencies are, what 
they can do and to whom they are accountable? This paper gives a brief overview of 
the main features, functions and future perspectives of agencies in the EU. It 
highlights the specific notion of the EU‟s highly integrated, multi-level legal system as 
an explanatory factor for the specificities of agency design. 
 
                                                          
*  Herwig C.H. Hofmann is Professor of European and Transnational Public Law and founding 
 Director of the Centre for European Law at the University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg.  
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II. POWERS, DESIGN AND CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION 
 
 The latest major amendment to the constitutional charter of the EU, the Treaty of 
Lisbon, changes only very little with regard to the legal framework for agencies in the 
EU. One of the very few differences is that agency activity is now explicitly subject to 
judicial review.1 But with only little case law on the essential aspects of agency design 
and agency functions in the EU, much is open in the political and scholarly legal 
debate on the possible structure and rights of EU agencies. 
 Three major aspects have an impact on the structure and the competencies of 
agencies as well as on their independence and accountability. One aspect arises from 
the notion of de-central implementation of EU law. Member States are empowered 
and obliged to implement EU law by means of national legislation and 
administration. Uniform legal enforcement in such de-central implementation 
requires a high level of coordination between the Member States and their 
administrative agencies. This coordinating role has in the past typically been played by 
comitology committees advising and supervising the European Commission 
(hereinafter referred to as the Commission). In an increasing amount of policy areas, 
this coordinating role is being undertaken by agencies of varying forms and designs. 
In a comparative perspective, however, one needs to add that European agencies are 
marked by generally limited functions when it comes to administrative rule-making. 
This distinguishes them from their counterparts in some Member States of the EU 
and also from those in other legal systems such as the US. European agencies may be 
authorised to make single-case decisions (adjudication) or to coordinate networks of 
regulators and to inform decision-makers, but they only exceptionally, and to a degree 
indirectly, engage in rule-making.  
 Second, the design and functioning of EU agencies are influenced by their scope 
of activity and purpose. Some are designed to advise the Member States and the EU 
institutions by providing information and by fulfilling a coordinating role for 
regulatory activity. Some actually prepare decisions to be ultimately taken by the 
Commission. Other agencies are designed to make implementation decisions in a 
given policy field with external effect vis-à-vis individuals. Finally, some are designed 
as hybrid entities which execute a certain policy or project in partnership with private 
parties and investors.2  
 A third aspect which has an impact on the nature of an agency is its accountability 
mechanisms through administrative supervision, including: method of agency 
reporting to the Commission; auditing by the Court of Auditors; political supervision, 
(which includes aspects of accountability to the EU legislative bodies) typically 
                                                          
1  See the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 263 Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
 Union (TFEU, stating that the Court of Justice of the European Union “shall also review the legality 
 of acts of bodies, offices or agencies of the Union intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third 
 parties.” This is almost the only mention of an EU agency in the entire Treaty. The case law of the 
 Court of Justice had been further advanced than that. In Soglema the now General Court had held that 
 agency acts were subject to judicial review (Case T-411/06 Sogelma v EAR [2008] ECR II-2771, para. 
 36). This was highly appropriate in view of Article 47 of the EU‟s Charter of Fundamental Rights (which 
 has now entered into binding force) explicitly granting the right to an effective remedy. 
2  See e.g. the agency established to the run the experimental fusion-energy project ITER – Council 
 Decision No 2007/198/Euratom of 27 March 2007 establishing the European Joint Undertaking for 
 ITER, OJ 2007 L 90/58 and Council Regulation No 1908/2006 of 19 December 2006 laying down 
 the rules of the participation of undertakings, research centres and universities, OJ 2007 L 54/4. 
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exercised by the European Parliament [EP] or the Council by means of budgetary 
powers, powers to nominate high ranking agency personnel, reporting duties and 
other methods; and finally, judicial review.  
 A widely accepted definition of EU agencies describes them as decentralised 
forms of administration that integrate national administrative bodies into the 
operations of the EU agencies by providing structures for co-operation between the 
supranational and national levels and between the national authorities.3 Yet, this 
definition helps paper over the fact that the structure and scope of activities differ 
considerably among EU agencies.  
 
A. Function, Classification and Organisation of Agencies 
 When looking at the role of agencies in the EU legal system, one should not 
forget that, generally, implementation of EU policies takes place in cooperation with 
and as coordination of national and EU actors in the context of administrative 
networks. The need for creating EU agencies, which like in many legal systems have 
no direct constitutional basis, can be explained by the specific conditions for 
implementing EU law within a network structure. Basically, as is re-iterated in Article 
291 (1) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [TFEU], the “Member States shall 
adopt all measures of national law necessary to implement legally binding Union 
acts.” In fact, most of the institutional features of agencies and many of their 
accountability mechanisms can be understood best as being oriented towards 
undertaking this networking function. At first sight, this seems to run counter to the 
generally received wisdom of EU administration being undertaken either at the EU or 
the Member State levels. One of the main reasons for this development of 
implementing EU policies in networks of EU and Member State actors may lie in the 
relatively small administrative capacities of the EU in relation to its duties.4 
 In this context, there is a continuously growing gap between the prolific creation 
of agencies in the EU and conferral of powers on them on the one hand, and their 
recognition in EU primary constitutional Treaty law on the other hand.5 As Dehousse 
writes, “European integration is an unprecedented attempt to build a form of 
continental order without recreating the hierarchical power structure of states,”
6 but 
warns that “as those who have been following the situation know, the creation of 
European agencies was a fairly haphazard development.”
7 In its 2002 
Communication8 the Commission saw the key reason for the establishment of 
                                                          
3   E. Chiti, “Decentralisation and Integration into the Community Administrations: A New Perspective 
 on European Agencies” (2004) 10 Eur LJ 402 at 423-431; S. Griller & A. Orator, “Everything under 
 control? The way forward for European agencies in the footsteps of the Meroni doctrine” (2010) 35 
 Eur L Rev 3. 
4  H. Kassim, “The European Administration: Between Europeanization and Domestication” in J. 
 Hayward & A. Menon eds, Governing Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 139 at 151. 
5  D. Curtin, “Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Agencies and Emerging Practices of Public 
 Accountability” in D. Geradin, R. Munoz & N. Petit eds, Regulation through agencies in the EU, 
 (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2005) 88; D. Fischer-Appelt, Agenturen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (Berlin: 
 Duncker und Humblot, 1999) at 87-117. 
6  R. Dehousse, “Delegation of Powers in the EU: The Need for a Multi-principals Model” (2008) 31 
 Western European Politics, 789 at 793. 
7  Ibid at 790. 
8  Commission of the European Communities “Communication from the Commission – The operating 
 framework for the European Regulatory Agencies” Brussels COM (2002) 718 final. 
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agencies as “the independence of their technical and/or scientific assessments.” Their 
main advantage is therefore that “their decisions are based on purely technical 
evaluations of very high quality and are not influenced by political or contingent 
considerations.”
9 In that sense, agencies help to create “Europe-wide epistemic 
communities whose technical truths transcend intergovernmental politics.”10 
However, agencies are also established as a more covert form of European 
integration at a time when “direct routes to further integration of the Union are 
blocked.”
11 Therefore, the rise of agencies as organisational forms in the EU goes 
hand in hand with the emergence of the constitutional principle of subsidiarity. 
Subsidiarity in the EU requires, simply stated, that action be taken on the European 
level only where a shared objective can actually be better achieved by action of the 
EU than by its Member States. The stated goal is to maintain government functions 
on a level as close as possible to its citizens.12 In reality, observance of the principle of 
subsidiarity in the EU has required the development of a system of decentralised yet 
cooperative administrative structures since Member States generally insist they are 
better placed to implement a policy. The cooperative structures then develop, for 
example, through information exchange, joint warning systems, coordinated remedies 
for arising problems and a wealth of similar systems, all of which have been functions 
of EU agencies. Agencies thus aid in satisfying the need for uniformity in the 
implementation of Union law, while at the same time providing a form of 
decentralised implementation.13 The aim of European agencies is therefore 
predominantly “to run networks of national administrations which come into play in 
the implementation of Community policies.”
14 
 These network coordination functions of agencies, their more limited decision-
making power and their linkage with national administrations, distinguish EU 
agencies from their US counterparts.15 EU agencies are, however, closing the gap. 
Some agencies have genuine decision-making powers. The Office for the 
Harmonisation of the Internal Market [OHIM] is empowered to make legally binding 
decisions on applications to register Community trademarks and Community designs. 
Similarly, the Community Plant Variety Office [CPVO] has the competence to adopt 
legally binding decisions in relation to applications for the registration of plant variety 
rights. So far, the furthest reaching delegations in force, have been given to the 
European Air Safety Agency [EASA]. It has been entitled to adopt non-binding 
“guidance material.” Given that this power is exercised in the context of the 
empowerment to issue individual decisions, such soft law “guidance” comes close to 
                                                          
9  Ibid at 5. 
10  M. Shapiro, “The problems of independent agencies in the United States and the European Union” 
 (1997) 4 Journal of European Public Policy 276 at 282. 
11  Ibid at 281. 
12  Article 5 (3) TEU states that “Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its 
 exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed 
 action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and 
 local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved 
 at Union level.” 
13  R. Dehousse, “Regulation by networks in the European Community: the role of European agencies” 
 (1997) 4 Journal of European Public Policy 246 at 257. 
14  Ibid at 255. 
15  Chiti, supra note 3 at 429. 
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hard law regulatory powers. The EASA also has quasi regulatory powers when 
advising the Commission on the rules to be adopted to implement the air safety 
regulation.16 These quasi-regulatory powers arise from the fact that the technical part 
of its opinions, in particular, the part dealing with the construction, design and 
operation of aircraft, cannot be altered by the Commission without prior 
collaboration with the Agency.17 In this role, EASA establishes administrative rules 
both for its internal administrative procedures as well as administrative rules to be 
applied by the Member States.18 The resulting internal “rulemaking procedures” of the 
agency include provisions for the establishment of a rulemaking programme, formal 
initiation of the process, the drafting of the rules, participation and consultation 
procedures (including consequent review of comments) and, finally, the rules 
regarding publication and entry into force of the agency guidelines.19 In many ways 
these rule-making procedures can be regarded as models for rule-making procedures 
by agencies. The approach chosen in the EASA legislation provides for procedures 
akin to the US approach of “notice and comment procedures” used in most 
administrative rule-making procedures by US agencies.  
 In view of these functions, classifications of EU agencies, despite the necessary 
generalisations, are an attempt to improve transparency and to streamline control, 
accountability and supervision of the exercise of public powers by EU agencies. I will 
not present various past attempts at classification but instead try to categorise 
agencies by their legal basis – i.e. the origin of delegation distinguishing between 
vertical and horizontal delegation of powers to agencies.  
 “Vertical” delegation takes place at the EU level between the Commission and an 
agency. In this case, the Commission, after having being delegated the powers to 
implement a policy in a legislative act, will “sub-delegate” this power to an EU 
agency. Most cases of vertical delegation can be found in what in EU terms is 
generally referred to as executive agencies. Executive agencies are those which the 
Commission has set up by executive decision to administer Union programmes in 
accordance with Council Regulation 58/2003. They can be entrusted with managing 
                                                          
16  Similarly, the European railway agency is entrusted in the field of railway safety with drafting 
 common safety methods and common safety targets to be adopted by the Commission and binding 
 on the Member States (See Art. 6 of Directive 2004/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
 Council of 29 April 2004 on safety on the Community's railways and amending Council 
 Directive 95/18/EC on the licensing of railway undertakings and Directive 2001/14/EC on the 
 allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of charges for the use of railway 
 infrastructure and safety certification (Railway Safety Directive), OJ 2004 L 220/16). In addition, the 
 agency has the task of drafting and proposing a harmonised format for both safety certificates and for 
 applications for them (see Art. 7 of Regulation (EC) 881/2004 of the European Parliament and the 
 Council of 29 April 2004 establishing a European Railway Agency (Agency Regulation), OJ 2004 L 
 164/1, as amended). 
17  Articles 12 b and 13 b of Regulation (EC) 1592/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
 of 15 July 2002 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation 
 Safety Agency, OJ 2002 L 240/1. 
18  Articles 14, 43 of Regulation 1592/2002, [2002] OJ L 240/1 and EASA MB/7/03 (Final) of 
 27.06.2003, European Aviation Safety Agency, Decision of the Management Board concerning the 
 procedure to be applied by the agency for the issuing of Opinions, Certification Specifications and 
 Guidance Material (“Rulemaking Procedure”, online: EASA <www.easa.eu.int>).  
19  Articles 14, 43 of Regulation 1592/2002, [2002] OJ L 240/1. 
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any tasks required to implement a Community Union programme, but not given 
“discretionary powers in translating political choices into action.”
20  
 From this, one can distinguish “horizontal” delegation which takes place directly 
in EU legislation creating an agency or empowering an EU agency with certain 
implementing tasks which would otherwise by default reside with the Member 
States.21 Cases of horizontal delegation are often undertaken in the context of what is 
generally, in a somewhat lazy shorthand, referred to as “regulatory” agencies. This 
terminology however does not imply that an agency has necessarily rule-making 
powers as is the case of many US agencies or agencies of EU member states such as 
is the case under Swedish administrative law.22 Unlike executive agencies, in the case 
of regulatory agencies, the legislative act or a Treaty provision directly creating an 
agency provides it with delegated powers. Legal disputes to the extent of powers 
which may be delegated or which have been delegated under these various legal bases 
are ripe.23 EU regulatory agencies can be sub-categorised in different ways, for 
example, according to the functions they perform. It is thus possible, with the 
Commission working paper of 2008,24 to distinguish agencies adopting individual 
decisions,25 providing direct assistance to the Commission and the Member States‟ 
administrations (through technical know-how, scientific expertise, inspection reports 
and other means),26 agencies in charge of operational activities (often with far reaching 
powers in the definition of the content and the reach of the operations, as well as the 
means employed to achieve them),27 and finally agencies responsible for coordination 
of networks of national regulators (which generally also support these, by supplying 
technical and scientific expertise as well as collecting information).28 Some agencies 
perform several of the mentioned functions. This list is far from complete, however. 
For example in the area of research, special partnership bodies have been created as 
                                                          
20  Article 6(1) of Council Regulation (EC) 58/2003 of 19 December 2002 laying down the statute for 
 executive agencies to be entrusted with certain tasks in the management of Community programmes, 
 OJ 2003 L 11/1. 
21  Article 4 (3) TEU and Article 291 (1) TFEU. 
22  The majority of agencies which are often labelled “regulatory” are established by EU legislation 
 properly so named on the legal basis of either a general provision such as Articles 114 or 352 TFEU 
 or on a policy specific legal basis such as Article 187 TFEU for research, and other legal basis. 
23  Especially Article 114 TFEU, which is now the legal basis for many new agencies, has been subject to 
 much dispute. See for an illustration the disputes underlying the cases C-66/04 UK v Parliament and 
 Council (smoke flavourings) [2005] ECR I-10553; Case C-217/04 UK v Parliament and Council (ENISA) 
 [2006] ECR I-3771, discussed in greater detail by K. Bradley, “Comitology and the Courts: tales of 
 the unexpected” in H.C.H. Hofmann & A. Türk, eds, EU Administrative Governance, (Cheltenham: 
 Elgar, 2006) 417; and H.C.H. Hofmann, “Which Limits? Control of Powers in an Integrated Legal 
 System” in C. Barnard and O. Odudu eds, The Outer Limits of EU Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press, 2008) 45. 
24  COM (2008) 135 final. 
25  These include inter alia the European Trade Mark Office [OHIM], the European Air Safety Agency 
 [EASA] and the chemical registration agency of the REACH regulation [ECHA]. 
26  These include inter alia the European Marine Safety Agency [EMSA], the European Food Safety 
 Agency [EFSA], the European Railway Agency [ERA]. 
27  For example quite a few agencies are in this category such as inter alia the European border safety 
 agency [FRONTEX], the former Council agencies EUROJUST, EUROPOL and CEPOL. 
28  For e.g. the European Network Information Safety Agency [ENISA], the European Centre for 
 Disease Control [ECDC], the European Fundamental Rights Agency [FRA] and the European 
 Institute for Gender Equality. 
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mixed public and private law bodies. These have been created to include third party 
and private financing into certain high-level research projects such as the international 
fusion energy project ITER, SESAR for air traffic management, or the European 
Institute of Innovation and Technology. 
 The organisation of agencies follows this basic distinction into vertical and 
horizontal delegation. Generally speaking, executive agencies which benefit from 
vertical (sub-) delegation by the Commission have a standardised structure under 
Regulation 58/2003 which leaves leeway only for small adjustments. That Regulation 
establishes that executive agencies are managed by a director29 and a steering 
committee.30 Anticipatory supervision of the executive agencies by means of vertical 
hierarchies include the authorisation of the detailed work plan and the draft operating 
budget of an executive agency, which must be submitted by its steering committee to 
the Commission annually.31 Ex post supervision takes place through the Commission‟s 
right to review and overrule agency decisions in specific cases.32  
 Regulatory agencies are directly created and empowered by legislation. They are 
generally governed by a management board (sometimes also called administrative 
board or council) typically with one representative from each Member State, some 
minority (often non-voting) representatives of the Commission, and sometimes other 
(non-voting) members such as representatives of the social partners, academic 
experts, industry representatives and other stakeholders. The management board is 
responsible for appointments within the agency, the budget, work programming, and 
evaluations. In some instances the Commission can object to the proposed work 
programme.33 The management board usually appoints the director of an agency 
(sometimes called president) on the basis of a Commission and in some cases a 
Council proposal often after a hearing by the European Parliament.34 Generally, a 
candidate needs to be independent and have the necessary skills for the position. 35 
                                                          
29  The Commission appoints the agency‟s director, generally for a period of four years. The director 
 externally represents the agency, is responsible for its management and performance. She or he is 
 responsible for the agency‟s budget, prepares the reports and is in charge of employment contracts 
 (Articles 10, 11 of Regulation 58/2003).  
30  The steering committee consists of five members appointed by the Commission for two years (Art. 8 
 of Regulation 58/2003). This committee adopts the agency‟s annual work program (including 
 objectives and performance indicators) and the budget on the basis of a draft by the director and after 
 approval by the Commission. It also submits an annual activity report together with financial and 
 management information to the Commission.  
31  Articles 7-12 of Council Regulation (EC) 58/2003 of 19 December 202 laying down the statute of 
 executive agencies Art. 13 (2), OJ 2003 L 11/1.  
32  Article 22 et seq. of Council Regulation (EC) 58/2003 of 19 December 202 laying down the statute 
 of executive agencies Art. 13 (2), OJ 2003 L 11/1.  
33  In this case the agency has to re-examine its programme and can adopt the programme, possibly 
 amended, usually only with a two-thirds majority on the management board, which either must 
 include the Commission representative‟s vote, or be based on unanimity among the Member 
 States‟ representatives. This is the case in the context of the EMSA, the ERA and the Community 
 Fisheries Control Agency [CFCA]. 
34  See e.g. Art. 26(1) of Regulation (EC) 178/2002 of the European Parliament and the Council of 28 
 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the 
 European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety, OJ 2002 L 
 31/1. 
35  See e.g. Art. 15(1) and 16 of Regulation (EC) 1406/2002 of the European Parliament and the Council 
 of 27 June 2002 establishing a European Maritime Safety Agency, OJ 2002 L 208/1, as amended. 
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The director is accountable to the management board and charged with the 
preparation and execution of its decisions, reporting and the day-to-day running of 
the agency, including staff matters. Given the technicality of many agency dossiers, 
they generally also contain scientific committees. Their appointment varies from 
designation by the management board36 to nomination by the Member States37 or a 
mixture of both.38 
 There is little in the way of standardised, supervisory methodology between the 
various forms of regulatory agencies. However, the one big exception is in regard to 
financial regulation.39 The EU financial regulation contains essential rules concerning 
agencies‟ establishment plan, the creation of what is known as an agencies‟ framework 
financial regulation, the consolidation of the agencies‟ accounts with those of the 
Commission, and the discharge by the European Parliament [EP]. In addition, the 
framework financial regulation lays down common rules governing the establishment 
and implementation of their budget, including control aspects. Budgetary discharge is 
granted by the EP. 
 
B. Delegation of Powers  
 In all modern legal systems, effective government requires the allocation of broad, 
general and often discretionary powers to administrative actors.40 The same is true in 
the context of the EU although EU constitutional law does not explicitly regulate 
delegation to EU agencies. The only explicit mentioning of agencies in the EU‟s 
constitutional basis takes place within the English language version of the first 
paragraph of Article 263 TFEU dealing with the annulment procedure before the 
European Court of Justice.  
 Nevertheless, case law on delegation was already established in the early days of 
European integration by the limitation on the powers of European agencies deriving 
originally from the Meroni41 ruling, in which the Court considered as unlawful the 
delegation of discretionary powers to agencies and restricted such delegation to 
clearly defined powers. In Meroni, the Court was reviewing the possibility of (what 
then was the High Authority and what later became) the European Commission to 
confer implementing powers on a private body. In the terminology introduced in this 
article, it would have been a case of vertical delegation of powers. In Meroni, the 
Court held that no more powers could be delegated by the Commission than had 
legally been granted and that such delegation must be explicit.42 The power of the 
Commission in Article 53 of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel 
                                                          
36  As is the case with the European Environmental Agency [EEA] and the EFSA.  
37  As is the case with the European Medical Agency [EMEA] and EUROFOUND. 
38  As is the case with the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction [EMCDDA]. 
39  Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 as amended. See also Proposal for a 
 Council Regulation on the Financial Regulation Applicable to the General Budget of the EC, COM 
 (2000) 461 final, in Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Financial Regulation 
 Applicable to the General Budget of the EC, COM (2001) 691. 
40  S.A. Shapiro, R.M. Murphy, “Eight Things Americans Cannot Figure Out About Controlling 
 Administrative Power”, (2009) 61 Admin L Rev 5 at 6; more generally for e.g. J. D. Huber & C. R. 
 Shipan, Deliberate Discretion? The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy (Cambridge: 
 Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
41  Cases 9 and 10/56 Meroni v High Authority [1957/58] ECR English Special Edition 133. 
42  Ibid at 150, 151. 
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Community [ECSC, which is no longer in force] to authorise or decide on the 
financial arrangements, however, “gives it the right to entrust certain powers to such 
bodies subject to conditions to be determined by it and subject to its supervision.”
43 
Delegation is thus possible when it “involves clearly defined executive powers” and 
when their exercise can “be subject to strict review in the light of objective criteria 
determined by the delegating authority.” On the other hand, where delegation 
involves “a wide margin of discretion which may, according to the use which is made 
of it, make possible the execution of actual economic policy” such delegation can not 
take place through the type of vertical delegation provided in the case.44 As reason for 
establishing this distinction, the ECJ refers to the principle of institutional balance – the 
EU terminology for the concept of the relative separation of powers. This reference 
to a general principle of law, one might argue, makes it unlikely that the Meroni ruling 
ought to be limited to the specific context of the ECSC Treaty45 and should be 
considered as being applicable also within the legal system of the Lisbon regime.46 
One might, on the other hand, equally argue that the institutional balance in the 
context of the ECSC was sufficiently specific as to not follow the notion of Meroni 
too strictly in the very different context of the EU under the Treaty of Lisbon. As 
Schneider argues, the EU‟s legal system is based on a more open legal framework 
explicitly recognising delegation to agencies.47 Also, Vos finds that delegation of 
broader powers to agencies nowadays ought not to fall afoul of the Meroni doctrine, 
as the EU‟s institutional balance could be protected “by a reinforcement or re-
balancing of the existing institutions and constitutional guarantees for decision-
making.”
48  
 However, as Dehousse reminds us, not only legal but also political considerations 
play a role for the more narrowly defined mandate of European agencies.49 In 
particular, the Commission seems to be anxious not to let the undoubted help that 
agencies provide in reducing its administrative overload result in a loss of its 
administrative authority and control. In reality, some agencies have gained quite 
considerable influence over the decision-making process, perhaps already stretching 
the Meroni doctrine to its limits, as was illustrated above with the example of the 
European Air Safety Agency [EASA]. This is not only the case where agencies have 
been entrusted with the adoption of binding decisions,50 but also where they play an 
                                                          
43  Ibid at 151. 
44  Ibid at 152. 
45  However, see R. Dehousse, “Misfits: EU Law and the Transformation of European Governance” in 
 C. Joerges & R. Dehousse eds, Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market (Oxford: Oxford 
 University Press, 2002) 207 at 221. Dehousse argues that its general framework sufficiently 
 distinguishes the EC Treaty from the regime prevalent under the previous ECSC Treaty, in which the 
 High Authority exercised important regulatory powers. In particular, in contrast to the enforcement 
 of EC law by national authorities, Art. 53 ECSC entrusted its application to the High Authority 
 itself. 
46  K. Lenaerts, “Regulating the Regulatory Process: „Delegation of Powers‟ in the European 
 Community” (1993) 18 Eur L Rev 23 at 41. 
47  J.P. Schneider, “EU Agencies and the Meroni Doctrine” (2008) 61 Admin L Rev 29 at 38. 
48  E. Vos, “Reforming the European Commission: What Role to Play for EU Agencies?” (2000) 37 
 CML Rev. 1113 at 1123. 
49  Dehousse, supra note 45 at 223. 
50  See Council Regulation (EC) 2100/94 of 27 July 1994 on Community plant variety rights, OJ 1994 L 
 227/1; Council Regulation (EC) 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark 
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essential part in the decision-making process such as the European Medicines Agency 
[EMEA] which is in charge of authorisation and supervision of medical products. 51 
EMEA has been given the task to deliver scientific opinions on applications for the 
authorisation of pharmaceutical products. Even though its opinions are not binding 
on the Commission, which takes the final decision in accordance with the applicable 
comitology procedure, it has been argued that “the EMEA‟s opinion appears to 
condition substantially the discretion of the Commission in taking the final 
decision”,
52 in particular as the Commission is obliged to “systematically rubber-stamp 
EMEA recommendations.”
53  
 More recent case-law has to a certain degree loosened the strictures of the Meroni 
style non-delegation doctrine. In Schräder v CPVO,54 the applicant challenged a 
decision of the Board of Appeal of an EU agency, the Community Plant Variety 
Office [CPVO]. In its review of the agency decision, the General Court applied only 
limited judicial review, explicitly because of the “discretion” the agency enjoyed.
55 This 
statement is remarkable, since without any reference to Meroni, the Court finds that an 
agency, such as the CPVO, can be entrusted with the exercise of administrative 
decisions subject only to marginal judicial review, a standard of review reserved for 
discretionary decisions. In Commission v Germany of March 2010 the Grand Chamber 
of the ECJ held that powers could be delegated to an agency (in this case EU law 
provided for delegation to national agencies) if democratic oversight of an 
independent agency was sufficiently protected. That was the case if first, parliament 
controlled the appointment of senior management of the agency as well as if second, 
the agency was required to submit regular public reports to the parliament. 56 Although 
it is not entirely clear to date whether this dictum is equally applicable to the EU 
itself, the case paints a more delegation-friendly picture of the current case law 
allowing for more independence of agencies than is generally regarded to be the case 
under the Meroni doctrine. 
 As an interim result, the debate on the importance of the early statements of the 
ECJ in a much changed legal environment is vigorous. It appears that the seminal 
Meroni case, the non-delegation doctrine is based on the idea that delegation of wide 
discretion, which would impede the institutional balance as defined by the Treaties, is 
not possible. Wide discretion is a notion which refers, in the definition of the ECJ, to 
quasi-legislative powers which means establishing the core elements of a policy for 
implementation. That leaves the possibility of far reaching delegation, even rule-
making powers if limited by legislative guidance and exercised by institutional 
                                                                                                                                     
 (codified version), OJ 2009 L 78/1; Regulation (EC) 1592/2002 of the European Parliament and the 
 Council of 15 July 2002 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a 
 European Aviation Safety Agency, OJ 2002 L 240/1. 
51  Regulation (EC) 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 laying 
 down Community procedures for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for human 
 and veterinary use and establishing a European Medicines Agency, OJ 2004 L 136/1. 
52  See E. Chiti, “The Emergence of a Community Administration: the Case of European Agencies”,
 (2000) 37 CML Rev 37 309 at 336. 
53  Dehousse, supra note 45 at 223.  See also Vos, supra note 48 at 1132. 
54  Case T-187/06 Schräder v Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO) [2008] ECR II-3151, confirmed on 
 appeal in Case C-38/09 P Schräder v CPVO [2010] ECR I-nyr of 15 April 2010. 
55  Ibid at para 63.  
56  Case C-518/07 Commission v Germany of 9 March 2010, [2010] ECR I-nyr, at paras 42-46. 
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supervision. It is within this logic that delegation of powers to agencies is growing. 
The Courts seem to be accepting this increasingly. Agencies, however, exercise their 
powers in cooperation with, rather than in isolation from other EU institutions, 
national and international bodies due to the complexities of the integrated system of 
administration in the EU.  
 
III. ACCOUNTABILITY AND INDEPENDENCE IN THE CONTEXT 
OF NETWORK COORDINATION  
 
 The conditions for independence and accountability of EU agencies are governed 
by the specific context of integrated administration. EU agencies face a predicament. 
Although they are supposed to act with executive neutrality they also are responsible 
to the political bodies of the EU with respect to budgets, work-plans and 
nominations of leading personnel as well as to Member States through the Council. 57 
Everson therefore points out some major factors of independence and accountability 
of agencies: Agencies are created and receive delegation of certain powers to exercise 
them by bundling expertise and technical know-how. This expertise is the main 
source of agency independence. This substantive independence is curtailed by mostly 
procedural rules to ensure accountability to politically responsible institutions of the 
EU. Independence is to be exercised in the context of integration of various 
administrative structures from the European and the Member State levels that deal 
with the implementation of EU policies. 
 
A. Accountability  
 With respect to EU agencies, both the political dimension of accountability, in 
ensuring that the political will prevails, and its legal dimension, in aiming to ensure 
compliance with the law, are designed to be established by ex ante and by ex  post 
accountability mechanisms. Ex ante accountability mechanisms of agencies broadly 
allow for the defining of tasks and for imposing conditions for carrying them out, 
including the choice of personnel entrusted with the tasks and the allocation of the 
budget to do so. Ex post mechanisms provide inter alia for possible demands to justify 
actions taken, as well as rewards for compliance or sanctions for non-compliance 
with the tasks defined ex ante.58 
 In EU law, the supervision of agencies appears to rely significantly on anticipatory 
elements, mainly through the right to nominate key personnel within an agency. In 
executive agencies, this right is tightly linked to the Commission‟s hierarchic 
administrative control, allowing it, for example, to nominate the members of the 
steering committees and the director of the agency. In regulatory agencies, this form 
of ex ante supervision has a more political dimension, due to the distribution of the 
nomination rights and hearing provisions amongst the Council, the EP and the 
Commission. For example, the members of the management boards are generally 
nominated by the Council on the basis of Member State representation. The election 
                                                          
57  M. Everson, “Agencies: the dark hour of the executive?” in H. Hofmann & A. Türk eds, Legal 
 Challenges in EU Administrative Law (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2009) 116. 
58  M. Bovens, “Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A conceptual framework” (2007) 13 Eur LJ 
 447. The ECJ links this notion with the requirement to guarantee an institutional balance, stating in 
 Case 70/88 Parliament v Council [1990] ECR I-2041, para. 22 that “[o]bservance of the institutional 
 balance(…) requires that it should be possible to penalize any breach of that rule which may occur.”  
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of the director of a regulatory agency usually takes place by the management board on 
the basis of a proposal from the Commission or the Council. In some cases, the 
election takes place after a hearing of the EP. 
 Anticipatory supervision also is exercised through the authorisation of work 
programmes and budgets. Again, with respect to executive agencies, this control is 
often in the form of hierarchic administrative supervision by the Commission. With 
respect to regulatory agencies, the political aspect of these supervision tools becomes 
more important. Also with regulatory agencies, there are aspects of administrative 
supervision in certain cases. Such supervision may exist, for example, where the 
Commission has the right to object to proposed work programmes.59 But generally, 
the director establishing the work and the financial planning of an agency is 
responsible to the management board, the majority of which is comprised of Member 
State representatives.  
 Ex post supervision takes place through administrative, political and judicial 
supervision. On the level of administrative supervision, executive agencies have 
reporting duties to the Commission through reports submitted by their steering 
committees. The reporting duties of regulatory agencies allow the Member States and 
the political and administrative institutions of the Union to exert pressure on the 
agency. Agency regulations usually provide that an annual report has to be forwarded 
to the Member States, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission.60 
Certain agencies specify that the director will address the agency‟s activities in a 
general report to the European Parliament.61 Some agency regulations even provide 
that the European Parliament or the Council can require the director to participate in 
a hearing on any subject related to the agency‟s activities.
62 Finally, exceptionally, some 
agency statutes provide that agency actions can be referred to the Commission for a 
review of legality or subject to internal review within the agency itself. 63 
 Supervision of agency activity takes place internally in cases in which agencies 
with decision-making powers have mechanisms for legality review in the form of an 
internal appeal. In those cases, following the internal appeal procedure is a pre-
condition for the admissibility of judicial review through an appeal to the General 
                                                          
59  As is the case in the context of the EMSA and the ERA. 
60  See e.g. Art. 6(9) of Regulation (EC) 460/2004 of the European Parliament and the Council of 10 
 March 2004 establishing a European Network and Information Security Agency [ENISA], OJ 2004 L 
 77/1, as amended; Art. 25(2)(b) of Regulation (EC) 881/2004 of the European Parliament and of the 
 Council of 29 April 2004 establishing a European railway agency (ERA), OJ 2004 L 220/3, as 
 amended and many  more. 
61  See e.g. Art. 32 of Regulation (EC) 881/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 
 April 2004 establishing an ERA, OJ 2004 L 220/3, as amended.  
62  See e.g. Art. 32 of Regulation (EC) 881/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 
 April 2004 establishing a European railway agency (ERA), OJ 2004 L 220/3, as amended; Art. 15(6) 
 of Council Regulation (EC) 168/2007 of 15 February 2007 establishing a European Union Agency 
 for Fundamental Rights [EFA], OJ 2007 L 53/1. 
63  See e.g. Art. 18 of Council Regulation (EEC) 337/75 of the Council of 10 February 1975 establishing 
 a European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (CDVT), OJ 1975 L 39/1, as 
 amended; Art. 22 of Council Regulation (EEC) 1365/75 of 26 May 1975 on the creation of a 
 European Foundation for the improvement of living and working conditions, OJ 1975 L 139/1, as 
 amended; Art. 22 of Council Regulation (EC) 2062/94 of 18 July 1994 establishing a European 
 Agency for Safety and Health at Work, OJ 1994 L 216/1; Art. 28 of Regulation (EC) 851/2004 of the 
 European Parliament and the Council of 21 April 2004 establishing a European centre for disease 
 prevention and control, OJ 2004 L 142/1. 
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Court.64 In all other cases, judicial review can be brought against agency decisions by 
parties directly or indirectly affected by a decision or by a Member State or EU 
institution under Article 263 TFEU. 
 Accountability is also linked to transparency. Transparency is in this context 
understood not in the more narrow sense of giving the right to access to documents 
(irrespective of the essential importance of that right for holding an agency 
accountable) but in the broader sense of improving the allocation of responsibility for 
decision-making. The latter is in many ways a pre-condition for exercising ex ante and 
ex post accountability measures. In this respect, the much criticised European Agency 
of the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders 
[FRONTEX] may serve as an example for how the creation of an agency may 
increase transparency about EU activity. FRONTEX was established by Council 
regulation replacing much of the previously existing fragmentary and opaque 
structures that were attached to the Council in one form or another, for example the 
Common Unit for external border practitioners [SCIFA] that was a Council Working 
Party.65 The fact that FRONTEX has been given quite far reaching operational 
powers in patrolling and securing the EU‟s external borders as well as its 
empowerment to enter into international operational cooperation, however, contains 
its own specific challenges for transparency with respect to the allocation of 
responsibilities. 
 
B. Independence 
 Independence of agencies may arise from various factors including inter alia the 
expertise of an agency and its relation to the regulated interests, an agency‟s 
organisational structure and its procedural provisions, as well as the position of the 
agency within the network administration of the EU. Independence is a relative 
concept. Independence can be freedom from influence by specific stakeholders in a 
matter - for example EU institutions, Member State governments or private parties. 
Being independent from the influence of one group of stakeholders, however, might 
in reality arise on the basis of strong influence or even dependence on others. 
Independence can also manifest itself in forms of financial independence or absence 
of control or supervision. Independence from certain external influences may also 
arise from practical aspects, for example the unique expertise that an agency has 
                                                          
64  See Art. 58-65 of Council Regulation (EC) 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade 
 mark (codified version) (OHIM), OJ 2009 L 78/; Art. 67-73 of Council Regulation (EC) 2100/94 of 
 27 July 1994 on Community plant variety rights (CPVO), OJ 1994 L 227/1; Art. 31-41 and Art. 11 of 
 Regulation (EC) 1592/2002 of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 July 2002 on common 
 rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), OJ 
 2002 L 240/1. 
65  Curtin, supra note 5 at 99. FRONTEX is an EU agency with a legal personality and a certain 
 operational autonomy. It has its own budget which is in part financed by the EU, in part by those 
 Schengen Member States which are not members of the EU such as Liechtenstein, Iceland, Norway 
 and Switzerland. FRONTEX is governed by its management board, which consists of operational 
 heads of national border control authorities and representatives of the European Commission. The 
 management board verifies the execution of the agency‟s budget and adopts internal financial rules. It 
 further adopts working and mission procedures for inter alia the so called Rapid Border Intervention 
 Teams [RABIT] which are mixed units from member State border guards jointly pursuing missions 
 at the EU‟s external borders. The management board also is in charge of appointing the Executive 
 Director and the deputy of the agency.  
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accumulated allowing it, in reality, to set its agenda and remain unchallenged in its 
decisions. 
 Expertise underlines the notion of decision-making based on the scientific as 
opposed to political influence over a certain decision-outcome. Expertise can be 
integrated into the agency by means of its permanent personnel as well as with 
respect to the integration of expert committees within the agency. Expertise and with 
it, independence of an agency, can however also be enhanced by participation of the 
regulated interest and other private parties who have an interest in the matter. For 
example, the EASA Regulation which stipulates that the procedures for the 
development of opinions, certification specifications and guidance material shall 
involve not only expertise of national aviation regulatory authorities, but also involve 
experts from “the relevant interested parties” and shall ensure that the agency 
publishes documents and “consults widely interested parties, according to a timetable 
and a procedure which includes an obligation on the Agency to make a written 
response to the consultation process.”
66 
 These procedural provisions strengthening the expertise of an agency go hand in 
hand with other elements of independence. Agency independence relies to a large 
extent on the fact that accountability and supervisory mechanisms are often based on 
ex ante nomination of personnel and ex post reporting and discharging mechanisms. 
For example, unlike executive agencies, for regulatory agencies hardly any substantive 
elements exist in the form of directions or guidance as to the nature of individual 
decision-making other than the above mentioned forms of requiring work 
programmes to be authorised in certain cases. This choice towards procedural forms 
of supervision has a strong influence on ensuring independence of European 
agencies.  
 Independence of agencies is, it appears from this discussion, relative. Executive 
agencies are explicitly auxiliary bodies to support the Commission, over which the 
Commission wields almost exclusive control. On the other hand, EU regulatory 
agency structures are a mirror of the competing interests involved in implementation 
of EU law and the conflicts of whether the European or the Member State levels 
should implement a policy and to what degree. The result is a structure in which the 
representatives of various interests have their role to play. It should be noted that 
such a multiplicity of actors involved in the delegation and supervision of delegated 
powers may result in a certain degree of strengthening the independence of the 
agency.67 Confronted with conflicting positions by several principals, agents may feel 
encouraged to apply their own best judgement to a problem. Establishing overview 
from various principals without the possibility of any single one blocking activity in 
case of conflicts with other principals, gives the agent large amounts of freedom.  
 The question of independence is also relative to the issue of the influences from 
which independence is sought.68 Is the goal to achieve independence of an agency 
from political influence expressed by the Commission or the European Parliament, 
from specific Member State interests or from the interests of a specific industry or 
                                                          
66   Article 52 (1) (c) of Regulation No 216/2008 of the EP and the Council on the common rules in the 
 field of aviation and establishing the European Aviation Safety Agency, OJ 2008 L 79/1. 
67  For a detailed discussion, see Vos, supra note 48 at 1125-33. 
68  For a more in depth discussion see E. Chiti, “An Important Part of the EU‟s Institutional Machinery: 
 Features, Problems and Perspectives of European Agencies” (2009) 46 CML Rev 1395 at 1399. 
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consumer lobby? The organisational structure which would be most appropriate to 
achieve this independence will differ accordingly. 
 
IV. REFLECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
 
 The factors leading to accountability and independence of EU agencies are both 
procedural and substantive. Not surprisingly, they differ as to the policy area and the 
legal basis of the agency. Generally speaking, accountability and independence are 
defined by the position of an agency within the administrative networks 
implementing EU law and policy. Agencies are actors which are created to navigate 
the difficult territory of implementation of EU law in the grey-zone between EU and 
Member State competencies. They are created and receive delegation of powers under 
EU law. Their raison d’être is usually to coordinate Member State implementing 
activities rather than taking on these responsibilities themselves. 
 The independence of an agency can increase with its accountability to multiple 
principals – namely, EU institutions as well as Member States. Next to this, even in 
the absence of clearly defined decision-making powers, a factor increasing an agency‟s 
independence is the amount of specific and unique expertise it can unite within its 
services. Such expertise and with it the independence of an agency is generally 
enhanced when the agency has access to information and participation of interested 
parties and stakeholders in the policy. The broader the spectrum of interests taken 
into account, and the more institutionalised and transparent the participation, the 
more independence the agency may gain. This arises from being able to gather a 
unique amount of information and knowledge about a specific topic which supports 
the already existing expertise-based legitimacy within an agency. Such participatory 
legitimacy, as one might call it, can be regarded a case of increased input-legitimacy 
into decision-making. Good input and well designed procedure will generally generate 
a bigger chance of proper outcome, which in turn generally dissuades Courts and 
political actors from intervening in the substantive choices of an agency.  
 Further independence arises, as the case of several agencies shows, from the 
possibility to conduct internal self-control of decisions. This sort of control is 
oriented towards legality and reasonableness of a decision and may generally raise the 
quality and legitimacy of decision-making procedures. Reflecting on the features 
leading to the independence of agencies in the EU is of course directly linked to 
aspects of accountability. Accountability can be strengthened in the context of 
reducing the amount of principals. EU executive agencies, for example, are nearly 
entirely controlled and responsible to the Commission. This makes them accountable 
but also much less independent vis-à-vis the political orientation of the Commission. 
Accountability will also be strengthened by the combination of ex ante and ex post 
supervision tools. Such supervision tools will include judicial review. Judicial review 
will have to be developed with the increasing powers conferred on agencies. Finally, 
accountability will be strengthened not only by control and supervision mechanisms 
but also simply by increasing transparency. EU administrative law, due to its network 
character, is in permanent evolution. The structures and responsibilities are generally 
rather opaque to outside observers. Clear distribution and descriptions of 
responsibilities and decision-making structures are a key ingredient to enhancing 
accountability of the exercise of public powers. 
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POLITICS AND POLICY CHANGE IN AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW 
 
Richard Murphy* 
 
This essay uses Justice Scalia’s and Breyer’s dueling opinions in FCC v. Fox 
Television Stations, Inc. (2009), as a vehicle for exploring the contested 
relationship between politics and policy change in administrative law. In Fox, 
a five – justice majority led by Justice Scalia insisted that an agency’s 
abandonment of an old policy position in favor of a new one should survive 
review for arbitrariness so long as the agency explains why its new position is 
reasonable. A different five – justice majority (yes – that adds up to ten) led by 
Justice Breyer thought that Justice Scalia’s stance left too much room for 
politicization of policymaking. To curb such influence, Justice Breyer insisted 
that an agency, to justify abandoning an old policy, must explain why it was 
reasonable to change from its old policy to the new one.  
   Neither of these two approaches in Fox hits quite the right note. Justice 
Scalia’s view unduly minimizes the problem of politicization. Justice Breyer’s 
solution seems formalistic and easy to evade. A better way forward may lie in 
combining Justice Scalia’s simpler framework with Justice Breyer’s more 
suspicious attitude. Taking a cue from Justice Frankfurter in Universal 
Camera, the courts should respond to the potential for excessive politicization 
of agency policymaking not with more doctrinal metaphysics but with a 
suspicious “mood.” 
 
Cet article se base sur les opinions adverses des juges Scalia et Breyer dans 
FCC v. Fox Television Stations Inc. (2009) comme véhicule pour 
explorer le rapport contesté entre la politique et les changements de politiques 
en droit administratif. Dans Fox, une majorité de cinq juges dirigée par le 
juge Scalia a insisté que l’abandon d’une ancienne politique par une agence en 
faveur d’une nouvelle politique devrait survivre à un examen pour juger si elle 
est arbitraire en autant que l’agence explique pourquoi sa nouvelle politique est 
raisonnable. Une autre majorité de cinq juges (oui – cela fait dix) dirigée par 
le juge Breyer a trouvé que la position du juge Scalia laissait trop de place à la 
politisation de l’élaboration de politiques. Pour enrayer cette influence, le juge 
Breyer a insisté que l’agence, pour justifier l’abandon d’une ancienne politique, 
doit expliquer pourquoi il était raisonnable de changer de l’ancienne à la 
nouvelle. 
  Ni l’une ni l’autre de ces approches n’est tout à fait dans la note. L’avis du 
juge Scalia minimise trop le problème de politisation. La solution du juge 
Breyer semble formaliste et facile à contourner. Une meilleure façon d’avancer 
serait peut – être de combiner le cadre plus simple du juge Scalia avec l’attitude 
plus soupçonneuse du juge Breyer. En suivant l’exemple du juge Frankfurter 
                                                          
*  AT&T Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law.  Many thanks to all of the participants
 at the Sixth Administrative Law Discussion Forum, Québec City, May 25-26, 2010, who commented
 on this essay, and special thanks to Professor Linda Jellum for critiquing a more preliminary draft. 
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dans Universal Camera, les tribunaux devraient réagir contre le potentiel de 
politisation excessive de l’élaboration de politiques par une agence non pas avec 
une métaphysique plus doctrinale mais avec une «disposition» soupçonneuse. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In American administrative law, agency policy decisions – whether developed through 
adjudication or rulemaking – are generally subject to a very weak form of stare decisis 
– perhaps one not worthy of the name.  Oversimplifying a bit, so long as an agency 
uses the right procedures, it can abandon an earlier discretionary policy choice (which 
might be styled as a construction of law) so long as the agency acknowledges the 
change and explains why it is reasonable.1  Thus, the agency need not explain why 
changing course is the only reasonable thing to do; the agency need only explain why 
changing course is a reasonable thing to do. 
 Two classic themes of administrative law underlie this relatively lax approach to 
agency change.  The first and more straightforward theme relates to agency expertise 
– as agencies learn more about the way the world works, they should be able to make 
policy changes to reflect their new knowledge.2  The second and more contestable 
theme relates to political accountability – agencies should enjoy a measure of 
policymaking flexibility because they are answerable to elected officials.3 
 This notion that political accountability justifies administrative discretion is easy 
to question. Certainly, presidents and Congress wield vast formal and informal 
influence over agencies, but a great deal of agency action must escape control by 
elected officials if only because the federal bureaucracy is so very vast.  Worse, where 
political officials do wield influence, they may under some circumstances taint rather 
than legitimate agency action. For instance, one might think that experts at the 
Environmental Protection Agency [EPA], not the president or a senator from West 
Virginia, should determine limits on pollution from coal-fired plants under the 
rulemaking authority of the Clean Air Act.4   
 This abiding concern that political preferences – broadly construed to include 
value judgments – can improperly affect agency policymaking featured prominently in 
the Supreme Court‟s recent exploration of the force of agency precedent in FCC v. 
Fox Television Stations, Inc., in which broadcast firms challenged the FCC‟s decision to 
abandon its “fleeting expletives” policy.
5  A five-justice majority led by Justice Scalia 
concluded that the agency had given an explanation for its action that was reasonable 
                                                          
1  See e.g. Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S 735, 742 (1996) (observing that an agency can 
 change its statutory construction subject to Chevron deference provided it gives a reasonable 
 explanation for the change and takes into account any legitimate reliance on its prior construction). 
2  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863-66 (1984). [Chevron] 
3  See ibid at 865-66 (“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, 
 and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices 
 ….”). 
4  Cf. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 406-10 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that contacts between EPA and 
 executive officials and Senator Byrd of West Virginia did not invalidate a rule governing emissions of 
 coal-fired plants where EPA had supplied a reasonable explanation based on substantial recorded 
 evidence for that rule).  
5  129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009). 
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enough to survive judicial review for arbitrariness.6  A different five-justice majority 
led by Justice Breyer, however, intimated strong concerns that the agency‟s decision 
had been unduly politicized.  In an effort to curb such influence, Justice Breyer 
insisted that an agency, to give a reasonable explanation for abandoning an old policy, 
must do more than merely explain why its new policy, considered on its own, is 
reasonable.  In addition, the agency must explain why it was reasonable to change from 
its old policy to the new one.7 Writing for the four most conservative justices in this 
regard, Justice Scalia rejected this contention.  In his view, the answer to the question 
“Why change?” always has an obvious answer:  An agency changes course when it 
likes its new policy better than its old one.8  For Justice Scalia, it is perfectly proper for 
an agency‟s likes and dislikes (i.e. its political preferences) to motivate its policy 
choices so long as those choices are otherwise reasonable. 
 This brief essay uses Justice Breyer‟s and Scalia‟s dueling opinions as a vehicle for 
exploring this contested relationship between politics and policy change in American 
administrative law.9  Underlying its analysis is the premise that in a representative 
democracy that places political appointees in charge of regulatory agencies with 
broad, vague mandates, political preferences should affect some regulatory choices.  
Still, such preferences should not distort expert administrative judgments – as the old 
saw goes, we have a right to our own opinions but not to our own facts.  In 
exercising judicial review, courts should do their best to police against such distortion. 
 Neither of the leading approaches in Fox seems to hit quite the right note 
regarding this problem of political preferences distorting discretionary judgment.  
Justice Scalia‟s opinion ignores the potential problem.  Justice Breyer‟s insistence that 
agencies answer the “Why change?” question seems too formalistic and disingenuous 
as a solution.  The FCC did, in fairness, explain why it was changing its policy – the 
problem was that Justice Breyer, perhaps quite wisely, did not think very much of the 
FCC‟s explanation.  
 One good path forward lies in combining Justice Scalia‟s simpler framework with 
Justice Breyer‟s more jaundiced attitude.  We all know that strong preferences can 
                                                          
6  Ibid at 1812-13. 
7  Ibid at 1830 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also ibid. at 1822 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
 concurring in the judgment) (stating agreement with Justice Breyer that “the agency must explain why 
 „it now reject[s] the considerations that led it to adopt that initial policy‟”).  
8  Ibid at 1811. 
9  For three notable, recent, and more extensive discussions of this relationship, see Nina A. Mendelson, 
 “Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making” (2010) 108 Mich L Rev 1127 
 (contending that determining the legitimacy of political reasons for agency action requires transparent 
 disclosure of political influence; contending that agencies should be required to publicly disclose 
 summaries of White House influence on significant rulemaking decisions); Kathryn A. Watts, 
 “Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review” (2009) 119 Yale LJ 2 (discussing 
 the evolution of the relationship between politics and expertise in supporting agency action; proposing 
 that transparent reliance on certain political preferences should count as a legitimate reason for agency 
 action in the context of arbitrariness review); Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, "Massachusetts v. EPA: 
 From Politics to Expertise” (2007) Sup. Ct. Rev. 51 (2007) (contending that in a string of recent, major 
 cases, the Supreme Court, concerned by excessive politicization of agency action during the Bush 
 administration, has pushed agencies to rely on expertise rather than political preferences).  See also 
 Elena Kagan, “Presidential Administration” (2001) 114 Harv L Rev 2246 (extolling the virtues of 
 increased presidential control over rulemaking); Peter L. Strauss, “Presidential Rulemaking” (1997) 72 
 Chicago-Kent L Rev 965 at 984 (contending that increased presidential control of rulemaking 
 threatens excessive politicization of administration and erosion of the constraint of law on politics). 
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distort judgment. Where a reviewing judge has reason to think that strong political 
preferences (or pressure) are affecting agency judgment, that judge should scrutinize 
the agency‟s explanation for a decision with a sharper eye – or dare one say – a harder 
look.  Taking a cue from Justice Frankfurter, the courts should respond to the 
potential for excessive politicization of agency policymaking not with a doctrine, but 
with a “mood.”
10  
 
II. BEFORE FOX 
 
 To set the stage for Fox, this section will briefly explain the major doctrines that 
the federal courts have developed for reviewing the sufficiency of an agency‟s 
explanation for a decision to abandon a previous policy choice. (Readers who would 
rather undergo dental surgery than read about State Farm and Chevron again may wish 
to skip ahead.) 
 
A.  Review of changes in policy that we put in the “policy” pigeonhole 
 The leading case governing the sufficiency of agency explanations for policy 
changes is that pillar of American administrative law, Motor Vehicles Mfgrs. Ass’n v. State 
Farm Automobile Ins. Co.
11
 This case arose out of the National Highway and Traffic 
Safety Administration‟s long effort to develop a rule governing passive safety 
restraints in automobiles.  During the Carter administration, the agency adopted an 
iteration of the rule, MS 208, which allowed automobile manufacturers to choose to 
install either airbags or passive seat belts.
12
  At the time, agency officials believed that 
manufacturers would choose airbags for 60% of vehicles and passive seat belts for 
40%.
13
  
 The Reagan administration then rode into office on a deregulatory agenda.  Under 
new leadership, the agency rescinded MS 208, explaining that the agency had 
discovered that the manufacturers would likely install airbags in only 1% of vehicles 
and that the benefits of passive seatbelts were not sufficient to justify significant costs 
to industry and consumer backlash.
14
   
 Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner Motor Vehicle Manufacturers 
Association [MVMA] contended that the agency‟s decision to rescind should be 
subject to the same type of extremely lax review that would have applied to a decision 
by the agency not to promulgate any rule in the first place.
15
  The Court rejected this 
argument, noting: 
 
Revocation constitutes a reversal of the agency‟s former views as 
to the proper course.  A settled course of behavior embodies the 
agency‟s informed judgment that, by pursuing that course, it will 
                                                          
10  Cf. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951) (observing that legislative enactment of 
 the “substantial evidence” standard of review expressed a congressional “mood” that the courts 
 should scrutinize agency findings of fact more vigorously than they had before). 
11  463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
12  Ibid at 37. 
13  Ibid at 38. 
14  Ibid at 38-39.  
15  Ibid at 41. 
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carry out the policies committed to it by Congress.  There is, then, 
at least a presumption that those policies will be carried out best if 
the settled rule is adhered to.
16
 
 
To rebut this presumption, the agency had to give an explanation for the rescission 
sufficient to satisfy arbitrariness review by the reviewing courts. Elaborating on what 
this standard requires, the Court explained that 
 
… the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a 
satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational 
connection between the facts found and the choice made. In 
reviewing that explanation, we must consider whether the decision 
was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether 
there has been a clear error of judgment. Normally, an agency rule 
would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on 
factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely 
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an 
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence 
before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed 
to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.
17
  
 
In other words, the agency must demonstrate that, in reaching its decision, it thought 
about the right stuff (the “relevant factors”) and, having done so, did not adopt a 
manifestly irrational position.  Judicial review of whether an agency choice is 
manifestly irrational requires, at bottom, a discretionary judgment call by the 
reviewing court – in other words, it requires courts to engage in the kind of practical, 
reasoned decisionmaking that courts expect of agencies.
18
 
 Applying the Court‟s gloss on the arbitrariness standard, all nine justices 
concluded that the agency had arbitrarily failed to explain why, rather than abandon 
MS 208 entirely, the agency did not instead amend it to impose an airbags-only 
standard.
19
  Five justices concluded, more tenuously, that the agency‟s assessment of 
the value of passive safety belts arbitrarily failed to consider the effects of inertia – i.e., 
that people might be too lazy to detach passive belts even though they do not care to 
wear them.
20
 
 In State Farm, the agency‟s change of position was obvious, and, because MS 208 
had not yet been implemented, there were no major reliance concerns to worry about.  
Many cases reiterate, however, that for a policy change to survive rationality review, 
                                                          
16  Ibid at 41-42 (citation and quotation marks omitted; italics added). 
17  Ibid at 43 (citations omitted). 
18  Cf. Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Judgment Calls (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 
 40-42 (observing that courts, when exercising constrained discretion to implement a vague legal 
 command, should  be subject to the same requirements of reasoned decisionmaking as agencies).  
19  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46 (1983). [State Farm] 
20  Ibid at 54. 
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an agency‟s explanation must at least acknowledge the fact of change.
21
  Also, agencies 
must assess the significance of any reliance interests to the rationality of that change.
22
 
 As it relates to Fox, one notable aspect of the majority opinion in State Farm was 
its failure to discuss the significance of policy preferences.  The majority opinion did 
recount how NHTSA‟s approach to passive safety restraints changed as presidents 
took and left power.
23
  None of the justices were born yesterday, and all knew that 
political preferences were strongly in play.  Nonetheless, the majority did not give any 
express weight to this political history in assessing the legality of NHTSA‟s 
abandonment of MS 208.  Instead, the majority opinion focused purely on the 
agency‟s supposed technocratic failures. 
 By contrast, Justice Rehnquist, writing for four justices in a partial dissent and 
partial concurrence, directly addressed the issue of politics in administration.  He 
explained: 
 
The agency‟s changed view of the standard seems to be related to 
the election of a new President of a different political party. It is 
readily apparent that the responsible members of one 
administration may consider public resistance and uncertainties to 
be more important than do their counterparts in a previous 
administration. A change in administration brought about by the 
people casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an 
executive agency‟s reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its 
programs and regulations. As long as the agency remains within 
the bounds established by Congress, it is entitled to assess 
administrative records and evaluate priorities in light of the 
philosophy of the administration.
24
 
 
The gist of this passage is that political preferences can provide a sufficient 
justification for an agency to shift from one reasonable policy to another reasonable 
policy. This embrace of politics as a justification for deference was not, strictly 
speaking, inconsistent with the State Farm majority‟s analysis insofar as all the justices 
would agree that political preferences cannot justify a policy choice with fatal 
technocratic flaws.  Politics can justify a choice among reasonable choices, not 
unreasonable ones. 
 There is, nonetheless, a difference in tone between the majority‟s and Justice 
Rehnquist‟s treatment of the role of political preferences.  The majority‟s careful 
recounting of how the agency‟s policy ping-ponged back and forth as administrations 
changed suggests a suspicion that politics was distorting technocratic judgment.  On 
this view, courts should tolerate rather than celebrate the effects of political 
preferences in agency policy change, and they should demand technocratic, not 
                                                          
21  See e.g. National Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) 
 (identifying unexplained inconsistency as a reason to condemn an agency interpretation as 
 arbitrary). 
22  Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S 735, 742 (1996) 
23  State Farm, supra note 19 at 35-38. 
24  Ibid at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part; dissenting in part). 
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political explanations from agencies.
25
  Justice Rehnquist‟s opinion amounted to a 
partial rejoinder to the majority‟s implicit criticism.  In essence, he was advising courts 
to consider that the effects of political preferences on policy change sometimes 
amount to democracy in action rather than illegitimate distortions of an expert-driven 
regulatory process.  
 
B.  Review of changes in policy that we put into the “law” pigeonhole 
 Aspiring Supreme Court justices are required to deny three times ere the rooster 
crows that construction of vague law requires policymaking (a/k/a lawmaking).  
American administrative law‟s Chevron doctrine nonetheless recognizes that an agency 
engages in policymaking when it chooses among reasonable constructions of a statute 
it administers.26 Given this recognition, it should not be surprising that the law 
governing changes in administrative statutory constructions subject to Chevron 
deference bears a striking resemblance to State Farm.  
 When reviewing a federal agency‟s construction of a statute it administers, a 
reviewing court must first determine whether to apply Chevron deference at all.  The 
metaphysics addressing this point are regrettably confusing, but they largely boil 
down to the propositions that Chevron should apply: (a) where an agency develops a 
statutory interpretation through legislative rulemaking or formal adjudication; or (b) 
where, based on the totality of the circumstances, the court concludes it would be 
reasonable to apply Chevron‟s style of reasonability review.27 
 Where Chevron does not apply, courts purport to be in primary charge of 
determining statutory meaning and will adopt an agency statutory construction only if 
they find it to be the most “persuasive.”
28  This stance would seem to minimize the 
role of agency political preferences in affecting statutory construction (but might be 
expected to increase the role of judicial political preferences).29 
                                                          
25  Cf. Watts, supra note 9 at 5 (noting that State Farm “has been read to clarify … [that] agencies should 
 explain their decisions in technocratic, statutory, or scientifically driven terms, not political terms”); 
 Kevin M. Stack, “The President‟s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws” (2006) 106 Colum L Rev 
 263 at 307 n.191  (describing State Farm as requiring agencies to “rationalize their decisions in terms of 
 statutory criteria” and blocking agencies from relying on a change in administration as “a sufficient 
 basis for agency action”). 
26  See Chevron, supra note 2 at 843-44 (characterizing ambiguous statutes as implicit delegations of 
 policymaking authority). 
27  See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-30 (2001) (indicating that statutory interpretations 
 produced via formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking should usually net Chevron 
 deference); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002) (indicating that determination of whether Chevron 
 deference should apply to a statutory interpretation should be a function of the totality of the 
 relevant circumstances). 
28  Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-35 (declaring that courts should apply Skidmore deference where Chevron is 
 inapplicable; pursuant to Skidmore, a court should adopt an agency‟s statutory construction only if the 
 court finds that construction persuasive). 
29  But perhaps not – see generally William Eskridge & Lauren Baer, “The Continuum of Deference: 
 Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan” (2008) 96 
 Geo LJ 1083 at 1142 (concluding, after an extensive survey of the Supreme Court‟s application of 
 various deference regimes, that the Court‟s affirmance rates when applying Chevron are only about 3% 
 higher than when the Court invokes Skidmore).  
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 Where Chevron does apply, courts apply its famous two-step (which some insist 
has only one-step – but let‟s not wander too far into the Chevron weeds).30  At the first 
step, the court checks whether Congress has spoken to the precise statutory question 
at issue. If Congress has done so, then the court should simply implement Congress‟s 
preferred construction.  If not, the court proceeds to the second step and checks 
whether the agency‟s construction was “permissible” or “reasonable.”
31  
Commentators have debated for a long time what this second step actually entails, 
but Professor Ron Levin long ago gave the best answer:  Step two checks whether the 
agency gave a reasoned explanation for its statutory construction.32  Step two, in short, 
is State Farm – which makes conceptual sense given that Chevron recognizes that 
construction of unclear statutes requires policymaking.  (It also makes a kind of 
historical sense given that State Farm was issued in 1983 and Chevron was handed 
down just a year later in 1984). 
 A quick read of Chevron itself confirms this identity.  Simplifying somewhat, the 
statutory issue revolved around figuring out what should count as a “stationary 
source” subject to extensive permitting requirements.  At step one of its Chevron 
analysis in Chevron itself, the Court canvassed all the relevant statutory text and 
legislative history and concluded that Congress had not communicated any clear 
intent with regard to the precise issue at stake.33 
 Revealingly, much of the Court‟s step-two analysis appeared in a subsection of its 
opinion that was captioned “Policy.”
34 The Court observed that Congress had plainly 
wanted the agency to give weight both to environmental concerns and to economic 
concerns as well.35 In the language of State Farm, both concerns were “relevant 
factors.” The Court then observed that EPA‟s rulemaking record demonstrated that 
the agency had, indeed, given reasoned consideration to both these factors, explaining 
how adoption of the “bubble concept” might actually have positive environmental 
effects and be more economically efficient.36  In the language of State Farm, the agency 
had not made a “clear error in judgment” in striking this policy balance.   
 On the way to affirming the agency, the Court minimized the importance of the 
fact that the agency had repeatedly changed its mind about the meaning of “stationary 
source.”
37 It is an easy matter to find Supreme Court cases indicating that courts 
should be quicker to defer to consistent agency statutory constructions.38 This 
                                                          
30  Matthew Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, “Chevron Has Only One Step” (2009) 95 Va L Rev 597; but 
 see Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, “Chevron‟s Two Steps” (2009) 95 Va L Rev 611. 
31  Chevron, supra note 2 at 842-43. 
32  Ronald M. Levin, “The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered” (1997) 72 Chicago-Kent L Rev 
 1253 at 1254 (suggesting courts regard step two and arbitrariness review as “identical”); Mark 
 Seidenfeld, “A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency 
 Interpretations of Statutes” (1994) 73 Tex L Rev 83 at 128-29 (arguing that step two should require an 
 agency to “explain why its interpretation is good policy in light of the purposes and concerns 
 underlying the statutory scheme”). 
33  Chevron, supra note 2 at 859-64. 
34  Ibid at 864. 
35  Ibid at 863. 
36  Ibid at 863-64. 
37  Ibid. 
38  For cases in which the Court seemed inclined to apply a somewhat stronger form of stare decisis to 
 agency statutory constructions than Chevron contemplates, see e.g. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace 
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proposition suggests that courts should review agency flip-flops with a sharper eye.  
The Chevron Court nonetheless advised that initial agency statutory constructions are 
“not instantly carved in stone” and stressed that agencies in fact should change their 
statutory constructions to fit new learning.39  
 In justifying its deferential approach to EPA‟s flip-flop, the Supreme Court 
invoked both technocratic and political concerns that are utterly familiar in judicial 
review of agency policymaking.  Courts should defer to agencies because they are the 
experts – EPA, not a federal judge, knows how to make the Clean Air Act work.40  
Courts should also defer to agencies because they are answerable to elected officials.41   
 Some have noted a tension between State Farm and Chevron with regard to the 
proper role of political preferences in agency policymaking.  The gist of this critique is 
that Chevron expressly admits that political accountability justifies deference to 
political preferences, whereas the majority in State Farm – unlike Justice Rehnquist – 
insisted on framing review in purely technocratic terms.42  This tension dissolves to 
some extent when one remembers that in State Farm the justices did not need to offer 
any special justification for deferring on an issue that everyone recognized fell into 
the “policy” pigeonhole.  After all, everyone knows that judicial deference is in order 
on matters of agency policy.  In Chevron, by contrast, the justices needed to explain 
why they were ceding interpretive authority on an issue denominated as “law.”  Thus, 
the Chevron Court had a reason to invoke the justification of political accountability 
that the State Farm majority lacked.  Still, it remains the case that Chevron, unlike the 
majority in State Farm, actively embraced political accountability (and thus political 
preferences) as a basis for deference. 
 
III. ALONG COMES A FOX 
 
 In 2009, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. gave the justices a vehicle for revisiting 
the role of political preferences in administration and the meaning of State Farm.  Five 
justices in writings scattered across three opinions expressed concerns about undue 
politicization in Fox.43  The four most conservative justices, led by Justice Scalia, did 
not seem to harbour such doubts.44 
                                                                                                                                     
 Co., 416 U.S. 267 at 274-75 (1974) (noting that “a court may accord great weight to the longstanding 
 interpretation placed on a statute by an agency charged with its administration”); United States v. 
 Chicago, North Shore & Milwaukee R.R. Co., 288 U.S. 1 at 13 (1933) (stating “the rule that settled 
 administrative construction is entitled to great weight and should not be overturned except for cogent 
 reasons”); United States v. Finell, 185 U.S. 236 at 244 (1902) (holding that, in case of “doubt,” the 
 longstanding interpretation of “the department charged with the execution of the statute should be 
 respected, and not overruled except for cogent reasons”); Edward's Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S.(12 Wheat) 
 206 at 210 (1827) (“In the construction of a doubtful and ambiguous law, the contemporaneous 
 construction of those who were called upon to act under the law, and were appointed to carry its 
 provisions into effect, is entitled to very great respect.”). 
39  Chevron, supra note 2 at 863. 
40  Ibid at 865. 
41  Ibid. 
42  See e.g. Watts, supra note 9 at 38-39 (noting that Chevron actively embraced a political-control model 
 for legitimating agency action whereas State Farm-style hard-look review “continues to insist on 
 technocratic rather than political decisionmaking when it comes to agencies‟ reason-giving duties”). 
43  See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1823 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (policy 
 changes must rest on principles that are “rational, neutral, and in accord with the agency‟s proper 
 understanding of its authority”); ibid at 1825-26 (Stevens, J.) (stressing that Congress wished broadcast 
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 The Fox matter arose out the FCC‟s efforts to carry out its thankless statutory 
mission of blocking the broadcast of “indecent” language.  Decades ago, the FCC 
interpreted the statutory term “indecent” to cover: 
 
language that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by 
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, 
sexual or excretory activities or organs, at times of the day when 
there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience.
45
 
 
In the 1978 case of FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, a fractured Supreme Court rejected a 
First Amendment challenge to the use of this interpretation to sanction a broadcaster 
for airing George Carlin‟s Filthy Words monologue.
46
  The narrow majority made much 
of the fact that Carlin‟s monologue repeated seven especially bad words over and 
over again.
47
 
 After Pacifica, the FCC, aware that it was operating in sensitive First Amendment 
territory, adopted an enforcement policy under which it declined to bring actions 
against broadcasters for “fleeting expletives.”  Under this policy, a broadcaster did 
not need to worry for its pocketbook or its license if an interviewee during a live 
broadcast suddenly made quick, non-literal use of a bad word.
48
 
 But then came Bono, Cher, and Nicole Richie.  Bono, terrifically pleased to win a 
Golden Globe for the music for Gangs of New York, described the experience as 
“f****** brilliant” during NBC‟s live broadcast of the award ceremony.
49
  During a 
live broadcast of the 2002 MTV Music Awards, Cher, displeased by critics who had 
suggested for some decades that her career was over, suggested that it would be good 
to “f***‟em.”
50
 Nicole Richie, during a live broadcast of the 2003 MTV Music 
Awards, advised audience members that it is “not so f****** simple” to get “s***” 
out of a Prada purse
51
– which is probably true but also not a nice thing to say with 
several million children watching. 
 These outbursts prompted two congressional subcommittee hearings during 
January and February 2004 at which various members of Congress raked the 
Commission over the coals for failing to enforce the indecency ban.  Of special note, 
at the January meeting, members specifically advised the Commission to overturn a 
                                                                                                                                     
 regulation “should be as free from political influence or arbitrary control as possible”); ibid at 1829 
 (Breyer, J., dissenting; joined in pertinent part by Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Souter) 
 (insisting that independent agencies may not make decisions based on “purely political reasons”). 
44  See generally ibid at 1812-13 (explaining, in just a few paragraphs, that the FCC had given a reasoned 
 explanation for abandoning the fleeting expletives policy). 
45  Pacifica Foundation, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1975). 
46  FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
47  Ibid at 729 & 751-55 (emphasizing that Carlin repeated his offending words over and over again); see 
 also ibid at 757 (Powell, J., concurring) (describing Carlin monologue as “verbal shock treatment”). 
48  See Fox, supra note 43 at 1807 (explaining evolution of FCC‟s fleeting expletives policy). 
49  Ibid. 
50  Ibid at 1808. 
51  Ibid. 
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ruling by its enforcement staff that NBC was not liable for Bono‟s “f****** brilliant” 
remark.
52
  
 Most dogs, if you kick them hard enough, will move.  In March 2004, the full 
Commission reversed its staff and concluded that the Bono broadcast had violated 
the indecency ban.
53
  The Commission held that the fleeting nature of Bono‟s remark 
was not dispositive because allowing this type of safe harbour would “likely lead to 
more widespread use” of bad words.
54
  Such an outcome would mark a failure to 
“safeguard the well-being of the nation‟s children from the most objectionable, most 
offensive language.”
55
 The Commission added that Bono‟s non-iteral use of his 
offending word was immaterial given that any use of the “F-Word … inherently has a 
sexual connotation.”
56
 The broadcast was patently offensive because the “F-Word,” 
alas, “is one of the most vulgar, graphic and explicit descriptions of sexual activity in 
the English language.”
57
 Notwithstanding its conclusion that the Bono broadcast was 
indecent, however, the Commission declined to sanction NBC because “existing 
precedent [governing fleeting expletives] would have permitted this broadcast.”
58
   
 In a later order, the Commission gave a similar treatment to Fox‟s broadcasts of 
the Cher and Nicole Richie remarks.
59
  In this order, the FCC described its fleeting 
expletives policy as a product of staff rulings and Commission dicta.
60
  It made clear 
that, going forward, there would be no safe harbour for fleeting expletives, though a 
lack of repetition would weigh against a finding of indecency.
61
 
 Various broadcasters petitioned for review, claiming that: (a) the new policy 
violated the First Amendment; and (b) the policy change was arbitrary under the 
Administrative Procedure Act.  The Second Circuit ruled for the broadcasters on the 
statutory ground and declined to reach the constitutional issue.
62
  
 As mentioned above, the Supreme Court by a 5-4 vote reversed the Second 
Circuit‟s conclusion that the FCC had failed to offer a reasoned justification for its 
action.
63
  In addition to dividing sharply over the sufficiency of the agency‟s 
explanation, the justices also clashed over the general nature of arbitrariness review as 
applied to agency policy shifts.  
 
                                                          
52  See “Can You Say That On TV?”: An Examination of the FCC’s Enforcement with respect to Broadcast Indecency, 
 Hearing before the Subcommittee on Telecomm. and the Internet of the House Committee on Energy 
 and Commerce, 108th Cong., 2d Sess., 2, 17, 19 (Jan. 28, 2004).  See generally Fox, supra note 43 at n.4 
 (discussing pressure inflicted by members of Congress on the FCC at the Jan. 28 hearing as well as at a 
 Feb. 11, 2004 hearing held by the same subcommittee). 
53  In re Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the “Golden Globe 
 Awards” Program, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975, 4978-80 (2004). 
54  Ibid at 4979, para. 9. 
55  Ibid. 
56  Ibid at 4978, para. 8. 
57  Ibid at 4979, para. 9. 
58  Ibid at 4981-82, para. 15. 
59  In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between February 2 2002, and March 8, 
 2005, 21 FCC Rcd. 13299 (2006) (hereinafter, “Remand Order”). 
60  Ibid at 13307, para. 21. 
61  Ibid at 13325, para. 61. 
62  FCC v. Fox Televisions Stations, Inc. 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d by 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009). 
63  Fox, supra note 43. 
336 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 2010 
 
 
A.  Justice Breyer’s majority opinion 
 Of the six opinions issued in Fox, Justice Breyer‟s opinion appears last and is 
denominated as a dissent.  Justice Kennedy, however, joined Justice Breyer‟s 
discussion of the proper framework for arbitrariness review of agency policy shifts, 
which thus attracted a majority vote.
64
  
 Near the opening of his opinion, Justice Breyer contended that, although 
independent administrative agencies have broad policymaking authority, they may not 
lawfully “make policy choices for purely political reasons nor … rest them primarily 
upon unexplained policy preferences.”
65
  Particularly at an agency such as the FCC, 
which is led by commissioners who serve fixed terms of office, are insulated from 
political control, and are not answerable to the voters, “it [is] all the more important 
that courts review [agency] decisionmaking to assure compliance with applicable 
provisions of the law – including law requiring that major policy decisions be based 
on articulable reasons.”
66
 
 Implementing the duty of reasoned decisionmaking typically requires more from 
an agency when it abandons an old policy in favor of a new one than when the 
agency starts from a clean slate.  Justice Breyer explained: 
 
To explain a change requires more than setting forth reasons why 
the new policy is a good one. It also requires the agency to answer 
the question, “Why did you change?” And a rational answer to this 
question typically requires a more complete explanation than 
would prove satisfactory were change itself not at issue. An 
(imaginary) administrator explaining why he chose a policy that 
requires driving on the right-side, rather than the left-side, of the 
road might say, “Well, one side seemed as good as the other, so I 
flipped a coin.” But even assuming the rationality of that 
explanation for an initial choice, that explanation is not at all 
rational if offered to explain why the administrator changed driving 
practice, from right-side to left-side, 25 years later.
67
 
 
Justice Breyer insisted that requiring an agency to answer the “Why change?” 
question did not impose a “heightened” standard of arbitrariness review; nor did it 
require an agency to demonstrate that its new policy was “better” than the old one.  
Instead,  
 
the law requires application of the same standard of review to 
different circumstances, namely circumstances characterized by the 
fact that change is at issue. It requires the agency to focus upon the 
fact of change where change is relevant, just as it must focus upon 
any other relevant circumstance. It requires the agency here to 
                                                          
64  See ibid at 1822 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
65  Ibid at 1829 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
66  Ibid at 1830 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
67  Ibid at 1830-31 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
Vol. 28(2)  Politics and Policy Change in American Administrative Law 337 
 
 
focus upon the reasons that led the agency to adopt the initial 
policy, and to explain why it now comes to a new judgment.
68
 
 
Applying this standard, an agency that wishes to abandon an old policy that was 
based on a particular view of the facts, applicable law, or special policy concerns, 
should explain why these factors are no longer controlling.   
 Although he seemed intent on minimizing the role of political preferences in 
policymaking, Justice Breyer did concede, “sometimes the ultimate explanation for 
change may have to be, „We now weigh the relevant considerations differently.‟”
69
  
Leaving room for agencies to “weigh” unchanged circumstances differently opens the 
door to political (i.e., value) preferences to come into play.  For instance, one might 
think that this approach would allow FCC Commissioners who particularly dislike 
bad language to justify abandoning the fleeting expletive policy by declaring 
something like:  “Given that bad language is bad for kids, we don‟t think our old 
policy offers enough protection.”  
 Justice Breyer‟s application of his framework to the FCC in Fox, however, 
suggests that he has a more potent form of review in mind.  For instance, as part of 
its justification for abandoning the fleeting expletives policy, the FCC indicated that it 
wished to protect children from the “first blow” of profanity.
70
  Justice Breyer 
contended that the “difficulty with this argument … is that it does not explain the 
change” given that the FCC “has long used the theory of the „first blow‟ to justify its 
regulation of broadcast indecency.”  He queried: “What, in respect to the „first blow,‟ 
has changed?”
71
  The short, implicit answer to his question would seem to be that the 
FCC now “weighs” this consideration differently.  It seems fair to hazard, however, 
that the agency could not have satisfied Justice Breyer by committing to paper a 
justification something like, “We at the FCC worry a lot more about „first blows‟ than 
we used to a couple of decades ago.  We can‟t imagine what we were thinking back 
then.” 
 In sum, Justice Breyer‟s approach to the role of political preferences in 
administrative policy changes seems ambivalent (which, by the way, is both wise and 
appropriate).  He holds to the view that independent regulatory agencies should base 
their policy choices on technocratic rather than “unexplained” political preferences.  
Knowing that political concerns cannot sensibly be squeezed out the system, he 
acknowledges that agency views regarding how to “weigh” relevant considerations 
may evolve and that this evolution may be reflected by policy changes.  His 
application of his framework to the FCC, however, seemed to give no weight to the 
agency‟s changed views of the significance of controlling the broadcast of bad 
language.   
 
B. Justice Scalia’s conflicting majority opinion 
 Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer agree with regard to many of the basics of 
arbitrariness review.  For instance, both claim that an agency change in policy does 
not trigger a “heightened” standard of review – contrary to any Court of Appeals 
                                                          
68  Ibid at 1831 (Breyer, J., dissenting). [Emphasis in original] 
69  Ibid at 1831. [Emphasis in original] 
70  “Remand Order”, supra note 59 at 13309, para. 25. 
71  Fox, supra note 43 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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intimations to the contrary.
72
  Both agree that an agency must acknowledge its policy 
shifts and take into consideration any reliance interests an old policy may have 
engendered.
73
 On either justices‟ approach, an agency that bases a policy change on a 
new understanding of the relevant facts must explain how its views have evolved and 
why they justify a new policy.
74
   
 The two justices part company, however, with regard to: (a) the proper role of 
political preferences in policy change; and (b) how this role affects the agency‟s duty 
to answer the “Why change?” question.   The short of the matter is that Justice Scalia 
and his fellow conservatives believe that political preferences may justify any agency 
choice among reasonable alternatives.  In a portion of his opinion that five justices 
(including Justice Kennedy) joined, he explained: 
 
[O]f course the agency must show that there are good reasons for 
the new policy. But it need not demonstrate to a court's 
satisfaction that the reasons for the new policy are better than the 
reasons for the old one; it suffices that the new policy is 
permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons for it, 
and that the agency believes it to be better, which the conscious 
change of course adequately indicates.
75
  
 
Suppose a reasonable FCC might adopt a safe harbour approach to fleeting expletives 
or it might not.  If both choices are “reasonable” – whatever exactly that means – 
then the FCC gets to choose which it “believes” to be better.  The agency need not 
explain why it believes this choice to be better – which, on some level, may be no 
more possible than explaining why one prefers chocolate ice cream to strawberry.   
 Justice Scalia‟s framework thus rejects Justice Breyer‟s contention that an agency 
must explain why it prefers a new (reasonable) policy over an old (reasonable) policy.
76
  
On examination, however, the scope of this disagreement seems rather small.  All 
justices expect an agency to provide reasons for any significant policy choice.  Where 
an agency policy change is motivated by changed factual or legal considerations, the 
agency must say so on any view as part of giving a reasoned explanation.
77
 The 
doctrinal difference between Justices Scalia and Breyer in Fox therefore reduces to 
how they treat agency decisions to change policy in the absence of any noteworthy 
change to any relevant considerations of fact or law. In other words, the difference 
revolves around treatment of policy choices based on evolving political preferences in 
the absence of any technocratic cover. 
 Even in this narrow context, moreover, the difference is more one of tone than of 
doctrine.  Justice Scalia believes that an agency need not explain why it “believes” one 
                                                          
72  Ibid at 1810-11 (Scalia, J.); ibid at 1831 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
73  Ibid at 1811 (Scalia, J.); ibid at 1830 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
74  Ibid at 1811 (Scalia, J.) (declaring that an agency making a policy shift must explain reliance on factual 
 findings that contradict those upon which its prior policy was based); ibid at 1831 (Breyer, J.,dissenting) 
 (declaring that “one would normally expect the agency to focus upon those earlier views of fact, of 
 law, or of policy and explain why they are no longer controlling”).  
75  Fox, supra note 43.  
76  See ibid at 1830-32 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (elaborating on the “Why change” requirement). 
77  Ibid at 1811 (Scalia, J.); ibid at 1831 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
Vol. 28(2)  Politics and Policy Change in American Administrative Law 339 
 
 
reasonable policy choice is “better” than another – it is enough that they are both 
reasonable.  Justice Breyer, by contrast, expects an agency to confess on the record 
where the reason for a policy change is simply, “We now weigh the relevant 
considerations differently.”
78
  Either approach ostensibly leaves room for political 
preferences to influence choice.  Turning to tone, however, Justice Scalia‟s opinion in 
Fox, like the majority opinion in Chevron or Justice Rehnquist‟s opinion in State Farm, 
demonstrates that the four most conservative justices of the current Court deem this 
role of politics in administration to be perfectly satisfactory.  The remaining five, led 
by Justice Breyer, seem more inclined to regard the role of political preferences in 
administration as a necessary evil to be exposed and minimized rather than 
celebrated. 
 
IV. GOOD JUDGMENT AND CONTROL OF POLITICS 
 
 Having dissected Fox for a bit, this essay will close by suggesting an alternative 
way of thinking about the problem of political preferences in administrative 
policymaking.  To start, it is obviously impossible for agencies to implement vague, 
indeterminate mandates without any regard to political or value preferences. The 
American system‟s decision to allocate control over agencies to political appointees 
accentuates the role of political preferences in administration and suggests that we 
regard this role as broadly acceptable. 
 At what point, however, does the effect of political preferences on administration 
become excessive?  To answer this question, it may be helpful to consider the nature 
of agency decisionmaking and judicial review.  Agencies make policies in response to 
some perceived problem that suggests some range of policy responses.  For instance, 
if there is evidence suggesting that carbon dioxide emissions are harming the planet, 
an environmental agency may explore potential efforts to curb these emissions.  The 
agency will gather and assess information that seems relevant to this task (e.g., data 
concerning past temperatures, ocean currents, ice sheets, etc.).  Among other 
influences, the agency‟s political preferences will affect what it chooses to investigate 
and how it assesses what it finds out.  
 In any mildly complex context, the agency‟s findings will not compel a particular 
and specific policy response as a matter of logic.  For instance, confirming that 
carbon dioxide emissions are warming the planet in a dangerous way may compel the 
conclusion that emissions should be reduced, but this information does not compel 
specific responses with regard to the precise level of reductions, their timing, nor 
their acceptable expense.  The agency‟s findings will, however, provide grist for 
practical, intuitive judgments – which the agency‟s political and value preferences 
must affect – regarding these specifics. In short, just as administrative law expects, the 
agency should investigate and consider the “relevant factors,” and, having done so, 
exercise good judgment regarding what to do about them. 
 When courts review an agency policy choice for arbitrariness, they are supposed 
to check whether the agency: (a) thought about what it was supposed to think about 
in fashioning its policy; and (b) made a “clear error” in judgment.  Both of these 
inquiries require judges to make practical, intuitive judgments that are inevitably 
subject to a judge‟s own political preferences – an effect well-illustrated by studies 
                                                          
78  Ibid at 1831 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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showing that conservative judges have a greater tendency to find liberal policies 
arbitrary and vice versa.
79
 Indeed, one justification for judicial deference to agency 
decisionmaking is that a deferential attitude should, in theory at least, help minimize 
the illegitimate force of such judicial political preferences.
80
 
 Another reason courts are supposed to defer to agency policy choices, however, is 
that agencies are supposed to be experts.  The EPA should know a great deal more 
about environmental policy than the courts; the FCC should know more about 
telecommunications policy, etc.  Especially in complex, technical contexts, this 
information asymmetry can make it difficult for courts to assess the correctness of 
agency action.  Therefore, just as I generally defer to my doctor‟s expert choice of 
treatment for whatever ails me, so also courts should defer to agency expert policy 
choices. 
 I am less likely to be so trusting of my doctor‟s recommendation of a test, 
however, if I know she stands to make a great deal of money from it.  In this 
circumstance, I will respond to the expert‟s conflict of interest by tending to rely on 
my own judgment to a greater degree.  I may ask more questions about the test; I 
might ask about other alternatives with greater urgency; I might even be more 
inclined simply to reject the doctor‟s advice altogether.   
 This common-sense reaction translates neatly enough into the realm of judicial 
review.  There is, in short, less reason for courts to be trusting of agency expert 
judgment where there are grounds for concluding that the agency‟s policy choice is 
strongly subject to potential distortion from political preferences or pressure.  In such 
a situation, it makes sense for a judge to probe more deeply into whether the agency 
has, indeed, adequately investigated, considered, and assessed all of the relevant 
factors or reached, at the end of the day, a “reasonable” policy judgment that avoids 
any “serious error” in judgment.  
 This prescription seems to fit Justice Breyer‟s behavior in Fox rather well.  As 
Justice Scalia himself made plain, the FCC was in hot water with members of 
Congress with oversight power over the agency.
81
  One way out of this hot water was 
to find NBC and Fox liable for the “fleeting expletives” uttered by Bono, Cher, and 
Nicole Richie.  Sure enough, the agency soon abandoned the “fleeting expletives” 
policy.  Under this circumstance, it made perfect sense for Justice Breyer to press 
hard on the agency‟s technocratic explanation for the change – querying, for instance, 
whether the agency had adequately explored empirical literature on the effects of 
profanity on young children or whether the agency had given short shrift to the 
concerns of local broadcasters who might have less technical ability than major 
corporations to control accidental broadcasts of fleeting expletives.
82
 
 At least in the context of judicial review, the answer to controlling political 
preferences in policymaking may not lie so much in fashioning new doctrines or 
frameworks that might well be easy to manipulate and confusing (cf., our good friend 
                                                          
79  See Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, “The Real World of Arbitrariness Review” (2008) 75 U 
 Chicago L. Rev 761 at 777, 788. 
80  For which we may as well cite Chevron, supra note 2 at 837, 865 (noting that agencies, unlike federal 
 judges, are answerable to elected officials). 
81  See generally Fox, supra note 43 at 1816 n.4 (collecting quotes from congressional subcommittee 
 hearings at which members of Congress grilled FCC Commissioners for failing to enforce the 
 indecency ban). 
82  Ibid at 1835-37, 1839 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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the Chevron doctrine).  Rather, the appropriate judicial response may lie in cultivating a 
somewhat less trusting and more suspicious “mood” when reviewing agency actions 
subject to hot-button political preferences and pressure.
83
  
 It bears noting that it is precisely when courts review agency policy changes 
intertwined with hot-button political preferences that judges are most likely to be 
influenced by their own strong preferences – surely Justice Scalia‟s and Justice Breyer‟s 
attitudes toward FCC control of indecent broadcasts had something to do with their 
contrasting approaches in Fox.  Judges with good judicial temperaments should be 
self-aware enough to try to minimize this problem but obviously cannot eliminate it.  
Still, even though judges should try to curb the role of their own politics in judicial 
review, it is only reasonable for them to take notice of the role of politics in agency 
decisionmaking.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 The leading cases in American administrative law on the subject of judicial review 
of agency policymaking – which include State Farm, Chevron, and now perhaps Fox – 
indicate a certain judicial ambivalence about the proper role of agency political 
preferences in policy change.  Ambivalence is an appropriate response given that it is 
perfectly appropriate and inevitable that political preferences affect policy change but 
not good at all where such influence becomes excessive. Agency policymaking must 
partake of politics, but it should also be constrained by expertise and law.
84
  At 
bottom, finding the right balance between politics and expertise must be a function of 
a type of sound judgment that is not easily captured in an all-encompassing, abstract 
doctrine. 
 In Fox itself, the two leading administrative law scholars of the United States 
Supreme Court, Justices Scalia and Breyer, dueled over how judicial review should 
control political preferences.  For Justice Scalia, the answer is simple – an agency can 
follow its politics and values where they lead provided that the agency comes up with 
a “reasonable” explanation for its policy change.  The agency need not explain how 
its political preferences drove it to choose one reasonable possibility over another.  
Justice Breyer, by contrast, seeks to control the role of political preferences by forcing 
agencies to answer the “Why change?” question in a way that may force agencies to 
“confess” when they are motivated by politics rather than expertise. 
 This brief essay suggests that one good, honest way forward would be to combine 
Justice Scalia‟s simple framework with Justice Breyer‟s suspicious attitude.  In short, it 
is perfectly reasonable for courts, when exercising the discretionary judgment needed 
to apply arbitrariness review, to eye agency policy changes with more suspicion where 
there are grounds for thinking that the agency‟s judgment was distorted by strong 
political preferences. The right judicial response to concerns over excessive 
administrative politicization may be to embrace a mood, not new doctrine.   
 
                                                          
83  Cf. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.) (explaining that the APA 
 expressed a congressional expectation that courts adopt a tougher “mood” when reviewing agency 
 factual findings). 
84  Cf. Strauss, supra note 9, at 985 (“The issue is mediating between politics and law – recognizing the 
 strengths and weaknesses of each and finding ways of promoting their proper contribution – rather 
 than pretending to locate the practice at either pole.”). 
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THE ELUSIVE SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY: EVALUATING 
ADJUDICATIVE TRIBUNALS± 
 
Lorne Sossin*  
Steven J. Hoffman** 
 
  Evaluating the success of adjudicative tribunals is an important but elusive 
undertaking. Adjudicative tribunals are created by governments and given 
statutory authority by legislatures for a host of reasons. These reasons may and 
often do include legal aspects, policy aspects and partisan aspects. While such 
tribunals are increasingly being asked by governments to be accountable, too 
often this devolves into publishing statistics on their caseload, dispositions, 
budgets and staffing. We are interested in a different and more basic question 
– are these tribunals successful? How do we know, for example, whether the 
remedies ordered by a tribunal actually do advance the purposes for which it 
was created? Can the success of an adjudicative tribunal be subject to 
meaningful empirical validation? While issues of evaluation and accountability 
cut across national and jurisdictional boundaries, the authors argue that this 
type of question can only be addressed empirically, by actually looking to the 
practice of a particular board or boards, in the context of a particular statute 
or statutes, and in particular jurisdictions at particular times. Such accounts 
can and should form the basis for comparative study. Only through 
comparative study can the value and limitations of particular methodologies 
become apparent. This study takes as its case study the role of adjudicative 
tribunals in the health system. The authors draw primarily from Canadian 
tribunal experience, though examples from other jurisdictions are used to 
demonstrate the potential of empirical evaluation. The authors discuss the 
relative dearth of empirical study in administrative law and argue that it ought 
to be the focus of the discussion on accountability in administrative justice. 
 
Évaluer le succès de tribunaux qui tranchent des litiges est une entreprise 
importante mais difficile à effectuer. Les tribunaux qui tranchent des litiges 
sont créés par des gouvernements et dotés de pouvoir légal par des législatures 
pour une multitude de raisons. Ces raisons peuvent inclure des aspects légaux, 
des aspects liés à des politiques et des aspects partisans ce qui est souvent le cas. 
Quoique les gouvernements demandent de plus en plus à de tels tribunaux de 
                                                          
±   This paper was originally prepared for the Sixth Administrative Law Discussion Forum, Québec City, 
May 25-26, 2010. The analysis paper builds on “Evaluating the Impact of Remedial Authority: 
Adjudicative Tribunals in the Health Sector,” which was presented at the CIAJ Conference, “Taking 
Remedies Seriously,” October 30, 2009. We have also benefited from the discussion arising from the 
Workshop on the Impact of Health Tribunals that was held at the University of Toronto‟s Faculty of 
Law on 28 May 2009 and funded by the Canadian Institutes of Health Research.  
*  Dean & Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. Sossin is a Vice-Chair of the Health 
 Professions Appeals and Review Board and the Health Services Appeal and Review Board, which are 
 discussed in this paper. The views expressed in this paper are his alone and do not necessarily reflect 
 the views of either Board. 
**  Adjunct Professor, Faculty of Health Sciences, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada, and 
 Fellow, Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, Ontario, Canada. 
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rendre compte, trop souvent, ceci se réduit à la publication de statistiques sur le 
nombre de cas traités, leurs dispositions, les budgets et le personnel. Une 
question différente et plus fondamentale nous intéresse – ces tribunaux 
réussissent-ils? Comment savons-nous, par exemple, si les recours ordonnés par 
un tribunal font en fait avancer les objectifs pour lesquels il a été créé? Le 
succès d’un tribunal qui tranche des litiges peut-il faire l’objet de validation 
empirique signifiante? Quoique les questions d’évaluation et du devoir de 
rendre compte traversent des frontières entre nations et champs de compétence, 
les auteurs soutiennent que ce genre de question ne peut être traité 
qu’empiriquement, en examinant en fait les pratiques d’un conseil ou de 
conseils particuliers, dans le contexte d’une loi ou de lois particulières et dans 
des sphères de compétence particulières à des moments particuliers. De tels 
comptes rendus peuvent et devraient constituer la base d’étude comparative. 
Seule l’étude comparative peut faire ressortir la valeur et les limites d’une 
méthodologie particulière. L’étude de cas choisie pour la présente étude est le 
rôle de tribunaux qui tranchent des litiges dans le système de santé. Les 
auteurs puisent surtout dans l’expérience de tribunaux canadiens, quoique des 
exemples tirés d’autres territoires de compétence soient utilisés pour démontrer 
le potentiel de l’évaluation empirique. Les auteurs discutent de la pénurie 
relative d’étude empirique dans le domaine du droit administratif et 
soutiennent que là devrait être le point central de la discussion du devoir de 
rendre compte dans le domaine de la justice administrative. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Evaluating the success of adjudicative tribunals, like accountability itself, is an 
important but elusive undertaking. Adjudicative tribunals are created by governments 
and given statutory authority by legislatures for a host of reasons. These reasons may 
and often do include legal aspects, policy aspects and partisan aspects. While such 
tribunals are increasingly being asked by governments to be accountable,1 too often 
this devolves into publishing statistics on their caseload, dispositions, budgets and 
staffing. We are interested in a different and more basic question – are these tribunals 
successful? How do we know, for example, whether the remedies ordered by a 
tribunal actually do advance the purposes for which it was created? Can the success 
of an adjudicative tribunal be subject to meaningful empirical validation? This is the 
question we attempt to explore.  
 While issues of evaluation and accountability cut across national and jurisdictional 
boundaries, we believe this question can only be addressed by looking to the practice 
of a particular board or boards, in the context of a particular statute or statutes, and in 
particular jurisdictions. Such accounts can (and, in our view, should) then form the 
basis for comparative study. Only through comparative study can the value and 
limitations of particular methodologies become apparent.  
                                                          
1   See for e.g. the paper presented by Laverne Jacobs on the new Ontario tribunal legislation for the 
 Administrative Law Discussion Forum (Quebec City) (May 25-26, 2010), “A Wavering Commitment? 
 Administrative Independence and Collaborative Governance in Ontario‟s Adjudicative Tribunals 
 Accountability Legislation” (2010) 26:2 Windsor YB Access Just. 
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 This study takes as its case study the role of adjudicative tribunals in the health 
system, but the concern for evaluation could be applied just as easily to a variety of 
administrative, policy or operational spheres. While we draw primarily from Canadian 
tribunal experience, the literature in this field is primarily American, British and 
Australian. Not only does this literature derive from several jurisdictions, it also is as 
likely to arise from sociologists, political scientists and health policy experts as from 
lawyers and legal scholars. Our hope is that this brief analysis stimulates discussion 
across both academic and national boundaries, and specifically within the 
administrative law community. 
 Adjudicative tribunals were established in order to play an important role in the 
health sector, yet their actual influence as part of the health system remains largely 
unknown.2 Most evaluations of their work have focused on internal measures of 
accountability and independence rather than external indicators of societal impact. 
When their effectiveness is examined, evaluators tend to utilize anecdotes from 
various experts and stakeholders rather than rigorous empirical data. As efforts to 
reform health systems continue both within Canada and internationally, it will be 
increasingly important to understand the benefits, costs and implications of 
adjudicative tribunals for providers and consumers of health care services as well as 
the institutional structures on which they rely.  
 In this context, empirical evaluations represent an opportunity to inform 
policymaking through better understanding the impact of adjudicative tribunals on 
the health system. Empirical research includes quantitative and qualitative 
investigations on the effects of tribunal processes and decision-making on economic, 
social or health outcomes.3  Empirical study designs range from experimental (e.g., 
randomized controlled trials, interrupted time-series studies, etc.) to observational 
(e.g., cohort, case-control and cross-sectional studies), with data often gathered from 
surveys, interviews, focus groups, statistical inventories, performance data or 
documentary analyses. 
 Empirical research certainly is not new to the health sphere but it is less common 
in adjudicative settings and rarer still in the context of administrative justice. That 
said, interest in empirical research in this aspect of the health system is on the rise. 4 In 
addition to these general challenges faced by all empirical legal researchers, any 
attempt to evaluate the impact of a health-related adjudicative tribunal faces 
additional hurdles. Not only has such an assessment never before been 
comprehensively undertaken, but the most suitable research methodology to do so 
remains highly elusive. Much of empirical health research, for example, relates to 
patient outcomes and the costs associated with achieving these outcomes. In the 
setting of adjudicative tribunals, these metrics may not apply. A proceeding before a 
health tribunal may take place after the outcome for the patient already has occurred, 
                                                          
2   Adjudicative tribunals may be defined in a number of ways. This category could include: (1) any 
administrative body engaged in adjudication, including regulatory bodies whose principle function is 
policymaking but who also engage in adjudication; (2) both administrative and judicial bodies which 
engage in adjudication; or (3) only those bodies whose primary or only function is adjudication. R. 
Ellis, Executive Branch Justice: Canada’s “Official Courts” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Osgoode Hall Law School, 
York University, 2009) [unpublished] at 77. 
3  M.M. Mello & K. Zeiler, “Empirical Health Law Scholarship: The State of the Field” (2008) 96 Geo. 
 LJ 649. 
4  Ibid. 
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or at a time when the outcome is unlikely to have any impact on patient outcome. For 
this reason, the tribunals in fact may impose additional costs on the health system 
without directly yielding improved health outcomes. While those additional costs may 
well lead to better practices and procedures on the part of other actors in the health 
system (e.g., regulatory colleges, insurance plans, hospitals), or enhance public 
confidence in the accountability of the health system, this type of benefit is indirect, 
may only become apparent over time, and is inherently difficult to measure.   
 Distinctions in statutory mandate and the absence of clear statutory language 
setting out the purposes of adjudicative tribunals may leave no final target outcomes 
against which services can be evaluated. Further, as creatures of statute that serve 
quasi-judicial functions, adjudicative tribunals sit at the intersection of the legal and 
health worlds. These tribunals operate within these two paradigms – a dichotomy of 
process and outcomes – whose goals may sometimes diverge. Indeed, these 
administrative bodies are expected to preserve the legal focus on process, fairness and 
individual-level dispute resolution while at the same time working to improve health-
related outcomes by enhancing the overall effectiveness of the health system.5 The 
tension between a process and a substance based mandate presents distinct challenges 
for empirical evaluation. The complex co-dependence and interconnectedness of 
these tribunals with the health system‟s constituent elements ensure that simple 
appraisal techniques cannot be effectively utilized. To the extent that adjudicative 
tribunals have an impact on the health system, it is likely to be linked to a host of 
other variables. The fact that evaluation is not easy, however, does not detract from 
its importance.  
 Despite these benefits, the evaluation and accountability of adjudicative tribunals 
is one of the least scrutinized areas of administrative law.6  The topic necessarily 
engages the issue of administrative independence, the statutory environment within 
which all adjudicative tribunals operate, the policy priorities of government which 
fund tribunals, the complexity of the health system, and the role of the court in 
supervising health-related adjudicative tribunals through the mechanisms of judicial 
review.  Evaluating impact in the health sector is also necessarily a contextual 
exercise.   As Peter Cane observed in the administrative law context, “the impact of 
judicial review needs to be studied in a contextualised way by reference to judicial 
review‟s objectives and functions. Also, it should not be assumed that, when we 
discuss the impact of judicial review, we are all talking about impact of the same thing 
or, at least, of a single institution with a single set of objectives and functions.”7 A 
similar approach is necessary for health-related adjudicative tribunals but has never 
been systematically followed. 
                                                          
5   While this process-outcomes dichotomy between the legal and health worlds is certainly evident when 
comparing their respective research literature, it is important to recognize that both types of work are 
conducted within both realms. Mello and Zeiler, ibid. for example, highlight several socio-legal studies 
that gathered outcome-related data, and health researchers frequently address questions of ethics and 
resource allocation that are more procedural in nature. 
6   See the discussion of the study of tribunals in Peter Cane, Administrative Tribunals and Adjudication 
 (London: Hart, 2009), ch. 1 
7  Ibid. M. Sunkin, “Conceptual Issues in Researching the Impact of Judicial Review on Government 
 Bureaucracies” in M. Hertogh & S. Halliday, eds, Judicial Review and Bureaucratic Impact: International and 
 Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 43.  
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 This paper aims to explore the context, challenges and opportunities for 
empirically evaluating the impact of adjudicative tribunals in the health sector. First, 
we discuss the purpose, function and importance of these bodies within the health 
system, including their statutory mandates and policy goals. Second, we examine the 
various ways in which their performance could potentially be assessed and will justify 
why there is a need to develop empirical approaches for the assessment of 
adjudicative decision-making. Third, we identify the barriers to evaluating the impact 
of adjudicative tribunals. Finally, based on this analysis, we explore the path forward 
for the empirical assessment of adjudicative decision-making.  
 The focus of this analysis is on Ontario‟s two adjudicative health tribunals in 
Canada, the Ontario Health Professions Appeal and Review Board [HPARB] and the 
Health Services Appeal and Review Board [HSARB]. Both HPARB and HSARB 
have statutory mandates to review important health decisions that intimately affect 
the lives of their constituents. Using these two bodies as case studies for exploring 
the context, challenges and opportunities for evaluating adjudicative tribunals may 
enrich our understanding of administrative tribunals throughout other sectors as well.  
 
II. THE CONTEXT OF ADJUDICATIVE TRIBUNALS IN THE HEALTH 
SECTOR 
 
 Adjudicative tribunals are administrative bodies that are created by statutes and 
exercise delegated decision-making powers of the executive branch for the purposes 
of achieving certain policy goals. They serve as an oversight mechanism for lower-
level decision-makers and apply legal and normative principles to resolve disputes 
between conflicting parties. They are independent – operating at arm‟s-length from 
the government – and serve quasi-judicial functions otherwise fulfilled by the formal 
judicial system. This independence, however, also has limits; their members are 
appointed by the executive branch of government (in the case of HPARB and 
HSARB, the power of appointment is effectively in the hands of the Minister of 
Health, in consultation with the Chair of the Boards) which also sets their staffing 
allowances and budgets. Their decisions, while often final, must be authorized by 
their enabling statute and are subject to judicial review by the courts.  
 In the health sector, adjudicative tribunals may be involved with resolving 
disputes regarding medical malpractice claims, insurance coverage for health care 
services, determination of mental capacity, licensing decisions for health care facilities, 
and patient safety procedures. They serve as an oversight and accountability 
mechanism for lower-level health decision-makers and ensure they follow appropriate 
processes and act according to their respective statutory mandates. They aim to boost 
public confidence in the credibility of decision-making within the health system, 
facilitate better and more consistent decisions, and reduce the risk of errors that in 
this context can have deadly consequences. Finally, they promote fairness and justice 
within health care, militate against self-interest and corruption, and provide 
opportunities to address wrongs through redress. 
 The HPARB, for example, is an integral part of Ontario‟s self-regulating health 
professional system. It helps to ensure that the health professions are regulated in the 
public interest, that appropriate standards of practice are created and maintained, that 
patients have access to the health professional of their choice, and that they are 
treated with respect and sensitivity by health professionals. HPARB was established 
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as a response to two related phenomena in the early 1970‟s: first, the 
recommendation arising out of the Report by the Honourable James Chalmers 
McRuer‟s Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights8 [McRuer Report] which 
emphasized the need for public interest oversight over self-regulating professional 
bodies; and second, the Committee on the Healing Arts tabled by the government on 
April 28, 19709 [Healing Arts Report], which also emphasized the primacy of public 
interest regulation of health professionals.  Under the Province of Ontario‟s Regulated 
Health Professions Act [RHPA] people may appeal the decision of a self-regulated 
health professional College to not pursue a disciplinary proceeding before the 
HPARB.10 If the appropriate statutory processes were not followed by the relevant 
College, then the Board is empowered to send the matter back to the college for 
reconsideration. HPARB also hears appeals from adverse decisions by the colleges in 
relation to registration requests. The remedies available to HPARB panels focus on 
the regulated Colleges, as opposed to the parties. For example, if a complaint was 
dismissed and an HPARB panel finds that the investigation was inadequate or the 
decision to dismiss the complaint was unreasonable, the complaint usually will be sent 
back to the College to reconsider its reasons or investigate the complaint further. 
Recommendations to the College may also be provided where the issues raised on a 
complaint review are more systemic. Parties, however, are not entitled to damages, or 
to an apology, or to any other individual remedy they may seek or to which they may 
feel entitled. For this reason, it is not uncommon to find parties who both seek a 
complaint review from HPARB and simultaneously pursue civil remedies against 
health professionals or health facilities arising from the same factual circumstances. 
 The HSARB similarly is a part-time Board providing oversight for the decisions 
of various actors within the health system. Its broad jurisdiction arises from fourteen 
different statutes and includes reviewing decisions concerning payment for health 
care services under the Ontario Health Insurance Plan [OHIP], eligibility for housing 
in long-term care facilities, licensing of nursing homes and other independent health 
facilities, and the decisions of public health officials.11  By contrast, HSARB provides 
individual remedies, ordering, for example, that OHIP fund out-of-country medical 
services where the statutory test is met. 
 Both HPARB and HSARB have a full-time Chair,12 and a roster of part-time 
members,13 some of whom have legal training (and, in the case of HSARB, legal or 
medical training) and some who do not. Both Boards have been held to be expert 
                                                          
8  Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights, (Toronto: Queen's Printer, Ontario, 1968) (Commissioner: 
 Honourable J.C.McRuer). 
9  Report of the Committee on the Healing Arts, (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1970) (Chair: I. R. Dowie) 
10   Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 18, s. 3. Also see R. Steinecke. A Complete Guide to 
 the Regulated Health Professions Act, looseleaf. (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2000). The RHPA is one of 
 several statutes administered by HPARB. 
11  C. Pitfield & C.M. Flood, “Section 7 „Safety Valves‟: Appealing Wait Times Within a One-Tier 
 System” in C.M. Flood, K. Roach & L. Sossin, eds, Access to Care, Access to Justice: The Legal Debate 
 Over Private Health Insurance in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005) 477. 
12   Since 2008, the same individual has served as Chair of both Boards. 
13   HPARB has three full time Vice Chairs and approximately 35 part-time members. HSARB has 
 approximately 25 part-time members. Of these, approximately 10 part-time members are cross-
 appointed to both Boards. 
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bodies by reviewing Courts which warrant deference. Their substantive decisions may 
only be overturned on judicial review to a court if found to be “unreasonable.”
14 
 As indicated above, a key aspect of evaluating tribunals created by statute is to 
assess whether a tribunal is fulfilling its statutory objective(s). This may be especially 
challenging, for example, if the specific goals of the relevant tribunal are diffuse and 
ambiguous in their enabling legislation. Ontario‟s RHPA, for example, does not detail 
the purposes of the Board, so this must be inferred from the powers and authority it 
has been provided. For example, as indicated above, HPARB has the power to review 
decisions of regulated health colleges, not to refer complaints to discipline on 
grounds of the reasonableness of the college‟s decision and the adequacy of the 
college‟s investigation.15 HPARB has broader jurisdiction to review decisions by 
Colleges to deny registration to applicants.16 Thus, while HPARB‟s role is generally to 
ensure public interest accountability over decision-making by regulated health 
Colleges, HPARB‟s role in reviewing complaints suggests a different purpose, and a 
more deferential standard of review, than its role in reviewing denials of registration.  
Evaluation needs to be responsive to these differences of statutory mandate and 
remedial discretion. 
 
III. THE CONTEXT FOR EVALUATING ADJUDICATIVE TRIBUNALS 
 
 Assessing the work of these adjudicative tribunals, as suggested above, is an 
inherently complex enterprise. However, evaluations can be thought of and 
categorized according to their orientation and methodology. 
 In terms of orientation, evaluations of tribunals can be focused on how they 
function or what impact they have. The former would analyze the internal operations 
of a tribunal while the latter would assess the body‟s external effects on a specified 
population. Procedural analyses are important to promote coherent internal 
management structures, good governance, accountability, efficiency and efficacy. 
External impact evaluations, on the other hand, represent a way to assess the real-
world effectiveness of the adjudicative tribunal, its impact on others within the health 
care system, and the benefits (or consequences) that this impact yields. Such studies 
can determine whether or not these bodies support and/or enhance the functioning 
of various health system institutions and decision-makers and whether or not they 
ultimately influence service provision, access to justice in the health sector, and health 
outcomes. External impact evaluations require expertise and independence – they are 
not traditionally conducted by auditors,17  ombudsmen18  or internal staff.19  
                                                          
14   See, with respect to HPARB, Botros v. Beadle (2007), 71 Admin LR (4th) 225, and with respect to 
 HSARB, Flora v. Ontario (Health Insurance Plan, General Manager) 2008 ONCA 538. 
15   See s. 29(2) of the Health Professions Procedure Code, Schedule 2 to the RHPA. 
16   See s. 22(1) of the Health Professions Procedure Code, Schedule 2 to the RHPA. 
17 Ontario, Office of the Auditor-General (J. McCarter), Annual Report 2008 (Toronto: Queen‟s Printer 
 for Ontario, 2008) online: Government of Ontario <http://www.auditor.on.ca/en/reports_en/en-
 08/ar_en08.pdf>). 
18  Ontario, Office of the Ombudsman, Ombudsman Ontario: Annual Report 2007-2008, (Chair: A. Marin) 
 online: Ombudsman Ontario <http://www.ombuds-man.on.ca/media/18971/ar08_ eng.pdf>.  
19 Ontario, Health Professions Regulatory Advisory Council, HPRAC: Annual Report April 1, 2007 – 
 March 31, 2008. Online: HPRAC <http://www.h-p-r-a-c.org/en/reports/resources/H-P-R-A-C-
 Annual-Report-2007-2008.pdf>. 
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 A review of several evaluations of administrative bodies highlights that they tend 
to focus on issues related to internal operations rather than external impact. The 
recent report of the Ontario Security Commission‟s Fairness Committee, for 
example, examined whether the agency‟s internal governance structure created a 
perception or reality of bias in its adjudicative responsibilities20. The United 
Kingdom‟s National Audit Office similarly reviewed the procedures used by its 
Department of Work and Pensions to medically assess incapacity and disability21 and 
to hear appeals of social security benefit decisions.22 Some reviews examine particular 
problems that had previously been identified23 while others focus on users‟ 
satisfaction with a tribunal‟s provision of services.24  
 Several assessment efforts have even focused on the internal operations of 
multiple tribunals or a jurisdiction‟s entire tribunal system, including the report of 
Ontario‟s Agency Reform Commission,25 the UK‟s Leggatt Review of Tribunals,26 and 
the report of the UK‟s former Council on Tribunals27. Academic publications similarly 
                                                          
20  Ontario, Ontario Securities Commission Report of the Fairness Committee to David A. Brown, Q.C., Chair of 
 the Ontario Securities Commission, 2004 (authors, C.A. Osborne,  D.J. Mullan, and B. Finlay). Online: 
 OSC<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/Five-Year-Review/fyr_2004-0818_fairness 
 committee.pdf>.[ Osborne Report] 
21  United Kingdom, National Audit Office, Progress in Improving the Medical Assessment of 
 Incapacity and Disability Benefits: Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General. HC 1141, Session 
 2002-2003, 17/10/2003.  (London: Stationery Office, 2003) online: NAO <http://www.nao. org.
 uk/publications/ nao_reports/02-03/0203-1141.pdf> [NAO Progress].   
22  United Kingdom, National Audit Office, Getting It Right, Putting It Right: Improving Decision-Making and 
 Appeals in Social Security Benefits. HC 1142, Session 2002-2003, 07/11/2003. (London: Stationery 
 Office, 2003). Online: NAO <http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/nao_reports/02-03/02031142
 .pdf> [NAO, Getting it Right].  
23  Ontario, Society of Ontario Adjudicators and Regulators, Towards Maintaining and Improving the Quality 
 of Adjudication: SOAR Recommendations for Performance Management in Ontario’s Administrative Justice 
 Tribunals. (Toronto: Society of Ontario Adjudicators and Regulators, 1995), online: SOAR 
 <http://www.soar.on.ca/soar-perf_man.htm> [SOAR Recommendations]; S. Blumenthal & S. 
 Wessely, The Pattern of Delays in Mental Health Review Tribunals. (London: Stationery Office, 1993); S. 
 Blumenthal & S. Wessely, “The Pattern of Delays in Mental Health Review Tribunals” (1994) 18 
 Psychiatric Bulletin 400. Online: The Psychiatrist <http://pb.rcpsych.org/cgi/reprint/18/7/398.pdf>.   
24  J. Aston, D. Hill & N.D. Tackey, The Experience of Claimants in Race Discrimination Employment Tribunal 
 Cases. Employment Relations Research Series, No. 55. (London: UK Department of Trade and Industry, 
 2006) online: DTI <http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file27818.pdf>;Employment Tribunals Service, 
 Employment Tribunals Service User Survey 2005 (London: Employment Tribunals Service, 2005); 
 Confederation of British Industry, A Matter of Confidence: Restoring Faith in Employment Tribunals 
 (London: Confederation of British Industry, 2005). Online: CBI <http://www.c-b- i.org.uk/n-d-b-
 s/Press.nsf/0/33f-9830ed-75f765b-8025708-8005-23621/$FILE/Tribunals-Brief-CBI.pdf>; M.P. 
 Carscallen, W.K. Gray & J.G. Pink, Regulatory Burden Task Force: Report to the Ontario Securities 
 Commission (Toronto: Ontario Securities Commission, 2003) online: OSC <http://www.o-s- c.gov. 
 on.ca/ About/Governance/Accountability/ga_20031212_rbtf-rpt.pdf>. 
25  Ontario, Agency Reform Commission on Ontario‟s Regulatory and Adjudicative Agencies (G. 
 Guzzo, J. Baird, B. Grimmett, G. Martiniuk & J. Flaherty) Everyday Justice: Report of the Agency Reform 
 Commission on Ontario’s Regulatory and Adjudicative Agencies. (Toronto: Government of Ontario, 1998). 
 Online: Council of Canadian Administrative Tribunals <http://www.ccat- ctac.org/ downloads/
 1998_Guzzo-report.pdf> [Guzzo Report].  
26  A. Leggatt, Tribunals for Users: One System, One Service (London: UK Department for Constitutional 
 Affairs, 2001) online: <http://www.tribunals-review.org.uk/index.htm>.  
27  M. Adler & J. Gulland, Tribunal Users' Experiences, Perceptions and Expectations: A Literature Review 
 (London: Council on Tribunals, 2003) online: Council on Tribunals<http://www.council- on-
 tribunals.gov.uk/docs/other_adler(2).pdf >. 
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appear to focus on the internal operations of tribunals across various topics – 
whether they regulate securities,28 medical malpractice claims,29 privacy,30 pensions,31 or 
determinations of medical incapacity32  – and often examine users‟ experience.33 While 
not a single governmental evaluation could be found that focused on the external 
impact of adjudicative tribunals, at least one academic publication discusses the 
potential benefits that administrative “health courts” (which resolve malpractice 
claims) can have on patient safety.34 
 In terms of methodology, assessments of tribunals can either be conducted 
through expert reviews or empirical evaluations. The first approach would take 
advantage of the personal experiences and perspective of an investigator (usually 
based on some combination of interviews and analysis of primary data and secondary 
literature) while the second approach attempts to attain more objective and 
generalizable data. Expert reviews often focus on identifying structural problems and 
recommending possible ways to overcome them. This approach is also more likely to 
have fewer costs and a faster completion timeline.  Empirical evaluations of tribunals, 
by contrast, aspire to scientific methods and can be used to, inter alia, quantitatively or 
qualitatively assess impact, identify the factors that determine their successful 
operations, and track perceptions of them over time. These two methodological 
approaches cannot be completely dichotomized as experts often utilize empirical 
methods and even the most scientifically rigorous and objective evaluations must be 
interpreted by individuals through the lens of their expertise.  
 Reviews of adjudicative tribunals have been conducted using both expert and 
empirical methodologies. Prominent observers, academics and practitioners, for 
                                                          
28 S. Rousseau, The Québec Experience with an Independent Administrative Tribunal Specialized in Securities: A 
 Study of the Bureau de décision et de révision en valeurs mobilières (Ottawa: Expert Panel on Securities 
 Regulation, 2008) online: Groupe Experts<http://www.groupe-experts.ca/eng/reports/research 
 -studies/quebec-independent-adjudicative-tribunal-rousseau.php>; P. Moyer, “The Regulation of 
 Corporate Law by Securities Regulators: A Comparison of Ontario and the United States” (1997) 55 
 UT Fac L Rev 43. 
29  G. Siegal, M.M. Mello & D.M. Studdert, “Adjudicating Severe Birth Injury Claims in Florida and 
 Virginia: The Experience of a Landmark Experiment in Personal Injury Compensation” (2008) 34 
 Am J L & Med 489.Online: Harvard School of Public Health < http://www.hsph.harvard.edu 
 /faculty/michelle-mello/files/FL-VA_PDF.pdf>. 
30 L. Jacobs. “Reconciling Tribunal Independence and Expertise -- Empirical Observations” (Presented 
 at The Future of Administrative Justice Symposium, University of Toronto, 18 January 2008) 
 online: University of Toronto Faculty of Law <http://www.law.utoronto.ca/ documents/ 
 conferences/adminjustice08_Jacobs.pdf>. 
31  L. Sossin, “The Effectiveness and Efficiency of Pension Regulation in Ontario and in Comparative 
 Perspective” (Toronto: Expert Commission on Pensions, 2007) online: Pension Review 
 <http://www.pension-review.on.ca/english/summaries/8Sossin.html>.  
32  M. Dolan, R. Gibb & P. Coorey, “Mental Health Review Tribunals: A Survey of Special Hospital 
Patients‟ Opinions” (1999) 10 Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 264; C. Bradley, M. Marshall & D. 
Gath. “Why Do So Few Patients Appeal Against Detention Under the Mental Health Act?”(1995) 
310 Brit Med J 364. Online: BMJ <http://www.b-m-j.com/cgi/content/full/310/6976/364>; J. 
Peay, Tribunals on Trial: A Study of Decision Making Under the Mental Health Act 1983 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989). 
33  H. Genn, B. Lever, L. Gray, and National Centre for Social Research, Tribunals for Diverse Users, 2006 
 Online: Department for Constitutional Affairs<http:// www.d-c-a.gov.uk/research/2006/01_2006. 
 pdf>. 
34  M.M. Mello et al, “„Health Courts‟ and Accountability for Patient Safety” (2006) 84 Milbank Quarterly 
 459.  
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example, have assessed various tribunals‟ organizational structures35, efficiency,36 
accessibility,37 independence,38 performance standards39 and overall effectiveness.40 
Other reviews feature  empirical elements such as (1) surveys that capture the 
perceived quality of services offered,41 stakeholder attitudes towards the tribunal,42 and 
the functioning of a certain process;43 (2) interviews that probe users‟ experiences with 
the tribunal,44 its perceived impartiality,45 and the effectiveness of a particular 
procedure;46 and (3) performance data and documentary analyses for examining key 
features of a tribunal‟s caseload47 and arrangements for how it makes appeal 
decisions.48  
 The challenge in evaluating health-related adjudicative tribunals, therefore, seems 
to lie at the intersection of orientation and methodology. Assessments of adjudicative 
tribunals have focused on both process and impact, and have been conducted using 
both expert reviews and empirical methods, yet not a single review could be found 
that empirically evaluated the external impact of an adjudicative tribunal, despite 
extensive searching. While this lack of research may indicate that such undertaking 
are not important, interesting or possible, the evidence suggests otherwise: the need 
for external impact evaluations is evident49 and such evaluations have been conducted 
                                                          
35  Osborne Report, supra note 20; Moyer, supra note 28.  
36  Carscallen, Gray & Pink, supra note 24. 
37  Adler & Gulland, supra note 27. 
38  Rousseau, supra note 28. 
39  SOAR Recommendations, supra note 23.  
40  Leggatt, supra note 26; Guzzo Report, supra note 25; Sossin, supra note 31; Mello et al, supra note 34. 
41  Employment Tribunals Service, supra note 24. 
42  Confederation of British Industry, A Matter of Confidence: Restoring Faith in Employment Tribunals 
 (London: Confederation of British Industry, 2005) Online: CBI <http://www.c-b- i.org.uk/
 ndbs/Press.nsf/0/33f9830ed75f765b8025708800523621/$FILE/Tribunals Brief - CBI.pdf>. 
43  P. Latreille,  J.A. Latreille & K.G. Knight.  Findings from the 1998 Survey of Representatives in Employment 
 Tribunal Cases. Employment Relations Research Series, No. 35. (London: UK Department of Trade and 
 Industry, 2004) online: BERR <http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file11453.pdf>); P. Latreille, J.A. 
 Latreille & K.G. Knight “Making a Difference? Legal Representation in Employment Tribunal 
 Cases: Evidence from a Survey of Representatives” (2005) 34 Indus. L. J. 308. 
44  Aston, Hill, & Tackey, supra note 24. 
45 Jacobs, supra note 30.  
46  Siegal, Mello & Studdert, supra note 29; NAO Progress, supra note 21; Bradley, Marshall & Gath, supra 
 note 32. 
47  B. Hayward, M. Peters, N. Rousseau & K. Seeds.  Findings from the Survey of Employment Tribunal 
 Applications 2003. Employment Relations Research Series, No. 33. (London: UK Department of Trade and 
 Industry, 2004) Available online: DTI <http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file11455.pdf>. 
48  NAO, Getting it Right, supra note 22; Peay, supra note 32. 
49  M. Hertogh & S. Halliday, eds, Judicial Review and Bureaucratic Impact: International and Interdisciplinary 
 Perspectives (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Center for Global Development‟s 
 Evaluation Gap Working Group, When Will We Ever Learn? Improving Lives Through Impact Evaluation. 
 (Washington DC: Center for Global Development, 2006) online: CGD <http://www.c-g- dev. 
 org/files/7973_file_WillWeEverLearn.pdf>; World Bank, Conducting Quality Impact Evaluations under 
 Budget, Time and Data Constraints. (Washington DC: World Bank, 2006). online: World- Bank
 <http://lnweb90.world-bank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/Doc-UNID-View-For-Java- Search/ 
 757A5CC0BAE22558852571770059D89C/$file/conduct_qual_impact.pdf>; OECD Development 
 Assistance Committee, Review of the DAC Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance (Paris: 
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,1998)online: OECD 
 <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/50/2065863.pdf>.  
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with success in related settings which also involve the nexus of the health and law 
sectors and beyond.50 
 The dearth of externally-focused empirical evaluations is not only a missed 
opportunity, in our view, but may also pose a significant risk. The lack of an empirical 
rationale for the benefits of a tribunal may render it vulnerable to opposition or 
simply to general cost-cutting initiatives, or to pursue policy directions that 
undermine rather than advance its purposes.  Without this data, the Boards may lack 
the baseline measures needed to track changes over time, evaluate the performance of 
decision-makers and staff, and engage in longer term strategic planning.  If you are 
running in the dark, there is no way to know whether you are moving forward, or 
further away from your destination, or simply going in circles. 
 Indeed, it is widely accepted that data-driven strategies are more likely to help 
decision-makers achieve their goals in a cost-effective way than polices pursued in the 
absence of evidence.51 Information gathered by health-related adjudicative tribunals 
like HPARB and HSARB through empirical methods may be of particular interest to 
government officials as it can demonstrate performance benchmarks and ensure 
public funds are being invested and spent effectively. If reform is called for, empirical 
data will be essential in identifying what needs to change. For academics, it is an 
under-scrutinized sphere of administrative law and health systems functioning that is 
both ripe for research and, potentially, reform. 
 
IV. CHALLENGES FOR EMPIRICALLY EVALUATING ADJUDICATIVE 
TRIBUNALS 
 
 Yet despite the tremendous benefits, empirical impact evaluations of adjudicative 
tribunals are not being conducted. This absence of assessment efforts is most likely 
attributable to the various challenges facing anyone who embarks on undertaking 
such a project. In the context of health adjudicative tribunals, these obstacles can be 
divided into three categories: (A) complexity in the health system; (B) methodological 
complications; and (C) legal barriers. 
 
A. Challenges with Complexity in the Health System 
 Empirically evaluating the impact of any adjudicative tribunal is a naturally 
difficult enterprise as it requires the body‟s various effects to be isolated from the 
larger social context within which it operates. This is no doubt complicated for 
tribunals in every sector because their activities are usually only indirectly related to 
their existential goals. This challenge, however, may be further exacerbated in the 
health context due to its overwhelming complexity. 
 Indeed, health systems are increasingly being recognized as complex adaptive 
systems that are multi-layered, non-linear and highly sophisticated. They consist of 
                                                          
50  Mello & Zeiler, supra note 3; N. Jones et al., “Working Paper 300: Improving Impact Evaluation 
 Production and Use” (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2009) online: <http://www.o-d-
 i.org.uk/resources/download/3177.pdf>. 
51  World Health Organization, World Report on Knowledge for Better Health (Geneva: World Health 
 Organization, 2004) online: WHO <http://www.who.int/r-p-c/meetings/world_report_ 
 knowledge_for_better_health.pdf>; K. Chalkidou et al., Comparative Effectiveness Research and 
 Evidence-Based Health Policy: Experience from Four Countries. 2009 87 Milbank Quarterly 339. 
 Online: Milbank <http://www.milbank.org/quarterly/milq_87_2-final-chalkidou.pdf>. 
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countless sub-systems with immeasurable independent actors, established policies, 
zealously guarded interests, entrenched professional “silos” and divergent cultures 
that can all influence each another and even alter their external environments. This 
web of elements, and the unpredictable interactions among them, ensures that 
conventional mechanistic or “cause-effect” conceptualizations of the health system 
are inaccurate and oversimplifications of its complex dynamics.52 
 While scientific knowledge has been greatly advanced by breaking big questions 
into smaller ones that can be observed, analyzed and understood through rational 
deduction, this process is severely limited when the studied phenomenon or 
intervention is located within a system whose constitutive parts are not independent, 
constant nor predictable. The fact that the health system exhibits characteristics of 
distributed control, co-dependence and nesting of smaller systems within other larger 
systems further aggravates this challenge and makes it difficult to fully examine 
adjudicative tribunals without reference to other actors and institutions (such as 
adjudicators, staff, government policymakers, regulatory colleges, relevant expert 
panels, the traditional court system and the public). Isolating and attributing impact is 
further problematized by the fact that health-related adjudicative tribunals serve 
diverse functions according to various players within completely different contexts.53 
 
B. Challenges with Research Methodology 
 Yet in addition to the daunting barriers of evaluating adjudicative tribunals caused 
by health system complexity, there are further methodological barriers associated with 
such an undertaking. The primary challenge, as highlighted above, is that simple 
research designs cannot be used to isolate adjudicative tribunals and elegantly locate 
cause-effect relationships between them and their goals. But above and beyond the 
various explanations illuminated by the complexity perspective is the fact that efforts 
of adjudicative tribunals are only indirectly related to their goals. Indeed, health 
services themselves only partially help meet their goal of improved health for people. 
Any legal, regulatory or oversight “intervention” that serves to better structure these 
services would be even further removed from their ultimate goals. Empirical impact 
studies of such interventions must be expertly designed to account for this 
complexity. 
 However, even if simple methods did exist to observe the relationship between 
adjudicative tribunals and their goals, there is currently a lack of clear evaluative 
criteria against which particular adjudicative tribunals can be measured. This is 
because their goals are not easily articulated and have thus not been defined with 
adequate precision – if defined at all. Desired outcome measures are consequently 
absent which ensures that suitable quantitative and/or qualitative research 
methodologies cannot be matched to them. This problem, however, cannot simply be 
overcome by brainstorming possible goals of adjudicative tribunals. Indeed, the 
existential purpose of these bodies may change and evolve over time with new 
legislators, government policymakers, adjudicators and tribunal staff who can each 
                                                          
52  B. Zimmerman, P. Plsek & C. Lindberg, Edgeware: Insights from Complexity Science for Health Care Leaders 
 (Irving, Texas: VHA Inc., 1998) 
53  P.E. Plsek & T. Greenhalgh (2001) “Complexity Science: The Challenge of Complexity in Health 
 Care” 323 Brit Med J 625. 
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contribute towards a shift in the focus and priority of their operations over time.54 
Various community stakeholders may also perceive the role of a particular 
adjudicative tribunal in their sector very differently depending upon their own 
mandate, ideological perspective and unique vantage point. While reference to a 
tribunal‟s enabling statute may be informative in crafting an outcome measure, it is 
not always decisive. In the case of HPARB, legislative provisions suggest this body 
was created to ensure effective regulation of the health professions in the public 
interest,55 yet this goal is not easily measurable. Indeed, the ability to empirically 
evaluate a complex intervention like a health-related adjudicative tribunal depends 
upon having a desired outcome that is observable and testable against a null 
hypothesis. 
 A desire to empirically “prove” cause-effect relationships between adjudicative 
tribunals and a particular outcome is also complicated by the impossibility of 
randomly allocating potential users of existing tribunals into groups that either receive 
or do not receive their services. Randomized controlled trials – the most rigorous of 
discrete empirical evaluations56 – assess the effect of an intervention on a test 
population in comparison to a theoretically identical population. This method, 
however, requires a properly-constituted (i.e., randomized) and adequately-sized (i.e., 
large) control group with both known and unknown confounding factors evenly 
distributed between them in order to isolate the impact of tribunal services and 
measure it against a benchmark. Non-randomized retrospective evaluations 
comparing users of tribunals to non-users (or the situation of the general public in 
jurisdictions with and without comparable tribunals) may not be an ideal solution to 
this challenge as this creates a situation where user-status and outcomes are measured 
at the same time. This prevents efforts to control for confounding factors which in 
turn extinguishes the possibility of making causal determinations.57 
 A penultimate methodological challenge for conducting external impact 
evaluations of health-related adjudicative tribunals is that there are few examples of 
past efforts upon which to emulate. As previously mentioned, many empirical studies 
have examined the internal processes of tribunals, but none could be found that 
focused on their societal impact. This is exacerbated by the dearth of obvious 
empirical data sets which can be analyzed and from which potential evaluators can 
draw.58 Whereas hospitals may be able to compare their patient population and its 
outcomes to those from neighbouring hospitals, adjudicative tribunals are not likely 
in a position to continually collect data about their past users nor compare this 
information to existing data sets from the same region or other jurisdictions. 
                                                          
54   For example, the evolution of Ontario‟s Health Professions Appeal and Review Board over a period 
 of 40 years was documented in the tribunal‟s formal submission to the Health Professions Regulatory 
 Advisory Council regarding interprofessional collaboration among health colleges and professionals. 
 Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, Recommendations to Health Professions Regulatory Advisory 
 Council. (Toronto: Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, 2008). online: HPARB 
 <http://www.hprac.org/en/projects/resources/hprac-1457May30HPARB.pdf>. 
55   Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 18, s. 3. 
56  GRADE Working Group, “Grading Quality of Evidence and Strength Recommendations”(2004)328 
 Brit Med J. Available online: BMJ <http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/328/7454/1490> 
 (accessed on 10 April 2009). 
57 Mello & Zeiler, supra note 3. 
58  Ibid. 
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 Finally, the identity and background of the researcher(s) evaluating the impact of 
an adjudicative tribunal must also be considered. While the goal of empirical study is 
to avoid bias and ideological assumptions, every researcher brings a particular matrix 
of perspective, orientation, experience and values to their work. Insiders, for example, 
may bring intuition and experiential judgment, while outsiders may bring 
independence, fresh eyes and objectivity.  
 
C. Legal Barriers 
 As institutions that function within both the health and legal systems, health-
related adjudicative tribunals must also overcome the realities of the legal sector that 
may not be particularly nurturing for empirical impact evaluations. For example, legal 
actors are often focused more on achieving due process, transparency and good 
governance than specific societal outcomes (like improved health status which is the 
goal of direct clinical health care). Excellent process in the legal world is often 
thought to be the most likely way to achieve the best outcome, without much 
attention to the actual substantive benefits or costs to which an excellent process 
might give rise. 
 There is also, appropriately, a much greater concern for maintaining 
independence and avoiding any apprehension of bias. Like impartiality, independence 
is a common law right of procedural fairness enjoyed by parties who come before 
administrative bodies in common law jurisdictions (including Canada, United States, 
United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand).  In Canada, independence for 
adjudicative tribunals is based on the categories of judicial independence identified by 
the Supreme Court of Canada in Valente v. The Queen (i.e., security of tenure, financial 
independence and administrative independence over adjudicative matters)59 and 
applied to administrative bodies in Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui Indian Band – albeit 
in a more flexible and contextually sensitive manner.60  
 Respecting this independence of adjudicative tribunals will naturally influence the 
process and content of any evaluation in multiple ways. For example, independence 
suggests that governments should refrain from evaluating tribunals‟ substantive 
decisions lest reasonable observers apprehend that tribunals may adjust their 
decision-making to align with what the government of the day perceives as 
“successful.”  Similarly, it may also be difficult for a tribunal to establish evaluative 
criteria or outcome measures for itself as this might lead a reasonable observer to 
conclude that the tribunal may pursue these goals at the expense of fairness to the 
parties. This concern for independence even questions the extent to which tribunals‟ 
staff and members can be directly involved in any evaluation for fear of influencing 
or interfering with their services that must remain neutral at all times. Contrary to 
encouraging self-evaluation as is common within the health sphere, the legal 
environment may actually discourage adjudicative tribunals from assessing their own 
                                                          
59   Valente v. The Queen (1985), 24 D.L.R. (4th) 161 (S.C.C.). 
60   Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui Indian Band (1995), 122 D.L.R. (4th) 129 (S.C.C.). It should be noted 
 that these standards of independence that are relevant in the adjudicative tribunal context are only a 
 common law right which may be displaced by statute, unlike judicial independence which is a 
 constitutional principle. See Ocean Port Hotel v. British Columbia, 2001 SCC 17. 
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external impact, especially since such undertakings are not explicitly part of their 
statutory mandates.61 
 Finally, as recently highlighted by the Nuffield Inquiry on Empirical Legal 
Research, the legal academy also suffers from a dearth of empirical competence and 
capacity to conduct such studies.62 While the field of empirical health law scholarship 
has recently grown exponentially,63 it is generally accepted that current capacity is 
inadequate and that it may further diminish over time.  Empirical legal methodologies 
are also not generally recognized to be as prestigious within the academic community 
as traditional doctrinal investigations.64 The pervasive culture of deference to experts 
and authority must further diminish the perceived value of objective empirical work 
and weaken any apparent need for more rigorous research that is higher on the 
hierarchy of evidence.65  Again, the focus on elements of process (e.g., bias and 
independence) rather than impact (e.g., judicial decisions) as indicator of quality and 
performance must also deter legal scholars from conducting work in this area such 
that target outcomes are less likely to be assessed. 
 
V. REASONS FOR OPTIMISM 
 
 However, despite the challenges faced by potential evaluators of adjudicative 
tribunals, there is reason for optimism: each of the various identified barriers can be 
overcome and have indeed been circumvented in similar evaluations. For example, as 
previously mentioned, many empirical evaluations have been conducted that focus on 
the internal operations of these bodies. A major literature review in 2007 highlighted 
much of the work that has been conducted and published in this area.66 Yet in 
addition to these studies, empirical evaluations have also been undertaken to assess 
the external impact of similarly-functioning specialty courts that operate within the 
judicial system. A systematic review of the research evidence has even been 
conducted on the societal impact of at least one type of these judicial organs.67 
 Indeed, methodologically, there may be much to learn from external impact 
evaluations of specialist courts in the judicial sector.68 For example, “drug courts” 
have been extensively evaluated in the United States and in other jurisdictions 
                                                          
61   On the other hand, a study which expresses respect for the adjudicative independence of tribunals 
 will likely have greater credibility and attract broader “buy in” than a study which is perceived as 
 inconsistent with it. 
62  H. Genn, M. Partington & S. Wheeler, Nuffield Inquiry on Empirical Legal Research: Law in the Real World: 
 Improving our Understanding of How Law Works: Final Report and Recommendations (London: Nuffield 
 Foundation,2006) Online: UCL<http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/socio-legal/empirical/docs/inquiry_
 report.pdf>. 
63  Mello & Zeiler, supra note 3. 
64  Genn, Partington & Wheeler, supra note 62. 
65 GRADE Working Group, supra note 56. 
66  M. Partington, E. Kirton-Darling & F. McClenaghan, Empirical Research on Tribunals: An Annotated 
 Review of Research Published between 1992 and 2007 (London: Administrative Justice and Tribunals 
 Council, 2007) Online: AJTC <http://www.ajtc.gov.uk/docs/EmpiricalResearch.pdf>.  
67  D.B. Wilson, O. Mitchell & D.L. Mackenzie, “A Systematic Review of Drug Court Effects on 
 Recidivism” (2006) 2 Journal of Experimental Criminology 459. 
68  J. Plotnikoff & R. Woolfson, Review of the Effectiveness of Specialist Courts in Other Jurisdictions. DCA Report 
 Series, No. 3/05. (London: UK Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2005) Online: DCA  
 < http://www.dca.gov.uk/research/2005/3_2005.pdf>. 
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regarding their ability to increase treatment rates, lower criminal recidivism, and 
enhance cost-effectiveness of prosecution.69 Domestic violence courts and community 
courts have similarly been assessed for compliance, cost-effectiveness, conviction 
rates and public perception, and mental health courts have been comprehensively 
examined for reducing criminal violence, enhancing community safety, conserving 
fiscal resources and improving clinical outcomes. However, it must be recognized 
that the context within which these judicial bodies operate is very different from that 
of health-related administrative tribunals. Not only are they part of the judiciary 
rather than the executive branch of government, but their existential goals are usually 
related to diverting complex or special cases from traditional courtrooms rather than 
supporting the infrastructure of a completely different system (like that of health). 
Empirically tracking desired outcomes like cost-savings and reduced reoffending rates 
will naturally be easier in this context when the intervention or service is more 
directly related to its goal. Yet, alternatively, it may actually be more difficult for these 
judicial organs to evaluate themselves due to their strict separation from the executive 
(which has the financial resources to fund such an undertaking) and the likelihood of 
them to zealously guard their independence.  
 The possible range of empirical legal research methodologies that can be used in 
evaluating health-related adjudicative tribunals may benefit from earlier studies. For 
example, Mello and Zeiler describe the diversity and comparative advantages of 
various empirical approaches that have been taken by scholars in the health law field 
to address issues as wide-ranging as medical malpractice reform and motor safety 
laws.70  And on the use of randomized controlled trials, for which these two scholars 
are less optimistic, Pleasence  provides an account of such an undertaking in the 
United Kingdom, highlights the many technical, practical and ethical barriers that 
were faced, and suggests ways to overcome them in the future.71 
 
VI. OPPORTUNITIES FOR MOVING FORWARD 
 
 There are several developments converging on the importance of evaluation. 
First, there is a wave of interest in enhancing accountability both in governmental and 
administrative settings. Second, and related to the first development, governments are 
increasingly attracted to legislative schemes which provide for greater transparency 
and oversight. In Ontario, for example, the recently enacted Adjudicative Tribunals 
Accountability, Governance and Appointments Act, 2009  requires a set of prescribed 
adjudicative tribunals (including HPARB and HSARB) to publish a set of “public 
accountability documents” which include a mandate and mission statement, a public 
consultation policy, a service standard policy, an ethics plan, and a member 
                                                          
69  Wilson, Mitchell & Mackenzie, supra note 67; United States Government Accountability Office, Adult 
 Drug Courts: Evidence Indicates Recidivism Reductions and Mixed Results for Other Outcomes (Washington DC: 
 United States Government AccountabilityOffice,2005) online: GAO<http://www.gao.gov/  
 new.items/d05219.pdf>; B.L. Green et al., “Building the Evidence Base for Family Drug 
 Treatment Courts: Results from Recent Outcome Studies” (2009) 6 Drug Court Review 53. Online:
 NDCI<http://www.n-d-c-i.org/sites/default/files/ncdc/DCR%2C%20Vol.% 206%2C%  
 20No%202.pdf>). 
70  Mello & Zeiler, supra note 3. 
71  P. Pleasence, “Trials and Tribulations: Conducting Randomized Experiments in a Socio-legal Setting” 
 2008) 35 J L & Soc‟y 8. 
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accountability framework.  The consultation plan must describe whether and how the 
tribunal will consult with the public when it is considering changes to its rules or 
policies. The service standard policy must set out the standards of service that the 
tribunal intends to provide and a process for making, reviewing and responding to 
complaints about the tribunal's service. The member accountability framework must 
contain a description of the functions of the members of the tribunal and a 
description of the skills, knowledge, experience, other attributes and specific 
qualifications required of a person to be appointed as a member of the tribunal. A 
code of conduct must also be established for the members of the tribunal.  Finally, 
the Act also requires adjudicative tribunals to prepare governance accountability 
documents, including a memorandum of understanding, a business plan and an 
annual report.  While these “public accountability documents” do not necessary 
provide the data necessary to conduct a complete evaluation of a tribunal, they help 
foster a culture of evaluation through tracking data, identifying benchmarks and 
engaging in strategic planning.  
 In order to determine the data which will be helpful in evaluating tribunals such as 
HPARB and HSARB, potential evaluators must also thoughtfully consider both the 
target audience of their research and the overall goal that their particular health-
related adjudicative tribunal is expected to help achieve, and then identify the most 
important targeted outcomes that are relevant to the audience and important for the 
goal‟s fulfillment.72 When such outcomes cannot directly be measured, as may often 
be the case, evaluators must identify strong surrogate endpoints which are 
measurements that reflect important outcomes even if they are of indirect or 
diminished practical importance. Performance indicators can then be developed 
followed by the corresponding methodologies for tracking changes to them. 
 In the case of Ontario‟s health-related adjudicative tribunals, both HPARB and 
HSARB may describe their overall goal as contributing to the health of Ontarians by 
enhancing decision-making within the health system. If government officials are the 
evaluation‟s intended audience, targeted outcomes could include: (1) confidence in 
the health system, (2) equity, justice and fairness in health decision-making, (3) 
strengthened health system institutions, and (4) better health services and patient 
safety via enhanced regulation and oversight. Since these outcomes would be nearly 
impossible to measure directly, surrogate endpoints can be developed and could 
possibly include: (1) access to adjudicative mechanisms for dispute resolution, (2) 
perceived legitimacy of adjudicative decisions, (3) satisfaction with adjudicative 
services, (4) perceived fairness and legitimacy of adjudicative services, (5) changed 
conduct of health system institutions and decision-makers, (6) establishment or 
expansion of support mechanisms for primary health decision-makers, (7) improved 
oversight of primary health decision-makers leading to better health outcomes, (8) 
better diagnostic and treatment decisions by primary health decision-makers, and (9) 
respect among stakeholders for the tribunal‟s oversight function. Performance 
indicators and their corresponding empirical methodologies could then range from 
the public‟s awareness for the tribunal‟s existence to the perceived concern among 
primary health decision-makers that their decisions will be reversed.  
 Once a system of empirical observation is in place, potential evaluators can 
establish benchmarks according to which they can track and assess performance. 
                                                          
72 S.O. 2009 c.33 schedule 5. 
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Such comparative points of measurement can be drawn from thoughtful 
consideration, aspirational goals of leaders, expert judgments on what is possible, data 
from similar tribunals in other jurisdictions (i.e., comparative analysis), or previous 
empirical observations from the same tribunal (i.e., interrupted time-series analysis. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
 In summary, adjudicative tribunals serve an essential function within the health 
sector, yet their contributions and impact on the delivery of health services and 
society in general are not usually evaluated empirically. A focus on evaluation may 
enhance tribunals‟ capacity to engage in continuous quality improvement efforts, 
enhance the public‟s confidence, and maximize their societal impact.  More broadly, a 
focus on empirical evaluation extends the reach of administrative law to the norms 
and means of administrative adjudication, and beyond the legal doctrines considered 
by tribunals or the courts which supervise them. In our view, understanding the 
significance and implications of these doctrines requires situating them in institutional 
and policy contexts. For administrative law, in short, it ought to matter whether 
administrative justice is or is not being realized.  
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REINVENTING REGULATION/REINVENTING ACCOUNTABILITY: 
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW GOVERNANCE REGIMES 
 
William D. Araiza* 
 
This Essay considers the doctrinal and institutional challenges courts and 
designers of New Governance systems face when considering the availability 
and scope of judicial review. Part II briefly summarizes New Governance 
principles, while Part III explains the challenges they pose for American 
standing law. The Essay then considers solutions. Part IV considers aspects of 
other nations’ administrative standing law, considering whether those nations’ 
legal innovations overcome these hurdles while remaining true to courts’ proper 
role in reviewing agency action. Other nations have taken significant steps to  
resolve these issues; however, it remains unclear whether those resolutions 
transfer to the different institutional and legal structure in the United States. 
Part V considers whether the problem of standing can be resolved in a 
principled way by reconceptualizing the injury plaintiffs allege when they 
challenge New Governance regulation. Finally, Part VI considers the proper 
scope of judicial review of New Governance regulation.  
 
Cet article traite des défis doctrinaux et institutionnels qui se présentent aux 
tribunaux et aux concepteurs de systèmes de Nouvelle Gouvernance lorsqu’ils 
envisagent la disponibilité et la portée de la révision judiciaire. La partie II 
résume brièvement les principes de Nouvelle Gouvernance alors que la partie 
III explique les défis qu’ils présentent pour la législation américaine en 
vigueur. L’article considère ensuite des solutions. La partie IV traite d’aspects 
de la législation administrative en vigueur d’autres nations, en examinant si les 
innovations juridiques de ces nations surmontent ces obstacles tout en 
demeurant fidèles au rôle approprié des tribunaux lorsqu’ils révisent les actions 
d’agences. D’autres nations ont adopté des mesures importantes pour 
solutionner ces questions; toutefois, il n’est pas encore clair si ces solutions 
peuvent s’appliquer à la structure institutionnelle et juridique différente des 
États-Unis. La partie V considère si le problème de la qualité pour agir peut 
être résolu de façon qui respecte les principes en conceptualisant différemment le 
préjudice allégué par le demandeur qui conteste la réglementation de la 
Nouvelle Gouvernance. Finalement, la partie VI considère la portée 
appropriée de la révision judiciaire de la réglementation de Nouvelle 
Gouvernance. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The approach to public administration known as “New Governance” has become a 
popular subject of academic study.  While specific New Governance ideas are often 
                                                          
*  Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.  Thanks to Claire Kelly, participants in the Sixth 
 Administrative Law Discussion Forum, Québec City, May 25-26, 2010, and participants in Brooklyn 
 Law School‟s informal workshop group for thoughtful comments on an earlier version of this 
 essay. Thanks also to Alison Matela for fine research assistance. 
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not particularly novel, it is only relatively recently that scholars have found 
methodological commonalities across different regulatory areas, and endowed them 
with the term “New Governance.”
1  Over the course of the last decade, this 
regulatory approach has become grist for a lively scholarly discussion that both 
examines this phenomenon more abstractly2 and applies it to particular regulatory 
contexts, both domestic3 and international.4 
 Unsurprisingly, up to now scholars have focused largely on discovering and 
examining these commonalities before considering how the phenomenon of New 
Governance fits with traditional public law features such as judicial review.  The lack 
of attention to judicial review is especially understandable since the characteristics of 
New Governance regulation make it, at first glance, a poor fit with traditional judicial 
review of administrative action.5  Nevertheless, despite its relatively lower priority as 
an object of study, it remains critical for New Governance scholars to consider how 
judicial review fits into the picture.  Accountability remains a fundamental 
requirement of public law, regardless of the modality of the regulation.  While New 
Governance promises to provide accountability through new approaches to 
regulation, an external – that is, judicial – role remains indispensable to that 
accountability, and hence, to the system‟s overall legitimacy.  The absence of such an 
external check will inevitably raise the concerns – including those about capture, 
misfeasance and neglect of diffuse interests – that led to the expansion of the judicial 
role in the American federal administrative system in the 1960s and 1970s.6 
 The importance of such external accountability need not distort the fundamental 
thrust of New Governance regulation.  While judicial review may be crucial, it need 
not be the tail that wags the regulatory dog.  The flex point between the basic 
principles of New Governance and judicial review may rest in legal doctrine 
governing the access to and scope of that review.  In other words, if anything needs 
to “give” in this system, it is not necessarily New Governance itself, nor the 
availability of judicial review, but rather, the doctrinal rules that govern such review.  
Making those rules conform to the structure of New Governance regulation in a way 
that preserves a meaningful yet appropriately limited role for courts may well 
constitute an important challenge to the construction of a full theory of New 
Governance regulation. 
 After Part II of this essay briefly summarizes New Governance principles, Part III 
lays out the challenges those principles pose for traditional American standing law.  
This part of the essay focuses on the doctrinal requirements of injury, causation and 
redressability and the problems they present for challenges to agency action taken 
under New Governance principles.   
 The essay then considers possible fixes.  Part IV expands the essay‟s geographic 
focus by considering aspects of other nations‟ laws governing standing to challenge 
                                                          
1  See e.g. Karkkainen, infra note 7 at 472 (discussing use of the term “New Governance”). 
2  See e.g. Lobel, infra note 27. 
3  See e.g. Susan Sturm, “Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach” 
 (2001)101 Colum L Rev 458 (American employment discrimination law). 
4  See e.g. David Markell, “The Role of Spotlighting Procedures in Promoting Citizen Participation, 
 Transparency and Accountability” (2010) 45 Wake Forest L Rev 435 (examining the New 
 Governance-influenced procedures for citizen participation in the North American Commission 
 for Environmental Cooperation). 
5  See infra Part II. 
6  See e.g. Richard Stewart, “The Reformation of American Administrative Law” (1975) 88 Harv L Rev 
 1667. 
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administrative action.  In particular, it considers whether innovations in those nations‟ 
standing law help overcome these hurdles while remaining true to courts‟ proper role 
in the administrative system.  While other nations have taken some significant steps 
to overcome or resolve these issues, it remains unclear whether those resolutions 
easily transfer to the different institutional and legal structure in the United States.  
Part V considers whether the standing problem can be resolved in a principled way 
by reconceptualizing the injury plaintiffs allege when they challenge New Governance 
regulation.  It suggests such a reconceptualization is both doctrinally plausible and 
justified by a proper understanding of New Governance regulation. 
 Part VI widens the essay‟s scope by considering the proper scope of judicial 
review of New Governance regulation.  In particular, it focuses on the problem 
presented by judicial review of ongoing agency management of public-private 
collaborations.  Such management constitutes much of what is novel about New 
Governance; however, judicial review of such ongoing activity raises concerns about 
judicial competence and overstepping.   
 Part VI notes the skepticism with which American courts have considered the 
prospect of judicial supervision of agencies‟ ongoing management activities.  
However, it suggests that some form of ongoing judicial supervision is probably 
necessary to any realistic scheme of judicial review of New Governance regulation.  
This Part of the essay analogizes to an area where American courts have previously 
exerted this type of power – structural reform litigation, and, in particular, judicial 
oversight over school desegregation.  It notes the challenges the desegregation 
mandate imposed on courts, and concedes the (at best) partial success of that effort.   
However, it also suggests that shouldering these burdens may become necessary in 
the administrative law context.  Part VI ends by suggesting the mechanics of how an 
appropriate system of judicial review might be constructed. 
 
II. THE BASICS: NEW GOVERNANCE AND THE CHALLENGES IT 
POSES 
 
 “New Governance” is a catch-all label that includes within it a variety of 
regulatory approaches.  However, for purposes of this very general examination, 
certain common characteristics of New Governance models can be identified.  This 
list is incomplete and not authoritative; indeed, New Governance scholars disagree 
about what New Governance actually includes.7  However, the identification here of 
some generally-accepted characteristics illustrates how, even at this general level of 
explanation, New Governance presents significant problems for the prospect of 
judicial review. 
 For our purposes, a key feature of New Governance is its use of soft, non-
mandatory regulatory tools.8  Regardless of “how soft” those tools are – that is, 
regardless of the precise degree to which non-binding norms mix with authoritative 
and mandatory legal rules – the fact remains that, compared with traditional 
regulation, New Governance features some significant degree of “regulation without 
rules.”  In place of rules, New Governance contemplates participant-generated and 
                                                          
7  See generally Bradley Karkkainen, “New Governance in Legal Thought and in the World: Some 
 Splitting as an Antidote to Overzealous Lumping” (2004) 89 Minn L Rev 471 (noting the variations 
 among New Governance scholars with regard to the scope of the field). 
8  See Lobel, infra note 27 at 388-395; see also Abbott & Sindal, infra note 13 at 508-509 (describing the 
 presence of “soft law” as one of the “four central elements of New Governance”). 
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enforced norms, with government performing an ongoing role of coordinating and 
incentivizing the work of other actors.9   
 Second, New Governance is marked by its broad, problem-based focus.10  Rather 
than slicing a particular problem into its component parts and allocating regulation of 
each to a particular agency, New Governance envisions a more holistic approach to 
problem-solving, one that emphasizes the interrelated nature of the regulatory 
problem at hand.  Coordinated delivery of social services for the poor, and 
coordinated land-use, transportation and environmental planning present two 
examples of holistic consideration of regulatory problems that traditionally are split 
into smaller parts for regulation by agencies operating under different mandates and 
often not communicating with each other. 
 Finally, New Governance is characterized by devolution and subsidiarity.11  New 
Governance scholars generally favour decentralized decision-making involving groups 
whose local focus would often make them invisible to a more centralized, 
hierarchical, bureaucracy.  Such decision-making is justified on the related grounds 
that problems are best dealt with by those in closest contact to the actual problem, 
and optimal solutions are often those that are closely tailored to the specifics of a 
given situation.12 
 These characteristics of New Governance, as laudable as they might be, 
nevertheless present significant challenges for a system of judicial review that was 
developed under a very different set of assumptions about how regulation is 
performed.  First, the “soft” nature of New Governance raises serious questions 
about causation under conventional standing doctrine.  As will be examined in more 
detail in Part III, if government is not unambiguously acting to the detriment of a 
particular interest, but rather is simply coordinating or incentivizing third-party 
action, it becomes unclear whether one can confidently say that a given government 
action has “caused” anyone any harm. 
 Other facets of New Governance raise analogous concerns.  The multi-pronged, 
holistic nature of New Governance regulation suggests that no one government 
institution is ultimately responsible for the harms caused.  While theoretically such 
multi-pronged approaches to problems can be led by one government actor, the 
dispersal of expertise and interests presumably means that in most cases regulation 
marked by this feature will take the form of multiple government actors coordinating 
their actions.13  This diffusion of authority may lead to a diffusion of responsibility, 
and a concomitant reluctance on the part of reviewing courts to conclude that judicial 
correction of one agency‟s misconduct will in fact redress the plaintiff‟s injury.
14  This 
                                                          
9  As suggested above, such action may co-exist with more traditional regulation. 
10  See e.g. Lobel, infra note 27 at 385-388. 
11  See e.g. Lobel, infra note 27 at 381-385; see also Abbott and Sindal, infra note 13 at 508-509 
 (describing the incorporation of “a decentralized range of actors and institutions” as one of the 
 “four central elements of New Governance”). 
12  See e.g. Abbott and Snidal, infra note 13 at 525-527. 
13  See e.g. Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Strengthening International Regulation Through 
 Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit” 42 Vand J Transnat‟l L 
 (2009) 501 at 528-529 (noting the phenomenon of diffused expertise in the transnational 
 regulatory context). 
14  See e.g. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, at 568-571 (1992) (plurality portion of opinion) 
 [Defenders of Wildlife] (concluding that the failure to sue the agency actually threatening an endangered 
 species renders speculative the question whether relief against the agency responsible for 
 administering the Endangered Species Act would redress any injury caused by a species extinction).  Of 
 course, this same dynamic impacts causation analysis as well.  This is unsurprising, given that 
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horizontal diffuseness of responsibility is matched by a vertical diffuseness, to the 
extent New Governance features devolution of decision-making power, whether to 
more local levels of government or private actors.  This vertical diffusion of 
responsibility raises the same concern about redressability. 
 Moreover, the nature of New Governance regulation as primarily concerned with 
coordination and management of others‟ actions raises questions about the 
appropriate scope of judicial review.  If the federal government‟s role in New 
Governance is that of “an orchestrator rather than a top-down commander,”15 and 
“less one of direct action than one of providing financial support, strategic direction, 
and leadership”
16 for other actors, then presumably judicial review of government 
action necessitates review of how the government performs those tasks.  As will be 
noted later,17 American courts have expressed concern about such programmatic 
judicial review.18  To the extent this reticence derives ultimately from the common-law 
limits on judicial review of administrative action, this problem may be one not purely 
confined to the United States.19  
 Thus, New Governance poses challenges both for the availability and scope of 
judicial review in the administrative system.  The next Part considers the availability 
problem, as seen through the lens of American standing law.  After canvassing other 
nations‟ legal systems for possible fixes to the problems thus presented, the essay 
then moves on to consider how judicial review – both its availability and its scope – 
can come to accommodate New Governance regulation while staying within the 
bounds of the traditional judicial role. 
 
III. NEW GOVERNANCE AND AMERICAN STANDING LAW 
 
 New Governance regulation fits uncomfortably with American legal doctrine 
governing the availability of judicial review of agency action.  The biggest problems 
flow from the doctrine‟s insistence that the defendant agency have caused the 
plaintiff‟s injury, and, relatedly, that judicial relief would redress the plaintiff‟s injury.  
In the usual situation where the agency is directly regulating private parties, causation 
is normally established quite easily.  Indeed, causation presents no special problem 
even in some third-party harm situations.  For example, courts generally have no 
problem finding causation when a plaintiff alleges that an agency‟s failure to regulate 
emissions pursuant to law allows a third party to continue to pollute, thus causing 
harm to the plaintiff. 
 However, causation becomes more problematic when regulation assumes certain 
New Governance forms.  To illustrate this, consider a case from over thirty years ago, 
well before the rise of a discourse on New Governance.  In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky 
Welfare Rights Organization,20 the plaintiff welfare-rights organization, acting on behalf 
                                                                                                                                     
 causation and redressability can be considered mirror images of each other.  See e.g. Charles Kelso, 
 “Standing to Sue: Transformations in Supreme Court Methodology, Doctrine and Results” (1996) 28 
 U Tol L Rev 93 at 135 n. 280. 
15  Abbott and Snidal, supra note 13 at 521. 
16  Paul Osterman et al, Working in America: A Blueprint for the New Labor Market (Boston: M.I.T. Press, 
 2001) at 151. 
17  See below Part VI. 
18  See e.g. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) [National Wildlife Federation] (noting 
 that requests for such programmatic corrections are generally not properly addressed to courts). 
19  See text accompanying infra note 47. 
20  426 U.S. 26 (1976) [Eastern Kentucky]. 
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of its members, sued the Internal Revenue Service [IRS], alleging that it had 
misinterpreted a provision of the Internal Revenue Code and thereby made it easier for 
hospitals to deny indigents free health care while still enjoying charity status (with the 
attendant tax deductibility of contributions).   
 The Supreme Court held that the organization could not show that the IRS 
caused its members‟ injury.  It concluded that it was simply too speculative whether 
the agency‟s regulation prompted the hospitals‟ denial of free services and therefore 
caused the plaintiffs‟ harm.  For the same reason, it concluded that it was similarly 
speculative whether a court order enjoining the regulation would redress that lack of 
medical care.21  Instead, the Court suggested that it was equally plausible that a court 
order requiring the IRS to tighten the rules for charity status would prompt the 
hospitals to choose to forego that status and continue denying free care.22 
 Somewhat more distantly, but in substance essentially indistinguishable, is the 
situation where government is alleged to violate law when funding activity by third 
parties.  For example, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife23 the plaintiffs argued that the U.S. 
Government violated the Endangered Species Act when it funded development projects 
abroad without engaging in internal consultations about the projects‟ impact on 
endangered species. In rejecting the plaintiffs‟ standing, a plurality concluded that 
their injury was not redressable, because (among other reasons) U.S. Government 
funding for the project made up only a small percentage of the project‟s cost.  
According to the plurality,24 it was therefore unclear whether the project would be 
stopped or altered even if the Court ruled for the plaintiffs on the consultation issue. 25   
 While it is hazardous to extrapolate, these examples nevertheless bode poorly for 
American courts‟ willingness to hear challenges to much New Governance 
regulation.26  If it is true that such regulation can be described as non-coercive and 
                                                          
21  See Kelso, supra note 14. 
22  426 U.S. at 42-44.  The Court endorsed Eastern Kentucky‟s analysis in a later, analogous, case.  See 
 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
23  504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
24  The members of the Lujan majority that refused to join Justice Scalia‟s redressability analysis – Justice 
 Kennedy, joined by Justice Souter – did not reach the redressability issue. See Defenders of Wildlife, 
 supra note 14 at 579, 580 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). 
25  Ibid at 571 (opinion of Scalia, J.).  A majority found that the plaintiffs had not established injury; for 
 that reason the Court denied the plaintiffs‟ standing.  See ibid at 562-567. 
26  A recent case, Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S.Ct. 2743 (2010), hints at a more generous 
 approach to standing. The facts of Monsanto are complex, but the key point is that the Court held that 
 a party had standing to challenge an injunction prohibiting an agency from taking a deregulatory act, 
 even though a reversal of the injunction would require the agency to consider whether to promulgate 
 a more limited deregulatory order after conducting an environmental assessment that might or might 
 not support partial deregulation.  See ibid at 2753-2754.  The Court observed that the agency had 
 made it clear that it favoured such a partial deregulation in response to the court‟s ruling on the 
 merits against its full deregulation decision.  For that reason, the Court stated that “there is more than 
 a strong likelihood that [the agency] would partially deregulate [the product] were it not for the 
 District Court‟s injunction.  The District Court‟s elimination of that likelihood is plainly sufficient to 
 establish a constitutionally cognizable injury.”  Ibid at 2754. 
      Monsanto suggests that an injury may be considered redressable even when the court‟s order (here, 
 reversing the lower court‟s injunction) simply throws the matter into the hands of a third party (here, 
 the agency), which might or might not take the action desired by the plaintiff.  As such, one might 
 view the Court‟s decision as a partial repudiation of its analysis in cases such as Eastern Kentucky.  See 
 text accompanying supra note 22.  But because the Court expressed such confidence that the agency 
 would in fact take the desired action, its analysis is probably best understood as simply an application 
 of the rule requiring only that it be “likely” that the plaintiff‟s injury would be redressable by a court.  
 See e.g. Sprint Communications v. APCC Services, Inc., 554 U.S. 269 (2008) at 269.  By contrast, in the 
 context of New Governance regulation, redressability would likely be far more speculative, given the 
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informal,27 and as relying on third-party action,28 then presumably it is beyond the 
reach of a plaintiff‟s lawsuit, as the defendant-agency can claim that the nature of the 
regulation renders causation and redressability too speculative. 29 The next Part 
considers how other nations‟ laws have approached this issue. 
 
IV. NEW GOVERNANCE REGULATION AND STANDING 
REQUIREMENTS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES 
 
 The world‟s legal systems are, of course, far too diverse to permit in this short 
space a comprehensive canvassing of other nations‟ standing law.  Instead, this essay 
will discuss particular aspects of that law to note both challenges and possibilities for 
accommodating judicial review of New Governance regulation. 
 As a very general matter, most nations‟ judicial systems recognize the need for a 
plaintiff to show an interest in the subject-matter of the lawsuit.  Common law 
nations derived this requirement from English law,30 while civil law nations generally 
recognize such a requirement as well.31  However, in some cases national legislatures 
have abolished the injury requirement in particular types of lawsuits.  Most notably, a 
number of common law and civil law nations have authorized environmental groups 
to sue on environmental matters without having to demonstrate the existence of a 
concrete interest, either of its own or one of its members.32  In other cases, legislatures 
or courts have authorized other organizations, such as unions or the Red Cross, to 
sue on matters relevant to the organization‟s interest without it having to satisfy that 
nation‟s law‟s conventional standing requirements.33 
 In one sense these broad grants of standing go beyond resolving the more 
discrete problem presented by standing to challenge New Governance action.  This 
latter issue presents the problem of conceptualizing injury and causation in the 
context of a prospective plaintiff who otherwise plainly has an interest in the 
challenged regulatory activity.  For example, New Governance regulation of land use 
                                                                                                                                     
 fluid, multi-party nature of the regulatory process.  Thus, Monsanto, while promising, does not 
 represent the deeper reconceptualization of standing law that may be required to secure 
 judicial review of New Governance regulation.  See below Part IV. 
27  See Orly Lobel, “The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
 Contemporary Legal Thought” (2004) 89 Minn L Rev 342 at 388-389. 
28  See Lester Salamon, “The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction” (2001) 
 28 Fordham Urb LJ 1611 at 1613. 
29  Cf. Eastern Kentucky, supra note 20 at 46 (Stewart, J. concurring) (“I cannot now imagine a case, at least 
 outside the First Amendment area, where a person whose own tax liability was not affected ever 
 could have standing to litigate the federal tax liability of someone else.”). 
30  See e.g. Jon Owens, “Comparative Law and Standing to Sue: A Petition For Redress For the 
 Environment” (2001) 7 Envtl Law 321 at 348. 
31  See generally van Dijk, infra note 33 (discussing French and German law); Parker, infra note 33 at 277-
 278 (discussing requirement under Italian law). 
32  See generally Owens, supra note 30.  Compare Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (refusing to 
 allow a well-known environmental advocacy group to challenge an agency action adversely affecting 
 the environment without showing injury either to the organization itself or to one of its members). 
33  See P. van Dijk, Judicial Review of Governmental Action and the Requirement of an Interest to Sue (Alphen ann 
 den Ryn, Netherlands and Rockville Maryland: Sitoff and Nordoff, 1980) (French court allowing a 
 union to sue); Douglas Parker, “Standing to Litigate „Abstract Social Interests‟ in the United States 
 and Italy: Reexamining „Injury in Fact‟” (1995) 33 Colum J Transnat‟l L 259 at 284-287 (Italian 
 legislature giving unions the right to sue to challenge anti-union contact by employers, without any 
 requirement that the union‟s own interest is at stake and without the union suing as a representative 
 of its members); ibid at 287-290 (Italian statute authorizing the Red Cross to sue to vindicate 
 humanitarian interests). 
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clearly impacts residents of the area, even if the “soft” nature of the regulation 
renders problematic standard applications of the injury and causation requirements.  
By contrast, the environmental, union and Red Cross legislation discussed above has 
simply wiped away those requirements.34 
 However, at another level one can discern useful parallels between legislation 
granting broad standing rights and judicial attempts to reconceptualize injury and 
causation.  Both moves can be justified by concern that the diffuse nature of the issue 
makes it hard for a would-be plaintiff to satisfy conventional rules.  In both cases 
then, the absence of these innovations raises the risk that no person would ever have 
standing to sue.35  Thus, the aggressive step of abolishing standing requirements and 
the more limited reconceptualization of injury and causation both respond to a desire 
to ensure the availability of judicial review when either the nature of the issue or the 
nature of the regulatory style would frustrate it under more conventional standing 
rules. 
 Other nations‟ actions also raise the separate, but related, question of institutional 
authority over standing requirements.  Italy, for example, has granted organizational 
standing, without the need for the organization to satisfy normal standing 
requirements, by statutorily authorizing particular organizations to sue to vindicate 
particular causes.36  Indeed, Italy has gone even farther, and empowered the Ministry 
of the Environment to certify environmental organizations as authorized to enjoy this 
special juridical status.37  Other nations that have wiped away standing limits for 
certain organizations have done so by courts construing generally-phrased statutory 
language.38 
 By contrast, in the United States standing remains very much a matter of judicial 
construction of constitutional law.  This difference matters because the constitutional 
nature of American standing law places primary responsibility for innovations with 
the Supreme Court, rather than Congress.  Moreover, the ostensibly unchanging 
nature of the case-or-controversy requirement suggests that a more likely and 
doctrinally justifiable innovation may involve reconceptualizing the inputs into the 
standing inquiry – here, injury and causation – rather than explicitly abandoning those 
requirements, as European39 and other40 legislatures have done. 
 Such a reconceptualization of injury and causation may change standing law 
sufficiently to accommodate judicial review of New Governance regulation.  
Nevertheless, systems where legislatures enjoy significant influence over standing may 
still be better-suited to respond to the challenge New Governance poses to judicial 
review.  The softness of New Governance regulation means that stretching concepts 
of injury and causation will entail difficult line-drawing problems. The Supreme Court 
                                                          
34  See e.g. Parker, ibid at 288 (noting that the Italian Red Cross statute goes beyond any concern with 
 concrete injury).  Compare Eastern Kentucky, supra note 20 (Stewart, J. concurring) (observing that under 
 the Court‟s refusal to grant standing to a private party beneficiary of an agency‟s assessment of 
 another party‟s tax liability, nobody would be able to contest the tax liability of a third party).  The 
 facts of Eastern Kentucky are provided above, at text accompanying supra notes 20-22. 
35  See Regina v. Sec’y of State for Foreign & Commw. Affairs ex parte The World Dev. Movement Ltd., 1 W.L.R. 
 386, 393 (Q.B. 1995) (British court recognizing standing for a public interest organization, in part due 
 to the fact that if standing were denied then nobody would have standing to challenge the legality of 
 the government action). 
36  See supra note 33 (Italy).  Compare Sierra Club, supra note 36. 
37  See Parker, supra note 33 at 288-294. 
38  See Owens, supra note 30 at 345-348 (Great Britain). 
39  See e.g. Parker, supra note 33 at 288-294 (Italy). 
40  See e.g. Owens, supra note 32 at 369 (Peru). 
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has already confronted this problem when dealing with its broadest application of 
these concepts – its acceptance as sufficient (even if only at the pleading stage) of the 
creative and attenuated causal chain in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory and 
Administrative Procedures [SCRAP].41  As the Court has grown more conservative, its 
embarrassment at its acceptance of the plausibility of the standing claim in SCRAP 
has increased.  However, its inability to draw principled limits has led it to reject 
injury and causation claims with only the barest of reasoning.  For example, in Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife,42 the Court rejected a claim that zookeepers and others with a 
professional interest in an animal species were injured by action threatening the 
species‟ continued existence with little more than the exclamation that such a claim 
was “beyond all reason.”
43 
 By contrast, legislatures enjoy much more legitimacy in drawing lines that, if 
drawn by a court, would appear to be unprincipled.44 Legislation is nothing if not line-
drawing; its legitimacy flows from legislators‟ popular mandate, rather than principled 
interpretation of a legal text.  Thus, nations where legislatures control standing may 
be better suited to draw potentially fine-grained distinctions about which parties may 
seek judicial review of New Governance regulation that theoretically impacts many 
groups of people, or interests that are in some sense diffused.45 
 Of course, practice is messier than theory.  In the American context the stark 
dichotomy between legislation and constitution is belied by the status of the APA as 
a foundational statute that has accommodated significant shifts in regulatory theory 
and understandings of judicial review.  The picture gets even murkier in light of the 
APA‟s status as a codification of longstanding common law rules of judicial review of 
agency action.46  Given the quasi-constitutional status of much of that common law, 
the APA arguably takes on a dual status – a “mere” statute that serves only as the 
default that Congress can override at will, but also a codification of quasi-
constitutional limits on judicial review.47  In turn, this dual nature suggests that the 
extent of congressional power to use its control over administrative law to influence 
the availability of judicial review remains an unresolved question in the American 
system.  To the extent courts in other systems face their own limitations beyond the 
power of the national parliament to influence, this difficulty may be more than a 
purely American one.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
41  412 U.S. 669 (1973) (accepting, for purposes of surviving a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs‟ claims that 
 changes in railroad rates harmed their interest as hikers because the rates would cause some 
 recycling activity to become uneconomical, thus leading to more trash deposited on hiking trails). 
42  Defenders of Wildlife, supra note 14 at 555. 
43  Ibid at 566. 
44  See e.g. William D. Araiza, “The Section 5 Power and the Rational Basis Standard of Equal 
 Protection” (2005) 79 Tul L Rev 519 at 546-551. 
45  See text accompanying supra note 37. 
46  See e.g. Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004) [Southern Utah] (describing some 
 of the APA‟s limitations on judicial review as based on the common-law principles of mandamus); 
 see also Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 606, 608-609 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the 
 “committed to agency discretion by law” provision for precluding judicial review of agency action as 
 resting on common-law limits on judicial review). 
47  See e.g. Webster, ibid at 609 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing political questions as one of the doctrinal 
 areas that developed as part of the common law of judicial review of agency action). 
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V. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE JUDICIAL ROLE 
 
 One might consider restrictions in American standing law to reflect merely 
technical flaws that are relatively easily corrected through a broader understanding of 
causation.  But the issue raises more fundamental concerns.  
 At one level, the problem can be understood to implicate not causation but the 
nature of the injury itself.  In Simon, for example, one might just as easily have 
understood the plaintiffs‟ injury not as loss of free medical care, but, as Justice 
Brennan saw it in his separate opinion, as the decreased opportunity to receive such 
care.48  Reconceptualizing the injury in this way might remedy the problem caused by 
the Court‟s skepticism about the causal link between the harm and the challenged 
government action. 
 One might object that this “resolution” is simply a play on words: if one doesn‟t 
know in a given case whether government really caused a particular injury, presumably 
one can know with more confidence that the government action at least made the 
injury more likely.  Under this understanding, this answer to the problem reflects not 
so much a reconceptualization of injury as a simple weakening of the causation 
requirement.   One might argue that it may be a good idea to weaken the causation 
requirement in this way, but still insist that the move described above simply 
accomplishes that straightforward fix, rather than reflecting any deeper rethinking 
about what injury should mean. 
 However, in another sense this resolution does go beyond wordplay to reflect a 
deeper reconceptualization of injury.  In Simon, Justice Brennan begins his critique of 
the Court‟s standing analysis by citing the plaintiff‟s legal claim – that “the IRS is 
offering the economic inducement of tax-exempt status to such hospitals under terms 
illegal under the Internal Revenue Code.”
49  Why worry about the legal claim when the 
issue is standing?  After all, we all understand that one may suffer injury separate 
from the invasion of one‟s legal rights – indeed, this is assumed when a plaintiff is 
held not to have standing because he is asserting the legal interests of a third party. 50  
Justice Brennan seems to take this unusual analytic route because he wanted to tie the 
plaintiffs‟ injury to the legal claim they are asserting: 
 
Respondents‟ claim is not, and by its very nature could not be, that 
they have been and will be illegally denied the provision of indigent 
medical services by the hospitals.  Rather, if respondents have a 
claim cognizable under the law, it is that the Internal Revenue 
Code requires the Government to offer economic inducements to 
the relevant hospitals only under conditions which are likely to 
benefit respondents.  The relevant injury in light of this claim is, 
then, injury to this beneficial interest – as respondents alleged, 
                                                          
48  See Eastern Kentucky, supra note 20 at 46, 56 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The relevant 
 injury ... is ... as respondents alleged ... injury to their „opportunity and ability‟ to receive medical 
 services”). 
49  Ibid at 55 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
50  See e.g. in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), the Court assumed that the taxpayers of a city had 
 Article III standing to sue a neighbouring town over its exclusionary zoning.  But even though the 
 taxpayers were assumed to have Article III injury, they were not allowed to sue because they were 
 asserting a third party‟s legal rights.  In the administrative law context one could also cite the (rare) 
 cases where a plaintiff suffers Article III injury but is nevertheless held to be outside of the zone of 
 interests protected by the statute.  See e.g. Air Courier Conference of America v. American Postal Workers 
 Union AFL-CIO, 498 U.S. 517 (1991). 
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injury to their “opportunity and ability” to receive medical 
services.51 
 
Justice Brennan‟s phrase, “the relevant injury in light of this claim,” has to be 
understood as tying the injury to the benefits they enjoy under the statute.  The 
statute creates the interest Justice Brennan believes the plaintiffs to have relied on for 
their standing.  This is not just loosening causation.  It is reimagining the nature of 
the injury. 
 New Governance regulation should be understood as creating rights analogous to 
the right perceived by Justice Brennan in Eastern Kentucky.  Under New Governance 
principles government aims, at least in part, to create conditions under which other 
actors modify their conduct in desired ways.  So understood, it makes sense to think 
about injury not as the deprivation of a particular concrete good (such as medical care 
or a clean environment), but instead as the deprivation of the optimal conditions 
under which other parties might provide the good. 
 One finds a parallel to this sort of incentivizing conduct in, of all places, 
constitutional litigation. In Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated General 
Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville,52 the Supreme Court concluded that a white-
owned contracting firm had standing to challenge a city‟s racial set-aside for 
contracting business, despite the plaintiff lacking any evidence that the set-aside had 
ever caused it to lose a contract.  Instead of denying standing, the Court 
reconceptualized the injury, by describing it as the inability to compete on a level 
playing field.53  In this sense, then, the Court‟s understanding of Equal Protection 
reflects a concern that is at least passingly analogous to some New Governance 
regulation.  In both New Governance and Equal Protection, the point is not to 
mandate certain outcomes (equal distribution of contracts to all races on a 
proportionate basis, or provision of a certain amount of healthcare).54  Rather, the 
point is to insist on a process – equal consideration of all contractors, regardless of 
race, and the incentivizing of private hospitals to provide medical care.  That process 
may or may not have a particular substantive good in mind,55 but in both cases the 
right in question is understood as a right to that process, not a right to that 
substantive good.  
 In such a case, where the government undertakes only to provide a decision-
making process it makes sense to understand the injury in analogous terms. In Eastern 
Kentucky Justice Brennan understood the interest, derived from the statute, as the 
“opportunity” to receive medical care based on an appropriate incentivizing of 
private conduct.  In Florida Contractors, the interest, derived from the Constitution, was 
the “opportunity” to compete for contracts on an equal basis.  So too, in a New 
Governance context one might understand the interest, derived from the 
                                                          
51  Eastern Kentucky, supra note 20 at 56 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
52  508 U.S. 656 (1993) [Florida Contractors]. 
53  Ibid at 666 (“When the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult for members of one 
 group to obtain a benefit than it is for members of another group, a member of the former group
 seeking to challenge the barrier need not allege that he would have obtained the benefit but for the
 barrier in order to establish standing. The “injury in fact” in an equal protection case of this variety is 
 the denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate inability to 
 obtain the benefit.”). 
54  See ibid. (equal protection). 
55  Equal protection may not have equal outcomes as its goal, though presumably there remains the 
 aspiration that, with equal treatment, outcomes will eventually equalize. 
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government‟s regulatory approach, as the opportunity to benefit from appropriate 
government leadership and coordination of third parties‟ actions. 
 Still, one might argue that equal protection is a special case – that, essentially, 
denial of equal treatment is itself understood to be a cognizable harm, even without 
an explicitly concrete loss.56  Under this argument, any other similar opportunity loss, 
such as the reduced likelihood of enjoying a particular good because of sub-optimal 
government incentivizing of private conduct, is simply different, and inadequate for 
standing purposes.  Indeed, American courts‟ insistence that injury be not just 
particularized, but concrete, seems to fly in the face of a claim that an individual has an 
interest in, say, the appropriate incentivizing of private conduct or an appropriate 
level of public-private consultation or partnership with regard to a given goal, 
completely separate from the interest in the concrete benefit itself.   
 However, such a reconceptualization seems to align better with the nature of New 
Governance regulation.  As explained in Part III, in New Governance regulation the 
government should be understood not as ultimately responsible for the provision of a 
particular service, but rather as a coordinator and facilitator of private conduct so that 
the good in question is provided via private choice.  The nature of this role suggests 
that the private party‟s interest protected in the regulatory program is best understood 
in terms of opportunities to enjoy the substantive good, rather than in terms of the 
good itself.  In addition to having the practical benefit of resolving the causation 
problem, this understanding of the plaintiff‟s interest aligns New Governance style 
with the interests private parties have in making sure that government follows the law 
when it regulates.  This harmonization therefore allows courts to answer questions 
about the availability of judicial review with an eye toward what government is really 
charged with doing when it regulates according to New Governance principles. 
 Doctrinally, this move may not be as difficult or unprincipled as it might seem at 
first glance.  American courts recognize that statutes may create rights, the 
deprivation of which constitutes an Article III injury.57  They also recognize that the 
APA requires that a plaintiff be “arguably within the zone of interests” sought to be 
protected by the statute alleged to be violated.58  While the “zone of interests” test is 
an additional, prudential standing requirement imposed over and above the Article III 
injury test, in a case where the injury is alleged to be the deprivation of a statutorily-
bestowed interest, there appears to be no reason why possessing that statutorily-based 
interest should not satisfy Article III requirements.  Indeed, basing the standing 
inquiry on the existence of a statutorily-granted interest hearkens back to traditional 
American standing law, which required such an interest (rather than simple concrete 
injury) as an indispensable element.59  In the case of New Governance, that 
statutorily-provided interest is best understood as an interest in proper government 
management of the collaborate relationships that constitute this style of regulation.   
                                                          
56  See e.g. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (holding that white plaintiffs are injured by being 
 intentionally placed in a majority-minority district, because being subject to the race-conscious action 
 itself constitutes the injury). 
57  See e.g. Havens Realty v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982). 
58  Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
59  See e.g. Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. United States, 263 U.S. 143 (1923); Alabama Power v. Ickes, 
 302 U.S. 464 (1938). 
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 Thus, the doctrinal pieces exist to accomplish this change.  To be sure, they may 
require some shuffling, but no more than courts have accomplished in the past when 
accommodating judicial review to new theories of regulation.60 
 
VI. BEYOND STANDING: THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 
NEW GOVERNANCE REGULATION 
 
 Structuring judicial review with “an eye toward what government is really charged 
with doing” raises concerns beyond the availability of judicial review.  In particular, it 
also raises issues about the scope of such review.  Most importantly for present 
purposes, New Governance envisions a role for government as ongoing manager of a 
continuing process of collaboration and problem-solving among various parties.  
Thus, judicial review of government‟s role in that process will entail ongoing review, 
with appropriately tailored remedies.  
 This form of judicial review poses challenges for American courts.  The Supreme 
Court is skeptical about judicial supervision of ongoing agency policy management.  
In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation61 the Court refused to consider as ripe for 
adjudication challenges to aspects of the Interior Department‟s general land 
management program, since actions taken under that program did not yet have “an 
actual or immediately threatened effect.”
62  It noted that such programmatic review 
clashed with “the traditional... and normal mode of operation of the courts.”
63  Even 
more to the point, in Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance64 the Court worried that 
judicial supervision of an agency‟s ongoing management responsibilities would stretch 
courts‟ competence and unduly interfere with agencies‟ discretion.
65  
 It is an important question whether these hurdles flow from legislative or 
constitutional limits on federal courts.  In National Wildlife Federation the Court 
characterized the limitation in that case as statutory, suggesting that Congress could 
cure the ripeness problem the Court identified by providing for judicial review “at a 
higher level of generality” than the level at which an agency action would normally be 
considered ripe.66  Similarly, in Southern Utah the Court described the hurdle as 
statutory, concluding that “[t]he prospect of pervasive oversight by federal courts 
over the manner and pace of agency compliance with [statutory directives to engage 
in ongoing management action] is not contemplated by the APA.”67   
                                                          
60  See text accompanying infra notes 74-81. As a final comparative glance, it bears noting that one 
 scholar concludes that at least the Italian system has largely adopted this approach. See Parker, supra
 note 33 at 279-280 (concluding that Italian standing law tends to focus more on the meaning of the 
 legal right asserted by the plaintiff and less on an American-style preliminary inquiry into the 
 plaintiff‟s injury). 
61  National Wildlife Federation, supra note 18. 
62  Ibid at 894.  Other nations‟ administrative law systems impose at least roughly analogous limits. See 
 e.g. van Dijk, supra note 33 at 134-135 (describing roughly analogous requirements in French 
 administrative law). 
63  National Wildlife Federation, supra note 18 at 894. 
64  Southern Utah, supra note 46 at 2373. 
65  Ibid at 2381. 
66  See National Wildlife Federation, supra note 18 at 894. 
67  Southern Utah, supra note 46 at 2381.  See also National Wildlife Federation supra note 18 at 890 n. 2 
 (refusing to consider as “final agency action” under the APA an agency‟s general program that does 
 not take the form of “some specific order or regulation, applying some particular measure across the 
 board”). 
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 However, at other times the Court appears to consider these hurdles to reflect 
fundamental separation of powers principles – in particular, the principle that 
challenges to large-scale, programmatic actions are most appropriately directed to 
Congress or the agency itself (including, presumably, to the presidential 
administration to which the agency is accountable).68 Such suggestions of a 
constitutional foundation for the limitation on judicial review echo the Court‟s 
citation of similar separation of powers reasons for refusing to hear generalized 
grievances.69 
 Still, if there is to be judicial review of New Governance some allowance must be 
made for broad, programmatic attacks.  To the extent New Governance regulation 
consists of government engaging in an ongoing planning and management process, 
judicial review of that regulation necessarily implies review of such ongoing, 
programmatic activities.  Slicing and dicing those activities in order to isolate a 
particular government action suitable for traditional judicial review and correction 
fundamentally misapprehends the thrust of New Governance.  To analogize very 
roughly, such traditional judicial review would amount to reviewing why the tire of a 
car was not properly rotating and attempting to correct it by mandating that it rotate 
correctly, instead of asking whether the entire car was operating correctly and 
mandating an appropriate remedy.  Simply put, if government regulation becomes 
more programmatic in nature, then judicial review must follow, if it is to remain 
relevant. 
 Such holistic judicial review finds a distant echo in courts‟ management of 
structural reform litigation – most notably, school desegregation litigation.  Such 
management responsibilities arose in response to the Supreme Court‟s rejection of 
immediate desegregation and its insistence on the complete removal of the vestiges of 
the previously segregated system. This combination created a landscape where 
fulfillment of the desegregation mandate was expected to come about through an 
ongoing process managed by courts. 
 Scholars who have studied courts‟ role in this process offer a decidedly mixed 
verdict on its success.70  In addition to concerns about their competence to manage 
such large-scale change, the alleged intrusiveness of long-term judicial control over 
schools has led a more conservative Supreme Court to impose severe limits on the 
tools courts can wield to ensure fulfillment of the desegregation mandate.  Somewhat 
analogous concerns apply also to the prospect of judicial supervision of agency 
management under New Governance.  Concededly, such supervision does not 
explicitly aim at remaking an institution.  However, it does involve reviewing how a 
                                                          
68  See e.g. Southern Utah supra note 46 at 891 (“respondents cannot seek wholesale improvement of [the 
 agency‟s land program] by court decree, rather than in the offices of the [agency] or the halls of 
 Congress, where programmatic improvements are normally made.”) [emphasis in original]. To the 
 extent the action is taken by an “independent” agency, the Court in a recent case appeared to 
 substitute Congress for the President as the party ultimately responsible for correcting such 
 programmatic failures. See Federal Communications Commission v. Fox Television Stations, 129 S.Ct. 1800, 
 1816 & n. 4 (2009). 
69  See Defenders of Wildlife, supra note 14 at 573-578.  This is not to say that the standing issue in Defenders 
 of Wildlife is exactly analogous to the ripeness-based concern in National Wildlife Federation.  However, 
 in both cases, the Court expressed concern about judicial review of general government policies, 
 without an effect that is either immediate, see National Wildlife, supra note 18 at 894, or particularized, 
 see Defenders of Wildlife, supra note 14. As a further ambiguity, in at least one case the Court has backed 
 off its statement in Defenders of Wildlife that the generalized grievance bar is necessarily of 
 constitutional stature.  See Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998). 
70  The classic statement of this pessimistic appraisal is Gerald Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts 
 Bring About Social Change? (Chicago: University or Chicago Press, 1991). 
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complex institution interacts on an ongoing basis with other institutions, in a way that 
runs the risk of intruding on the entity primarily tasked with those responsibilities. 71  
If courts could only partially succeed (at best) at the desegregation task before their 
supervisory role was sharply cut back, one might wonder if the same fate would likely 
attend supervision of ongoing agency management of a complex, interactive 
regulatory process. 
 At the very least, judicial review of New Governance regulation suggests a new 
role for courts.  Justice Scalia implied as much in Southern Utah, when he tied 
restrictions on judicial review of ongoing agency action not just to the APA but to 
the tradition of the mandamus remedy on which the relevant part of the APA 
rested.72  Indeed, if Justice Scalia has his history right, then the issues raised by this 
new type of judicial review transcend American law and affect, at the very least, other 
nations whose administrative law traditions relate back to English common law.73  
 The parallel between this new type of judicial review and the troubled history of 
courts‟ management of school desegregation gives pause to any confident call for 
reworking judicial review to account for the characteristics of New Governance 
regulation.  Still, judicial review of agency action in the United States has undergone 
major changes in the past, even within the last sixty years during which the APA has 
purportedly set forth the basic ground rules.  For example, courts have expanded the 
concept of standing,74 embraced judicial review earlier in the administrative process, 75 
and greatly expanded the judicial role in reviewing agency action for reasonableness. 76  
All of these developments are relevant to the type of judicial review necessary to 
ensure effective supervision over New Governance regulation.  At the same time, in 
embracing these earlier innovations courts remained mindful of their limited role and 
the need to respect agency discretion.77  These past examples of doctrinal evolution 
suggest that one should not too quickly discount the courts‟ ability to develop new 
practices of judicial review that both respond to new regulatory realities and respect 
their limited roles.   
                                                          
71  Speaking for a unanimous court in Southern Utah, supra note 46, Justice Scalia expressed those 
 concerns in this way: 
The principal purpose of the APA limitations we have discussed [on judicial review 
of ongoing agency management of a regulatory issue] – and of the traditional 
limitations upon mandamus from which they were derived – is to protect agencies 
from undue judicial interference with their lawful discretion, and to avoid judicial 
entanglement in abstract policy disagreements which courts lack both expertise and 
information to resolve.  If courts were empowered to enter general orders 
compelling compliance with broad statutory mandates, they would necessarily be 
empowered, as well, to determine whether compliance was achieved – which would 
mean that it would ultimately become the task of the supervising court, rather than 
the agency, to work out compliance with the broad statutory mandate, injecting the 
judge into day-to-day management. 
72  Ibid at 2381. 
73 Cf. supra note 47. 
74  Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); SCRAP, supra note 41. 
75  Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). 
76  See e.g. Greater Boston Tel. Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971) 
 (sketching out the development of “hard look” review of agency action under the “arbitrary and 
 capricious” standard). 
77  See e.g. Toilet Goods v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967) (companion case to Abbott Laboratories, finding an 
 agency action unripe even under the more generous Abbott Laboratories test); Motor Veh. Mfrs Ass’n v. 
 State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43-44 (1983) (recognizing the limited role of judicial review even 
 under the “hard look” gloss on the “arbitrary and capricious” standard). 
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 Congress can assist the courts in this effort.  In 1946 Congress enacted the 
skeletal framework we know as the APA, and the courts construed it over time.  
Similarly, Congress enacted a “mood” when it enacted the substantial evidence test,
78 
and courts applied it using their unique expertise.79  In facing this new challenge, a 
combination of more careful statutory specification of the availability and substance 
of judicial review and continued evolution of the gloss courts place on the APA80 
provide at least some hope that New Governance can generate a new understanding 
of appropriate judicial review. Such innovations would follow in the footsteps of the 
statutory innovation and judicial gloss that altered judicial review of agency action 
during the New Deal, the consumer and environmental movements of the 1960s and 
1970s, and the deregulatory/cost-efficiency thrusts of the 1980s and 1990s.81  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
 The reconceptualization of judicial review offered above takes us into deep 
waters.  It suggests that what is needed is more than just a tinkering with any one 
legal system‟s standing doctrine or system of remedies.  Instead, it suggests the need 
for a more general rethinking of judicial review – or, more accurately, a re-application 
of fundamental principles of judicial review to the new challenges posed by New 
Governance regulation.  Such a re-application requires that we revisit the 
fundamental purposes and limitations of judicial review in the administrative system.  
It is only with those first principles re-established that we can confidently think about 
how the reinvention of public administration requires the reinvention of judicial 
review. 
                                                          
78  Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951). 
79  See e.g. ibid at 494-496 (discussing how a reviewing judge should review an ALJ‟s credibility-based 
 fact-findings when those findings were reversed by the agency head on appeal); Penasquitos Village, Inc. 
 v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1977) (same). 
80  See generally William D. Araiza, “In Praise of a Skeletal APA: Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness 
 Alliance, Judicial Remedies for Agency Inaction, and the Questionable Value of Amending the APA” 
 (2004) 56 Admin L Rev 979 (noting how courts have been able to place glosses on the general 
 language of the APA to reflect evolving theories of regulation and judicial review). 
81  For classic examples of how judicial review has moved in relation to changes in theories of regulation, 
 compare Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608(2nd Cir. 1965) (applying 
 arbitrary and capricious review with an eye to ensuring that under-represented environmental 
 interests were considered by the agency) with American Dental Ass’n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 
 1993) (Posner, J.) (applying cost-benefit analysis to agency action under the arbitrary and capricious 
 standard). 
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IMPLICATIONS OF THE INTERNET FOR QUASI-LEGISLATIVE 
INSTRUMENTS OF REGULATION 
 
Peter L. Strauss* 
 
It is a quarter century since I began telling my Administrative Law students 
that they had better be watching the Internet and how agencies of interest to 
them were using it, as they entered an Information Age career. The changes 
since then have been remarkable. Rulemaking, where the pace has perhaps 
been slowest, is now accelerating into the Internet, driven by a President 
committed to openness and consultation. This paper seeks little more than to 
point the reader toward the places where she can find the changes and watch 
them for herself. 
 
Il y a un quart de siècle que j’ai commencé à dire à mes étudiants en droit 
administratif qu’ils feraient bien de surveiller l’Internet et comment les agences 
qui les intéressent s’en servent, au moment où ils entreprenaient une carrière à 
l’ère de l’information. Les changements depuis lors ont été remarquables. 
L’élaboration de règles, où l’évolution a peut-être été la plus lente, s’accélère 
maintenant à l’Internet, mené par un Président qui s’est engagé à l’ouverture et 
à la consultation. Cet article ne vise pas plus que d’indiquer à la personne qui 
le lit les endroits où elle peut trouver les changements et les surveiller pour elle-
même. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Our exploding experience with technology has extraordinary implications across the 
full range of governmental activities.  As Vivek Kundra, the United States‟ Chief 
Information Officer, remarked at a recent press conference in San Francisco, 
“technology deployed for public service can fundamentally change how a government 
and its people interact.”
1  At the time, he and others were addressing the delivery of 
government services – creating a common platform for municipal service calls (311) 
that would permit using Twitter in any city to report a need for pothole repair was the 
repeated example.  The focus in this paper is on a more limited set of developments – 
not on the delivery of services, but on the formation and to a lesser extent the 
implementation of policy through agency quasi-legislation. 
 The Information Age has spawned two dominating changes in 
visibility/accessibility and, perhaps, participation respecting the development of 
agency regulations (“tertiary legislation,” in EU parlance; “subsidiary legislation,” 
often in national systems) and guidance instruments (“soft law”): first,  the emergence 
of readily searchable, universally accessible Internet data sets permitting immediate, 
essentially cost-free, and universal access to government information bearing on 
proposed regulatory actions, the proposals themselves, comments and data supplied 
by others, and the regulations or guidance documents that result; and, second, the 
                                                          
*  Betts Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. Deep thanks to Cynthia Farina, 
 proactive and deeply engaged in these issues as the following pages will attest, who has been generous 
 with comments and suggestions; Natalie Orpett provided valuable research assistance. Responsibility 
 for these pages is mine alone. 
1  “US Chief Information Officer Press conference” (2 March 2010), online: SFGTV  
 < http://san-francisco.granicus.com/Media-Player.php?publish_id=557>. 
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development of interactive sites permitting persons to enroll for notice of 
developments of possible interest to them, and to submit commentary on proposals 
that concern them.  My hope for this paper is to spark a conversation about these 
developments, as and if they are evidencing themselves in our respective legal 
cultures, and their possible implications for the future of quasi-legislative 
administrative action. 
 The legitimacy of permitting unelected officials to create binding legal texts is an 
enduring problem for any democracy.  “In an era when executive authority seems to 
be growing at the cost of parliamentary accountability,” Genevieve Cartier wrote in 
the Canadian context, “democratic control over policy-making seems ever more 
urgent.”
2 The literature about the European Union often invokes a “democracy 
deficit” in discussing the regulation-like “implementing measures” that emerge there 
as tertiary legislative instruments, corresponding to agency regulations in the USA.3  
“Implementing measures” emerge from the shadowy process of “comitology,” a 
hidden and bureaucratic process whose very name suggests arcane mysteries and 
possible intrigue.4  Hence the “democracy deficit.”  In the United States, one can 
without difficulty ascribe a similar problem to agency regulations; although adopted 
following a procedure involving both public notice, public participation, and 
explanation, nonetheless the adopters are appointed, not elected, officials.  They lack 
the legislative connection of ministers in parliamentary democracies.  The possible 
influence of an elected President arguably increases, rather than diminishes, the 
problem.5 
 The growth in executive authority Professor Cartier wrote about has proved 
inevitable in our complex age. A century ago, the U.S. Supreme Court found violation 
of the Secretary of Agriculture‟s rules governing the grazing of sheep in national 
forests, seen as an inevitable filling in of the details of a statute authorizing his 
administration of those lands, to be in and of itself a basis for sending someone to 
jail.6  Today, regulations emerge from agencies at ten to twenty times the rate 
Congress produces statutes,7 and “soft law,” influential though not formally binding, 
                                                          
2   Genevieve Cartier, “Procedural Fairness in Legislative Functions: The End of Judicial Abstinence?”  
 (2003) 53 UTLJ 217 at 218. 
3   These measures are two levels below the EU‟s constitutive treaties and one below its statute-like 
 “secondary” measures – regulations and directives adopted by its Parliament and Council, that 
 acquire legitimacy through the involvement of the European Parliament (and, to a lesser extent, a 
 Council composed of persons who are politically responsible on a national level), as well as the public 
 manner in which they are considered.  See e.g., Paul Craig & Grainne De Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases 
 and Materials 4th ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 134; Giandomenico Majone, 
 “Europe‟s „Democracy Deficit‟: The Question of Standards” (1998) 4 Eur LJ 5.  
4   On these processes generally, see Peter L. Strauss, Turner Smith, & Lucas Bergkamp, “Rulemaking” 
 in George Bermann et al, eds, Administrative Law of the European Union (Washington D.C.: ABA, 2008).  
5 Peter L. Strauss, “Overseer or „The Decider‟ – the President in Administrative Law” (2007) 75 Geo 
 Wash L Rev 695; Peter L. Strauss, “Presidential Rulemaking” (1997) 72 Chicago-Kent L Rev 965. 
6 United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911). 
7 Congress enacts four hundred or so public laws annually; estimates of annual regulatory production I 
 have seen range between 4000 and 8000; no one counts soft law instruments, but at technical 
 agencies at least its volume is enormous – particularly as contemporary ideas about rulemaking 
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is created in greater volumes still.  This phenomenon is reflected in a hierarchy of 
legal texts that I believe can be found in every developed economy: 
 
Foundation document(s), adopted by “the nation” 
 
Hundreds of statutes, adopted by an elected legislature 
 
Thousands of regulations, adopted by politically responsible executive officials 
 
Tens of thousands of interpretations and other guidance documents, issued by responsible bureaus 
 
Countless advice letters, press releases, and other statements of understanding, generated by individual bureaucrat 
 
We understand passably well the ordering and influence of the top three layers of this 
hierarchy.  Legal systems treat each of them as binding text, subject only to the 
requirements that they be authorized by the superior authority and appropriately 
adopted following designated procedures; if valid, each of them has legislative effect 
on government and citizen alike, until displaced by another text validly adopted at the 
same or a higher level.  It is on passing from the second to the third tier that the 
“democracy deficit” problem rears its head. We understand, too, that the innumerable 
informal items of the fifth tier, while often in fact influential on private conduct, are 
denied any jural effect. We would find some confusion on the fourth, “soft law” tier – 
confusion whether these documents are legitimate instruments of agency policy, or a 
ruse to evade the higher procedural obligations associated with adopting regulations; 
confusion whether an agency may give them any jural effect and, if so, to what 
degree; and confusion whether and to what extent they must be respected by the 
courts.
8
  And soft law documents, much less often given the imprimatur of the 
Ministers, Secretaries or Administrators who head political agencies, present the 
“democracy deficit” problem in even sharper outline. 
 In another essay,9 I have explored the question whether Americans can find a 
satisfying resolution of the deficit in the “strong unitary executive theory” popular 
among some American academics – that is, the claim that our elected President is 
entitled to decide all policy issues Congress may have delegated to the various 
Departments and administrative agencies of our government.  As would not surprise 
anyone familiar with my earlier writings,10 I concluded there that reconciling delegated 
executive authority of a law-making character with democratic ideals on a theory of 
                                                                                                                                     
 encourage the adoption of malleable standards setting goals for achievement rather than precise rules 
 prescribing particular courses of action  The regulated then earnestly and understandably seek 
 guidance about ways in which they might be able to meet those standards.  
8 On this subject see Peter L. Strauss, “Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper 
 Respect for an Essential Element” (2001) 53 Admin L Rev 803; for a similar understanding of the 
 Canadian situation, see Laura Pottie & Lorne Sossin, “Demystifying the Boundaries of Public Law: 
 Policy, Discretion, and Social Welfare” (2005) 38 UBC L Rev 147  
9 Peter L. Strauss, “Legislation that Isn‟t: Attending to Rulemaking‟s Democracy Deficit” (2010) 98 Cal 
 L Rev at 1351. 
10 Strauss, supra note 5.   
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voter-ratified political will is deeply unsatisfying, if not hazardous to our rule-of-law 
culture.  We tolerate agency specification of, for example, permitted pollutant levels 
only because it involves acts of reasoned judgment, within frameworks established by 
statutes and subject to judicial review.  “We must so construct the President‟s relation 
to government as to permit the enduring belief that we live in a rule-of-law culture of 
constrained reasonable judgment, even as we recognize the contributions that 
political will can make.”
11 
 My ambitions here are different – to explore the variety of ways in which 
governmental use of the Internet may engage citizens in the world of quasi-legislation 
and in doing so, just possibly, provide its own response to the “democracy deficit.”  
The paragraphs following will draw primarily on the developments at the level of 
American federal government, with occasional reference to state practice and to the 
practices of the European Union.12  Their intention is, simply, to provide a framework 
for further discussion and documentation of progress in our respective legal systems. 
 
II. SECRET LAW  
 
"We hear of tyrants, and those cruel ones: but, whatever we may 
Have felt, we have never heard of any tyrant in such sort cruel, 
As to punish men for disobedience to laws or orders 
Which he had kept them from the knowledge of." 13 
 
The first case in which the United States Supreme Court held a congressional statute 
to be invalid as an excessive delegation of authority14 dramatized the problem of 
secret law.  A depression-era statute had given the President certain authority to 
control interstate commerce in petroleum and its products, as a means of stabilizing 
prices; and he and the Secretary of the Interior (to whom he had subdelegated this 
power) had adopted rules in the exercise of that authority.  When the validity of this 
statute came before the Supreme Court (all but one of whose members would find it 
to be standardless), the government was embarrassed to admit that a reexamination 
of the relevant documents (which at the time were not publicly available) had revealed 
that the Secretary had inadvertently revoked the relevant regulation before the lawsuit 
had been filed.15 “[I]t was shocking that the government attorneys, the private parties, 
and the courts had not been aware of the status of the regulation. „The furor resulting 
from the hot oil case provided the final impetus for the enactment of remedial 
                                                          
11 Strauss, supra note 9 at n 86. 
12 Drawing on European Union Administrative Law, supra note 4. 
13  Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham (Edinburgh, UK: William Tait, 1843) vol 5 at 547; 
 Erwin N Griswold used this as the epigram to his “Government in Ignorance of the Law--A Plea for 
 Better Publication of Executive Legislation” (1934) 48 Harv L Rev 198, discussed in text at n 17 
 below. 
14 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
15  Ibid at 412-413. 
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legislation [the Federal Register Act] in 1935.‟”16 Just the prior year, only weeks before 
the argument and decision in the case – perhaps even sensing what would likely 
transpire – Erwin Griswold (later to become Dean of Harvard Law School and US 
Solicitor General) had argued passionately and persuasively the need for “a 
reasonable means of distributing and preserving the texts of ... executive-made law.”17  
The Federal Register, a daily gazette of executive branch documents including rules 
and rulemaking proposals, was the result. 
 The Federal Register, like such publications generally, was a useful but imperfect 
response to the problem of secret law.  A bulky daily publication, with an ambitious 
yet (necessarily) limited index, its effective use required lawyers and librarians.  
Moreover, it was incomplete.  While regulations were included, “soft law” documents 
– guidance and interpretations – generally were not.  Access to “soft law” might be 
possible – the federal Administrative Procedure Act [APA] encouraged its public 
availability and indexing by provisions prohibiting its use to the disadvantage of 
private parties unless it was available and indexed18 – but that access might require 
travel to one of a limited number of agency reading rooms, or perhaps to a specific 
agency office.  Just what might constitute a qualifying index was nowhere specified, 
and one can readily imagine many obstacles to its detail.  If not precisely secret, then, 
regulatory law was often obscure and access to it expensive. 
 Providing further relief from the problems of secret law is perhaps the most 
obvious use of the Internet.  In 1994 the Federal Register and in 1996 the Code of 
Federal Regulations (where adopted regulations are eventually collected) were 
embedded and made readily searchable at the website of the Government Printing 
Office,19 one of the first important federal e-government projects.  They are now 
available as well on for-profit and non-profit sites such as Lexis and Cornell‟s Legal 
Information Institute.20  Each agency‟s electronic reading room, required by law,21  
holds regulations, guidance, interpretations, staff manuals – any quasi-legislative 
document in which the public might be interested.22  If Boolean search is enabled, the 
documents are not only there, but also exquisitely indexed, in a manner no print 
edition or document filing system could hope to achieve.  The interventions of 
                                                          
16 Mary Whisner, “Practicing Reference . . . A Manual „to Inform Every Citizen‟” (2007) 99 Law Libr J 
 159 at 160, citing Morris L. Cohen, Robert C. Berring & Kent C. Olson, How To Find The Law , 9th ed 
 (St. Paul: Westlaw, 1989) at 265. 
17  Griswold, supra note 13. Griswold was on the staff of the Solicitor General‟s office until 1934, when 
 Panama Refining was briefed; Thus he could easily have been aware of the coming firestorm; his 
 article was published in the December, 1934 issue of the Law Review; argument in Panama Refining 
 was held that month, and the decision announced in January 1935. 
18  5 U.S.C. 551(a) (1, 2). 
19 Code of Federal Regulations, online: US Government Printing Office <http://www.gpo- access.
 gov/index.html>. 
20 See Cornell University Legal Information Institute, online: Cornell University Legal Information 
 Institute < http://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/>.  
21 Required in America at the national level by the Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 
 1966, Pub. L. 104-231, Oct. 2, 1996, 110 Stat. 3048, amending 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(2). 
22 See e.g. online: FAA <http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/>, collecting a wide range of soft 
 law documents as well as FAA regulations. 
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librarians and lawyers are no longer required (although they may still be useful); if the 
document is in the electronic library, it cannot be “off the shelf” and on someone 
else‟s desk.  
 One of the more important regulations issued by the Department of 
Transportation‟s National Highway Traffic Safety Administration [NHTSA] has been 
its Standard 208,23 requiring the installation first of seatbelts and then of airbags in 
American automobiles. Understandably, manufacturers and others have had 
questions about the requirements of the standard, and interpretation of its provisions, 
which they have addressed to NHTSA‟s General Counsel.  His interpretive letters 
responding to their inquiries have always been public documents, but access to them 
once depended on either visiting his office in Washington, D.C. or finding an 
industry group or member that had made its own collection.  One can imagine both 
the expense of hiring a lawyer to perform that search, and the imperfections of the 
filing system she would encounter.  Enter the website NHTSA has been maintaining 
for years, collecting the opinion letters of its Chief Counsel, making them available 
for Boolean search,24 and promising their reliability.25  Its enterprise so impressed 
General Motors and an industry group that had begun electronic recordkeeping years 
before NHTSA supplemented its paper files, that they each donated their electronic 
records of earlier letters for inclusion in the searchable repository.  Now using an 
Internet connection half a continent (or half the world) away from Washington, 
anyone wishing to learn NHTSA‟s interpretations of Standard 208 (or any of its other 
regulations) reliably has that information in seconds.  The visibility of government 
law, hard and soft, has been exponentially increased. 
 To be sure, even this simplest and most obvious use remains a work in process.  
The European Union offers a single search-enabled Internet gateway to “legislation,” 
                                                          
23  Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards And Regulations, 49 CFR Parts 552, 571, 585, and 595 
24  See National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, online: NHTSA: <http://isearch.nhtsa.gov/>. 
25 See National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, online: <http://www.n-h-t-s- a.dot.gov/
 portal/site/nhtsa/menuitem.4d1e17245-efafde89-ec0f-210dba046-a0>. The Chief Counsel‟s 
 promise, “The Chief Counsel's interpretations, issued in the form of letters responding to questions 
 from the motor vehicle industry and the public, represent the definitive view of the agency on the 
 questions addressed and may be relied upon by the regulated industry and members of the public,” 
 may be contrasted by the disclaimers many agencies post with their soft law (responding to 
 unfortunate signals sent by judicial review cases). The Food and Drug Administration, for example, 
 attaches this standard disclaimer to its guidance (“soft law”) documents: 
This guidance represents the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA's) current 
thinking on this topic. It does not create or confer any rights for or on any person 
and does not operate to bind FDA or the public. You can use an alternative 
approach if the approach satisfies the requirements of the applicable statutes and 
regulations. If you want to discuss an alternative approach, contact the FDA staff 
responsible for implementing this guidance. If you cannot identify the appropriate 
FDA staff, call the appropriate number listed on the title page of this guidance.   
 See, e.g. Guidance for Industry, FDA Staff, and Third Parties - Inspection by Accredited Persons 
 Under The Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002 and the FDA Amendments Act of 2007; 
 Accreditation Criteria, online: <http://www.fda.gov/Medical-Devices/Device-Regulation- and-
 Guidance/GuidanceDocuments/ucm089702.htm>. 
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both enacted26 and under consideration,27 where “Legislation” is understood to 
comprise all binding texts (i.e., tertiary as well as secondary measures), as well as 
“certain important non-binding acts.”  There is no uniform way to access either EC 
or American agencies‟ soft law files.28  Other national practices remain highly variable.   
At the state and local level in the USA, access even to regulations may still be 
haphazard, and soft law is not yet readily accessible.29  Converting paper documents 
to electronic ones requires resources and incentives; both may be in short supply.  
(This problem will prove even more prominent in the following sections of this 
essay). One readily imagines, however, that this kind of use of the Internet will be the 
fastest to become universal, with the result that the world of “secret law” will shrink 
significantly, if not wholly disappear.30 
 
III. KNOWING WHAT QUASI-LEGISLATORS KNOW AND WHAT 
THEIR PLANS ARE 
 
 In American contemplation, the “democracy deficit” associated with quasi-
legislation creates often rigorous judicial attention to the rationality of its exercise.  
Although (absent possible implications for important rights) American courts barely 
consider the rationality of legislation or the regularity of legislative procedures when 
they review legislation for constitutionality, the procedures prescribed for quasi-
legislation and the rationality of the judgments it reflects are strongly checked, 
particularly in matters of high economic or social consequence.  One characteristic 
opinion, reviewing an Environmental Protection Agency rule with major economic 
                                                          
26  See Europa, Eur Lex, online: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/legis/index.htm>; see Cynthia Farina, 
 Sidney Shapiro and Thomas Susman, “Transparency and Data Protection in ABA Section of 
 Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice” in Bermann et al., supra note 6 at 21 ff. 
27 See ibid. Europa Pre Lex, online: <http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/apcnet.cfm?CL=en>. 
28  In the Department of Transportation, for example, the FAA guidance is accessed directly from a 
 “Regulations & Policies” tab prominent at the top of its home page; NHTSA guidance, however, 
 much less prolix, requires one to know to follow the FOIA link obscure at the bottom of the home 
 page to FOIA Electronic Reading Room. 
29 The California Office of Administrative Law, for example, offers what appears to be comprehensive 
 access to regulations adopted by California agencies but no access to soft law, other than manuals of 
 the Department of Social Services, online: OAL <http://www.oal.ca.gov/>; the web site of its 
 Department of Agriculture gives no hint that that vital department harbours any soft law. Online: 
 CDFA <http://www.cdfa.ca.gov/Regulations.html>.  In New York, the equivalent office warns on 
 its website, indexing state agencies, that “If you are seeking regulations regarding a specific area, a 
 number of New York State agencies now make their rules and regulations available online. Others 
 document their statutory authority.” Online: Government of New York <http://www.g-o-r- 
 r.state.ny.us/Regulatory-Reform/current-regulations.htm>. 
30 One cannot doubt that certain documents government agencies use to establish standards for their 
 employees‟ behaviour – “law” in the important sense that it marks the practical limit of state 
 tolerance for private actions – will be kept secret in the interest of avoiding manipulative or 
 challenging behaviors.  If, for example, state police are secretly instructed to issue speeding tickets 
 only to motorists who exceed the legal speed limit by, say, ten miles per hour, that instruction may 
 rationally accommodate predictable differences in speedometer calibration and also serve to focus 
 attention on major violators; for it to be made public, however, would invite faster driving by many 
 and might eliminate the margin of error the practice creates.     
384 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice  2010 
 
 
consequences for the coal and electric power industry as well as environmental 
values, consumed 103 pages of an opinion closely attending to the EPA‟s reasoning 
and the factual contentions it had to resolve, before remarking in conclusion, “we 
have taken a long while to come to a short conclusion: the rule is reasonable.”31 
 The last half-century‟s developments in American administrative law have 
witnessed an emphatic growth in the transparency associated with both government 
information and quasi-legislative planning.  Integration of Internet resources into 
these pre-existing trends is already considerably magnifying its effects. 
 Start with information. As enacted, the federal Administrative Procedure Act required 
only that “matters of official record shall in accordance with published rule be made 
available to persons properly and directly concerned,” with a “good cause” 
confidentiality exception.32  The rulemaking procedure generally required public 
notice of proposed rules with an opportunity for public comment prior to adoption, 
with a “concise general statement of their basis and purpose” to accompany the 
adopted rule; in addressing the policy issues involved, the notice need specify “either 
the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and 
issues involved.”33 In 1966, Congress had amended the APA to give “any person” 
strongly enforcible rights to see any information in a government agency‟s possession, 
to the extent it did not fall within one of nine rather narrow exceptions – a freedom 
of information measure [FOIA] now commonplace in world legal systems.34 In 
general,35 data (as distinct from preliminary policy views) was unprotected from such 
claims; thus, a request for “all studies likely to be considered in connection with your 
rulemaking proposed April 2, 2010” would likely have to be honoured (although no 
formal procedural link is made between a citizen‟s request and a rulemaking to which 
that request might relate).  Perhaps reacting to the enhanced transparency the FOIA 
had put in place (dramatically reemphasized by Congress in extensive strengthening 
amendments it enacted in 1974), and/or the suddenly increasing importance of 
rulemaking brought about by the great expansion of health and safety regulation in 
the early 1970's, courts asserted that notice and comment procedures could not be 
effective unless the government made available to the public, alongside its proposal, 
important studies on which the proposal relied.36 
 Enter the Internet.  The Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 199637 
envisaged moving FOIA activity to the Web – agencies are to have FOIA links on 
their website, which explain the Act, permit the filing of electronic requests, and – as 
importantly – are to serve as repositories for frequently requested material, so that it 
                                                          
31 Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F. 2d 298, 410 (D.C. Cir.1981). 
32 60 Stat. 237, §3(c) 
33  5 U.S.C. 553(b), Section 4(a) of the original APA (emphasis added). 
34  The American Freedom of Information Act can be found at 5 U.S.C552(a) (3) and following. 
35  Protection was afforded classified information, information compromising personal privacy interests, 
 and proprietary information provided by private parties.  
36 Peter L. Strauss, “Statutes That Are Not Static – The Case of the APA” (2005) 14 J Contemp Legal 
 Issues 767.  
37  Supra note 21.  
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may simply be found there.  Now public dockets could be created, to which any 
relevant documents, including studies, could be posted for ready availability and 
comment.  Agency reaction to these developments was variable and, generally, slow; 
the most thoroughgoing effort was made by the Department of Transportation, 
which (at considerable savings for the Department) converted its entire filing system 
to electronic form – much of it open to public access.  Using its Data Management 
System [DMS],38 interested members of the public could see every public document 
associated with a given proceeding, within days of its filing.  Supporting studies, early-
filed comments and the like were thus available to commenters.  
  The E-Government Act of 2002 emphasized a national commitment to such 
development.  The Act requires agencies to accept comments “by electronic means” 
and to make available in their e-dockets “public submissions and other materials that 
by agency rule or practice are included in the rulemaking docket...whether or not 
submitted electronically.”39 Although the mandate is qualified by “to the extent 
practicable,” the idea is clearly that the public should be able to find everything in the 
e-docket that they could find if they went to the agency reading room.  Directed to 
agencies, the Act did not itself require creation of the single, unified electronic data 
system, but the Bush administration, in implementing it, moved all rulemaking to the 
Internet through a new portal, Regulations.gov,40 and a unified data management 
system associated with it, the Federal Data Management System [FDMS].   Works in 
progress, the early difficulties of the Act‟s implementation and of Regulations.gov 
were well captured in a law review article by Beth Noveck, a young law professor who 
subsequently became a central figure in the Obama Administration‟s commitments to 
open government,41 and by a report for the American Bar Association42 based on the 
work of Cynthia Farina, another law professor who has since become a central figure 
in Cornell‟s Electronic Rulemaking Initiative, discussed below.
43   
 One such problem: agency capacity and willingness to migrate to an electronic 
docket (as DOT had) is mixed, so that for many agencies the FDMS dataset is both 
incomplete and far from instantaneous, and search capabilities are limited. Even 
today, not all agencies are uniformly (and timely) putting all materials in rulemaking 
dockets on to their e-dockets available through Regulations.gov.  Changes in 
                                                          
38 Now incorporated into the Federal Data Management System, online: FDMS <http://dockets-
 info.dot.gov/>; the process was complicated by the broader reach of the DMS, which entirely 
 replaced paper dockets at DOT; FDMS, at least initially, could not achieve that universality given 
 variablility in the readiness of different government agencies for such a transition.  The transition and 
 its difficulties prompted DOT to create a generally helpful guide for FDMS searches, online: FDMS 
 <http://docketsinfo.dot.gov/FDMS_Tips.cfm>. 
39 Sec. 206 (c) (d).  
40  Online: Federal Government <http://www.regulations.gov>. 
41 Beth Noveck, “The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking” (2004) 53 Emory LJ 1.  Prof. Noveck is 
 currently United States Deputy Chief Technology Officer and Director of the White House Open 
 Government Initiative. 
42 Committee on the Status and Future of Federal e-Rulemaking, Achieving the Potential: The Future of 
 Federal E-Rulemaking – A Report to Congress and the President (2008), available online: CERI 
 <http://ceri.law.cornell.edu/erm-comm.php> [ABA Study].  
43  See text accompanying note 89 below. 
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Regulations.gov and FDMA are occurring with regularity.  As recently as April 7, 
2010, for example, a memorandum from Cass Sunstein, the Administrator of the 
White House Office of Management and Budget [OMB]‟s Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs [OIRA] directed all agencies to “make it easier for members of the 
public to find and view [rulemaking] information ... [by using] the Regulation 
Identifier Number [RIN] on all relevant documents throughout the entire „lifecycle‟ 
of a rulemaking ... [–] documents including, but not limited to, notices of proposed 
rulemaking, final rules, and (to the extent that they are associated with a rulemaking) 
notices, guidances, environmental impact statements, regulatory impact analyses, 
information collections, and supporting materials.”
44 
 The Obama Administration‟s emphasis on improving government transparency, 
captured in a presidential Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government issued the 
day after his inauguration, has also produced an explosion in general data availability 
(useful for but not necessarily connected to particular rulemakings). One such 
development, likely to have a direct impact on rulemakings, is agency development of 
public libraries of scientific reports; the Environmental Protection Agency [EPA]‟s 
recently launched Health and Environment Research Online database45 contains over 
300,000 scientific studies searchable along a variety of parameters. A central 
government website, data.gov, not only makes available to public use a rapidly 
increasing number of machine readable federal datasets, but also links to datasets 
identified by particular government agencies in response to the OMB‟s “Open 
Government Directive,”
46and to the increasing number of state, local and tribal data 
sites.47  Similar initiatives exist – are inevitable – elsewhere.48 They permit private 
creation of programs letting the public use data they find for their own purposes – an 
NGO could create a searchable database to let people “see” the local effects of sea 
level rises that may be associated with global warming, just as EPA‟s Toxic Resource 
Inventory49 now permits anyone to see what toxins are being released in their 
                                                          
44 See online: OMB <http://www.white-house.gov/omb/assets/in-foreg/Increasing-Open-
 ness_0407-2010.pdf> While the RIN system has been in place for many years, the problem with 
 using it to track a rule (and electronically map/display its lifetime, in the manner of the European 
 Parliament and Commission sites) is that it has not been consistently used across agencies, or even 
 within a single agency over time.  Inconsistency defeats efforts to build rule timelines automatically 
 (actually, it generally makes historical data about rulemaking problematic).  The OMB memo is a first 
 step towards defining government-wide consistent practices. 
45  See online: EPA <http://www.epa.gov/hero/>.  
46 The directive, issued December 8, 2009 to implement President Obama‟s Memorandum, online: 
 White House <http://www.whitehouse.gov/open/documents/open-government-directive> set 
 April 7, 2010 as a date by which each agency was to publish at least three high-value data-sets in an 
 open (platform independent, machine readable, and unrestricted) format, and every agency subject to 
 the memorandum did so. Online: Federal government <http://www.data.gov/open> and 
 White House <http://www.whitehouse.gov/open/around>.  
47 See online: OMB <http://www.data.gov/statedatasites>; see online: Data SF (San Francisco) 
 <http://www.datasf.org/> and online: NYC Government (New York City) 
 <http://www.nyc.gov/html/datamine/html/home/home.shtml>. 
48  See online: Government of UK, <http://data.gov.uk>.  
49 See online: EPA < http://www.epa.gov/tri/>; see e.g. Bradley Karkainnen, “Information-forcing 
 Regulation and Environmental Governance” in Grainne de Burca & Joanna Scott eds, Law and New 
 Governance in the EU and the US (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2006) 293.  A similar utility is promised for 
 2011 respecting carbon dioxide emissions.  Michael Gerrard, “Greenhouse Gas Disclosure 
 Requirements Are Proliferating,” (April 1, 2010) 243:61 NYLJ. 
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neighbourhood.  This is not the place to discuss “Government 2.0,” but one can 
readily imagine the transformative impact.  The TRI experience is a forceful 
illustration of what can happen when “the government exposes capabilities that can 
then be used by the private sector” – to generate pressures, or to build (open-source) 
programs (like Iphone applications).50 “If the government invests in key capabilities 
that the private sector can then build on, you get this virtuous circle.”
51  
 Transparent  planning.  The text of the APA does not require the public to learn of 
potential rulemaking activities before a notice of proposed rulemaking, inviting 
comment, is published.  The notice the APA requires need not appear until late in 
the rule development process.  Thus it may be that, as one administrative law scholar 
who had also been EPA‟s General Counsel once put it, “[n]otice-and-comment 
rulemaking is to public participation as Japanese Kabuki theater is to human passions 
– a highly stylized process for displaying in a formal way the essence of something 
which in real life takes place in other venues.”
52  The Regulatory Flexibility Act had 
already begun to change this state of affairs in the print era, with a requirement53 that 
agencies semi-annually publish a regulatory agenda briefly describing their planned 
rulemakings and providing, inter alia, a point of contact within the agency to whom 
submissions might be made or with whom discussions could be held.  The Unified 
Agenda of April 1994 consumed over 1500 pages in the Federal Register, with as many 
as six or seven entries per page; there were about 100 pages of index.  Initially one of 
the most difficult elements of the Federal Register to find and search online, it has now 
been integrated into Regulations.gov.54  It can be searched only one agency at a time, 
search capabilities are limited, and – as indicated – the availability of an RIN number 
assuring access to all matters in ensuing dockets is, for the moment, uncertain.55  
 American Presidents from Ronald Reagan forward have appeared to wish to build 
on this process as a means of increasing central coordination and perhaps control of 
rulemaking activities.  President Reagan‟s Executive Order 12498 added participation 
in an annual “regulatory plan” to the requirements of cost-benefit analysis of 
important regulations under the OIRA supervision that he had  previously established 
by his Executive Order 12291.  Yet this planning element of what is now a firmly 
established presidential regime, continued as Section 4 of President Clinton‟s E.O. 
12866, has remained quite obscure.  The literature is full of attention to the problems 
                                                          
50  See “US Chief Information Officer Press Conference” supra note 1 at 24:50. 
51  Ibid at 26:00 Development can flow back to government as well.  The CeRI initiative discussed 
 below, a private effort to help the government improve the e-rulemaking experience, is one example.  
 Another was provided a few years ago by OMBWatch, an NGO monitoring White House activities.  
 Using federal procurement data the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 required 
 be made available online, OMBWatch developed <www.fedspending.org> to monitor governmental 
 spending patterns.  Impressed, OMB acquired the program and, adapted to its purposes, it can be 
 found online: OMB <www.usaspending.gov>. Information from an E-mail from Gary Bass, 
 OMBWatch (May 6, 2010). 
52  E. Donald Elliott, “Reinventing Rulemaking” (1992) 41 Duke LJ 1490 at 1492-93.   
53  5 U.S.C. §602. 
54  See online: <http://www.regulations.gov/public/component/main?main=UnifiedAgenda=240>. 
55 See text accompanying note 44 above. 
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and potential of the cost-benefit analysis of individual rulemakings called for by 
Section 6, the effective central element of this regime.  But unlike the situation in the 
European Union56 – and for that matter California57 – where planning is transparent 
and such consultations as occur begin early, to date neither priority planning nor the 
early public consultations that might go along with it are well developed in our federal 
practice.  Regulations.gov, for example, offers no chance to submit a request for 
rulemaking not already undertaken; while the APA does provide a procedure for 
petitioning an agency to engage in rulemaking,58 this element of its procedures has yet 
to be given general electronic form.  Individual agencies may well do more in the way 
of providing early notice of projects under development, supplementing this resource.  
Thus, the EPA has created a rulemaking gateway providing information about the 
progress of a “priority regulation” from the moment the beginning of work on the 
project has been approved, without regard to whether it is mentioned in the 
regulatory plan.59  
 
IV. CONSULTATIONS 
 
 We Americans have long prided ourselves on our notice and comment 
procedures for rulemaking.60  While other legal systems may often undertake 
consultation on proposed regulations, that typically occurs within a limited interest 
community identified by the agency, out of public view and rarely required as a 
general matter.  Of course American agencies may, and indeed sometimes do, 
conduct “private” consultations in connection with rulemaking, either before notice 
or as they are attempting to digest the results of the public comment period. 61  To the 
extent such private consultations, either inside or outside government, produce 
consensus around a particular course, they contribute to critical assessments of the 
public comment process.62  Yet the private consultations have a certain odour,63 
                                                          
56 The Union‟s European Commission publishes periodic workplans of the matters currently under 
 consideration, and its YourVoice site at <http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/index_enhtm>, offers 
 consultations at quite early stages of proposal development.  See text accompanying n 4 above. 
57  See online: OAL <http://www.oal.ca.gov/2009_Rulemaking_Calendar_Office_of_Adminis-tra-
 tiv.htm>, showing proposed timeline of development. 
58  5 U.S.C. §553(e). 
59  See online: EPA <http://yosemite.epa.gov/opei/rulegate.nsf/content/about.html?opendocument>.  
60 Just as APA rulemaking was hitting its stride in the late 1960's, one of the great scholars of the first 
 APA generation characterized it as “One of the greatest inventions of modern government.” 
 Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 6.15, (Supp. 1970) at 283. 
61  For a sharp critique of this practice at the Federal Communications Commission, see Philip Weiser, 
 “Institutional Design, FCC Reform, and the Hidden Side of the Administrative State” (2009) 61 
 Admin L Rev 675.  
62  Elliott, supra note 52.  
63  C.f.  Home Box Office v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), excoriating the practice of private 
consultations after a comment period has closed.  While the opinion has had limited jural effect, and 
seems not to have discouraged the FCC in particular, see Weiser, supra note 61, its practical effect on 
most agencies‟ behaviour appears to have been considerable, reaching also into the pre-notice period 
to influence the logging of meetings and contacts. See Sidney A. Shapiro, “Two Cheers for HBO: 
The Problem of the Nonpublic Record” (2002) 54 Admin L Rev 853; from September 15, 2009, the 
White House has made public a database of all visitors, downloadable in machine-searchable form.  
Online: White House <http://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/disclosures/visitor-records> 
(visited April 22, 2010), and EPA posts the schedules of all its senior administrators‟ meetings with 
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producing strong impulses to transparency – as reflected, for example, in the quite 
detailed procedures associated with statutory procedures for negotiated rulemaking. 64  
And the nature of “hard look” judicial review (considering only such matters as have 
come into the public record in support of the adopted rule, and effectively requiring 
agency response to important comments) has given the comment process force. 
 In the paper process world, the comment as well as the notice stage of federal 
agency rulemaking provided a limited opportunity.  One filed one‟s comments in 
paper, only with the requesting agency, and toward the end of the comment period 
provided.  Consequently, commenters could only expect to address the agency‟s 
proposal, not such information or views as others may have provided.  Even if one 
wanted to read the comments of others, and even if there were time to do so, timely 
physical access would have been difficult if not impossible.  In contrast to the 
consultation practice that, for example, the European Union follows in respect of its 
possible legislative initiatives,65 comments are typically sought relatively late in the 
regulation-development process – after, for example, initial consultations with OIRA 
over cost-benefit issues. 
 Enter the Internet, and many elements of the historic notice-and-comment 
process might be expected to change.  The possibilities of expanded access to 
materials forming the basis for proposed rules have already been discussed;66 if filed 
electronically or converted to electronic form, comments (like soft law documents) 
can be promptly available nationwide, facilitating response.67 “Reply” comments 
become more feasible, and some agencies are in fact experimenting with their use – 
although “wary of extending an already lengthy process and proliferating the number 
of comments that must be considered.”68  Associating the capacity to create a 
comment, government-wide, with a utility that permits ready identification of 
proposals open for comment and exploration of any data associated with them – this 
is the basic design of Regulations.gov – lowers the quantum energy barrier to 
commenting, perhaps considerably.69  The ease and costlessness of filing comments 
                                                                                                                                     
persons from outside EPA, with RSS feeds from each. Online: EPA <http://yosemite.epa.gov/o-
pa/admpress.nsf/Calendars?OpenView>. 
64  5 U.S.C. §561 et seq. Although called “negotiated rulemaking,” the process is more aptly described as 
 negotiated rule development, since if successful its direct result is not a rule, but a notice of 
 proposed rulemaking generated by a consensual effort among the agency and representatives of 
 interested groups.  It thus constitutes a proceduralization of pre-notice consultation practice; 
 although encouraged by many (including several Presidents), its costs and limited successes in 
 practice have resulted in only occasional use of it.  See e.g. Stuart Benjamin, “Evaluating E-
 Rulemaking: Public Participation and Political Institutions” (2006) 55 Duke LJ 893 at 922.  
65  Strauss, supra note 4. 
66 See text accompanying note 44 above. 
67  Delays can occur, as agencies must authorize comments to be posted, lest inappropriate or properly 
 confidential matter appear.  ABA Study, supra note 42 at 56 and n 131. 
68 Ibid at 58.   
69  The site permits browsing by an an impressive number of topics (or keywords); in providing for RSS 
feeds that might automate notice of developments of interest, however, the site enables subscription 
only agency by agency.  While some Departments have provided sub-units (the Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service, APHIS, and the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture, for 
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on the Internet could broaden the base of commenters, and empower “political 
campaigns” about controversial rulemaking proposals.70  Even a physical postcard 
comment requires a stamp and the effort to write it out, and carries a postmark; an 
electronic comment might be filed with a simple click on the website of a soliciting 
NGO, and received with no reliable indicator from where and from whom it in fact 
came. Within agencies, using computer-based data files (including the possibility of 
digital processing of mass communication comments) may make the development of 
rules more efficient.  The rulemaking agency now reaches its judgment in a much 
more transparent setting, if all can readily access the “record” on the basis of which it 
acts.  Finally, the fact of a consolidated, uniform, and freely accessible “rulemaking 
record” also permits enhanced White House participation in/oversight of the agency 
decisional process, that in a paper record world would have been largely inaccessible 
outside the agency. 
 As earlier remarked,71 the implementation of these changes was sharply criticized 
in years before the Obama Administration.  Regulations.gov is a site in continuing 
development, and among the products of the transparency commitments of the 
Obama Administration72 has been an “exchange” site for continuing discussion with 
the public of possible changes.73  Changes already effected make it possible, if one 
knows the RIN number of a particular rulemaking,74 to subscribe for email 
notification of any additions to that docket. There remain not inconsiderable 
difficulties about programming (what kinds of searches the FDMS will permit) and 
agency resources/effort (willingness/ability/time taken to put all material into the 
electronic database).   
 Perhaps the most significant issues, captured in 2006 by a Symposium issue of the 
Duke Law Journal,75 concern the potentially transformative effects of broadscale public 
participation, converting what has in general proved to be a low-participation level, 
expert process into a more plebiscitary one.  Professor Stuart Benjamin, in one 
article,76 finds the unified system of Regulations.gov particularly troublesome; 
permitting individual agencies to experiment, he argues, might permit learning 
whether the benefits of e-rulemaking outweigh what he sees as its potential costs – 
increasing comment quantity without affecting content or result,77 while making the 
                                                                                                                                     
example), others do not – one gets all EPA RSS feeds or none, with no possibility of limitation to the 
topic, or even office, of particular interest. 
70  On this issue, see generally the work of Stuart Shulman, a political scientist who with others has 
developed a computerized system for handling mass e-mail comments, briefly described in ABA 
Study, supra note 42 at 53 & n 126. See e.g. Stuart Shulman (2009) “The Case Against Mass E-mails: 
Perverse Incentives and Low Quality Public Participation in U.S. Federal Rulemaking” 1(1) Policy & 
Internet, Article 2, online: <http://www.pso-commons.org/policy-and-internet/vol1/iss1/art2>. 
71 See text accompanying nn 41-42 above. 
72 See e.g. text accompanying n 44 above. 
73  See online: Regulations.Gov <http://www.regulations.gov/exchange/node>. 
74 See text accompanying n 44 above.  
75 “Thirty-fifth Annual Administrative Law Issue: The Role of the Internet in Agency Decisionmaking” 
 (2006) 55 Duke LJ. 893 ff. 
76  Stuart Benjamin, “Evaluating E-Rulemaking: Public Participation and Political Institutions” (2006) 55 
 Duke LJ 893. 
77  Here he cites a prominent FCC rulemaking on media ownership rules, in which over a million 
comments were received, but treated by the agency as not “terribly helpful or influential.”  Ibid at 908 
and n 43. 
Vol. 28(2) Implications of the Internet for Regulation 391 
 
 
rulemaking process more costly for resource-strapped agencies; and increasing the 
intrusiveness and effects of congressional oversight and judicial review, to similar 
effect.  There might be a case for modest, skeptical experimentation, but the unified 
full-speed-ahead approach signaled by Regulations.gov involve costs that are too 
high, benefits that are too uncertain.78  Professor Cary Coglianese, in another article,79 
remarks that, historically, the median rulemaking has invited only tens of comments, 
few from individual citizens; while this pattern may be changing with the introduction 
of electronic comment possibilities, Professor Coglianese (with Professor Benjamin) 
is skeptical whether quality gains result.  If one discards outlier rulemakings inviting a 
particularly high volume of (politically motivated) commentary from the data, some 
have reported, he suggests, no dramatic changes in volume – and no changes at all in 
substantive contribution – have occurred.80  “Rather than a revolution in citizen 
participation, the end result from even ambitious attempts at e-rulemaking seems 
likely to turn out much less interesting than the high hopes many now seem to 
harbor.”
81  Professor John Figueiredo‟s study of the results of e-rulemaking at a single 
agency, the Federal Communications Commission, similarly found no more than 
marginal change.82  
 
V. DIALOGUE? 
 
 The Obama Administration appears committed to exploiting the world of social 
media to its fullest.  One can hardly find a government site lacking blogs, RSS feeds, 
twitter pages, facebook links, and the like – and in the service not only of “getting the 
message out,” but also receiving input in discussion formats open to participant 
“ratings” that, in theory at least, will drive the most popular submissions into clearest 
view.  President Obama‟s open government initiative, coordinated by the White 
House Office of Science and Technology Policy, has generated ambitious Open 
Government Plans,83 numerous “open” websites,84 and similar commitments – 
                                                          
78  See also Stuart Shulman, “Whither Deliberation: Mass E-Mail Campaigns and U.S. Regulatory 
Rulemaking” 2006) 3 Journal of E-Government 41; Stephen Zavestoski, Stuart Shulman, & David 
Schlosberg, “Democracy and the Environment on the Internet:  Electronic Citizen Participation in 
Regulatory Rulemaking,” (2006) 31 Science, Technology & Human Values 383; Steven Balla, & 
Benjamin Daniels, “Information Technology and Public Commenting on Agency Regulations” 
(2007) 1 Regulations & Governance 46. 
79  Cary Coglianese, “Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present and Future” (2006) 55 Duke LJ 
 943. 
80 “According to one recent study of about 500,000 comments submitted on an especially controversial 
 EPA rule [addressing airborne mercury levels], less than 1 percent ... had anything original to say.”  
 Ibid at 959.  
81  Ibid at 968. 
82  John Figueiredo, “E-Rulemaking: Bringing Data to Theory at the Federal Communications 
 Commission” (2006) 55 Duke LJ 969. 
83  See the EPA‟s 53-page “Open Government Plan 1.0” available online: EPA <http://www.e-p-
 a.gov/open>.  
84  See e.g.  the OSTP website <http://www.whitehouse.gov/open,>; in general, one can find an open 
 website at a top-level government website rather than agency-by-agency – for example online: Open 
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proliferating at a dizzying rate, defying delimitation much less assessment in a paper 
such as this. Beth Noveck, whose early paper was mentioned earlier,85 has been central 
to these developments. 
 And for rulemaking?  EPA‟s elaborate and very recently published “Open 
Government Plan”86 includes a heading on “Expanding Public Awareness and 
Involvement in the Development of Rules and Regulations,” but it does not appear 
to be sponsoring dialogue in that context.  Perhaps the commitments and style (to 
date) of Regulations.gov limits it to an electronic form of the standard “notice and 
comment” process.  The most interesting development in this respect of which I am 
aware is a university project that one might think a descendant – at least a close 
relative – of the ABA Report mentioned above.87  Cynthia Farina, its Reporter, has 
also been deeply involved in the Cornell Electronic Rulemaking Initiative [CeRI],88 an 
interdisciplinary effort that with the support of the National Science Foundation and 
the Departments of Commerce and Transportation is working generally to facilitate 
use of the Internet in rulemaking – and specifically to “[a]ssist[], and actively 
promot[e], agency experimentation in Internet-based ways to elicit public 
participation beyond just the notice-and-comment process.”  One effort, very much 
in line with the ABA study, has been to model ways in which the Regulations.gov site 
can be made more open, helpful, even educational for the citizen coming to it.  
Another, very much in progress as I write, is an experiment in converting a 
rulemaking to a discussion format.89  
 The Department of Transportation currently has pending a rulemaking proposal 
that would prohibit most “texting” by commercial drivers whose safe conduct it can 
directly regulate.90  CeRI has taken the quite extensive proposed rule and explanation, 
and summarized it thematically on its “regulationroom” website.  On different days, 
different specific elements of the proposal (for example, how is “texting” to be 
defined; what drivers are covered; what penalties are provided for) are identified for 
discussion, and participants see and react to each other‟s comments on that element.  
In effect, the discussion collects comments focused on particular elements of the 
rulemaking, where the ordinary comment process is to the whole of a proposal, as 
well as facilitating some back-and-forth.  At the conclusion of the discussion period, 
the CeRI staff developed a draft summary – again open to participant input – and the 
final product was submitted to the Department as a public comment on behalf of the 
participating discussants. 
 The last steps – aggregation by an outside body and submission of a unified 
comment – would not be required if the Department itself were running the website.  
It could itself create the matrix that would permit commenters to focus their 
                                                                                                                                     
 Government <www.dot.gov/open> but not online: FAA <www.faa.gov/open> where the Federal 
 Aviation Administration is a subunit of the Department of Transportation 
85  Noveck, supra note 41. 
86  See supra note 83. 
87 See text accompanying n 42 above.  
88   See online: CERI <http://ceri.law.cornell.edu/> 
89  Online:  Regulation Room<http://regulationroom.org/> 
90  Limiting the Use of Wireless Communication Devices, 75 Fed. Reg. 16391, April 1, 2010 (RIN 2126–
 AB22); online: Regulations.gov <http://www.regula-tions.gov/search/Regs/home.html#search-
 Results?Ne=11+8+8053+8098+8074+8066+8084+1&Ntt=RIN+2126%25e2%2580%2593AB22&
 Ntk=All&Ntx=mode+matchall&N=0>. 
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contributions on particular issues, in ways that would be transparent to others 
interested in the same issues and that would not require responders to search the 
whole body of comments (as at present) to see if there were any on the particular 
points that might happen to interest them.  Agency staff, after the comment period, 
would have the significant advantage of a disaggregated collection of comments, 
arranged point by point, as well as any general inputs that might have been submitted. 
 Is it realistic to expect discussion of the interactive nature CeRI hopes to 
promote?  Will it be too complicated/costly to present proposed rules, often quite 
complex and with disparate interrelated sections, in a manner that would facilitate 
such focused discussion, if it could be expected?  And will open discussion actually 
eventuate?  Rulemaking is unlike the construction of a Wikipedia, or even early-stage, 
free-form consultation on a general question like government openness policy.91  
People have direct stakes in the outcome, possibly momentous ones – and that can 
both magnify numbers past the relatively few interested volunteers who have thus far 
appeared in White House on-line consultations, and produce more political 
behaviour.  One can imagine many other questions about the future of the project – 
strongly suggesting, inter alia, that the way forward is by cautious experiment and 
observation, not across-the-board imposition of a uniform mode of proceeding.  
Perhaps a threshold determination like that now required for negotiated rulemaking is 
called for.  For the moment, the thing to see is that the presence of the electronic 
format permits, if it will not necessarily generate, a kind of dialogue about proposed 
rulemaking that simply could not have been imagined in paper format.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
 It is a quarter century since I began telling my Administrative Law students that 
they had better be watching the Internet and how agencies of interest to them were 
using it, as they entered an Information Age career.  The changes since then have 
been remarkable.  Rulemaking, where the pace has perhaps been slowest, is now 
accelerating into the Internet, driven by a President committed to openness and 
consultation.  This paper seeks little more than to point the reader toward the places 
where she can find the changes and watch them for herself. 
 
 
 
                                                          
91  Cf. President‟s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, online: PCAST 
 <http://pcast.ideascale.com/> (one of a number of free-form, on-line collaborative discussions the 
 Office of Science and Technology Policy has conducted). 
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CONSULTATION DURING RULE-MAKING: A CASE STUDY OF THE 
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE PROTECTION REGULATION  
 
France Houle 
 
Since it prescribed its first regulatory policy in 1986, the Federal government 
implemented a consultation process with stakeholders and the general public 
during the rule-making process. This process is not legally mandatory (unlike 
in the province of Quebec). However, failure to conduct a consultation process 
results in an administrative sanction: the refusal to approve the new regulation 
by Cabinet.      
     This article reports on the results of an empirical research project we 
conducted in 2004 within the Immigration Division of the Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada Department [CIC].  Our general research question was 
exploratory in nature. We wanted to know how CIC civil servants understood 
their obligation to consult with citizens.  Our case-study indicates that it is 
difficult to implement a consultative culture within a department that has a 
strong long-term commitment to protect the integrity of the Canadian territory.  
 
Depuis la mise en oeuvre de sa toute première politique réglementaire en 1986, 
l’administration publique fédérale consulte les parties prenantes et le public en 
général lors de l’élaboration d’un projet de règlement.  Ces politiques n’ont pas 
pour effet de rendre la consultation légalement obligatoire (comme au Québec), 
mais administrativement obligatoire.  La sanction du non-respect de cette 
obligation résulte en le refus par le Cabinet d’approuver le nouveau règlement.  
     Dans cet article, nous faisons rapport sur les résultats d’une recherche 
empirique que nous avons menée en 2004 avec la section de l’immigration du 
ministère de la Citoyenneté et de l’Immigration du Canada [CIC].  Notre 
question générale de recherche était de nature exploratoire : nous voulions 
savoir comment les fonctionnaires de CIC comprenaient l’obligation qui leur 
était faite de consulter les citoyens.  Notre étude de cas indique qu’il est difficile 
d’implanter une culture de consultation dans un ministère dont la mission est, 
depuis longtemps, de protéger l’intégrité du territoire canadien.   
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In Canada, common law recognizes a right of citizens to participate in governmental 
decisions, but only when their individual rights and interests are affected. We are all 
familiar with the application of the principles of natural justice in administrative 
adjudication, and the fact that those principles do not apply when the government is 
about to make a decision of a legislative nature, unless a statute prescribes otherwise.  
For example, the Loi sur les règlements in Québec requires the government to give 
notice that it is about to approve a regulation and give time to its citizens to 
                                                          
  Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Montreal. The author thanks the Quebec Fund of Research 
 on Society and Culture as well as the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for 
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comment.  This notice and comment procedure represents, however, the bare 
minimum in terms of participatory rights.1  In general, Parliament and legislatures 
have not shown great interest in improving the democratic legitimacy of regulations. 
This leaves the Executive to decide if, how and when it will consult with its 
stakeholders and the general public. Some governments have implemented 
consultation processes which are administratively, but not legally, mandatory to 
achieve this end.2   
 The Federal Government has been active on this front since it prescribed its first 
regulatory policy in 1986.3 Since then, consultations with stakeholders and the general 
public in the rule-making process has become a core element of this policy.  Its most 
recent incarnation is the Cabinet Directive on Streamlining Regulation.4 A Cabinet 
Directive is unlike any other guideline.  The use of this format indicates that this 
document is mandatory on all Government officials.  This Directive, which came into 
effect on April 1, 2007, sends a clear signal to the public administration about the 
intention of Cabinet: it must conduct consultations with those who are affected by 
proposed regulations.5 Failure to do so will result in a form of administrative sanction: 
the refusal to approve the new regulation by Cabinet.6    
                                                          
1  Loi sur les règlements, L.R.Q., c. 18.1, s. 10. 
2  For a detailed description of the legal and administrative steps during the federal and Québec 
 regulatory processes, see Luc Gagné, Le processus législatif et réglementaire au Québec (Cowansville, PQ:  
 Yvon Blais, 1997) at 269;  Le processus législatif et réglementaire fédéral (Cowansville, Yvon Blais, 1999) at 
 424.  See also on the federal regulatory process, Justice Canada, ―The Regulatory Process‖, online: 
 Justice Canada < http://www.justice.g-c.ca/ eng/dept-min/pub/legis/rm-mr/part-2/toctdm.html>.  
 Other relevant readings on the regulatory process include: John Mark Keyes, Executive Legislation: 
 Delegated Law Making by the Executive Branch (Markham, Ont.: Butterworths, 1992) at 308;  Paul J. 
 Salembier, Regulatory Law and Practice in Canada (Markham, Ont.: Butterworths, 2004) at 447.   
3  Although the text of the Regulatory Policy is not available on the Government of Canada website, 
 Carole Kennedy, Director of the Canada Gazette Directorate 1994-2007, refers to it.  See ―A Glance 
 at the Canada Gazette, Past, Present and Future‖ online: Library and Archives Canada 
 <http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/canada-gazette/035001-2000-e.html>. 
4  Cabinet Directive on Streamlining Regulation, section 2.0, online: Government of Canada 
 <http://www.regulation.gc.ca/directive/directive01-eng.asp#_Toc162687221>. 
5  Ibid at s. 4.1. 
6  See Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Guide to the Federal Regulatory Development Process, online:   
 <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/ri-qr/documents/gfrpg-gperf/gfrpg-gperftb-eng.asp>.  The Guide states 
 at Step 6:  
Treasury Board Meeting and Decision: TBS-RAS is responsible for briefing 
Treasury Board ministers on regulatory proposals. Officials of the regulatory 
organization (preferably at the level of assistant deputy minister [ADM] but no 
lower than the director level) are sometimes required to be available during the 
meeting to provide additional information. TBS-RAS will inform you when this is 
the case, and TBS-RAS will advise as to the time and place of the meeting, which is 
a Cabinet confidence.  The Treasury Board, as a Cabinet committee, may make any 
of the following decisions: 
 
 Approve or reject pre-publication of the proposed regulation;  
 Approve or reject requests for exemptions from pre-publication;  
 Send the item to Cabinet or one of its other committees for 
consideration;  
 Refer the matter back to the responsible minister for further 
consideration 
and information; and  
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 This government orientation is not surprising given the advances in the 
theoretical work achieved by scholars since the model of the welfare state was 
questioned regarding its capability to implement successfully a Rawls-like system of 
distributive justice.  Indeed, many scholars in different disciplines, such as political 
science, economics and law have proposed new approaches to explain how 
governments are now functioning.7 ―New public management‖ and ―Reinventing 
government‖ were two of the normative theories that were put forward in the 
eighties and nineties.8 Today, scholars such as Lester Salamon suggest that these two 
approaches are no longer useful because the changes that were proposed have mostly 
been implemented.9  Salamon is of the view that the challenge now is to better 
understand how the governments we have produced function: ―one that 
acknowledges the existence and likely persistence of ‗third-party government‘ and that 
focuses more coherently and explicitly on the distinctive challenges that it poses.‖
10 
 Salamon calls this approach the ―New Governance.‖  First, he uses the term 
―governance‖ instead of ―government‖ to emphasise ―what is perhaps the central 
reality of public problem-solving for the foreseeable future—namely, its collaborative 
nature, its reliance on a wide array of third parties in addition to government to 
address public problems and pursue public purposes.‖
11  He argues that collaboration 
is necessary ―because problems have become too complex for government to handle 
on its own.‖
12   Second, he uses the term ―new‖ to recognize that these ―collaborative 
approaches, while hardly novel, must now be approached in a new, more coherent 
way, one that more explicitly acknowledges the significant challenges they pose as 
well as the important opportunities they create.‖13   
 This article is dedicated to learning more about the implementation of the ―New 
Governance‖ model within the Canadian Federal Government.  In order to illustrate 
some of the challenges that third party government poses, I report on the results of 
an empirical study I conducted in 2004 within the Immigration Division of the 
                                                                                                                                     
 Defer the item to another meeting.  
 Approved submissions are sent to PCO for action (see Step 7). Your TBS-RAS analyst will inform 
 you of any follow-up actions that may be needed, refusals of regulatory proposals by the 
 Treasury Board, or proposals that are deferred‖. 
7  See e.g. William Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Chicago: Aldine, Atherton, 1971) 
 at 241; John A. C. Conybeare, ―Bureaucracy, Monopoly, and Competition: A Critical Analysis of the 
 Budget- Maximizing Model of Bureaucracy‖ (1984) 28 American Journal of Political Science 479; 
 André Blais & Stéphane Dion, ―Are Bureaucrats Budget Maximizers? The Niskanen model and Its 
 Critics‖ (1990) 22 Polity 655; Patrick Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice: Economic 
 Explanations in Political Science (London:  Pearson Education, 1991) at 286.   
8  On this point, see Daniel Mockle, ``La gouvernance publique et le droit‖ (2006) 47 Les Cahiers de 
 Droit 89 at paras. 67-86. 
9  Lester M. Salamon, The Tools of Government:  A Guide to the New Governance (Oxford, Oxford University 
 Press, 2002) at 8. 
10  Ibid at 8. 
11  Ibid; In fn. 26, he notes that he is indebted to George Frederickson, The Spirit of Public Administration, 
 (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1997) at 78-96, for his suggestion to use the term ―governance.‖ 
12  Ibid. ―...because disagreements exist about the proper ends of public action, and because government 
 increasingly lacks the authority to enforce its will on other crucial actors without giving them a 
 meaningful seat at the table.‖ 
13  Ibid. 
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Citizenship and Immigration Canada Department [CIC].14 This case-study shows the 
difficulty in implementing a consultative culture within a department that has a strong 
long-term commitment to protect the integrity of a national territory.  
 
A. Context  
 The first regulatory policy of the Federal Government came into effect in 1986.15 
Its main feature was that it required departments and agencies to analyse the socio-
economic impact of any new regulatory requirements or regulatory changes.16  From 
then to now, a Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement [RIAS] accompanies a draft 
regulation and both documents are published in Part I of the Canada Gazette for 
notice to and comments by interested parties.17  The content of a RIAS mainly derives 
from a functional perspective as well as a utilitarian analytical framework.  It requires 
a regulatory authority to demonstrate that a problem exists that can be best addressed 
through the implementation of a new regulation. Before making a final determination 
on the choice of the instrument, the regulatory authority must conduct a socio-
economic analysis of the impact of adding a new regulatory requirement or changing 
an existing one.  Finally, it must examine the impact of the new measure and balance 
its benefits against its costs.  It is only when the regulatory authority can convince the 
government that the proposed regulation will result in the greatest net benefit to the 
Canadian society (the public interest) that it will be approved by the Governor-in-
Council (the Cabinet). But, before this final approval, the regulatory authority must 
submit its analysis to public scrutiny.  This is when the requirement for a regulatory 
authority to seek comments from the public comes into play.18   
 Enhancing the accountability of regulatory authorities and the transparency of the 
regulatory process were viewed as central for successful regulatory reforms.  In 
particular, regulatory authorities needed to broaden their views on the complexity of 
the problems they encountered.  They could no longer reduce problems to their 
simplest form in order to be able to apply their own rules and procedures. For 
example, they could no longer resort to their legal power to regulate and be satisfied 
that that was sufficient justification for making new rules. In other words, a 
government could not regulate simply because a statute empowered it to do so. It 
                                                          
14  France Houle, ―L'effectivité des études d'impact de la réglementation dans le processus réglementaire 
 fédéral‖ (in progress). 
15  Kennedy, supra note 3.   
16  Government of Canada Privy Council Office, Government of Canada Regulatory Policy, online: PCO-BCP  
 < http://beyondfactoryfarming.org/documents/Fed_Reg_Policy99.pdf> [Regulatory Policy 1999]. The 
 1999 policy document superceded the 1986 policy which is no longer available online.  
17  See ―Consultation‖, online: Canada Gazette <http://canadagazette.gc.ca/consult/consult-eng.html>.  
 An example posted at the time of writing are the ―Regulations Amending the Canadian Aviation 
 Regulations (Parts I and IV — Conduct of Flight Tests)‖, Vol. 144, No. 48 — November 27, 2010.  
18 Since its first appearance on the Canadian federal regulatory scene, the basic content of the impact 
 analysis statement has not changed significantly.  It is divided into six sections.  Sections 1, 2 and 3 
 are called description, alternatives, benefits and costs.  Sections 5 and 6 are called compliance and enforcement and 
 contact person. Section 4 is called consultation.  The regulatory authority must describe who was consulted 
 and the mechanisms that were used to conduct consultations.  It must also include a discussion on 
 the results of the consultation and the name of any group still opposed to the regulation.  This 
 section of the RIAS is revised after the notice and comment procedure is completed.  The regulatory 
 authority must state if comments received lead to a modification of the proposed regulation and, if 
 not, the authority must explain the reasons why it chose not to change it.  
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needed to justify the soundness of the regulation from an economic and/or social 
perspective (by providing a regulatory impact analysis statement). Regulatory 
authorities also needed to learn to take several parameters into consideration when 
devising regulatory programs, and not only the ones that would serve the 
maximisation of their budget and their field of competence.   Indeed, when regulatory 
authorities have adopted a narrow analytical framework in the past, it led them, for 
example, to copy one regulatory system on top of the other, without really addressing 
the particular needs of the social and economic systems into which regulations will 
operate.19  
 These bureaucratic failures were understood as a direct consequence of the lack of 
constraints placed on departments and agencies to justify any regulatory initiatives 
based on their soundness from social and economic perspectives. This lack of 
accountability of regulatory authorities was notably addressed through the obligation 
to produce a RIAS:  regulatory authorities would justify their decision to regulate by 
showing that a problem existed and that the best solution to solve it would be to 
adopt a regulation because the net benefits for the population would be greater than 
their inconvenience.20 
 Improving transparency was another key issue to the betterment of regulations.  
Consultation with the stakeholders and the general public aims at achieving two goals.  
The first goal is to ensure that the regulatory authority has not misunderstood the 
problem; the second is to ensure greater voluntary compliance with the new 
regulatory requirement.  It is believed that by submitting its regulatory policies to 
economic and social actors, the regulator enriched, not impoverished its process.  
Since a regulatory authority purports to know the cause at the root of a problem and 
the best cure, why not submit its views for scrutiny to those who are affected by its 
proposed regulations?  On the one hand, if affected parties disagree with the 
government, perhaps their comments may bring the regulatory authority to partially 
or entirely rethink its approach.  Even if such comments are not so well accepted, 
their mere existence will give a clear signal to the regulatory authority that further 
persuasion is needed before it can adopt its regulation and achieve a measure of 
voluntary compliance. On the other hand, if affected parties agree with a proposed 
regulation, chances are that voluntary compliance with the new requirement will be 
higher.  The theory behind these assumptions is that the binding force of the law 
comes from the acceptance of the rule by those who are subjected to it.     
 Different types of information are contained in a RIAS to provide to those who 
would like to participate in the rule-making process the relevant background 
information to evaluate by themselves whether the regulation will achieve its intended 
goals. The consultation mechanism put into place by the Canadian government is a 
two-step process.  First, the regulatory authority consults its stakeholders at the stage 
of the elaboration of the regulatory policy.  This is an informal procedure and the 
only record available is the short summary that one can find in the first version of the 
                                                          
19  On this issue, see any of the writings, supra note 7.  
20  On this issue, the writings of George Stigler on regulatory capture are of particular interest. George 
 Stigler ―The Theory of Economic Regulation‖ (1971) 2 Bell Journal of Economics and Management 
 Science 3; See also Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, ―The Politics of Government Decision 
 Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture‖ (1991) 106 Quarterly Journal of Economics 1089; M.E. 
 Levine & J.L. Forrence, ―Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a 
 Synthesis‖ (1990) 6 JL Econ & Org 167. 
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RIAS.21 Once the government decides to go ahead with its project of making a 
regulation, a second round of consultations occurs.  It is at this stage that a RIAS is 
pre-published with the proposed regulation in Part 1 of the Canada Gazette. During 
this formal consultation process, the stakeholders and the general public are invited 
to submit their comments.  At the end of the consultation period (which varies but 
does not appear to be less than 30 days), comments are analysed and may be used to 
modify the draft regulation.  After the regulations are approved by the Governor-in-
Council, they are published in Part II of Canada Gazette with a final version of the 
RIAS integrating a summary of this second round of consultations.   
 
B. Methodology  
 In 2004, I completed the primary research phase of a project studying, among 
other things, the consultation process followed by the different divisions of 
Citizenship and Immigration Department during the formulation of new Immigration 
and Refugee Protection regulations. This primary research consisted of a series of 
interviews conducted over a period of twelve months with as many divisions of the 
Department as possible.22 
 I interviewed civil servants working in 11 different divisions of the Department 
focusing on immigration matters, as it was the subject-matter of the proposed 
regulation. These civil servants were either in charge of, or involved in, the 
consultation process that was followed during the formulation of the regulation.  
They were working in the following divisions: legal, medical, cost recovery, 
sponsorship, selection, enforcement, ports and border, citizenship, administrator of 
regulatory matters (coordination of consultations), refugee resettlement, and visa 
policy.  
 To formulate interview questions, I used relevant federal policies as a starting 
point: the Regulatory Policy23 and the Regulatory Process Management Standards24 
which is incorporated in the former.  These policies set the standards to solicit the 
views of stakeholders affected by proposed regulations and it is these standards that 
were applied by CIC at the time we conducted the interviews.  In the section 
dedicated to consultation, one can read: 
 
Regulatory authorities proposing new regulatory requirements, or 
changes to existing regulatory requirements, must carry out timely 
and thorough consultations with interested parties. The 
consultation effort should be proportional to the magnitude of the 
impact of the proposed regulatory change. Notice of proposed 
                                                          
21  A RIAS [Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement] is published with the proposed regulation.  In this 
 RIAS, there is a section entitled ―consultation‖ summarizing the first round of consultation and the 
 format to conduct it chosen by the regulatory authority. For a description of the content of the 
 RIAS, see ―Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement‖ online: Department of Justice Canada  
 < http://canada2.justice.gc.ca/eng/dept-min/pub/legis/rm-mr/part4/rias-reir.html>. 
22  See Houle, supra note 14. 
23  The latest version of the Regulatory Policy is published on the web site of the Privy Council Office of 
 the Canadian Federal Government online: PCO-BCP <www.pco-bcp.gc.ca>.  
24  The standards were established by Treasury Board of Canada and they are applicable to all 
 Departments‘ Managers.  The standards appear at the end of the Regulatory Policy 1999, supra note 16. 
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regulations and amendments must be given so that there is time to 
make changes and to take comments from consultees into account. 
     Regulatory authorities must clearly set out the processes they 
use to allow interested parties to express their opinions and 
provide input. In particular, authorities must be able to identify and 
contact interested stakeholders, including, where appropriate, 
representatives from public interest, labour and consumer groups. 
If stakeholder groups indicate a preference for a particular 
consultation mechanism, they should be accommodated, time and 
resources permitting. Consultation efforts should be coordinated 
between authorities to reduce duplication and burden on 
stakeholders. 
     Regulatory authorities should consider using an iterative system 
to obtain feedback on the problem, on alternative solutions and, 
later, on the preferred solution. 
     Consultations should begin as early as possible in order to get 
stakeholder input on the definition of the problem, as well as on 
proposed solutions.25 
 
 Relevant federal policies therefore highlight the importance of timely, thorough 
and proportionate consultation as well as the need for a clear and iterative 
consultation process.  These ideas were used to design the study‘s questions and to 
analyze its findings.  
 
C. Findings 
 On the specific subject of consultations, interviews focused on four general 
themes: 1) Knowledge about Stakeholders; 2) Dynamic of Consultations; 3) Reasons 
Underpinning Consultations; 4) Procedural Aspects of Consultations.     
 
1.  Knowledge about Stakeholders  
 The main objective of this theme was to ascertain whether the civil servants in 
charge of the consultation process, in each division included in the research sample, 
had a clear idea of who should be considered a stakeholder.   
 A stakeholder is an old legal concept. This person was originally the one who held 
money or other property while its owner was being determined.  However, in the 
twentieth century, the word stakeholder took another meaning: it was used to 
describe a person or an organization with a legitimate interest in a project or entity.  
In this sense, a stakeholder is a term used to speak of any interested party in the 
regulations to be adopted, be they individuals or groups affected by them.  
 In the Federal Regulatory Process Management Standards, it is said that 
authorities must be able to identify and contact interested parties including, where 
appropriate, representatives of labour and consumers‘ groups.
26 
 Were civil servants, who were involved in or in charge of consultation within CIC, 
able to identify their stakeholders?   The results of the interviews revealed that civil 
servants divide stakeholders into two groups: governmental stakeholders and civil 
                                                          
25  Ibid. 
26  Ibid. 
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society stakeholders. Governmental stakeholders include other governments, such as 
other divisions in CIC and federal departments and agencies as well as provincial and 
municipal governments. All of the participants identify these parties as governmental 
stakeholders. The civil society stakeholder is a more loosely defined category.  It can 
include practitioners, NGOs and public interest groups as well as any individual 
affected by the regulatory policy. Each civil servant is in charge of making a 
determination as to who is a stakeholder for the purpose of consultation within his or 
her division.  As one participant put it:  
 
[ … ] you want to make sure that you consult widely enough that 
you‘re hitting your target audience, but not so widely that you‘re 
diluting opinions, because that could be a problem.27  
 
 Although there is some value in letting civil servants of each division determine 
their stakeholders, the interviews showed there is some confusion among the CIC 
civil servants with regard to the identification of their stakeholders, the difference 
between the two stages of the consultation process and the very meaning of the 
concept of consultation itself.   
 Concerning the identification of the stakeholders, some participants were able to 
clearly name the complete list of their stakeholders.  Others were able to name two or 
three of their main stakeholders.  Finally, some participants were not able to name 
any of their stakeholders or gave vague answers such as the ―Canadian public.‖  
Knowing who is going to be consulted in advance is the starting point to a 
transparent procedure.  It is also a more efficient way to avoid undesirable lobbying 
practices.  Individuals and groups intending to participate in the rule-making process 
should have their name registered in the lobbyist registry.28  
 On the meaning of the concept, some participants were of the opinion that 
stakeholders include only experts such as practitioners and NGOs. Other participants 
were more of the view that any person or group affected by the proposed regulation, 
whether or not they have any particular expertise on the subject-matter, should be 
included. In fact, for them the concept of stakeholders was much closer to the idea of 
that of a client of a Department than that of a stakeholder.   
 One criticism that can be made is that this definition is too broad at the first stage 
of the consultation process; that is to say, at the stage of the development of the 
regulatory policy. During the first round of consultations, participation should be 
limited to those whose aim is to influence the development of a policy in a way they 
consider to be in the public interest.  Fixing boundaries on who, among possible 
stakeholders, can participate meaningfully to a consultation process aimed at quality 
discussions and debates on regulatory policy options. The aim is quality, not quantity.   
It is at this stage that the perceived problems and possible solutions are discussed and 
                                                          
27  Interview 413.  Notes on file with author. 
28  Lobbying Act, RSC 1985, c. 44 (4th Supp.), ss. 6-10.  The registry of lobbyists is the principal means 
provided under the Lobbying Act to ensure transparency with regard to lobbying of public office 
holders. For specific information about the registry, see the section on ―The Registry of Lobbyists‖ in 
the brochure published by the Office of the Registrar of Lobbyists entitled, A Summary of New 
Requirements in The Lobbying Act, June 2008, online: ORL <http://www.ocl- cal.gc.ca/ eic/ 
site/lobbyistlobbyiste1.nsf/vwapj/Info_booklet_Eng.pdf/$FILE/Info_booklet_Eng.pdf>.   
 
Vol. 28(2)  Consultation During Rule-Making 403 
 
 
the choice of instruments made.  It is the most important round of consultations, the 
one that really matters and this is the main reason for which it is crucial to ensure the 
quality of this process.   
 Administrative case law with respect to the choice of interveners during a policy-
making exercise of a regulatory agency offers useful guidelines. There are two general 
rules: a) when a regulatory board has to select persons or groups who will be admitted 
to intervene during the proceedings, the board must take into account the advantages 
to hearing contributions by responsible and informed persons, and; b) the necessity 
to save time and energy.  Finally, it should be clearly recognized that it is up to the 
Department to select its stakeholders and invite them to submit their views on a 
regulatory policy. In addition, those who are not on the list, but wish to be, should be 
able to request that they be added to the list and state their reasons for wanting to 
participate in the rule-making process.  
 On the basis of the information gathered by CIC during the first round of 
consultations, the proposed regulation and the accompanying RIAS are published in 
the Canada Gazette. This, in turn triggers the second stage of the consultation process 
during which the members of the general public in general, including CIC clients, are 
invited to submit comments.   At this point in time, the regulatory policy is decided 
and it is unlikely that it will be changed, save for minor details.  Therefore, this 
second step of the consultation process should be viewed more as a formality.  
Indeed, it is interesting to note that in the final RIAS, the one published with the 
approved regulation, this second step is not called consultation but prepublication 
note.  
 
2.  Dynamic of the Consultations  
 The objective pursued by this set of questions was to form a better understanding 
as to how the participants approached consultations they undertook with government 
stakeholders or civil society stakeholders. The gist of the conversation was to find out 
whether the participants approached consultations with a particular mindset 
depending on which type of stakeholder they consulted.  
 Eight participants said that the dynamic of the relationship was not the same with 
civil society stakeholders.  Three of the eight participants were of the view that civil 
society stakeholders‘ perspectives were different, but that they were equally 
important.29  When they were asked to elaborate on this point, they added that some 
groups and practitioners have a better understanding of how things work at the 
operational level and that this knowledge is crucial to designing efficient and fair 
regulations. This indicates that these civil servants approached consultation with an 
open mind. 
 Five of the eight participants stated that civil society stakeholders‘ perspectives 
were not equal in importance to government stakeholders. They thought that the civil 
society stakeholders‘ perspective was too narrow, not solution-oriented, and 
confrontational. They also stated that government stakeholders had a better 
understanding of immigration operations and, as a result, their views have more 
weight than those of the civil society stakeholders.30   One participant said:  
 
                                                          
29  Interviews 802, 212 and 309.  Notes on file with author. 
30 Interviews 413, 608, 359, 111, 705.  Notes on file with author. 
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They are advocates, their role is strictly to be a watchdog and that‘s 
good, you need that, but it‘s not often solution oriented. Also 
because they are always criticizing, it‘s very difficult to find a way 
to solve problems that are going to (inaudible) to others. That 
makes it difficult because then they will charge that we‘re not 
consulting with the right people, that only they are the right people 
to consult on the refugee issues and yet (inaudible) not solution 
oriented enough.  That‘s not their role, their role is to be a 
watchdog so you know it creates a lot of tension sometimes.31  
 
 These results indicate that these civil servants do not approach consultations with 
a mind as open as one would likely hope for.  Finally, three participants said that the 
dynamic of the relationship between both categories of stakeholders, and especially 
NGOs was the same.32  When they were asked to elaborate on the similarities, they 
were not able to explain their answers.  This may indicate a lack of frankness.   If 
these two last figures are added up, two-thirds of the participants do not appear to 
have a positive attitude toward consultations.  This raises the question of the level of 
good faith required to engage in a meaningful consultation process and build long-
term relationships with the stakeholders.     
 These findings also suggest that there is a need to define more clearly the purpose 
of consultations during the development of a regulatory policy. It would be the 
responsibility of the Department to clearly state in its consultation documentation 
what they wish to achieve with the consultations in which they are about to engage. 
For example:  What is on the table for discussion and debate? Is it possible to discuss 
their views on what the problem is and the solutions they propose? What are the cost 
and the benefit of the proposed solution? What is the impact on rights and freedoms? 
and so on. In sum, more training of the civil servants, focusing on specific objectives 
would be useful. 
 
3.  Reasons for Consulting  
 The objective with this theme was to form a better understanding of the 
perception of the participants on whether they view consultation as an important 
mechanism in the rule-making process and, if yes, why? Not surprisingly (it is part of 
the official discourse in the public administration), all of them said that they were of 
the opinion that consultations are a very important mechanism in the rule-making 
process.  Some were able to substantiate their support with solid reasoning, while 
others were very vague, indicating a limited understanding of why consultations are 
important.  
 Two types of well-founded reasons for consulting emerge from the interviews. 
Some participants said that consultations were important to ensure that regulations 
are truly operational. For them, the goal of consultation is to make a better regulation 
in the sense that it is efficacious: a regulation which accomplishes what it is intended 
to accomplish. Others said that consultations were important to ―flesh out the 
concerns of the outside world,‖ whether they approved or disapproved of the 
regulations. These civil servants of the CIC said that when stakeholders disapproved 
                                                          
31  Interview 359.  Notes on file with author.  
32  Interviews 359, 413 and 705.  Notes on file with author. 
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of the regulation, it is important for them to know why they disapproved, for 
discussions and debates can occur on the issues.  Thereafter, CIC civil servants can 
help to dissipate a misunderstanding (explaining regulatory choices), to mitigate or to 
accommodate whenever possible by bringing some changes to the proposed 
regulations, or even to not go forward with a proposed change when CIC civil 
servants deem it necessary.  As one civil servant stated:  
It‘s … because you‘re getting into the political side of things and 
it‘s very difficult to, sometimes, foresee the impact of something 
that you‘re going to do, which we try to mitigate that through the 
consultation process.33 
 
 From this last account, it is interesting to note that for these participants it is 
crucial that CIC makes acceptable regulations for those affected by it. This concern is 
linked to the broader issue of democracy as it provides greater transparency in the 
process of formulating a regulation.  As some participants put it:  
 
… the whole intention of the government is to make sure that 
there‘s an agreement between the lawmakers and those subject to 
it. [Consultations] do not necessarily help to make better 
regulations, but regulations that will be better accepted by the 
Canadians.34 
 
 Two types of limited understanding of the importance of consultations emerged 
from the interviews: 1) those who believe that consultation is useful for identification 
purposes, that is to say to meet people, to put a face on a name and to know them 
better; 2) others thought that consultations served the purpose of exchanging 
information and to educate stakeholders about immigration processes. These 
purposes are not completely irrelevant – they occur during a consultation process, 
however, they are not the primary reasons why consultation is done.  
 These findings also suggest that there is confusion around the objectives of the 
consultation process. During the first round of the consultation, the main focus of 
the issues – acceptability of policy choices based on principles or whether the policy 
choices are operational – should also be on the table for discussion.  Too often, there 
is still no real dialogue between the regulator and the stakeholders, only two parallel 
monologues. When expectations are not clearly stated, a sense of frustration and of 
wasting time and energy grows exponentially. 
 
4. Procedural Aspects of Consultations 
 Here the objective was to form a view of the perception of the participants on 
issues such as: How much time is devoted to consultations? How to determine the 
scope of the consultation?  What forms do consultations take? At which stage of the 
rule-making process are consultations conducted? How are the comments received 
processed?  
                                                          
33  Interview 608.  Notes on file with author. 
34 Interview 705.  Other participants shared similar views: interviews 212, 413.  Notes on file with 
 author.  
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 The perceptions of the participants to the quantity of time they spent on 
consultations during the rule-making process varied from one interview to the other.  
However, all participants seemed to be of the opinion that too much time was 
devoted to consultations.  Indeed, some participants used qualifications such as 
―huge, massive, hundreds.‖  But for some of them, the consultation process also 
included the consultations conducted by Deputy Minister Robillard on the Green 
Paper (―Trempe Report‖) in 1997:35 ―[In the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
(IRPA)] situation, we were consulting for at least three years before we actually 
published the draft regulation.‖
36 However, the ―Trempe Report‖ gives only general 
legislative policy orientation and is by no means a document which can be cited in the 
RIAS as proof that consultations occurred with stakeholders on the specifics of the 
regulations (as one can read in some RIASs accompanying the final IRP Regulations 
and published in the Canada Gazette, Part II).  One question that this last practice 
raises is whether the division in charge of writing this RIAS had time to conduct 
meaningful consultations as opposed to merely a formality.   
 Another participant said that he spent about 5 to 10 percent of his time on 
consultations, but qualified his answer by adding it is a lot ―because after a while it 
adds up.‖ When asked to put a percentage on the time they spent consulting, the 
participants‘ answers varied significantly. One participant said:  
 
It takes up well over 50 percent of the time of policy officers. 
Depending on where you are in the cycle, it can be 100 percent. 
[…]during some periods of getting ready for the IRPA regulations, 
the only thing we were doing was consultation. And that means 
preparing the documents, setting up meetings, sending the 
documents out, reading with the individuals, talking with them, 
receiving their comments, feeding back their comments. Often, for 
periods of six months, or eight months, or nine months, the only 
thing we did is consulting. I would say, we do a lot consulting. But 
consulting is one of those things you can never do enough of. You 
can always do more. The problem is you can always do more and 
you can always find someone else that you should have talked to. 
Particularly immigration is one of those areas of public policy 
where it seems everyone has an opinion and we talk about 
engaging with the public!37 
 
 This answer suggests that this civil servant was overwhelmed by the consultation 
process.  This may mean that CIC did not control the process very well during the 
drafting of the new Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations.  On the one 
hand, since the entire regulation was completely redrafted, the task of coordinating 
the workload was no doubt daunting and this may explain the reaction of this civil 
servant.  On the other hand, the situation faced by the CIC may illustrate the need to 
                                                          
35  Canada, Legislative Review Advisory Group, ―Not just Numbers: A Canadian Framework for Future 
 Immigration" (Ottawa: Citizenship and Immigration, 1997) at 168 (Chair: Robert Trempe). 
36  Interview 111.  Notes on file with author. 
37  Interview 802.  Notes on file with author. 
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better plan the rule-making procedure when a regulation is re-done entirely, as 
opposed to modification to some parts or provisions of a regulation. 
 On the question as to how to determine the scope of the consultation, almost all 
participants were of the view that the criteria of proportionality should guide their 
decision. This is not surprising since Treasury Board guidelines are clear on this 
aspect of the procedure.38 Proportionality is assessed through two main criteria: 
whether the change is contentious or not and the extent of the change proposed to 
the regulations: ―If it is a small modification which is not contentious, consultations 
should be very small.‖
39 The first criterion is relatively easy to apply.   The main 
stakeholders will voice their concerns quickly and clearly.  The second criterion is less 
clear. A participant was of the view that consultations should be considered less 
extensive when the change is purely technical. However, when asked what he meant 
by the words ―purely technical‖ this participant did not answer. It would be useful for 
Treasury Board to clarify the concept of proportionality. 
 As to the form of consultations, one participant stated clearly that although it is 
mandatory to consult, the government does not impose a rigid procedural form.  It 
can be done formally or informally, during a face-to-face meeting, on the telephone 
or in writing (paper or electronic). ―We followed the process as best we could I guess 
and we did have lots of informal consultations. People calling up, writing, asking for a 
meeting and so we would meet with them or respond.‖40 
 On the procedural steps followed for consultations on the regulations, most of 
the participants were not able to describe all of them. Some participants referred to 
papers and documents prepared on the policy orientation in the proposed regulations 
which were sent out and stakeholders were invited to make their views known.  They 
were not able to state very clearly whether this occurred before or after the first RIAS 
was issued with the proposed regulation in the Canada Gazette.   
 A minority of participants referred to a unit which was created within CIC and 
that was put in charge of the consultations process.  In fact, a unit was created 
especially to manage the entire rule-making process engaged in by CIC to re-write the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations.41  The role of this unit was to check 
that the whole Regulatory Policy was followed before sending the regulations to 
Treasury Board.  As long as the consultations occur, this unit was satisfied when the 
goals of the policy were formally met.  The task of this unit was not to check the 
quality of the consultations conducted by each division of CIC.  As long as the 
division reported that consultations were conducted, this was sufficient to let its 
section of the regulation continue its way in the system.    
 This unit was also in charge of receiving all the comments, classifying them ―in a 
spread sheet or a table,‖
42 sorting them out using criteria such as the importance of 
the comment, its repetitiveness or, contrarily, presenting some significant differences, 
and, finally, dispatching the relevant comments to each division of CIC.  Therefore, it 
seems that each division did not receive all the comments, although one participant 
                                                          
38  Canada, Treasury Board, ―Guidelines for Effective Regulatory Consultations‖ online: Treasury Board 
 of Canada Secretariat < http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/ri-qr/documents/gl-ld/erc-cer/erc-certbeng.asp>. 
39  Interview 212.  Notes on file with author. 
40  Interview 705.  Notes on file with author. 
41  Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations SOR/2002-227. 
42  Interview 309.  Notes on file with author. 
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said that they read all the comments, but others thought that the unit was 
summarizing all of them.  In my opinion, this unit does not have the qualifications to 
exclude or summarize comments.  They should only classify them and direct them to 
the relevant division. 
 In the batch of comments received, the division would sort them out further 
using other criteria such as whether or not the division had in the past thought about 
a particular issue raised by a stakeholder: 
 
What we are trying to find is things that we hadn‘t thought about 
or issues, comments, or concerns that we hadn‘t already addressed. 
[…] what is missing, what is new, where they‘ve raised issues that 
we haven‘t thought about. Is there any potential problem?
43 
 
 Other divisions set aside the comments they qualified as representing ―extreme 
and/or disconnected views with reality‖ and, therefore, ―irreconcilable with what 
needs to be achieved under the statute.‖
44   These findings suggest that each division is 
in charge of deciding the criteria they will use to include or exclude comments.   
There should be some discussions among CIC as to the proper criteria to be used for 
the purpose of sorting out comments in order to reach a good level of uniformity.   
 As far as transparency goes, some participants said that sometimes they will take 
the time to respond to some comments, but it was not possible to find out more on 
this point.  It is also useful to know that the comments are not posted on the CIC 
web site, but one can theoretically access them through an access to information 
request.45 These requests are managed by a unit within CIC which decides to grant 
access to the information in all or in part based on the provision of the Access to 
Information Act.46 Further inquiry would be needed to form a better view of the 
decision-making power of the civil servants staffing this unit (is it real or merely 
formal).  In any case, the chances of the unit having access to all the comments, and 
uncensored, are very unlikely. 
 
II. THE AARHUS CONVENTION  
 
 Although consultations in Canada during the rule-making process are still at a 
relatively early stage of development, the findings of this empirical research indicate 
that there are flaws in the consultation process followed by CIC.  This suggests that 
governmental policy guidelines and standards should be thoroughly examined.  In 
order to conduct a useful examination, a first step could be, in addition to more 
empirical research, to conduct comparative research between the content of the 
Canadian guidelines with that of other jurisdictions.  In this regard, it would be useful 
for the federal government to turn its attention to the work of the European 
                                                          
43 Interview 111.  Notes on file with author.  
44  Interview 413.  Notes on file with author. 
45  Generally, in Canada, the system of access to federal government information has suffered from 
 significant challenges.  See, for example, the federal Information Commissioner‘s most recent report 
 on access and delay; Information Commissioner of Canada, Out of Time (A Special Report to 
 Parliament) April, 2010.   
46  R.S., 1985, c. A-1. 
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Commission in general and the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters [Aarhus Convention] 
conceived at Aarhus, Denmark in 1998 in particular.47  
 The Aarhus Convention is an example of a legally binding European instrument 
canvassing rules of conduct for an efficient and legitimate consultation mechanism.  
If the Aarhus Convention is seen as an innovation in the field of public participation, it 
is because of the importance of the subject it covers in the field of environment.  
Environmental measures have the characteristic of affecting a broad range of citizens, 
from the average citizen to farmers and agricultural organisations.  Furthermore, the 
environmental policy sector is a field where the interests of the public with respect to 
openness and transparency frequently enter in conflict with the interests of businesses 
in keeping their data secret.  Therefore, the Aarhus Convention gives individuals a right 
to access environmental information that is kept in the hands of public authorities.48 
 In the preamble of the Convention, the parties recognize ―that the public needs to 
be aware of the procedures for participation in environmental decision-making, have 
free access to them and know how to use them.‖
49 In other words, the Convention goes 
further than Canadian standards by not only acknowledging that the public needs to 
be informed, but also that the institutions need to make sure citizens know how to 
access the information. Also of interest in this Convention is that instead of putting 
forward a formal method for consultation, it developed a series of precise obligations 
for states to follow when they consult their populations on environmental matters.50  
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
 After more than 20 years of consultations during the rule-making process it would 
be appropriate to determine whether some or all of the consultation process should 
be legally mandatory.  On this point, two distinct legal avenues could be discussed.  
The first avenue would develop an argument based the principles of natural justice.  
The question could then be whether these principles can be adapted to support 
systems of new governance involving ―third-party government‖ as Salamon puts it.51  
The starting point of the discussion could be the decision of Evans J.A. in Apotex52, 
for he proposed an interesting development to the doctrine of legitimate 
expectations.   
 This doctrine, as explained by the Supreme Court, ―is part of the rules of 
procedural fairness which can govern administrative bodies. Where it is applicable, it 
can only create a right to make representations or to be consulted.‖
53  As Evans J.A. 
rightly pointed out in Apotex, the Supreme Court specifically said ―that the doctrine 
                                                          
47  Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
 Environmental Matters (the Aarhus Convention), 25 June, 1998, 2161 UNTS 447, online: UNECE  
 < http://www.unece.org/env/pp/>.  
48  Ibid at art. 4 (1). 
49  Ibid at preamble. 
50  Ibid at art. 6. 
51  Salamon, supra, note 9 at 8. 
52  Apotex Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2000] 4 F.C. 264 (C.A.).  Leave to SSC denied [2000] S.C.C.A. 
 no 379. 
53  Reference re Canada Assistance Plan (B.C.), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525 at 528. 
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has no application to the exercise of legislative powers‖
54 as it would ―place a fetter on 
an essential feature of democracy.‖
55 In the realm of the exercise of delegated 
legislative powers, however, Evans J.A. stated that similar considerations do not apply 
because these powers are not subject to the ―same level of scrutiny as primary 
legislation that must pass through the full legislative process.‖
56 He concluded that ―in 
the absence of binding authority to the contrary, the doctrine of legitimate 
expectations applies in principle to delegated legislative powers so as to create 
participatory rights when none would otherwise arise, provided that honouring the 
expectation would not breach some other legal duty, or unduly delay the enactment 
of regulations for which there was a demonstrably urgent need.‖ 57    
 The second avenue could take a fresher look at this issue by examining case-law 
pertaining to consultation with First Nations.  This case-law is interesting because it is 
based, inter alia, on the fiduciary duty between government and Aboriginal people to 
support the view that the state exercises its authority in the name of Aboriginal 
people.58  It would be of interest to explore the idea as to whether the same argument 
can be made when the state exercised its authority to govern all citizens on its 
territory as it was put forward by Evan Fox-Decent in a text on the fiduciary nature 
of state legal authority.  As the author explains: ―there is something deeply fiduciary 
about the state's relationship with the people over whom it asserts power, and that 
the fiduciary nature of this relationship explains the state‘s legal authority to 
announce, administer and enforce law.‖
59  Simply put, the fiduciary nature of state 
legal authority may prove to be a powerful analytical tool to support the view that the 
state owes its citizens a legal duty to consult. 
 
                                                          
54  Apotex, supra note 52 at para. 102. 
55  Canada Assistance Plan, supra note 53 at 559-560, cited with approval by Evans J.A. ibid. at para. 109.  
56  Apotex, supra note 52 at para. 110. 
57  Ibid at para. 126. 
58  There are several Supreme Court decisions on this subject, but of particular importance, see : 
 Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, 2010 SCC 53; Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada 
 (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2005 SCC 69, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 388; Haida Nation v. British Columbia 
 (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511; R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507. 
59  ―The Fiduciary Nature of State Legal Authority‖ (2005) 31 Queen‘s LJ 259 at 259. 
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In this paper, I will argue that general administrative law concerns about the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of rule-making have special force in the municipal 
zoning by-law context. In particular, I will argue that a particular, civic 
republican conception of legitimate state action offers the best justification for 
municipal regulation and provides the best normative foundation for 
developments in municipal consultation processes. In Part II, I will argue that 
the consultative processes in Quebec’s zoning laws reflect a commitment to civic 
republican ideals, but that because of specific features of municipal regulation, 
these ideals are incompletely realized. In Part III, I will argue that a 
particular municipal institution – the ward council – enables the zoning 
process to better approximate civic republican ideals.  I conclude this paper by 
arguing that ward councils not only strengthen the normative justifications for 
municipal regulation, they contribute to its effectiveness.  
 
Dans cet article, je vais soutenir que les préoccupations du droit administratif 
général au sujet de la légitimité et l’efficacité de l’élaboration de règles ont une 
importance particulière dans le contexte de la réglementation municipale sur le 
zonage. En particulier, je vais soutenir qu’une certaine conception civique 
républicaine de l’action légitime de l’état offre la meilleure justification de la 
réglementation municipale et le meilleur fondement normatif pour les 
développements des processus de consultation municipaux. Dans la partie II, je 
vais soutenir que les processus de consultation des lois sur le zonage du Québec 
reflètent un engagement envers les idéaux civiques républicains mais qu’à cause 
de certains aspects précis de la réglementation municipale, ces idéaux ne sont 
pas complètement atteints. Dans la partie III, je vais soutenir qu’une 
institution municipale particulière – le conseil de quartier – fait que le 
processus de zonage se rapproche mieux des idéaux civiques républicains. Je 
termine l’article en soutenant que les conseils de quartier non seulement 
renforcent les justifications normatives de la réglementation municipale, ils 
contribuent à son efficacité. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
As others in this special issue have noted, scholars and practitioners of administrative 
law have long been concerned with how to design effective consultative rule-making 
                                                          
*  Assistant Professor of Law, McGill University. I thank participants in faculty workshops at the 
 Faculties of Law at the University of Alberta, McGill University and Queen‘s University for incisive 
 comments. I am also particularly grateful to participants in the Sixth Administrative Law Discussion 
 Forum, Québec City, May 25-26, 2010, for their probing questions. For conversations that greatly 
 assisted in developing this paper, I thank Richard Briffault, Robert Ferguson, Rod Macdonald, Chuck 
 Sabel, and Bill Simon. For excellent research assistance, provided at various stages of the project, I 
 thank Adela Maciejewski Scheer, Tim Petrou, Owen Ripley, and Lisa Smith.  I acknowledge the 
 support of the Borden Ladner Gervais Fellowship program for funds that were instrumental in 
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processes. In his contribution, Professor Peter Strauss argues that advances in 
technology have the potential to make administrative rule-making consultations in the 
United States more accessible and transparent.1  In  a similar vein, Professor France 
Houle examines how Canadian civil servants have responded to the recent Cabinet 
Directive on Streamlining Regulation,2 which makes stakeholder consultations a mandatory 
part of the Federal Government‘s regulation-making process.3  Two general concerns 
motivate the scholarly focus on the design of consultative processes in the rule-
making context.  First, as Strauss notes, this focus reflects a general concern about the 
democratic legitimacy of rule-making by the executive branch.4  Second, as Houle 
argues, governments face increasingly complex governance challenges and as a 
consequence, have turned to collaborating with stakeholders in order to ensure that 
their governance initiatives are effective. Administrative law scholars are elaborating 
normative theories and developing analytical tools to assess these emerging forms of 
collaboration.5   
 In this paper, I will argue that the concerns about the legitimacy and effectiveness 
of rule-making have special force in the municipal zoning by-law context.6  In 
particular, I will argue that a particular, civic republican conception of legitimate state 
action offers the best justification for municipal regulation and provides the best 
normative foundation for developments in municipal consultation processes.  Before 
I turn, in the main body of this paper, to the detailed substantive and institutional 
arguments, I will very briefly introduce this paper‘s theoretical position and I begin 
with the normative theory that is the counterpoint to my position.  
 Pluralist theories of democracy have exerted considerable influence on the 
theoretical writing on municipal law. These theories place a premium on 
government‘s capacity to respond to citizen preferences and they understand citizen 
autonomy to be defined primarily in terms of the pursuit of private preferences. 7  
                                                          
1  Peter Strauss, ―Implications of the Internet for Quasi-Legislative Instruments of Regulation‖  
 (2010) 28:2 Windsor YB Access Just. 
2  Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Cabinet Directive on Streamlining Regulation, Section 2.0, online: 
 TBS <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/riqr/directive/directive01-eng.asp>. 
3  France Houle, ―Consultation During Rule-Making: A Case Study Of The Immigration And Refugee 
 Protection Regulation‖ (2010) 28:2 Windsor YB Access Just. 
4  He writes: ―The legitimacy of permitting unelected officials to create binding legal texts is an enduring 
 problem for any democracy.‖ Supra note 1 
5  Professor Houle cites Lester Salamon‘s New Governance Approach as a particularly influential 
 account of these developments. Supra Note 3. In his presentation at the conference, Professor 
 Denis Lemieux applied the New Governance Approach to environmental regulation.  See Dennis 
 Lemieux, ―Economic Instruments and Environmental Regulation‖ (Paper Delivered At the Sixth
 Administrative Law Discussion Forum, Québec City, 25 May 2010), [Unpublished]. 
6  Some authors classify Canadian municipalities as administrative bodies, albeit with political functions. 
 See e.g. René Dussault & Louis Borgeat, Administrative Law: A Treatise, vol. 1 (Toronto: Carswell, 
 1985) at 188-89 and Pierre Issalys & Denis Lemieux, L’Action gouvernementale: précis de droit des 
 institutions administrative, 3rd ed (Cowansville: Yvon Blais, 2009) § 5.5. 
7  The literature on such theories is voluminous. For the contrast drawn in the main text, see Frank 
 Michelman, ―Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of 
 Local Government Legitimacy‖ (1977-78) 53 Ind LJ 145 at 148. For prominent contemporary 
 articulations of the pluralist position, see William A. Fischel, ―Public Goods and Property Rights: Of 
 Coase, Tiebout and Just Compensation‖ (August 7, 2000), online: Dartmouth College 
 <http://www.dartmouth.edu/~wfischel/Papers/00-19.pdf>. See also William A. Fischel, The 
 Homevoter Hypothesis (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001) [Fischel, Homevoter]; Edward 
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Perhaps the most prominent exponent of this theory, Professor William Fischel, 
argues that American homeowners are passionately engaged in local government 
because they seek through zoning regulations ―insurance‖ for their homes.  
According to Fischel, home values are dependent on their surroundings, and it is 
difficult, if not impossible to purchase private insurance to protect against 
neighborhood change.  As a consequence, he claims, local government becomes the 
vehicle through which homeowners control their surroundings to protect home 
value.  For Fischel, local government is where homeowner‘s private preferences are 
cashed out.8   
 In this paper, I will offer a contrasting, civic republican theory of municipal 
institutions, which rests on a different conception of the relationship between the 
state and citizens, of citizen autonomy and of policy making.  Rather than primarily 
consisting of freedom to pursue preferences, autonomy in this view is conceived of as 
freedom from domination.  In civic republican theory, it is unjustifiable for the state 
merely to give effect to the private preferences of citizens.  To be justified, state 
action must rest on publicly defensible reasons, reasons, that is, which appeal to some 
understanding of the public good.9  To permit otherwise would allow the state to 
affect some citizens‘ choices in ways that are not defensible to them.  Such an 
outcome would subject citizens to state action that is merely an expression of will, not 
a manifestation of public reasons, and domination is the fact of being vulnerable to 
this kind of state action.10  Although authors have drawn a distinction between 
pluralism and civic republicanism in the local government context,11 none has worked 
out a civic republican approach to local government law with the degree of detail and 
attention to the Canadian, and in particular, the Quebec context that I attempt in this 
paper.   
 In Part II, I will argue that the consultative processes in Quebec‘s zoning laws 
reflect a commitment to civic republican ideals, but that because of specific features 
of municipal regulation, these ideals are incompletely realized.  In Part III, I will argue 
                                                                                                                                     
 Zelinsky, ―Metropolitanism, Progressivism and Race‖ (1998) 98 Colum L Rev 665. For a particularly 
 influential development of the initial Tiebout insight, see Vincent Ostrom et al., ―The Organization of 
 Government in Metropolitan Regions: A Theoretical Inquiry‖ (1961) 55 American Political Science 
 Review 416. For a critical survey of writing on the model, see Wallace E. Oates, ―The Many Faces of 
 the Tiebout Model‖ in William A. Fischel, ed, The Tiebout Model at Fifty (Cambridge, Mass.: Lincoln 
 Institute of Land Policy, 2006) 21. For Canadian contributions to the literature, see Andrew 
 Sancton, Merger Mania: The Assault on Local Government (Kingston: McGill-Queen‘s University Press, 
 2000) at 74-75, 91-92, 167; Robert L. Bish, ―Local Government Amalgamations: Discredited 
 Nineteenth-Century Ideals Alive in the Twenty-First‖ (March 2001) C.D. Howe Institute 
 Commentary 150, online: C.D. Howe Institute <http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/bish.pdf>.     
8  Fischel, Homevoter, ibid.  
9  For an articulation of this requirement of reasoning in terms of the public good, see T.R.S. Allan, 
 Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 287: 
 ―No one should be criticized for confronting his fellow citizens with arguments that he thinks 
 pertinent to any moral or political issue, however difficult or divisive, provided only that he claims no 
 special knowledge or authority that precludes rational inspection and challenge.‖ For a general 
 defense of civic republican legal theory, see Samantha Besson & José Luis Martí, ―Law and 
 Republicanism: Mapping the Issues‖ in Samantha Besson & José Luis Martí, eds, Legal Republicanism: 
 National and International Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 3. 
10  On this conception of autonomy, see Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government 
 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) c. 1. 
11  See the overview of the literature in Robert C. Ellickson & Vicki Been, Land Use Controls: Cases and 
 Materials (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2005) at 47-50.   
414 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice  2010 
  
 
that a particular municipal institution – the ward council – enables the zoning process 
to better approximate civic republican ideals.  I conclude this paper by arguing that 
ward councils not only strengthen the normative justifications for municipal 
regulation, they contribute to its effectiveness.  I begin by working out in more detail 
the civic republican position that I advance and by considering the deliberation-
enhancing features of the law of zoning in Quebec. 
 
II. CIVIC REPUBLICANISM AND THE DELIBERATIVE FAILURES OF 
MUNICIPAL LAW   
 
 Quebec zoning laws‘ consultative processes facilitate public deliberation.  By 
affording citizens the opportunity to shape the norms that govern them, these 
processes aim to place municipal officials in a position to consider the interests of 
those affected by the regulation.  By so limiting the likelihood that the state will act in 
ways that are not justifiable to those subject to regulation and by providing 
opportunities to contest proposed state action, these processes serve civic republican 
ends.  They prevent non-domination (and not mere non-interference), because they 
provide opportunities for the state to justify its actions (or non-actions) to citizens 
and they enable citizens to engage actively in self-rule.12  Civic republican theorists 
have disagreed about the capacity of deliberative processes such as these to yield civic 
republican ends and before I turn to consider the details of Quebec‘s zoning regime, I 
will briefly engage this debate. 
 
A. Civic Republicanism and Deliberative Democratic Institutions 
 Professor Richard Bellamy has argued that pervasive and persistent disagreement 
about the substance of political, moral and legal decisions is an inescapable feature of 
political life,13 and that the civic republican injunction against domination requires an 
institutional response to this state of affairs that extends to citizens ―equal concern 
and respect as autonomous reasonors.‖
14  Bellamy argues that democracies with 
thriving political party systems provide just such institutions.  It is in these systems, 
Bellamy argues, that citizens can participate on equal political terms with one another.  
He writes:  
 
So long as a system of equal votes, majority rule and party 
competition – however interpreted – offers a plausible system for 
giving citizens an equal say in the ways collective arrangements are 
organized – including those of the democratic process – then a 
                                                          
12  Bellamy argues that it is this focus on self-rule that distinguishes civic republicanism from liberal 
 theories which are concerned primarily with limits on the power of government. Richard Bellamy, 
 Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defense of the Constitutionality of Democracy (Cambridge, U.K.: 
 Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 156: ―Seeing freedom as liberty from mastery rather than 
 freedom from interference brings out this common rationale (that relating to individuals as 
 autonomous agents who should be allowed to choose and think for themselves, even when that 
 involves making mistakes), while revealing why we should see limited government in terms of 
 popular controls rather than a priori restrictions on certain kinds of governmental intervention‖.   
13  For this point, he draws on Professor Jeremy Waldron‘s work. See e.g. Jeremy Waldron, ―The Core 
 of the Case Against Judicial Review‖ (2006) 115 Yale LJ 1346.  
14  Bellamy, supra note 12 at 191.   
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self-constituting democratic constitution that avoids dominating 
through arbitrary rule will have been secured.15 
 
 Modern political parties have particular significance for Bellamy because, he 
argues, they track broad ideological differences that cut across a whole range of issues 
in society.16  According to him, political parties offer citizens bundles of policy 
proposals that reflect the policy compromises and inputs of interest group coalitions 
that operate within a broadly shared ideological framework.  Political parties, Bellamy 
argues, enable citizens to engage in public reasoning by voting on these policy 
bundles. 
 Moreover, Bellamy identifies seven features of public reasoning which, taken 
together, exemplify the civic republican virtue of non-domination.  They are: 1) a 
commitment to openness and transparency; 2) an ethos of public-spiritedness, which 
guides political proceedings; 3) the presence of publically available rules, reasons and 
conventions; 4) a focus on the public good rather than private interests; 5) the use of 
reasons that are accessible to all members of the public; 6) the fact that reasoning is 
undertaken by the public; 7) the production of decisions that will be found acceptable 
by all members of the public.17  Bellamy argues that political parties, of the kind for 
which he advocates, facilitate political discourse which evidences all these features of 
public reasoning.18 
 Although Bellamy‘s main theoretical opponents are ―legal constitutionalists‖ who 
advocate for constitutionally entrenched rights, the substantive content of which is 
determined by the judiciary, he also directs criticisms towards deliberative democrats 
who advocate for deliberative institutions, such as citizens‘ juries, which are designed 
to minimize the likelihood participants will appeal to ―prejudiced, uniformed or 
unreasoned arguments.‖19  Bellamy notes that experts typically constitute such bodies 
and their agendas, and that because there are no guarantees that these constituting 
acts track the interests of the citizens rather than the paternalistic views of experts, 
these institutions create a risk that experts will dominate citizens.  Bellamy further 
argues that proponents of deliberative democracy assume that the outcome of a 
properly structured deliberation will be a principled consensus, which yields a right 
answer to contentious public disagreements.20  But, according to Bellamy, this focus 
on substantive outcomes is misguided, given the fact of pervasive and persistent 
political disagreement.  Under these conditions, he argues, right answers are 
unattainable,21 and the appropriate focus of civic republican analytical attention should 
instead be on deliberative procedures and institutions that evince the seven features 
of public reasoning identified above.  Such procedures and institutions, he argues, 
                                                          
15  Ibid at 220-21. 
16  Bellamy identifies two broad sets of such cleavages — the centre-periphery and the right-left. Ibid at 
 233-39. 
17  Ibid  at 179. 
18  Ibid at 221-39. 
19  Ibid at 190. 
20  Ibid at 188. Bellamy argues further that the deliberative democratic institutions can sometimes 
 exacerbate domination. Ibid at 189. I address that critique in my discussion of the institutional design 
 features of ward councils.  See below.   
21  See Waldron, supra note 13.  
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provide effective safeguards against domination, in particular, because they increase 
the likelihood that political activity will yield mutually acceptable compromises.  
According to Bellamy, compromises of this sort evidence a due regard for citizens‘ 
substantive views of policy.22   
 Bellamy‘s argument is primarily concerned with debates about the role and 
appropriateness of judicial review, in the context of constitutional rights.  Whatever 
the merits of the argument in that context, they do not apply in the rule-making 
context and, what is of particular relevance to this paper, his arguments against 
deliberative democracy do not apply in the context of the creation of zoning by-laws.  
Let us begin by taking off the table Bellamy‘s claim that deliberative democrats are 
committed to right answers to policy disagreements.  A commitment to deliberative 
democracy does not necessarily entail a commitment to right answers.  One might 
argue instead that the value of deliberative democratic procedures lies in the fact that 
they provide citizens with opportunities to participate directly in the state‘s decision-
making.  As we shall see below, if designed appropriately, these procedures provide 
occasions for officials to engage in public reason-giving and for citizens to engage in 
self-rule.23  These features of appropriately designed deliberative procedures provide 
civic republican safeguards against domination by the state and a civic republican can 
advocate for these procedural safeguards without reference to arguments about the 
correctness or even the wisdom of the substantive outcomes that result from these 
procedures. 
 Now that we have considered and rejected Bellamy‘s arguments linking theories 
of deliberative democracy to claims about right answers to political disputes, we can 
turn to address his claim that because experts control the agendas of deliberative 
democratic institutions such as citizen‘s juries, and there are no guarantees that these 
experts, when deciding upon the content of these agendas, are responsive to the 
interests of citizens.  This concern about expertise is reflected in Bellamy‘s general 
argument about the role of expertise in political decision-making.  He writes:  
 
It might be argued that some political decisions are purely 
technical, regarding the choice of the most appropriate means to 
agreed ends.  However, putting to one side the fact that experts 
frequently disagree even in quite technical areas, such as nuclear 
power, most policy assessments tend to involve politically 
contentious moral and ideological judgments at some level or 
another.24 
 
                                                          
22  Bellamy defends the value of such compromises when he writes: ―compromise often goes deeper 
 than … attempts to ‗split the difference‘. Instead, there is a genuine effort to integrate the different 
 concerns and the various weightings they have for those involved. … For a genuine process of 
 ‗hearing the other side‘ produces compromises that are not only strategic alternations of the means to 
 better pursue self-interested ends but also promote changes to these ends.  In this way, the various 
 sides are shown not only a formal respect as rights-bearers but also equal concern with regard to their 
 substantive views of what their rights are and the ways they wish to exercise them.‖ Bellamy, supra 
 note 12 at 193-94. 
23  See below, Part III.  
24  Bellamy, supra note 12 at 169.   
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There are two related arguments here: the first targets the specific role of experts in 
creating deliberative democratic institutions and the second addresses the general role 
of expertise in political decisions.  The first argument about the role of experts can be 
answered by noting that some deliberative democratic institutions are constituted by 
actors with democratic pedigree, and not by experts.  A number of such institutions, 
including the ward councils, are created at the initiative of ordinary citizens and under 
the authority of legislation.25  Moreover, as we shall see, ward council members are 
democratically elected and their agendas are set by elected officials.26  The 
composition and agendas of these institutions are established through democratic 
means, not by experts and as a result, Bellamy‘s first argument against deliberative 
democratic institutions simply does not apply to a significant set of these institutions. 
 Bellamy‘s second, more general argument about the role of expertise in political 
decision-making leads him to the conclusion that ―the only peers entitled to choose 
between alternative collective moral and political choices are not the community of 
experts in these (specialized regulatory) fields but the community of all moral and 
political reasonors.‖
27  This argument specifically targets the claim that judges are 
worthy of deference on constitutional matters because they possess relevant 
expertise.  One may accept Bellamy‘s claim in the context of judicial review, yet argue 
that the claim requires more nuance in the context of the administrative state.  One of 
the central rationales for administrative agencies is that they have specialized expertise 
that legislatures do not28 and one of the key reasons for regulations is that legislatures 
lack the expert knowledge and time necessary to generate legislation that tracks the 
on-the-ground developments in specific regulatory domains.29  In the context of the 
administrative state, it may be true that ―the community of all moral and political 
reasonors‖ indirectly creates, through legislation, the framework within which 
administrative agencies work, but legislation also delegates to the administrative 
agencies the authority to make specific regulatory choices that have ―collective moral 
and political‖ dimensions.     
                                                          
25  See below. For a description of deliberative institutions that are not constituted by experts, see 
 Gessica Gropp et al ―La Participation citoyenne et le développement des communautés: fiches 
 descriptive de 10 expériences de participation citoyenne‖, Doc. 2, online: Institut national de santé 
 publique <http://www.i-n-s-p-q.qc.ca/Developpement- Social/docs/participation_ citoyenne_10_
 experiences.pdf>. 
26  See below, Part II. 
27  Bellamy, supra note 12 at 169. 
28  John Willis, ―Canadian Administrative Law in Retrospect‖ (1974) 24 UTLJ 225 and John Willis, 
 ―Lawyers' Values and Civil Servants' Values‖ (1968) 18 UTLJ 351. For the rise of expertise in 
 municipal governance during the New Deal era, see C. Richard Tindal & Susan Nobes Tindal, Local 
 Government in Canada (Toronto: Nelson Education, 2004) c. 2. For an examination of how the idea of 
 planning as a science emerged in this era, see Robert H. Nelson, ―Zoning Myth and Practice: From 
 Euclid Into the Future‖ in Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden, eds, Zoning and the American Dream: 
 Promises Still to Keep (Chicago: Planners Press, 1989). For an examination of this movement, stressing 
 its anti-corruption motivations, see Gerald Frug, City Making: Building Communities Without Building 
 Walls (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) at 51-52. In the American administrative law 
 context, see Richard Stewart, ―The Reformation of American Administrative Law‖ (1974-1975) 88 
 Harv L Rev 1667 at 1678 and Martin Shapiro, Who Guards the Guardians? Judicial Control of 
 Administration (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1988) at 36-38 and Cass R. Sunstein, 
 After the Rights Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990) c. 1. 
29  See generally Harry Arthurs, ―Regulation-Making: The Creative Opportunities of the Inevitable‖ 
 (1970) 8 Alta L Rev 315.  
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 Of course there is much debate about how and whether these choices and 
delegations are subject to democratic controls.30  Nonetheless, the very fact of this 
delegated authority suggests that the binary choice offered by Bellamy – the 
community of experts or the community of all moral and political reasonors – is, in 
the context of the administrative state, not clear-cut.31  In addition, this binary 
opposition misses the complex interplay between expert and citizen opinion in the 
administrative state.  There may be some circumstances in which experts provide 
necessary guidance to ordinary citizens and enable the latter to make informed 
judgments about public policy issues.32  For instance, ombudsman offices, through 
their investigative and reporting functions assist citizens in monitoring government 
action;33  human rights commissions often have similar educational roles,34 as do 
entities charged with managing and overseeing victims of crime compensation funds.35  
In addition, there may be conditions under which it is only with the input of those 
affected by regulation that policy makers, including experts, can create effective 
regulation.36  This is particularly the case where private commercial actors37 or 
                                                          
30  For an overview of this debate in the American context, see Steven P. Croley, ―Theories of 
 Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process‖ (1998) 98 Colum L Rev 1 and in the Canadian 
 context, see Genevieve Cartier, ―Procedural Fairness in Legislative Functions: The End of Judicial 
 Abstinence?‖ (2003) 53 UTLJ 217 at 218. For a civic republican defense of the administrative state, 
 which argues that administrative agencies, because of their expertise and delegated authority, are 
 better positioned to engage in public reasoning than legislatures or courts, see Mark Seidenfeld, ―A 
 Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State‖ (1991-1992) 105 Harv L Rev 1515 at 1542. 
 He writes: ―Administrative agencies, however, fall between the extremes of the politically over-
 responsive Congress and the over-insulated courts. Agencies are therefore prime candidates to 
 institute a civic republican model of policymaking.‖ 
31  For a detailed civic republican analysis of the administrative state, which acknowledges the complex 
 interplay between legislatures and administrative agencies to whom legislatures delegate authority to 
 agencies precisely because these agencies are better positioned than the electorate at large or its 
 elected representatives to engage in detailed policy-making, see Henry S. Richardson, Democratic 
 Autonomy: Public Reasoning about the Ends of Public Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 224. 
 He writes: ―there are good reasons for us to hope that agencies develop substantive expertise in the 
 course of pursuing projects that we, through our legislature, have decided that they ought to pursue.‖ 
32  On the capacity of regulation to perform this function, generally, see Cass R. Sunstein, ―Interest 
 Groups in American Public Law‖ (1985-86) 38 Stan L  Rev 29; see also Glen Staszewski, ―Reason-
 giving and Accountability‖ (2009) 93 Minn L Rev 1253.   
33  See e.g. the reporting functions set out in the Public Protector Act, R.S.Q. c. P-32, s. 27. 
34  See e.g. the discussion of the educational mandate of the Ontario Human Rights Commission in 
 Mary Cornish et al, Enforcing Human Rights in Ontario (Aurora, Ont.: Canadian Law Book, 2009) at 70-
 82. 
35 For an overview of services provided by Victims‘ Services in Saskatchewan, see Victims Services 
 Branch, online: Government of Saskatchewan <http://www.justice.gov.sk.ca/victimsservices>.  
36  See Jason Corburn, ―Bringing Local Knowledge into Environmental Decision Making‖ (2003) 22 
 Journal of Planning Education and Research 420. 
37  This is one of the standard arguments for recourse to government by contract, and in particular, by 
 public-private partnerships. For an historical overview of these debates, see William J. Novak, 
 ―Public-Private Governance: A Historical Introduction‖ in Jody Freeman and Martha Minow, eds, 
 Government By Contract (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009) 23. For the specific 
 advantages of public-private partnerships, see E.S. Savas, Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships 
 (New York: Seven Bridges Press, 2000) at 238-41. For an overview of the uses of these partnerships 
 in Canada, see Conference Board of Canada, Steering A Tricky Course: Effective Public-Private Partnerships 
 for the Provision of Transportation Infrastructure and Services, online: Conference Board of Canada 
 <http://www.conferenceboard.ca/documents.aspx?did=2751>. For a general assessment of private-
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citizens,38 and not officials, have the requisite level of on-the-ground knowledge for 
regulation to be effective.  In this paper, we shall see that municipal processes 
incorporate both kinds of expert-citizen interplay.    
 In this section, I have staked out specific theoretical ground in contemporary civic 
republican debates.  In particular, I have argued that, contra Bellamy, deliberative 
democratic institutions are not ruled out by civic republican theory and in particular, 
by civic republican accounts of the administrative state.  With the theoretical space 
thus narrowed, I turn now to consider some of the consultative processes of Quebec 
municipal law and to examine how they manifest a commitment to civic 
republicanism.  
 
B. Consultation Requirements 
 Municipal law statutes in Canada and Quebec impose notice, publicity and 
consultation requirements on municipal councils when they pass zoning by-laws.39  In 
Quebec, after a municipal council has adopted a draft by-law, the clerk or secretary 
treasurer of the municipality must submit a certified copy to the relevant regional 
authority.40  He or she must post in the office of the municipality notice of a public 
meeting to discuss the proposed by-law and must publish the notice in a newspaper.41  
In addition, legislation prescribes that the municipality shall hold a public hearing on 
a draft by-law, at a date, time, and place of the council‘s choosing.42  At that meeting 
the mayor or the mayor‘s designate presides, and according to the legislation, shall 
explain the draft by-law and hear anyone who wants to express an opinion about the 
draft.43 Some jurisdictions require additional consultations at the sub-municipal 
(borough or ward) level44 and some consultations are conducted by a specialized 
office of a municipality, either at the request of the municipal council, or pursuant to 
applicable legislation.45  If the by-law does not contain provisions that are potentially 
subject to referendum, the draft by-law is adopted after the public meeting, with or 
without changes.46   
                                                                                                                                     
 public partnerships, including their democratic and efficiency dimensions, see Pauline Vaillancourt 
 Rosenau, ―The Strengths and Weaknesses of Public-Private Policy Partnerships‖ in Pauline 
 Vaillancourt Rosenau, ed, Public-Private Policy Partnerships (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000) 217. 
38  See e.g. the initiatives described in Archon Fung, ―Deliberative Democracy, Chicago-Style: Grass-
 roots Governance in Policing and Public Education‖ in Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright, eds, 
 Deepening Demcoracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (New York: Verso, 
 2003) 111. 
39  These requirements are subject to judicial oversight. See Wiswell v. Metropolitan Corporation of Greater 
 Winnipeg, [1965] S.C.R. 512 and Marc-André LeChasseur, Zonage et urbanisme en droit municipal québécois 
 (Montreal: Wilson & LaFleur, 2009) at 70. 
40  An Act Respecting Land Use Planning and Development, R.S.Q. c. A-19.1, s. 124 [L.A.U.]. 
41  Ibid. at s.126. Failure to provide notice in the manner prescribed may result in the by-law‘s being 
 quashed. See William Buholzer, Halsbury’s Laws of Canada-Planning and Zoning (Markham, Ont.: 
 LexisNexis, 2008) at 386. 
42 L.A.U., supra note 40 at s.125. 
43  Ibid. at s. 127. 
44  See Charter of ville de Lévis, R.S.Q. c. C-11.2, s. 86(1); Charter of ville de Québec, R.S.Q. c. C-11.5, s. 74.1. 
45  See Charter of the ville de Montréal, R.S.Q. c. C-11.4, s. 83. 
46  L.A.U., supra note 40 at s. 134. Buholzer notes that unlike other provincial legislation, Quebec law 
 does not require an additional public hearing if council alters a draft by-law after the public hearing. 
 Buholzer, supra note 41 at 395. 
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 For those provisions of draft zoning by-laws which are subject to referendum 
requirements,47 the degree of citizen scrutiny is even greater.  If a draft zoning by-law 
contains a provision that is subject to a referendum, the person responsible for 
explaining the by-law in the public meeting must identify the provision and explain 
the right that certain persons have to make an application to submit the provision to 
approval to qualified voters for approval.48  After this meeting, the council must adopt 
a second draft by-law, and no provision in this second draft by-law can be included 
that does not relate to a matter included in the first draft by-law.49  A summary of this 
draft by-law may be produced by the municipality and may be made available free of 
charge to anyone who requests it.50   The legislation then sets out the conditions under 
which an application for a referendum concerning such a draft by-law may be made51 
and requires that the municipal clerk or secretary treasurer issue a public notice of the 
second draft by-law that includes information about who may sign onto an 
application with respect to which provisions, as well as the requirements for a valid 
application.52  If no valid applications are made, council must adopt the draft by-law 
without change.53  If a valid application has been received, the by-law must be 
approved by qualified voters, in accordance with the relevant legislation.54 If a 
provision receives a majority of affirmative votes (or the amount specified in the 
provisions governing the referendum), the by-law is deemed to be approved by the 
qualified voters55 and comes into force, subject to subsequent approval processes to 
ensure conformity with the objectives of the relevant land use planning and 
development plan.56 
 These process requirements impose on state officials a requirement to make 
public their decisions, to open them to direct citizen scrutiny and to justify them 
directly to citizens.  They therefore appear to satisfy the civic republican criteria for 
non-domination that we considered above.  Yet several well-established criticisms of 
municipal governments suggest that such processes fail to function effectively, in part 
because municipal governments themselves are imperfect forums of deliberation.  I 
turn now to raise these criticisms, before introducing institutions that can answer 
them.  We will see that in addition to providing a justificatory account of municipal 
law, civic republicanism can generate institutional design proposals.            
 
C. The Deliberative Failures of Municipal Councils 
 Consider first a criticism of the representativeness of municipal institutions.  
Municipal governments are susceptible to being dominated by local majorities who 
are indifferent or hostile to minority interests, and therefore they can systematically 
                                                          
47  For the comprehensive list, see L.A.U., supra note 40 at s. 123. 
48  Ibid. at s. 127. 
49  Ibid. at s. 128. 
50  Ibid. at s. 129.   
51  Ibid. at s. 130. 
52  Ibid. at s. 132. 
53  Ibid. at s. 135. 
54  Ibid. at s. 136.1. The relevant legislation is An Act Respecting Elections and Referendums in Municipalities, 
 R.S.Q. c. E-2.2 [E.R.M.]. 
55  Ibid. at s. 576.  
56  See L.A.U., supra note 40 at ss. 137.15, 137.16. 
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fail to represent those interests.  An extensive literature suggests that standard public 
law problems of majoritarianism are intensified when political jurisdictions are small. 57  
In small jurisdictions there is a high risk of homogeneity and, as a consequence, of 
persistent majority control of political institutions.  This theoretical insight has been 
borne out by experience.58  In its most intense form, this majority control can result in 
the physical exclusion of minorities from municipalities.  Because municipalities have 
extensive control over land use regulations within their jurisdictions, majorities within 
already homogeneous municipalities can reinforce that homogeneity by enacting 
exclusionary measures.  ―Exclusionary zoning‖ occurs in wealthier municipalities, 
where residents seek to protect property values and limit demand and expenditure on 
social services by preventing lower-income residents from residing within their 
borders.  A standard mechanism of exclusionary zoning is a by-law that limits 
residential housing to single-family units on large lots.   Because only higher income 
households can afford this kind of housing, such by-laws exclude lower income 
households.59   
 In addition to this problem of majoritarian dominance, there is a second way in 
which municipal institutions can fail to represent significant democratic interests.  
Municipal governments are susceptible to being dominated by intensely motivated 
and well-resourced minorities, and therefore may act in ways that are contrary to the 
preferences of the majority.60   The general situation of small group dominance has 
been addressed extensively within public choice literature and in broad outlines, it is 
as follows.  The individual preferences of members of a group which represents the 
majority of the population on a given issue can be of relatively low intensity.  These 
individuals will not be sufficiently motivated to publicly influence government policy 
and thereby give effect to their preferences.  Nonetheless, when aggregated, their 
preferences can outweigh those of any other group.  By contrast, individuals in a 
second group may each have intense preferences with respect to an issue.  This group 
may numerically constitute a minority within the jurisdiction and, when aggregated, 
the weight of their preferences may be lower than the aggregated preferences of the 
majority.  Yet the individuals in this minority can be highly motivated to shape 
government policy, and when those who share such preferences are well-resourced, 
they can influence government to give effect to their preferences.61   
 This scenario describes land developers‘ influence within municipalities.  
Developers are well-resourced and highly motivated to influence municipal land use 
                                                          
57  See e.g. Carol M. Rose, ―New Models for Local Land Use Decisions‖ (1984-85) 79 Nw UL Rev 1155 
 at 1159-60; Christopher Serkin, ―Big Differences for Small Governments: Local Governments and 
 the Takings Clause‖ (2006) 81 NYUL Rev 1624. 
58  See e.g. Richard C. Schragger, ―Consuming Government‖ (2003) 101 Mich L Rev 1824 at 1834, 
 Sheryl D. Cashin, ―Localism, Self-Interest and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: Addressing 
 Barriers to the New Regionalism‖ (2000) 88 Geo LJ 1985 at 1991-2015, Richard Briffault, ―Our 
 Localism, Part II: Localism and Legal Theory‖ (1990) 90 Colum L Rev 346 at 393.   
59  On exclusionary zoning and its effects generally, see Richard Briffault, ―Localism and Regionalism‖ 
 (2000) 48 Buff L Rev 1 at 25-26 and Myron Orfield, Metropolitics (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
 Institution, 1997) at 5-6. 
60  Neil K. Komesar, Law’s Limits: The Rule of Law and the Supply and Demand of Rights (Cambridge, U.K.: 
 Cambridge University Press, 2001) c. 4. 
61  On this point about the relative advantages of small and large groups, see Mancur Olson, The Logic of 
 Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
 1971) at 58-59. 
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regulation.  Residents who constitute the majority within a municipality may prefer 
land use regulations that are at odds with those sought by developers, but because 
each of these residents is significantly less motivated than developers to participate in 
planning processes, they will not participate or will not participate as intensely, and 
their preferences will go unsatisfied.62  In addition, participation in land use processes 
may represent a cost to residents that they cannot afford, either because they cannot 
afford to spend to participate (i.e., by paying for child-care or transportation costs) or 
because work obligations prevent them from participating.63  As a result, the minority 
preferences dominate over those of the majority and municipal institutions fail to 
represent a democratically significant set of interests. 
 Consider next a more direct criticism of participatory processes in municipalities.  
Citizen involvement in these processes is voluntary and the empirical literature 
strongly suggests that when participatory processes are of this nature, some groups 
are significantly over-represented.  Those individuals who have significant time and 
intellectual and monetary resources tend to participate most effectively in voluntary 
processes.64  By contrast-as we have just seen-individuals whose work or family 
circumstances make it burdensome to participate in voluntary institutions typically 
under-engage.   Moreover, among those who do participate in voluntary participatory 
settings, there are individuals who are unable to express themselves in the vernacular 
of the educated professional classes.  The empirical literature suggests that such 
individuals tend to defer to those more comfortable in that vernacular.65  At the 
municipal level of governance, this problem is compounded by the structure of 
meetings that are open to the public.  In general, citizens have very limited time to 
speak and as a result, often do little more than air grievances that do not occasion 
reasoned engagement.66       
                                                          
62  Komesar, supra note 60. For an argument that site-specific land-use decisions are highly likely to 
 evidence capture, precisely because there is insufficient legislative log-rolling and deliberation, see 
 Rose, supra note 57 at 1159-60.   
63  Organizations that support deliberative processes sometimes attempt to overcome these limitations 
 by covering transportation costs, providing child-care services or offering modest stipends. See e.g. 
 Josh Lerner, ―Participatory Budgeting in Canada‖ in Daniel Chavez & Einar Braathen, eds, Progressive 
 Cities (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research, forthcoming), online: 
 Transnational Institute <http://www.tni.org/archives/newpol-docs_pbcanada> and Daniel 
 Schugurensky, ―The Tango of Citizenship Learning and Participatory Democracy‖ in Karsten 
 Mundel & Daniel Schugurensky, eds, Lifelong Citizenship Learning, Participatory Democracy and Social 
 Change (Toronto: Transformative Learning Centre, 2004) 607.  
64  Elena Fagotto & Archon Fung, ―Empowered Participation in Urban Governance: The Minneapolis 
 Neighborhood Revitalization Program‖ (2006) 30 Journal of Urban and Regional Research 638 at 
 643. 
65  Lynn Sanders, ―Against Deliberation‖ (1997) 25 Political Theory 347. 
66  See e.g. Heather Campbell & Robert Marshall, ―Public Involvement and Planning: Looking Beyond 
 the One to the Many‖ (2000) 5 International Planning Studies 321 at 331. In the Canadian context, 
 see Mariana Valverde & Ron Levi, ―Freedom of the City: Canadian Cities and the Quest for 
 Governmental Status‖ (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall LJ 409 at 441 for a description of such unreflective 
 discourse. 
provincial law requires cities contemplating zoning changes to hold public meetings 
and consultations in often complicated and expensive ways.  This obligation gives a 
platform to those who oppose inclusionary measures; they are generally more 
educated and better equipped to participate in meetings, petitions and phone calls 
to councilors than those who are the potential beneficiaries of inclusionary zoning 
measures.  In Toronto, predictably, most of the ―untold number of community 
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 The literature suggests, then, that municipal governments are susceptible to a 
variety of conditions that lead to deliberative failures.  Municipal councils can be 
dominated by majority or minority interests that are unresponsive to segments of the 
electorate, and municipal processes can be overly solicitous of certain privileged 
voices.  The challenge for the remainder of this paper lies in considering one kind of 
institution, the ward council, which is capable of overcoming these conditions.  I 
begin by setting out the structure of the ward councils before turning to argue that 
they respond to the deliberative failures of municipal governments. 
 
III. WARD COUNCILS AS DELIBERATIVE INSTITUTIONS 
 
A. The Structure of Ward Councils  
 The structure of ward councils is complex and I will begin my discussion of them 
by laying out that structure in some detail.  Section 35 of the Charter of Ville de Québec67 
provides that ―the city council shall, by by-law, divide the territory of the city into 
wards within which a ward council may be established.‖  Section 35.1 provides that 
on the application of 300 persons who are electors within the ward, or who represent 
a commercial, industrial, institution or community institution situated in the ward, the 
procedure to establish a ward council can begin.  The procedure consists of a public 
meeting, in which a poll is held to decide on the establishment of the ward council. 68  
Following a majority vote of eligible voters, the city council may decide to establish a 
ward council.69  The city council determines, by by-law, the formalities for calling and 
holding ward council meetings, the responsibilities of general members and boards of 
directors, the term limits of the latter, as well as any other operational matters. 70  All 
persons of full age who reside in the ward and persons of full age who represent a 
commercial, industrial, institutional or community institution situated within the ward 
are general members of the council and are entitled to vote on matters that come 
before the council.71  The legislation provides that councils are to be funded by the 
city, and that a ward council is under an obligation to report to the city council. 72  The 
city is under an obligation to identify a set of subject matters, and establish a public 
consultation process with the ward council on those matters.73  In addition, the ward 
council may on its own initiative, give advice to the city council, the executive 
committee or a borough council on any matter concerning the ward.74 
 Each ward council is managed by a board of directors (conseil d’administration).  The 
members of the board are elected every two years by ward members. 75  Each board of 
                                                                                                                                     
meetings‖ around the new bylaw degenerated into angry shouting matches (citations 
omitted). 
67  Charter of ville de Québec, supra note 44.   
68  Ibid at ss. 35.3-35.4. 
69  Ibid at s. 35.5. 
70  Ibid at s. 35.13. 
71  Ibid at s. 35.15. 
72  Ibid at ss. 35.16, 35.17. 
73  Ibid at s. 36. 
74  Ibid at s. 36.1. 
75  Quebec City, Revised By-law, c. F-1, Règlement sur le fonctionnement des conseils de quartier (January 30, 
 2007), s. 47.   
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directors is comprised of four men and four women.76  In addition to these eight 
members of the board there is a ninth who is a representative of a commercial, 
industrial or institutional establishment in the ward.77  The members of the board act 
on a voluntary basis. 78 A city councilor who represents an electoral district situated in 
whole or in part in the ward can be a non-voting member of the board of directors.79  
It is also a practice for boroughs to put at the disposal of ward councils a facilitator 
(agent de consultation) who is present at all meetings of the ward councils, aids in their 
preparation, and ensures that the records and agendas of meetings are completed.80 
 In Quebec City, ward councils are mandatorily consulted on some matters.  These 
include: the adoption or modification of an official plan for the ward council; 
regulations that can modify municipal services in the ward council; a development 
project that affects the ward; a zoning project or a major renovation of property 
within the ward, including a public park or recreational facilities; or a project that 
changes the names of streets or public places in the ward.81 More generally, ward 
councils are consulted by the executive committee or the borough councils 
concerning any project that would modify a zoning regulation and that would be the 
object of a public hearing or consultation.82  The practice of consultation seems to 
incorporate an even broader range of topics.83 Whenever the city council or its 
executive committee consults a ward council, the latter must inform the borough of 
the consultation and the ward council must submit the result of any consultation to 
the requesting body, as well as to the borough, which can then make 
recommendations.84  In addition, a ward council can initiate a consultation on any 
subject matter that affects the ward.85  Consultations are supported by the Service des 
communications et des directions d’arrondissement, which is a department within the City of 
Quebec charged with putting into effect the City‘s public consultation policy, setting 
out and putting into place implementation plans for the ward councils, putting into 
place a training program for members of the ward council and developing effective 
                                                          
76  Ibid at s. 43. 
77  Ibid. 
78  Ibid at s. 86. 
79  Ibid at s. 44. 
80  Laurence Bherer, Une lecture institutionaliste du phénomène participatif (Ph.D. Dissertation, Université de 
 Montesquieu Bordeaux IV, 2003) at 225 [unpublished]; Laurence Bherer and Sandra Breux, Les 
 conseils d’arrondissment et les conseils de quartier de la Ville de Québec : similitude, opposition ou complèmentarité? 
 (Montreal: INRS-Urbanisation, Culture et Société, 2003) at 5, online: Villes Régions Monde 
 <http://www.vrm.ca/travaux_vrm.asp?ID=320>. See also Bherer, Une lecture institutionaliste du 
 phénomène participatif, supra at 254-55.   
81  Quebec City, Revised By-law, c. P-4, Règlement sur la politique de consultation publique (March 19, 2007), s. 
 5.1.3.  
82  Ibid. The articles setting out the subject matters that require a public hearing or consultation are listed 
 in L.A.U., supra note 40 at ss. 125-127.   
83  Bherer, Une lecture institutionaliste du phénomène participatif, supra note 80 at 225. 
84  Charter of Ville de Québec, supra note 44 at s. 72.1; Règlement sur la politique de consultation publique, supra 
 note 81 at s. 5.1.3.   
85  Règlement sur la politique de consultation publique, ibid.   
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communication strategies.86  Ward councils are required to report to the city and the 
borough council on its activities in the time and manner prescribed.87  
 Consultations initiated by the city or a borough can take the form of a request for 
an opinion or of a mandate to hold a public consultation.88  Ward councils respond to 
requests for opinion in the course of regular meetings, which are open to the public 89  
By contrast, a public meeting consultation has specific publicity requirements 
including that the published notice provide a clear and concise statement of the 
project to be addressed in the consultation and of the relevant issues.  A public 
consultation also has a specific format: the consultation begins with a statement of 
the issues, followed by a question period and concluding with commentary by the 
ward council members and an expression of their opinion of the matter. 90  A report 
resulting from the public consultation must include a summary of the public opinions 
expressed in the consultation, commentary by the ward council members and 
recommendations.91  The report is sent to the body that initiated the consultation and 
is made available to the members of city council, the executive committee of the city 
and to the borough council, as well as to anyone who requests it.92  There is then a 
public announcement of the means and results of the consultation.93  Whether the 
ward council is consulted through the means of a request for an opinion or a public 
consultation, the entity that originates the consultation presents discrete options to be 
voted upon.94  The recommendations of the ward councils are not binding, although 
according to the Quebec City website they are generally followed. 
 
B. Ward Councils as Responses to the Deliberative Failures of Municipal 
Institutions 
 Now that we have seen the structure and practice of ward councils, let us turn to 
consider how ward councils offer a civic republican response to the democratic 
deficits identified above.  Consider first the problem of neglected interests.  Recall 
that local governments are particularly susceptible to either majoritarian dominance 
wherein minority interests are systematically under-considered, or to special interest 
capture wherein the interests of the majority are disregarded.  Ward councils act as a 
counter-weight to these tendencies by making public the views of ordinary citizens 
                                                          
86 Quebec City, Service des communications (last visited Apr. 28, 2010), online: Ville de Québec 
 <http://www.ville.quebec.qc.ca/apropos/vie_democratique/administration/services_organismes_m
 unicipaux/dga_services_soutien/communications.aspx>. 
87  Charter of Ville de Québec, supra note 44 at ss. 35.16-35.17. 
88  Règlement sur la politique de consultation publique, supra note 81 at s. 5.1.4.    
89  According to Professor Bherer, these requests typically involve minor matters. Bherer, Une lecture 
 institutionaliste du phénomène participatif, supra note 80 at 226. For an example of such a request, 
 undertaken in the course of a regular meeting of conseils de quartier, see the minutes posted online: 
 Ville de Québec <http://www.ville.quebec.qc.ca/docs/pv/conseils_quartier/lacite/vieux-
 quebec/vieux-quebec-capblanc-colline-parlementaire_0906171900.pdf> 
90  Règlement sur la politique de consultation publique, supra note 81 at ss. 3.3.1-3.3.4.   
91  Ibid at ss. 3.3.4-3.3.5. 
92  Ibid at s. 3.3.4. 
93  Ibid at s. 3.3.5. For an example of the format and result of a public consultation at a conseil de
 quartier, see the report online: Ville de Québec <http://www.ville.quebec.qc.ca/apropos/
 vie_democratique/participation_citoyenne/conseils_quartier/vieux quebec/docs/ 
 consultation_borne-interactive_recommandations_cq.pdf>. 
94  Bherer, Une lecture institutionaliste du phénomène participatif, supra note 80 at 226. 
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and by putting local governments in the position of either accepting or rejecting those 
views.  Local governments must openly consider concerns that a majority or a special 
interest minority might prefer to ignore. This publicity function of the ward councils 
is consistent with that of publicity requirements in public law that compel 
governments to articulate their reasons for action when there is good reason to think 
that they are pursuing policies that evince a disregard for significant interests.95   The 
evidence suggests that ward councils fulfill this publicity function well: although 
merely advisory in nature, ward council opinions are taken seriously and they affect 
policy.96   
 There is a serious challenge to this claim about the capacity of ward councils to 
address representative failings: if these failings are endemic to local governments 
generally, why should ward councils be exempt?  One response focuses on the extent 
to which ward councils can act as counter-weights to majoritarian dominance within 
local governments.  Ward councils enable groups that are minorities within boroughs 
or the city but that are concentrated within neighborhoods to have a voice in local 
government.97  If majorities within such neighborhoods dominate proceedings and 
can compel elected officials to attend to a perspective that would otherwise be 
neglected, they act as a counter-weight to local government majoritarianism.   Ward 
councils provide an institutionalized role for minorities, at least where minorities are 
concentrated in neighborhoods.   
 What then of the problem of special interest group capture?  At the level of the 
borough or the city, the checking function of the ward councils is the same as in the 
case of majority-dominated borough assemblies or city councils.  Those assemblies 
and councils will have to answer to otherwise under-represented groups when such 
groups are concentrated in neighborhoods.  Moreover, if there is a majority in a city 
or borough that holds a view contrary to those interests that dominate the elected 
bodies, it will be represented in a variety of ward councils.  Because consultations are 
mandatory in a broad range of subject matters, even if the majority of residents in a 
borough or city are under-motivated to participate, their voices will be heard through 
their boards of directors, as we shall soon see.   
                                                          
95  For instance, the Minister of Justice is under an obligation to report to the House of Commons any 
 bill or regulation which, in his or her opinion, is inconsistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
 Freedoms. Department of Justice Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. J-2., s. 4.1. Similarly, under s. 33 of the Constitution 
 Act, 1982 legislatures or Parliament can over-ride a judicial finding that legislation is unconstitutional, 
 if they do so expressly and they renew the over-ride in five year intervals. Constitution Act, 1982, s. 33, 
 being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. Since five years is the maximum term of 
 a government, this compels any government to justify its policy choice before the electorate at least 
 once in its term. For proposals to render section 33 more deliberation-enhancing, see Tsvi Kahana, 
 ―The Notwithstanding Mechanism and Public Discussion: Lessons from the Ignored Practice of 
 Section 33 of the Charter‖ (2001) 44 Canadian Public Administration 255. 
96  According to the official Quebec City website (my translation): ―To this point, the municipality has 
followed most of the recommendations of the ward councils. This attests to the importance of these 
institutions, which are unique to Quebec.‖ Ville de Québec, Conseils de quartier (last visited Apr. 28, 
2010), online: Ville de Québec <http://www.ville.quebec.qc.ca/ap- ropos/vie_democratique/ 
participation_citoyenne/conseils_quartier/index.aspx>. 
97  For arguments in favour of local minority control of municipal institutions, see Sheryll D. Cashin, 
 ―Middle Class Black Suburbs and the State of Integration: A Post-Integrationist Vision for 
 Metropolitan America‖ (2001) 86 Cornell L Rev 729. And for general arguments in favor of this kind 
 of ―inter-institutional diversity‖, see Heather Gerken, ―Second-Order Diversity and Disaggregated 
 Democracy‖ (2005) 118 Harv L Rev 1099. 
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 One might accept these counter-weight functions of ward councils yet still be 
concerned about the possibility of special interest capture or majoritarian dominance 
of the ward councils themselves.  A response to this concern requires a consideration 
of the structure of ward council deliberations.  Even if special interests or majorities 
are motivated to dominate ward council they are checked by the deliberative structure 
of the proceedings.  The facilitator and the elected official, as well as professional 
staff are present to ensure that the relevant policy issues and facts are aired.  If special 
interests or majorities attempt to dominate ward council meetings or public 
consultations their voices will have to contend with all others present in an 
environment that facilitates reasoned deliberation.    
 However, as authors have noted, participation rates in ward council meetings are 
variable and in some ward councils the level of participation is anemic.98  In such 
circumstances, one might worry that there are not sufficient voices to give rise to 
truly reasoned deliberation.99  This concern can be met by considering the quorum 
rules and the structure of the boards of directors.  There are three kinds of meetings: 
annual general assemblies, where the annual business of the ward council is 
conducted;100 special assemblies that are convocated at the request of at least one 
hundred members;101 regular meetings of the board of directors, which are open to the 
public and public consultations.  Substantive matters are not addressed in general 
meetings and special assemblies have quorum requirements of 50 members.  There is 
no concern about insufficient deliberation in the first case because no meaningful 
deliberation occurs and there is no concern about lack of attendance in the latter case, 
because the quorum requirements are set sufficiently high that they answer that 
concern.  It is in regular meetings, in which attendance is sparse, that many 
substantive matters arise and that the concern about numbers has most purchase.   
 In these, quorum is achieved when five members of the board of directors are 
present.  The composition of the board of directors is intended to ensure broad 
representation.  Aside from the member representing a business or organization, each 
member of the board is an at-large representative and there is no attempt at sectoral 
representation – the only attempt at demographic representation is the gender 
division on the board.102  The at-large nature of the representation, in combination 
with the deliberative procedures detailed above, aims to limit the extent to which any 
particular group can dominate the proceedings. The literature on group decision-
making suggests that if representation and procedures are constructed in ways that 
counteract pressures which lead to over-valuing certain perspectives, groups can 
engage in careful and meaningful deliberation.103  The literature suggests that even in 
the absence of broad representation, if the relevant information is made available to 
them, groups can effectively deliberate about the public good if participants are 
                                                          
98  Bherer, Une lecture institutionaliste du phénomène participatif, supra note 80 at 257. 
99  In the administrative law literature, this criticism about representativeness has been leveled against 
 civic republicanism. See Stephen P. Croley, ―Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the 
 Administrative Process‖ (1998) 98 Colum L Rev 1 at 81-85.   
100  Règlement sur le fonctionnement des conseils de quartier, supra note 75 at s. 5. 
101  Ibid at s. 2. 
102  Laurence Bherer, ―La démocratie participative et la qualification citoyenne : À la frontière de la 
 société civile et de l‘État‖ (2006) 18 Nouvelles pratiques sociales 24 at 32. 
103  See e.g. Mark Seidenfeld, ―Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity and Judicial Review of Agency Rule-
 Making‖ (2001-2002) 87 Cornell L Rev 486 at n. 92. 
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willing and able to engage in such deliberation.104  And if individuals act in an 
institutional context that facilitates public-minded reasoning, the likelihood that they 
will do so increases. Given the institutional parameters within which ward councils 
operate, the members of the board have strong incentives to consider seriously the 
public interest.105   
 In the end, even if the problems of democratic under-representation cannot be 
eliminated from local governments, the structure of the ward councils aims to 
increase the capacity of under-represented groups to have their concerns heard within 
the institutions of local government and to ensure that deliberative processes 
incorporate diverse voices.  The ward councils place municipal governments under a 
civic republican burden of reasoned justification for their actions.  It is nonetheless 
possible that despite the safeguards described above, individuals or groups with 
intense preferences may exert disproportionate influence in ward council meetings.  
But if their preferences prevail, I suggest it is because of the rhetorical force of the 
arguments that these individuals and groups can bring to bear on the issues.  We shall 
see that within the forum of the ward council, deliberative procedures can level the 
rhetorical playing field.  
 
C. Ward Councils as a Civic Republican Response to Defects in Municipal 
Deliberation  
 Recall that a central problem with voluntary consultative processes is that they 
tend to be dominated by those who have the time to participate and who speak in the 
vernacular of the educated middle class and that those unable to speak in that way 
tend to defer to the judgments of those who can.  Recall further that the consultative 
processes within municipalities tend to be perfunctory.  The first concern about time 
and resources can be partially answered by noting that ward councils provide child 
care for those who participate in meetings and the problem of insufficient time and 
consideration of issues is met by the very existence of ward councils: they enable 
                                                          
104  Parallel institutions can cultivate and strengthen these dispositions. Edmonton provides examples of 
 such institutions. For instance, Neighborhood Leagues are voluntary associations that support 
 community activities and directly engage municipal governance issues. See Ron Kuban, Edmonton’s 
 Urban Villages: The Community League Movement (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2005). Some 
 modern civic republican writers stress that the state is not the only locus of value-formation and that 
 intermediate organizations, such as Neighborhood Leagues, can serve this function. See Cass R. 
 Sunstein, ―Beyond the Republican Revival‖ (1988) 97 Yale LJ 1539 at 1573. In addition, 
 municipalities can provide resources for citizens to inform themselves about substantive law, so that 
 they may engage their officials effectively. For instance, the City of Edmonton, through its Planning 
 Academy, provides affordable courses on the zoning process that are designed for the public. City of 
 Edmonton, Planning Academy (last visited Apr. 28. 2010), online: City of Edmonton 
 <http://www.edmonton.ca/city_government/planning_development/planning-academy.aspx>.     
105 Among sources of these incentives is the scale of the wards: the issues typically at stake in ward 
 council meetings affect ward councilors‘ neighbours, with whom councilors have regular, face to face 
 interactions. On the potential for such interactions to increase decision-makers‘ sense of 
 accountability, see Robert Ellickson, Order Without Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
 1991). On the capacity of informal norms, developed in such face-to-face encounters, to generate 
 norms that regulate their interactions, see Robert Ellickson, The Household: Informal Order Around the 
 Hearth (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008) at 102: ―Relationship-specific norms are 
 informal expectations about how each participant should behave in the future. They emerge from 
 participants‘ spontaneous (i.e. unnegotiated) successes in coordinating with one another.‖ On the 
 general function that institutional roles play in differentiating public and private motivations, see 
 Michelman, supra note 7.  
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extended deliberation that is not possible within the standard strictures of hearing 
processes.106 In the remainder of this section, I will address the potential for 
differences in ways of speaking to influence outcomes.  The deliberative resources 
of ward councils, which aim to counteract this source of influence, come in multiple 
forms.  The City trains ward councilors in how to conduct meetings and as we have 
seen boroughs provide ward councils with facilitators.107 Moreover, professional staff 
and political representatives are present at meetings to provide substantive expertise. 
These mechanisms aim to level the discursive playing field.     
 Ward councils do so by setting ground-rules for discussion, structuring 
deliberation, training participants and distributing the relevant information to all in an 
accessible form.  The experience of participants in similar deliberative institutions 
suggest that when faced with value-laden, complex and technical planning issues, 
ordinary citizens from diverse backgrounds can engage in informed discussions.108  In 
ward councils in particular, the training provided by the City, the presence of 
facilitators, of elected officials who have no vote and are there primarily to inform 
and listen, and of relevant administrators and professionals, structure the deliberative 
processes.  Moreover, the combination of formal procedures and an informal tone in 
discussions creates the conditions for respectful discussion among equals. 109  Formal 
procedures limit the ability of participants to dominate meetings, and the informal 
tone of discussion, coupled with the fact that participants are neighbors who have 
repeat dealings, reinforces the equality of participants.110   
 
D. Objections to the Idea of Ward Councils as Forums for Civic Republican 
Deliberation 
 A critic might object that deliberative institutions at the local government level 
can at best approximate deliberative ideals and that approximations can, in certain 
circumstances, yield outcomes that are worse than institutions that do not take into 
account these ideals at all.  Call this the argument from second-bests.111  In some 
circumstances, according to this argument, divisions in a polity over issues of values 
are so great that processes that aim at reasoned deliberation only sharpen 
                                                          
106 Another possibility for reducing barriers to participation is the moderated online forum. See e.g. 
 Community Research Connections, e-Dialogues for Sustainable Development (last visited Apr. 28. 
 2010), online: Community Research Connections <http://crcresearch.org/research-tools/e-
 dialogues/e-dialogues>.  
107  Règlement sur le fonctionnement des conseils de quartier, supra note 75 at s. 46. 
108  Bherer, Une lecture institutionaliste du phénomène participatif, supra note 80 at 223. For a survey of Canadian 
 examples, see F. Leslie Seidle, ―Citizens Speaking for Themselves: New Avenues for Public 
 Involvement‖ in Hans J. Michelmann, Donald C. Story, & Jeffrey S. Steeves, eds, Political Leadership 
 and Representation in Canada: Essays in Honour of John C. Courtney (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
 2007) 81. 
109  Ibid. 
110  Ibid. On the capacity of informal and formal norms to mutually reinforce practices of reasoned, non-
 dominating deliberation, see Pettit, supra note 10, c. 8. 
111  In the legal literature, the argument from second bests in the design of institutions has been treated 
 most extensively by Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of Legal 
 Interpretation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006). For a discussion on this point, in 
 the context of deliberative democratic institutions, see Jon Elster, ―The Market and the Forum‖ in 
 James Bohman & William Rehg, eds, Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics (Cambridge, 
 Mass.: MIT Press, 1997) 3 at 18.  
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disagreement and highlight the impossibility of coming to reasoned resolutions.  By 
contrast, the argument continues, with decision-making processes that do not stress 
deliberation, deep disagreements over values are not brought to open and public 
view, and there is no expectation that public decision-making involves anything more 
than responsiveness to private preferences.112  According to this objection, in a 
decision-making process where majority preferences determine outcomes, for 
example, via a simple vote, policy outcomes are achieved without open and divisive 
public disagreement and the social harms that deliberative processes create are 
avoided. 
 There is a second objection that can be advanced by the argument from second 
bests: if participants in deliberative processes do not abide by the norms of rational 
deliberation, the objection states, these processes may subvert deliberative ideals 
more than do alternatives that completely ignore them.  For instance, if participants 
in a deliberative process seek to dominate one another they may undermine the ideals 
of equal respect more than they would in a simple vote through which they pursue 
their narrow self-interests.113  At least in the case of a vote without extensive 
deliberation, the argument from second bests concludes, the process itself does not 
subject citizens to manifest domination, although the results may.   
 The downside risks that the argument from second bests raises are real, but they 
can be mitigated by good institutional design.  Consider first the problem of deep 
disagreements over values.  One way of avoiding public and divisive expressions of 
differences over values is to remove issues that give rise to such divisions from the 
ambit of deliberative processes in public institutions.  The literature on negotiated 
rule-making in public law suggests that issues giving rise to deeply entrenched 
divisions are not appropriate for resolution through negotiation, and authors 
therefore recommend systematically excluding such issues from negotiated-rule 
making processes.114   Authors who have examined the operations of ward councils 
suggest that issues of land use regulation typically do not give rise to deep clashes of 
values, and so in general, the objection is inapplicable.115 However, where such 
disagreements do arise, the ultimate decision-making authority lies with elected 
municipal representatives whose decisions are then subject to judicial review, and 
these institutions blunt the impact of deep disagreements among neighbours.    
 Consider next the objection pertaining to domination within deliberative 
proceedings.  Here again, we can respond to the argument from second bests by 
                                                          
112  For a similar argument, made in the constitutional context, which stresses the potential for 
 deliberative processes to create discord, see Jonathan R. Macey, ―The Missing Element in the 
 Republican Revival‖ (1987-1988) 97 Yale LJ 1673 at 1674. See also Cass R. Sunstein, ―The Law of 
 Group Polarization‖ (2002) 10 Journal of Political Philosophy 175.   
113  This example of a failed deliberative process is not merely hypothetical. For an examination of such 
 failures in the context of a specific deliberative initiative in Berkeley, California see Campbell & 
 Marshall, supra note 66.  
114  See e.g. Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, ―The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rule-
 Making‖ (1985-86) 3 Yale J on Reg 133 at 138-140, 152. On negotiated rule-making more generally in 
 public administration, see Lawrence Susskind & Lawrence Cruikshank, Breaking the Impasse: Consensual 
 Approaches to Resolving Public Disputes (New York: Basic Books, 1987). Deliberative democratic theorists 
 have attempted to identify the reasons for which issues can be excluded from discussions in the 
 public sphere. See Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton: 
 Princeton University Press, 2004) at 66-78. 
115  Bherer, Une lecture institutionaliste du phénomène participatif, supra note 80 at 259. 
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incorporating into such proceedings good institutional design principles.  The 
deliberative institutions surveyed above employ trained facilitators who ensure that 
participants have equal air-time; the processes reframe issues in language and 
terminology that is accessible to all; they generate rules that stress the values of 
discussion rather than debate; and they employ membership restrictions that aim to 
ensure some demographic mix.116  These and other institutional safeguards answer the 
objection because they create conditions in which the risk of domination is 
significantly lessened. Ultimately, objections leveled by the argument from second 
bests are empirical in nature and require on-the-ground assessments of institutions.  
Where institutions fail to meet deliberative ideals, and do so in ways that are self-
defeating, we should ensure that there are mechanisms that enable institutions to 
change and avoid these self-defeating tendencies.117   
 Let us consider one kind of institutional change that may respond to both 
objections from the argument from second bests.  Instead of holding a vote to 
determine what the recommendation from the ward council will be on any given issue 
and transmitting the result to the borough or city, ward councils might only transmit 
an opinion to those bodies when the members of the ward council can come to a 
consensus.  In the absence of consensus, all that would be conveyed to the borough 
or city would be the minutes from the ward council meeting on the relevant issue. 118  
Such a change in process would have several advantages.  First, in those situations 
that give rise to deep disagreements about important values, the ward council process 
would not create winners or losers.  Instead, elected representatives who operate at 
one remove from the directly deliberative institution of the ward council would 
engage in the weighing of interests necessary to regulate in the face of such 
disagreement.  By removing the capacity to recommend from ward councils under 
conditions of deep normative disagreement, the sting of having one‘s neighbours 
make a public decision against one‘s deeply held convictions is lessened.  Second, the 
proposed institutional change would provide an incentive to reach consensus, and 
would disincentivize hold-outs.119  In cases where there is no consensus, the ward 
council consultation would not affect the policy of the boroughs or the city, as those 
bodies would be in the position that they were in before the ward council deliberated. 
There would be no clear recommendation among the relevant options and 
                                                          
116  See Part III, A – C. 
117  On self-defeating regulation, see Cass R. Sunstein, ―Paradoxes of the Regulatory State‖ (1990) 57 U 
 Chicago L Rev 407. 
118  I thank Rod Macdonald for this example of a consensus-favoring default rule, which he observed at 
 play in the Westmount Neighborhood Association. Consensus-favouring default rules carry risks. For 
 instance, participants in deliberations may have a tendency to converge on a consensus because of 
 social pressure to conform, rather than as a result of exercising their independent judgment. One way 
 to capture the deliberative benefits of a consensus rule, while minimizing its conformity-inducing 
 costs, is to ensure that initial heterogeneity is built into the decision-making process. If participants 
 are initially committed to a variety of views, and the decision rule for the group stresses consensus, 
 participants will engage in creative problem-solving activities that attempt to reconcile participants‘ 
 aspirations. Steven Kelman, ―Adversary and Cooperationist Institutions for Conflict Resolution in 
 Public Policymaking‖ (1992) 11 Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 178 at 194-95. 
119  For an influential account of hold-outs in the property context, see Michael Heller, ―The Tragedy of 
 the Anticommons: Property in Transition from Marx to Markets‖ (1998) 111 Harv L Rev 1621 and 
 for an institutional proposal that aims to overcome hold-out problems, see Michael Heller & Rick 
 Hills, ―Land Assembly Districts‖ (2008) 121 Harv L Rev 1465.    
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participation in the ward council would be an academic exercise. Participants become 
involved in ward councils because they are interested in effective action and the 
possibility of such an inconclusive outcome would incentivize behaviours that 
conduce to consensus building.     
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 In this essay, I have argued that municipal processes in Quebec, and in particular, 
the ward councils evidence features of a civic republican ideal of non-domination.  In 
Part II, we saw that the processes of making zoning by-laws impose what appear to 
be exigent consultation requirements including, in certain cases, a requirement to hold 
a referendum.  However, in that Part, we also saw that standard criticisms of 
municipal councils suggest that these consultative processes are insufficient to ensure 
the kind of deliberation envisioned by civic republican theory.  In Part III, I argued 
that these standard criticisms can be answered by the ward councils and I defended, 
against a range of objections, the claim that ward councils instantiate civic republican 
ideals.   
 I close this essay by considering two more general objections to the approach 
taken by this paper.  A first objection states that a standard conflict in municipal law 
is between local and regional interests,120 and that the deliberative procedures I have 
described in this paper do nothing to address this substantive conflict.  A second 
objection states that issues of local government regulation necessarily involve the 
pursuit of self interest, and that the present essay‘s focus on theories of deliberation 
and on consultative bodies, misses this point.   
 My response to the first objection is that institutions which require the state to 
justify its actions have value in themselves.  I do not claim to resolve the 
localism/regionalism debate in this paper, but I do claim that institutional 
mechanisms that require municipal governments to justify their governance choices 
to citizens are an improvement over institutional mechanisms that do not.  
Deliberative institutions of the kind I have described in this paper will not necessarily 
generate right answers to policy conundrums (indeed, such answers may not exist), 
but they do facilitate public deliberation and such deliberation respects the autonomy 
of citizens because it ensures that the state publicly justifies its actions to those who 
are affected by it. 
 I advance descriptive and normative arguments in response to the second 
criticism, which states that questions of local government necessarily implicate the 
pursuit of self-interests.  The criticism is descriptively lacking insofar as it does not 
account for key features of municipal law.  The notice and meeting requirements of 
municipal law and institutions such as the ward councils suggest that municipal law is 
concerned with public justifications for state action.121  In addition, courts impose on 
municipalities legislative action requirements of good faith and reasonableness, which 
                                                          
120  For classic treatments of the issue, in the American context, see Orfield, supra note 59; David Rusk, 
 Cities Without Suburbs (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1993); Richard Briffault, 
 ―Our Localism: Part I - The Structure of Local Government Law‖ (1990) 90 Colum L Rev 1; and in 
 the Canadian context, see Marie-Claude Prémont, ―La Fiscalité au Québec: de la cohabitation au 
 refuge fiscal‖ (2000) 46 McGill LJ 716. 
121  See in particular L.A.U. supra note 40 at ss. 130-31. 
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constrain the admittedly broad discretion that municipalities enjoy in this area.122  The 
ward councils are simply one more institution that gives expression to this civic 
republican impetus of municipal law.   
 The normative response to accounts of municipal regulation, in which self-
interest occupies a central place, is that they misunderstand the very nature of legal 
regulation.  Deliberative theorists have responded to the pluralist conception of the 
state by arguing that it is normatively indefensible.123  Authors argue that any adequate 
account of state action requires arguments that are sensitive to the normative 
particularities of state action.124  Professor Jon Elster has framed pluralist insensitivity 
to these particularities as evidencing confusion between the logic of the market and 
that of the public forum.  In the market-place, the only question to be answered is: 
how are my preferences to be satisfied?  But the public forum is driven by an entirely 
different set of questions.125  In the forum, we are concerned not only with our own 
wants, but with how decisions affect others and with questions of justice.  In the 
forum, it is not enough to aggregate private preferences.  Rather, citizens deliberate 
together about what the public good is and about what it requires of the state and of 
citizens.126  As we saw in the introduction to this paper, this normative concern 
animates administrative law‘s focus on consultation requirements in the rule-making 
context.  This essay has argued that deliberative municipal institutions share this 
normative concern and I hope that the institutional design considerations and 
institutions that I have raised here can be transposed to other domains of the 
administrative state. 
 
                                                          
122  See Entreprises Sibeca Inc. V. Frelighsburg (Municipality), 2004 SCC 61, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 304. 
123  For a specifically American critique along these lines, see Frank Michelman, ―Law‘s Republic‖ (1988) 
 97 Yale LJ 1493 at 1499, 1501-03.  
124  Jon Elster, ―The Market and the Forum‖ in Bohman & Rehg, supra note 111, 3 at 18.   
125  Ibid at 10-11.    
126  Ibid at 24-25. Moreover, contrary to some theorists of democratic deliberation, Elster argues that it is 
 not enough to deliberate for the sake of deliberation. It is in the very nature of political action that 
 those engaged in it seek policy outcomes and do not merely pursue the intrinsic benefits of 
 deliberation.   
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COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: OUTLINING A FIELD OF 
STUDY 
 
Susan Rose-Ackerman*  
Peter L. Lindseth** 
 
Comparative administrative law is emerging as a distinct field of inquiry after 
a period of neglect. To demonstrate this claim, the authors summarize their 
edited volume on the topic – a collection that aims to stimulate research across 
legal systems and scholarly disciplines. After a set of historical reflections, the 
authors consider key topics at the intersection of administrative and 
constitutional law, including the contested issue of administrative independence. 
Two further sections highlight tensions between expertise and accountability, 
drawing insights from economics and political science. The essay then considers 
the changing boundaries of the administrative state – both the public–private 
distinction and the links between domestic and transnational regulatory bodies, 
such as the European Union. The essay concludes with reflections on a core 
concern of administrative law: the way individuals and organizations across 
different systems test and challenge the legitimacy of public authority. 
 
Le droit administratif comparé est en train de se manifester comme domaine 
d’étude distinct suite à une période pendant laquelle il a été négligé. Pour 
démontrer cette affirmation, les auteurs présentent un sommaire du volume à ce 
sujet dont ils dirigent la publication – une collection qui vise à stimuler la 
recherche au sein de divers systèmes juridiques et diverses disciplines 
d’érudition. Après une série de réflexions historiques, les auteurs traitent de 
questions–clés qui relèvent en même temps du droit administratif et du droit 
constitutionnel, y compris la question controversée de l’indépendance 
administrative. Deux autres sections mettent en lumière des tensions entre 
l’expertise et l’obligation de rendre compte, puisant dans les sciences 
économique et politique. L’article traite ensuite des limites changeantes de l’état 
administratif – d’une part, quant à la distinction public–privé et d’autre part, 
quant aux liens entre les organismes de réglementation domestiques et 
transnationaux, telle que l’Union européenne. L’article se termine avec des 
réflexions sur une préoccupation de fond du droit administratif : la façon dont 
les individus et les organisations dans des systèmes différents mettent à l’épreuve 
et contestent la légitimité de l’autorité publique. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The American political scientist Frank Goodnow published his classic study on 
comparative administrative law in 1903.1 Unfortunately, this auspicious beginning did 
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436 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 2010 
 
 
not precipitate sustained scholarly interest in the field over the coming century.  As a 
focus of comparative study, administrative law has languished relative to its domestic 
counterpart, which flourished in the twentieth century with rise of the modern 
administrative state.  The relative neglect of comparative administrative law is now 
changing, and we aim to contribute to its renaissance with our edited book, 
Comparative Administrative Law.2 Our goal in that volume and in this essay is to survey 
the field in order to document renewed scholarly attention to this rich and compelling 
field of study. Our hope is that these collected essays will help to generate interest in 
the field and to suggest promising arenas for future research. 
 Administrative law cannot avoid confrontations with politics.  Perhaps even more 
than constitutional law, it frames the interaction between law and politics; it provides 
the conceptual vocabulary for their transformation over time in response to social 
change. In the western tradition administrative law initially reflected the growing 
distinction between state and society, and it mediated between those seemingly 
distinct realms. Over the course of the twentieth century, it served a similar mediating 
function as the regulatory state emerged.  It flourished in the space opened up by the 
instability of the classic triad of legislative, executive, and judicial power. It came to 
define the often murky terrain between the institutions of government (in which 
those powers were purportedly “constituted”) and the diffuse and fragmented realm 
of regulation in all of its many manifestations.  Today, throughout the world, at the 
borders between the private and public sectors and between nation states and 
transnational bodies, administrative law continues to be a realm of legal contestation 
and redefinition. It is not just about fair and transparent procedures; honest, hard–
working officials; and the protection of individual rights – although these are all 
important. It also concerns the democratic legitimacy of government policymaking. A 
fair and open policymaking process helps democratic citizens hold modern 
government to account in the face of demands for delegation and regulation, both 
within and beyond the state.   
 In opting for a broad conception of the field, our goal is to break down 
boundaries between scholars, not only those from different national or legal 
traditions, but also those from different disciplinary or doctrinal perspectives.  One of 
us has a background in economics and political science (Rose–Ackerman); the other 
in the legal and social history of the state (Lindseth). We meet on the common 
ground of comparative administrative law and regulatory practice.  In our edited 
volume we have drawn from a wide range of legal scholarship, ranging from 
constitutional law, state and local government law, regulated industries, European 
integration, transnational litigation, public international law, as well as administrative 
law more traditionally conceived.   
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
1   Frank J. Goodnow, Comparative Administrative Law: An Analysis of the Administrative Systems National and 
 Local, of the United States, England, France, and Germany (New York and London: Knickerbocker, 1903). 
2  This essay is adapted from our introduction to Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter L. Lindseth, eds, 
 Comparative Administrative Law (Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar, 2010). That volume resulted from a 
 conference held at Yale Law School in May 2009 with the support of Yale Law School‟s Oscar M. 
 Ruebhausen Fund.  
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II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AS HISTORICAL INSTITUTION 
 
 Because administrative law is intimately bound up with the development of the 
modern state, the study of administrative law can usefully begin with historical 
reflections on its interactions with social and political change over the last two 
centuries.  As a phenomenon in western history, the emergence of administrative law 
has been intimately tied to the increasing “specificity and subjectivity” of public 
administrative power since the end of the eighteenth century.3  In Western Europe, 
and by extension in North America, “administrative power” and “administrative law” 
emerged in tandem over the course of the nineteenth century, although at clearly 
different paces.4 Moreover, owing to quite different institutional and conceptual 
starting points, the results of this process often differed as well.  The substantive and 
procedural distinctions are now well known: Rechtsstaat/Etat de droit enforced by 
specialized administrative judges in the continental tradition, on the one hand; and 
Rule of Law enforced by the ordinary judiciary in the Anglo–American tradition, on 
the other.5   
 Despite these differences, the conjunction between a specifically public 
administrative power within the state and a body of law to constrain that power holds 
true more broadly, as the experience of other regions of the world suggests.  In East 
Asia, for example, although the term “administrative law” was unknown prior to 
contact with the West, the prevailing traditional system of government – with its 
commands from higher to lower level officials; its proliferation of regulatory 
mandates; its definition of competences; and its ambition for a “professional, 
disciplined, meritocratic, and rule–bound” body of public servants – suggests that 
East Asia may well have been something of a pioneer in the development of 
constraints on specifically administrative action.6 Traditional East Asian law lacked, 
however, a realm of “private” right distinct from the realm of public governance.  It 
is also certainly true that, up to the end of the eighteenth century, old regime 
monarchies in Europe ruled through a corporatist system of privileges and 
jurisdictions grounded in conceptions of right (notably “property”) that we would 
today clearly see as private.  Nevertheless, it was precisely the progressive extrication 
of “public” authority from this corporatist old regime by the end of the eighteenth 
century, as well as the development of a distinct corps of public servants to pursue 
and defend these new public prerogatives over the course of the nineteenth, that 
marked the emergence of administrative modernity in the Western world.  However, 
with its eventual contact with the West, East Asian law, through a process of copying 
                                                          
3   Bernardo Sordi, “Révolution, Rechtsstaat, and the Rule of Law: Historical Reflections on the Emergence 
 of Administrative Law in Europe” in Rose-Ackerman & Lindseth, supra note 2 at ch. 1. 
4   See e.g. Jerry Mashaw, “Explaining Administrative Law: Reflections on Federal Administrative Law in 
 Nineteenth Century America” in Rose-Ackerman & Lindseth, supra note 2 at ch. 2. 
5   See e.g. Peter L. Lindseth, “„Always Embedded‟ Administration: The Historical Evolution of 
 Administrative Justice as an Aspect of Modern Governance” in Christian Joerges, Bo Stråth & 
 Peter Wagner, eds, The Economy as a Polity: The Political Constitution of Contemporary Capitalism, (London: 
 UCL Press, 2005). 
6  John Ohnesorge, “Administrative Law in East Asia: a Comparative-Historical Analysis” in Rose-
 Ackerman & Lindseth, supra note 2 at ch. 5. 
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(what organizational theorists call isomorphism), began to mimic these basic features 
of a modern administrative law regime.7 
 Depending on the polity, this emergent corps of public servants in Europe, the 
United States and elsewhere did not necessarily conform to the Weberian ideal type 
of bureaucracy.8  Over the course of the nineteenth century, what united the more 
bureaucratic forms of administrative power on the European continent with their 
relatively less bureaucratized counterparts in Britain and North American was the 
increasing importance of positive law – legislation – in framing the limits of public 
authority.  And as legislatures increasingly democratized,9 the pressure on the state to 
intervene in society also increased, whether via a Weberian bureaucracy or other 
mechanisms. This went along with demands that its agencies and officials operate in a 
legally constrained, transparent, and accountable fashion. 
 Moving from the nineteenth to the twentieth century, changes in the underlying 
functions of the state in the twentieth century influenced the development of 
administrative law.10  The rise of industry with monopoly power and the privatization 
of formerly state – controlled sectors produced a demand for the control of markets 
to which all developed states responded, albeit in different ways. Moreover, 
administrative law has sometimes checked populist or democratic demands by giving 
organized and powerful economic interest groups a way to challenge policy. There is 
an ongoing tension in the political and historical analysis of administrative law. Public 
law provisions that are justified as a check on overarching state power can also be a 
means of entrenching existing private interests. Legal constraints may under some 
conditions limit the ability of democratic governments to constrain concentrated, 
monopolistic economic interests. 
.  
III. CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
 
 Turning to more present concerns, administrative law has been shaped by 
differences in constitutional structure across various states – for example, presidential 
or parliamentary; democratic or authoritarian; federal or unitary; tripartite or more 
multi–faceted. Constitutional texts and administrative law interact to shape the rights 
and duties of professional administrators, elected politicians, and judges. Even though 
public administration and the bureaucracy receive little detailed treatment in the texts 
of most constitutions, they form the backbone of state functioning.11 
 One way to approach the links between constitutional structure and 
administrative law is through the lens of political economy, and more particularly 
through the work of positive political theory [PPT]. Unlike explicitly normative work 
                                                          
7  Ibid. 
8  Nicholas Parrillo, “Testing Weber:  Compensation for Public Services, Bureaucratization, and the 
 Development of Positive Law in the United States” in Rose-Ackerman & Lindseth, supra note 2 at 
 ch. 3. 
9   See e.g. Charles Tilly, Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650-2000 (New York: Cambridge University 
 Press, 2003) at 213-217 for “A Rough Map of European Democratization” over the nineteenth and 
 twentieth centuries. 
10  Marco d‟Alberti, “Administrative Law and the Public Regulation of Markets in a Global Age” in 
 Rose-Ackerman & Lindseth, supra note 2 at ch. 4. 
11  Tom Ginsburg, “Written Constitutions and the Administrative State: On the Constitutional Character 
 of Administrative Law” in Rose-Ackerman & Lindseth, supra note 2 at ch. 7. 
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in constitutional law and political theory, PPT attempts to model state behaviour in 
terms of the self–interest of the actors involved.12 
 US–focused PPT would predict that parliamentary systems would provide for 
lower levels of judicial oversight of the administration than presidential systems. PPT 
explains judicial review in the US as a result of the legislature‟s desire to check the 
executive and its inability to do this effectively on its own. Thus, the legislature is the 
dominant actor that can assign tasks to the courts. In a parliamentary system the same 
political coalition controls both branches, and so legislators from the majority 
coalition would not want the courts to intervene to oversee executive action. In 
contrast to these expectations, comparative analysis finds that courts in the UK, 
France and Germany are, in fact, quite active in reviewing administrative actions.13 
Either the theory of legislative dominance has limited force, or other factors prevent 
the government from constraining the courts. The courts themselves seem to be 
independent actors at least insofar as they assert jurisdiction and oversee the 
executive.  If judges believe that executive discretion needs to be controlled and if the 
legislature is doing little, they may step in, grant standing to public interest plaintiffs 
and limit executive power.14 
 Federalism and central/local relations are a key aspect of constitutional–
administrative structure in both the EU and the US. Strong notions of Member State 
sovereignty in the EU as well as dual sovereignty in the US make it difficult to carry 
out a coherent policy in either polity. It is all very well to speak of EU–style 
subsidiarity as a principle for dividing authority, but if the subordinate governments 
differ in their capacities and organization, and if they must cooperate to achieve 
policy goals, then simply allocating tasks down the governmental chain will not work.  
Both central control and cross–government cooperation are needed as well as local 
knowledge and implementation.15 
 This raises an important general issue. If the structures of administrative and 
constitutional law hamper competent policy implementation, how ought one to 
reconcile established legal traditions with pragmatic efforts to better balance expertise 
and accountability with the protection of individual rights? One of us has argued 
elsewhere that this challenge inevitably entails a complex mix of “resistance and 
reconciliation” – normative resistance animated by those constitutional traditions, on 
the one hand, but also a necessary degree of reconciliation to the demands for 
efficient problem solving, on the other.16  The result, however, will almost certainly be 
suboptimal if judged by the criteria of either perspective alone. 
 
                                                          
12  For a collection of articles that apply the approach to administrative law see Susan Rose-Ackerman, 
 ed, Economics of Administrative Law (Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar, 2007). 
13  M. Elizabeth Magill & Daniel R. Ortiz, “Comparative Positive Political Theory” in Rose-Ackerman 
 & Lindseth, supra note 2 at ch. 9. 
14  Tom Zwart, “Overseeing the Executive: Is the Legislature Reclaiming Lost Territory from the 
 Courts?” in Rose-Ackerman & Lindseth, supra note 2 at ch. 10. 
15  Fernanda G. Nicola, “„Creatures of the State‟: Regulatory Federalism, Local Immunities, and EU 
 Waste Regulation in Comparative Perspective” in Rose-Ackerman & Lindseth, supra note 2 at ch. 
 11. 
16   Peter L. Lindseth, Power and Legitimacy: Reconciling Europe and the Nation-State (Oxford: Oxford 
 University Press, 2010). 
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IV. ADMINISTRATIVE INDEPENDENCE AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW 
 
 Administrative independence is often defended as a way to assure that decisions 
are made by neutral professionals with the time and technical knowledge to make 
competent, apolitical choices. The heart of the controversy over independence – 
which we suggest is ubiquitous – usually stems from a disconnect between much 
modern administration and traditional democratic accountability that flows from 
voters through elected politicians to the bureaucracy. Attempts to legitimate entities,  
such as the many so–called “independent agencies,” in traditional democratic terms 
often stresses the importance of processes that go beyond expertise to incorporate 
public opinion and social and economic interests.  The ideal is an expert agency that 
is independent of partisan politics but sensitive to the concerns of ordinary citizens 
and civil society groups. The risk is capture by narrow interests. 
 To take one example, the independence of agencies is much contested in 
common law parliamentary jurisdictions where the tension between notions of 
unitary government policymaking and agency independence are also often in serious 
tension. Canada, for example, has a particularly vexed history because of a lack of 
clarity about the place of such agencies in the structure of government.  The UK, 
Australia and New Zealand have, in contrast, given independent agencies a clearer 
and more well–articulated position in their governmental structures.17  In the US 
independent regulatory commissions attempt to address democratic concerns by 
building in partisan balance. Instead of requiring technocratic expertise or 
professional credentials, most agency statutes set up a multi–member governing 
board and require that no more than a bare majority can be from a single political 
party. For example, in a five–member board, no more than three can have the same 
party affiliation. As with the US judiciary, the appointment process is highly political.  
But with fixed, staggered terms and party balance, agencies can, in principle, respond 
to changing conditions as their membership changes gradually over time.  
 This feature of US commissions has not been copied in the EU. The European 
Union has substituted “technocratic for democratic legitimacy.”
18 Agencies have 
proliferated at the EU level in recent years, but rather than seeking partisan balance 
based on political party affiliation, Member States are represented on agency boards.19  
This practice is a political compromise, but, in practice, it leads to the dominance of 
technical experts who are appointed by Member States and interact with their 
respective specialized ministries. Outside of North America and Europe, the creation 
and operation of agencies have been influenced by both American and European 
legal models but often have distinctive features. For example, in Brazil although the 
independent agency model was borrowed from the United States, Brazilian agencies 
                                                          
17  Lorne Sossin, “The Puzzle of Administrative Independence and Parliamentary Democracy in the 
 Common Law World: A Canadian Perspective” in Rose-Ackerman & Lindseth, supra note 2 at ch. 
 13. 
18  Martin Shapiro, “A Comparison of U. S. and European Independent Agencies” in Rose-Ackerman 
 & Lindseth, supra note 2 at ch. 18.  See also Giandominico Majone, “Two Logics of Delegation: 
 Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance” (2001) 2 European Union Politics 103. 
19  Johannes Saurer, “Supranational Governance and Networked Accountability: Member State 
 Oversight of EU Agencies” in Rose-Ackerman & Lindseth, supra note 2 at ch. 36. 
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are clearly subordinate to the executive.20 Hence, they have struggled to provide 
credible commitments to investors both domestic and foreign and to ordinary 
citizens and civil society groups. In Taiwan an independent regulatory agency for 
telecommunications ran up against a Supreme Court that struck down an 
appointments process that gave too large a role to the legislature.21 
 
V. PROCESS AND POLICY 
 
 Public agencies promulgate regulations for many different purposes.  They seek to 
correct market failures, protect rights, and distribute the benefits of state actions to 
particular groups – ranging from the poor or disadvantaged minorities to politically 
powerful industries such as agriculture or oil and gas. Executive policymaking in 
democracies raises issues of public legitimacy, and this is a central focus of 
administrative law in the United States where the notice and comment provisions of 
the Administrative Procedure Act [APA] guide the process.22 These provisions require 
agencies to provide notice, hold hearings, and give reasons when they issue a rule. 
The final rule can then be subject to judicial review, which reaches beyond 
compliance with the procedural demands of the APA both to the rational 
underpinnings of the rule and to its consistency with the implementing statute.  
 Discussions of “good” policy by social scientists, risk analysts, and other 
specialists sometimes clash with the focus of American administrative law on 
transparency and participation. This tension between technical competence and 
mechanisms to promote legitimacy may be less evident in other legal systems where 
the law does little to constrain policymaking processes compared with the 
adjudication of individual administrative acts.23 Judicial review, except where human 
rights or other constitutional prescriptions are at stake, does not usually take on the 
merits of broad policy choices.  
 For example, one can compare the way politics and policymaking interact in the 
contrasting experience of the US and the EU. In the United States an executive order 
mandates White House review of major regulations produced in the core executive 
branch.24 Such oversight extends beyond the implications of a program for the public 
                                                          
20  Mariana Mota Prado, “Presidential Dominance from a Comparative Perspective: the Relationship 
 between the Executive Branch and Regulatory Agencies in Brazil,” in Rose-Ackerman & Lindseth, 
 supra note 2 at ch.14.  
21  Jiunn-rong Yeh, “Experimenting with Independent Commissions in a New Democracy with a Civil 
 Administrative Law Tradition: The Case of Taiwan” in Rose-Ackerman & Lindseth, supra note 2 at 
 ch. 15. Other agencies police the accountability of the government itself. The case for independence 
 is particularly strong for such agencies, but so is the need for oversight to prevent either their capture 
 by regime opponents or their lapse into inaction. Given this risk, oversight agencies should be 
 independent of the state but should also be subject to the scrutiny of ordinary citizens and civil 
 society groups. John Ackerman, “Understanding Independent Accountability Agencies” in Rose-
 Ackerman & Lindseth, supra note 2 at ch. 16. 
22  U.S. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553 - 706. 
23   Susan Rose-Ackerman,  Controlling Environmental Policy: The Limits of Public Law in Germany and the 
 United States (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1995); Susan Rose-Ackerman, From Elections to 
 Democracy: Building Accountable Government in Hungary and Poland (Cambridge UK: Cambridge 
 University Press, 2005). 
24  The current executive order 12866 is available online: Office of Regulation and Regulatory Affairs, 
 OMB <http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/Utilities/EO_Redirect.jsp>. President Obama issued a 
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budget and measures the costs and benefits for society at large. The cost–benefit 
approach has, moreover, been particularly influential in the United States, but, a 
similar technique, called Impact Assessment [IA], is becoming increasingly common 
in Europe.25  There is a lively debate in Europe both over substantive review of policy 
based on economic principles and over the expansion of public participation and 
transparency requirements to cover rulemaking.  However, this debate has had 
relatively little impact on administrative law, which has been largely silent concerning 
the policymaking process as opposed to decisions in individual cases.  
 Those urging greater reliance on economic criteria need to recognize that these 
approaches can themselves be tools to obtain political advantage. Thus, in the United 
States, White House review of regulations under cost–benefit criteria can help the 
president control the content of major regulations produced by executive branch 
agencies.26 A tool, which appears neutral on its face, can be manipulated for political 
ends. This is possible because any cost–benefit analysis involves many judgment calls. 
Seldom will there be a single “right” answer that anyone trained in the technique will 
accept.27  Thus, in a democratic polity cost–benefit analysis and similar technocratic 
tools, although useful in focusing policy debates, cannot be the sole criteria for 
choice. 
 However one views the debate over process as a matter of administrative law, it is a 
key area of contestation in terms of regulatory policy. The traditional tension in 
administrative law between technical expertise and accountability plays out somewhat 
differently in the US, the EU, and the UK. Courts can act as a counterweight to the 
prevailing ethos – upholding expertise in the US, and treating claims of expertise with 
caution in the EU. The UK courts, however, apparently view both public 
participation and expertise with caution, and they legitimate administrative action 
based on a Weberian understanding of a hierarchical, professional, politically neutral 
civil service.28 
 Many participants in the debate over policy analysis privilege a particular type of 
expertise derived from science and economics. Others urge more transparent, 
participatory decision–making processes. The two approaches are compatible so long 
as state officials recognize that they may not have all the necessary expertise. 
Participation and transparency can serve not just as rights but also as means to the 
end of better policy outcomes. Greater public involvement may not only produce 
more effective policy but also increase the acceptability of the regulatory process both 
in representative democracies and in entities, such as the European Union, that also 
seek public legitimacy. As a practical matter, however, regulatory agencies may not 
                                                                                                                                     
 supplementary executive order 13563 on January 18, 2011. Online: Office of Information and 
 Regulatory Affairs <http://www.reginfo.gov/jsp/utilities/EO_13563.pdf >. 
25  Jonathan Wiener & Alberto Alemanno, “Comparing Regulatory Oversight Bodies across the Atlantic:  
 The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the US and the Impact Assessment Board in the 
 EU” in Rose-Ackerman & Lindseth, supra note 2 at ch. 19. 
26   Elena Kagan, “Presidential Administration” (2001) 114 Harv L Rev 2246. 
27   For e.g., the choice of a discount rate and the proper way to monetize morbidity and mortality 
 are both fraught with controversy even among those committed to the method of cost-benefit 
 analysis. Edward R. Morrison, “Judicial Review of Discount Rates Used in Cost-Benefit Analysis,” 
 (1998) 65 U Chicago L Rev 1333; Cass R. Sunstein, “Incommensurability and Valuation in Law,” 
 (1994) 92 Mich L Rev 779 at 796. 
28  Catherine Donnelly, “Participation and Expertise: Judicial Attitudes in Comparative Perspective” in 
 Rose-Ackerman & Lindseth, supra note 2 at ch. 21. 
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move toward greater participation and stronger standards of transparency and 
reason–giving absent a massive public outcry. In the United States the APA arguably 
arose from congressional effort to constrain delegated policymaking under a 
separation–of–powers system.29 No such incentives exist in parliamentary systems.30  
 Paradoxically, however, many new regulatory agencies in Europe have introduced 
accountable procedures on their own initiative even though they are isolated from 
electoral politics. Case studies from the UK, France and Sweden show that the 
regulators supported greater public involvement because they needed outside support 
to survive and could imitate established models in the US and elsewhere.31 More 
participatory and transparent processes were seen as a way of increasing their own 
legitimacy. However, these moves did not always have that effect. Sometimes they 
simply increased the power of the regulated industry, thus increasing the risk of 
capture. Agencies reacted to this concern by taking steps to facilitate consumer 
input.32 
 For policies where a cost–benefit test seems appropriate, one response would be 
to combine cost–benefit analysis with transparency as a means of blocking agencies 
from adopting measures that benefit narrow interests.  This requirement could have 
legal force if applied by the courts. As one of us has argued,33 a judicial presumption 
in favour of net benefit maximization increases the political costs for narrow groups, 
which would have to obtain explicit statutory language in order to have their interests 
recognized by courts and agencies.34  This proposal raises an important question that 
is central to the discussion of administrative litigation to which we now turn. What 
should be the judiciary‟s role in reviewing the policymaking activities of modern 
executive branch bodies and regulatory agencies?  
 
VI. ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION 
 
 There is a famous adage in French administrative law – juger l'administration, c'est 
encore administrer – “to judge the administration is still to administer.”  It recognizes the 
difficulty, if not impossibility, of separating the process of legal control from the 
underlying process of administration.  External legal control, whether exercised by 
courts or court–like administrative tribunals like the French Conseil d’Etat, will always 
shape regulatory policy in a myriad of ways. Read most strongly, this French adage 
implies an ideal of a “self–regulating” administrative sphere that is detached from 
traditional values of justice and guided by its own sense of policy rationality and its 
own estimation of the public interest in the construction and regulation of the 
                                                          
29   Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry Weingast “Administrative Procedures as Instruments 
 of Political Control” (1987) 3 JL Econ & Org 243. 
30   Terry M. Moe & Michael Caldwell, “The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A 
 Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems” (1994) 150 Journal of Institutional and 
 Theoretical Economics 171; Rose-Ackerman, Controlling Environmental Policy, supra note 23 at 7-17.  
31  Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, “Administrative Agencies as Creators of Administrative Law Norms: 
 Evidence from the UK, France, and Sweden” in Rose-Ackerman & Lindseth, supra note 2 at ch. 22. 
32  For e.g., the Office of Communications (Ofcom) in the UK, or the Autorité de Régulation de 
 Télécommunications (ART) in France, opted for increased consumer input in various ways.  See ibid. 
33   Susan Rose-Ackerman, Rethinking the Progressive Agenda (New York: Free Press, 1992). 
34  See also Cass Sunstein, Risk and Reason (Cambridge UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002) at 191-228. 
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market.35  This adage, moreover, underlies the French dualité de juridiction, in which 
administrative judges, organically attached to the executive, are primarily competent 
to hear challenges to administrative action.  
 Historians and jurists, of course, have long understood that this strong reading 
does not comport well with reality.  In his contribution to Comparative Administrative 
Law, Jean Massot, a member of the French Conseil d’Etat for over four decades, notes 
how the French system of administrative justice “progressively became both an 
extremely powerful judge and an institution at least as independent as its judicial 
counterparts.”
36 French administrative judges came to realize that, despite the 
potential impact of their rulings on administrative policy–making in the “general 
interest,” their office still required independence, procedural fairness, even a 
willingness to revisit certain aspects of the underlying administrative act in the interest 
of justice in the particular case. 
 This tension between justice and administration – between the policy prerogatives 
of the state pursuing regulatory programs, on the one hand, and the demands of 
justice in individual disputes, on the other – is a key concern.  Administrative 
litigation raises a set of questions familiar to any student of administrative law: Under 
what circumstances should we allow a private party to enlist the aid of an 
independent judge to rule on a dispute over administrative action?  Who may seek 
that aid (standing)? When (timing)? On what issues (scope of review)? To what end 
(remedies)?   
 The approaches that particular polities have taken to these questions are deeply 
bound up with historical choices in response to functional, political, and cultural 
demands.  The American “appellate review” model, for example, was inspired by the 
relationship between appellate and trial courts in civil litigation.37 The “office of the 
administrative judge” in France, by contrast, has focused on its guarantees of 
independence as well as its substantive ambition to reconcile the rights of individuals 
with the “general interest” represented by the state.
38  The members of the French 
Conseil d’Etat exercise dual roles as both policy advisors to the government as well as 
judges of the governments‟ administrative acts.  
 The common law world provides yet another set of models.  Thus, in Australia, 
administrative tribunals charged with merits review examine whether, all things 
considered, the challenged action is not merely legal but “correct or preferable.”
39 This 
contrasts with the American system, where forms of agency review are functionally 
similar to “merits review,” and the British, where there is a distinction between 
tribunal “appeal” (on law and fact) and judicial “review” (on law alone).
40  Indeed, 
there is arguably not a crude civil law/common law divide (with continental Europe 
                                                          
35   Lindseth, supra note 5 at 119. 
36  Jean Massot, “The Powers and Duties of the French Administrative Judge” in Rose-Ackerman &
 Lindseth, supra note 2 at ch. 24. 
37  Thomas W. Merrill, “The Origins of American-Style Judicial Review” in Rose-Ackerman &
 Lindseth, supra note 2 at ch. 23. 
38  Massot, supra note 36. 
39  Peter Cane, “Judicial Review and Merits Review:  Comparing Administrative Adjudication by Courts 
 and Tribunals” in Rose-Ackerman & Lindseth, supra note 2 at ch. 25. 
40  Ibid. 
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largely representing the former, and the UK, US, and Canada the latter).41  Rather, US 
and Canadian judges favor deference, at least to some extent.  UK judges, by contrast, 
seem to share the inclination of their more civilian colleagues in Europe, where the 
influence of French and German administrative justice is pervasive.  Both UK and 
EU courts unhesitatingly substitute their judgment for that of administrators on 
questions of law.42 
 
VII. THE BOUNDARIES OF THE STATE: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
 
 Especially in countries with a civil law tradition, the distinction between public 
law and private law has been central to the development of administrative law. The 
common law tradition often obscured this boundary, but today all modern states 
recognize its existence. Given the ubiquity of a distinctive public law, the move over 
the last several decades to privatize and contract out government services presents a 
particular challenge. What legal principles should apply to private bodies that carry 
out formerly public functions or that take on new tasks under contract? Will the trend 
toward the use of nominally private firms lead to the integration of public and private 
law, even in states, such as France and Germany, where the public law/private law 
distinction has deep historical roots?  
 Privatization has many meanings, but three salient ones can be discerned.43  First, 
in its strongest form, privatization means that the state exits entirely from a sector or 
policy area leaving it to be governed only by the laws that regulate the actions of all 
private businesses and that frame private interactions. Second, a public utility may be 
converted into a private firm, with or without a “golden share” remaining in state 
hands, and placed under the supervision of an independent regulatory agency. Third, 
the state may decide that a nominally private firm must comply with some public law 
strictures in carrying out its business, even in the absence of oversight by a specific 
agency. This last category raises the most direct challenge to traditional public 
law/private law distinctions, especially in states with a civil law tradition. It also 
challenges libertarian presumptions about the inherent value of private enterprise 
compared to public bureaucracies as service providers. 
 A public law of privatization is needed and must start with a distinction between 
core government functions that ought not to be privatized and those where the 
private sector can be brought in under some conditions.44 Debate over this issue 
                                                          
41  Paul Craig, “Judicial Review of Questions of Law: A Comparative Perspective” in Rose-Ackerman & 
 Lindseth, supra note 2 at ch. 26. 
42   In the UK, the leading cases are Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147, and 
 R v Hull University Visitor, ex p Page [1993] AC 682. For more detail on the EU, see Paul Craig, EU 
 Administrative Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), ch. 13.  
43  Daphne Barak-Erez, “Three Questions of Privatization” in Rose-Ackerman & Lindseth, supra note 
 2 at ch. 29. 
44  In our volume, Jean-Bernard Auby discusses the way contracts with government can extend public 
 values to private service-delivery firms, but he stresses the risks inherent in programs of private 
 provision for formerly state-supplied services.  Jean-Bernard Auby, “Contracting Out and „Public 
 Values‟: A Theoretical and Comparative Approach” in Rose-Ackerman & Lindseth, supra note 2 at 
 ch. 30. These concerns have produced legal limits on contracting out in many countries, but they 
 have also generated a range of responses - from careful contract drafting to self-regulatory 
 mechanisms. In our volume as well, Laura Dickinson extends this analysis to the US military, often 
 understood as beyond the scope of administrative law. Laura A. Dickinson, “Organizational Structure 
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should consider institutional competence and risks to human rights. Different 
organizational forms may be more or less equipped to instill public law norms. 
Administrative law must articulate a set of public law principles that ought to apply to 
some degree to all entities that carry out public policies.45  
 These principles ought to distinguish among suppliers that provide standardized 
goods and services to public and private entities (for example, office supplies, asphalt 
roadways, computer systems); those that supply special purpose products but do not 
deliver services (for example, weapons producers, dam builders); and those that 
supply the public services themselves (for example, incarceration of convicted felons, 
primary education, garbage collection, review of applicants for government benefits). 
Drawing the lines between these categories will not be easy, but each raises distinct 
issues. The first is governed by market pressures and the law should assure that these 
pressures apply to government contracts and keep the process free of corruption and 
favoritism. The second requires greater attention both to the contracting process and 
to on–going oversight, but the aim is essentially timely and cost–effective contracting.  
 Finally, if public/private relationships extend to the third category, the law needs 
to do more than to assure simple contract compliance and to place limits on waste 
and corruption. Here, the use of private entities is arguably only justified if they take 
on some of the characteristics of public agencies and hence are governed by 
administrative and constitutional law principles that apply to government bodies. This 
includes making policy in a transparent and participatory way, rather than operating 
behind closed doors to allocate contracts or other benefits to particular sectors. 
Furthermore, once private firms are selected to implement a public program, they 
should be subject to duties that are similar to those facing public bodies.46  
 
VIII. THE BOUNDARIES OF THE STATE: TRANSNATIONAL 
ADMINISTRATION IN THE EU 
 
 Some entities with regulatory authority operate beyond the state – perhaps 
internationally, like the GATT/WTO, or regionally and supra–nationally, like the EU. 
If their decisions affect rights and duties within states, how should we understand 
that power in legal terms?  Should we understand it as a novel kind of 
“constitutional” authority, perhaps of an emerging proto–state? Or is it best 
understood as a denationalized extension of “administrative governance” on the 
national level?  We do not pretend to answer these complex questions here, though 
one of us has argued extensively for an essentially “administrative, not constitutional” 
                                                                                                                                     
 and Institutional Culture in an Era of Privatization:  The Case of Private Military Contractors in the 
 United States” in Rose-Ackerman & Lindseth, supra note 2 at ch. 31.  She grounds her study in 
 organizational theory by examining the relative impact of inside socialization and sanctions versus 
 outside incentives in influencing behavior, a contrast with broader relevance beyond the specific case 
 she examines. 
45  Barak-Erez, supra note 43. 
46  An important variant on the public/private divide arises if a regulated sector, such as banking and 
 finance, is in private hands, but becomes a serious public policy concern in a crisis. If some of the 
 firms are “too big to fail,” the state may intervene under emergency conditions. See generally Irma E. 
 Sandoval, “Financial Crisis and Bailout: Legal Challenges and International Lessons from Mexico, 
 Korea and the United States” in Rose-Ackerman & Lindseth, supra note 2 at ch. 32 and Giulio 
 Napolitano, “The Role of the State in (and after) the Financial Crisis: New Challenges for 
 Administrative Law” in Rose-Ackerman & Lindseth, supra note 2 at ch. 33. 
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understanding of denationalized regulatory power in the EU.47 Scholars are 
increasingly looking to administrative law as a framework for understanding the 
exercise of rulemaking and adjudicative power beyond the state.48 
 Nowhere is this truer than in the legal literature on the European Union. 
Recently, a group of leading European administrative law scholars launched the 
Research Network on EU Administrative Law [ReNEUAL] that aims to draft a kind 
of “restatement” or “best practices” for administrative law in the EU.  The 
ReNEUAL project will not only cover the administrative activities of EU bodies 
strictly speaking, but also those of national bodies implementing EU law.  The project 
extends to the EU‟s participation in a variety of international regulatory and 
enforcement schemes that can also be understood in administrative law terms.49 
 The process of European integration has not only led to the development of a 
supranational EU administrative law, but it has also spurred a movement toward a 
deeply “Europeanized” administrative law on the national level as well.  This process 
of Europeanization has had an impact well beyond those domains where Member 
States explicitly implement EU law.  European integration is increasingly relying on a 
particular mode of governance – “adversarial legalism” – that was first observed in 
the United States by the American political scientist Robert Kagan.50  Adversarial 
legalism combines centrally formulated prescriptive rules and a diffuse and 
fragmented process of enforcement which depends crucially on judicial review to 
ensure compliance.  Given its decentralized character, the European Court of Justice 
has understandably sought to impose some measure of uniformity on national 
administrative processes in order to ensure effective enforcement of EU rules and 
standards. 
 However, a concern arises from the growth of transnational networks – the 
challenge of safeguarding individual rights as networks spread.  The network 
phenomenon is increasingly global in its scope, although transnational governance in 
the EU clearly presents the most developed example.51  In the EU we see clearly the 
interplay between classic liberal rights (personal freedom, property rights, and other 
basic interests) and network decisionmaking that affects those rights.  The dispersion 
of decisional power in networks means that one of the central concerns of traditional 
administrative law – the protection of the individual in the face of overreaching 
                                                          
47   Lindseth, supra note 16. See also Peter L. Lindseth, “Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative 
 Character of Supranationalism: The Example of the European Community” (1999) 99 Colum L R. 
 628; and Peter L. Lindseth, “Agents without Principals?: Delegation in an Age of Diffuse and 
 Fragmented Governance” in Fabrizio Cafaggi, ed, Reframing Self-Regulation in European Private Law 
 (Alphen aan den Rijn, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2006). 
48  See e.g. Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, “The Emergence of Global 
 Admimistrative Law” (2005) 68 Law & Cont Probs 15; Herwig H.C. Hofmann & Alexander H. Türk, 
 eds, EU Administrative Governance, (Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar, 2006); Herwig H.C. Hofmann & 
 Alexander H. Türk, eds. Legal Challenges in EU Administrative Law: Towards an Integrated Administration 
 (Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar, 2009). 
49  George A. Bermann, “A Restatement of European Administrative Law: Problems and Prospects” in 
 Rose-Ackerman & Lindseth, supra note 2 at ch. 34. 
50  Kagan, Robert, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
 Press, 2001); R. Daniel Kelemen, “Adversarial Legalism and Administrative Law in the EU” in Rose-
 Ackerman & Lindseth, supra note 2 at ch. 35. 
51  Francesca Bignami, “Individual Rights and Transnational Networks” in Rose-Ackerman &
 Lindseth, supra note 2 at ch. 37. 
448 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 2010 
 
 
public power – becomes vastly more challenging in the transnational administrative 
context.  In confronting this challenge on a more global scale, the EU example, even 
with certain admitted complexities and drawbacks, may be helpful in developing 
models elsewhere. 
 
IX. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Administrative law exists at the interface between the state and society – between 
civil servants and state institutions, on the one hand, and citizens, business firms, 
organized groups, and non–citizens, on the other. Civil service law and bureaucratic 
organization charts and rules provide the background, but administrative law‟s 
essential role is to frame the way individuals and organizations test and challenge the 
legitimacy of the modern state outside of the electoral process.  There are two broad 
tasks – protecting individuals against an overreaching state and providing external 
checks that enhance the democratic accountability and competence of the 
administration.   
 Public law is the product of statutory, constitutional, and judicial choices over 
time; it blends constitutional and administrative concerns. The Germans speak of 
administrative law as “concretized” constitutional law,
52 and Americans often call it 
“applied” constitutional law.
53 The English, with no written constitution, refer to 
“natural justice” and, more recently, to the European Convention on Human Rights 
[ECHR]. The French tradition of droit administratif contains within it a whole 
conceptual vocabulary – dualité de juridiction, acte administratif, service public – that has 
been deeply influential in many parts of the world.  East Asia has a long tradition of 
centralized, hierarchical, and bureaucratic rule – a sort of “administrative law” avant la 
lettre.  And yet, in forging its own modern variants, East Asia has also drawn on 
Western (and particularly German and US) models.   
 Administrative law is one of the “institutions” of modern government, in the 
sense that economists and political scientists often use that term.54 It is thus amenable 
to comparative political and historical study, not just purely legal analysis.  The 
distinction between public and private is essential to administrative law, one that 
common law jurisdictions long sought to downplay by claiming that the same courts 
and legal principles should resolve both wholly private disputes and those involving 
the state. Nevertheless, even in the common law world, debates over the proper role 
and unique prerogatives of state actors are pervasive. Some scholars still assume that 
one can compartmentalize regulatory activities and actors into either a public or a 
private sphere. This may be analytically convenient, but it does not fit the increasingly 
                                                          
52   See e.g. Fritz Werner, “Verwaltungsrecht als konkretisiertes Verfassungsrecht” (1959) Deutsches 
 Verwaltungsblatt 527. 
53   See e.g. William  D.  Araiza, “In  Praise  of  a Skeletal  APA:   Norton  v.  Southern  Utah Wilderness  
 Alliance,  Judicial  Remedies  for  Agency Inaction, and the Questionable Value of Amending the 
 APA” (2004) 56 Admin L Rev 979 at 1002 (noting “the maxim that administrative law is applied 
 constitutional law”)  
54  See e.g. Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York: 
 Cambridge University Press, 1990) at 3-5; James G. March & John P. Olsen. Rediscovering Institutions: 
 The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: Free Press, 1989); James G. March & John P. Olsen. 
 “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders” (1998) 52 International Organization 
 943 at 948. 
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blurred boundary between state and society. Recent developments have also strained 
another familiar distinction, between justice and administration.  In Europe, for 
example, courts regularly apply the principle of proportionality – if a policy interferes 
with a right, then it must be designed in the least restrictive way.55 As a result, courts 
have begun to impose standards on government policymaking, at least when rights 
are at stake.  Finally, international legal developments are increasingly influencing 
domestic regulatory and administrative bodies throughout the world.56   
 Our collective volume, Comparative Administrative Law, tries to take account of 
current developments in the field. It seeks to illuminate both the historical legacies 
and the present – day political and economic realities that continue to shape 
administrative law as we proceed into the twenty – first century.  Our efforts are 
necessarily preliminary and are by no means exhaustive. Nevertheless, we aim to 
capture the complexity of the field and to distill key elements for comparative study.  
We look forward to further research and writing as the field grows and develops. 
 
 
 
                                                          
55   On the German origins of proportionality analysis and its diffusion throughout Europe and beyond, 
 see Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews, “Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism” 
 (2008) 47 Colum J of Transnat‟l L 73-165.  
56  The project in Global Administrative Law centered at New York University, focuses on the 
 administrative law of international organizations, such as the World Trade Organization. 
 Kingsbury et al, supra note 48. Nevertheless, it often draws on domestic models of the administrative 
 process for inspiration. Our focus is complementary. We emphasize how the practices of multi-
 national and regional bodies have both emerged out of and affected the administrative process in 
 established states. 
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JOHN REILLY, BAD MEDICINE: A JUDGE’S STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 
IN A FIRST NATIONS COMMUNITY (SURREY, B.C.: ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN BOOKS, 2010) 
 
David Milward* 
 
Judge John Reilly‟s new book, Bad Medicine, is not by conventional standards an 
academic monograph.  In fact, Reilly makes no pretence towards his book being a 
scholarly one, and this is possibly one of its greatest strengths.  He has a message to 
deliver, not just for academics and policy makers, but for Canada and possibly the 
world at large.  He disavows the often mysterious and arcane jargon that academia 
insists must be correct in order to make his message accessible to anyone who may 
venture to read it, from the most educated to the least educated.  
 That message is how the Canadian legal system is just not working for Aboriginal 
peoples in Canada, and in fact only makes things worse. A focal point of this message 
is how the usual formula of “law and order” and „send “em to jail” just does not work 
for Aboriginal crime, and for crime in general. The whole premise of incarceration is 
to dissuade people from crime by the threat of punishment as a consequence for 
committing prohibited acts.  The fundamental flaw in this premise, as Reilly well 
demonstrates, is that many Aboriginal peoples live in extremely horrid personal and 
social circumstances that easily overpower any hypothetical fear that the criminal law 
is designed to instil.   
 But it is not just the criminal justice system.  It is the whole legal and political 
framework in Canada as well, as applied, misapplied, or not applied to Aboriginal 
peoples.  The imposition of certain laws and political structures, like the Indian Act, 
and its attendant band and council system are very much a part of the problem.  
According to Reilly, this system breeds corruption, dependency, and exploitation of 
Aboriginal peoples as much as any other oppressive force.  A focal point of this 
criticism is the late Reverend John Snow, former chief of the Stoney people, whom 
Reilly is adamantly convinced tried to establish himself and his children as a 
dictatorial dynasty over the Stoney.  Of course, Canadian officials do not get to walk 
away blameless either, since Reilly also accuses them of the time-honoured practice of 
passing the jurisdictional buck whenever there was a troublesome Aboriginal 
complaint that called into question the legitimacy of the whole framework.     
 Reilly offers an intensely personal and compelling account of both past events and 
the present situation as he sees it.  This is part of what I mean when I say he makes 
no pretence at making this a scholarly work.  His work is part social commentary, part 
political indictment, and part biography. As such, his work is written with an intensely 
personal style where nobody is spared if there is anything worthy of criticism, not 
even himself.  He is incredibly candid when he describes himself as having been part 
of the problem, a self-proclaimed right-wing bigoted judge who sentenced many 
Aboriginal persons to jail because it was what they brought on themselves, it was 
what the law demanded, and he gave no thought to rocking the boat called the legal 
system.  It took a little longer than overnight to come to different realizations, by his 
own admission. 
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 Such honesty is admittedly refreshing.  This honesty can be both a strength and a 
weakness as featured in his writing.  One way in which his decidedly personal 
approach is a strength is that there is no mistaking what he is saying, and where he is 
coming from.  He writes in a clear and brutally honest style so that anybody with a 
modicum of reading skill cannot mistake his intentions and the message he is trying 
to convey.  In this respect, his mission of accessibility succeeds. 
 He also shrewdly points out a paradox with the system of today.  Reilly still sits as 
a supernumerary judge, so some people may raise their eyebrows when he makes 
strong, sweeping, and dare I say political charged, statements in his writing.  This can, 
after all, raise questions about judicial impartiality in an office he still occupies, albeit 
in reduced capacity.  He himself is alive to this, but it only gives him a little more fuel 
for his fire.  The legal and political system places premiums on things like propriety, 
impartiality, objectivity, and waiting until a complaint is formally established through 
legal process before the accused can truly be condemned for his or her actions.  
These features of the system, however, can be exploited to insert so many obstacles 
in the way of those trying to bring the truth to the light of day.  Reilly thus explicitly 
tells us that, even as he is aware of the constraints that he may be expected to 
observe, he is going to throw caution to the winds and tell the truth as he sees it.  
Making sure that people know the truth is more important than his own personal 
comfort, a lesson he says he learned when he first ordered the Crown to investigate 
social conditions and allegations of political corruption on the Stoney Reserve over a 
decade ago. 
  His intensely personal voice can be both a source of strength, and a source of 
weakness.  There may be instances where adopting a detached scholarly voice would 
have better served his credibility.  Reilly was initially guarded in assessing blame on 
Chief Snow when he first released his judgment ordering the investigation during a 
case involving domestic violence by a man named Ernst Hunter.  Reilly at this point 
was aware that the allegations against Chief Snow had the potential to be false, and 
acknowledged this during his judgment.  In the book, however, Reilly makes himself 
crystal clear that he honestly believes all of the allegations to be 100% true, and 
indicates that many members of the Stoney nation also believed them to be true.  He 
even goes so far was to call Chief Snow the “most evil man” among the Stoney he 
has ever met; strong language indeed.  There is however another side of the story that 
Reilly acknowledges only briefly, and in my view inadequately.  Chief Snow is, and 
remains a quite popular former chief among the Stoney.  He is still remembered for 
having resisted the White Paper proposed by Trudeau‟s government, for having 
helped secure a significant land base for the Stoney, for repeated instances of 
personal generosity towards his fellow Stoney, among other things.  Snow‟s 
supporters have also alleged that Snow inherited a massive debt from his predecessor, 
and was doing the best he could to turn things around when he came back to power.  
When it is all said and done, the verdict is still out for me on whether Chief Snow is 
truly what Reilly says he is, and that is partly because Reilly does make a powerful 
case for substantiating the allegations against Snow.  If all of the allegations are true, 
then Chief Snow was indeed the epitome of what is wrong with giving self-serving 
Aboriginal elites all the powers and money they need to serve their own self-interest 
at the expense of their people, and how the current framework fails Aboriginal people 
miserably.  But Reilly barely if at all presents the other side of the story, and in my 
view it weakens his credibility to some degree. 
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 Reilly, to his credit, is not content to simply describe the problem but also strives 
to engage in an earnest search for solutions.  These include instituting financial 
accountability mechanisms for Aboriginal peoples overseen by the federal 
government, revamping Aboriginal education, economic development for Aboriginal 
peoples, and allocating electoral districts in both Parliament and the provincial 
legislatures specifically for Aboriginal peoples.  Reilly seems content to put these out 
there as hopeful solutions, but also makes little to no effort to engage in any rigorous 
analysis of their viability.  Any serious proposal has to be accompanied by an earnest 
effort to analyze its efficacy, and whether it will actually help solve the problem.  
Efficacy aside, Reilly‟s book would need to engage with real concerns about whether 
his solutions would be acceptable to Aboriginal peoples themselves.  For example, his 
financial accountability proposal will readily meet with cries of paternalism and 
colonialism through bureaucracy.  The proposal for greater electoral representation 
would meet with opposition from some Aboriginal circles that it simply represents 
overlaying a different kind of colonial structure on Aboriginal communities that used 
to have their own political systems.  Economic development, while ostensibly meant 
to further the material good of Aboriginal peoples, will engage well known tensions 
between those Aboriginals who want access to the available benefits and those who 
believe that economic development often contemplates actions that both violate the 
natural world and traditional values.  Several of the proposals that Reilly makes 
engage issues that are fundamentally contentious and divisive within Aboriginal 
communities themselves, and involve a tension between a real desire to preserve 
Aboriginal cultural values and yet somehow survive in a much changed world.  There 
is however no effort to examine this reality in any depth.  Perhaps Reilly simply 
wanted to put the suggestions out there for food of thought, and that is fair enough, 
at least for the time being. 
 Overall I can recommend Reilly‟s book, notwithstanding some of its problems.  It 
does have an important message that needs to be heard, not just by Aboriginal 
peoples, but by the rest of Canada and its leaders as well. 
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accepted for publication.  Authors will be consulted for any substantial changes.  Page 
proofs of articles will be sent to the lead author but only typographical errors may be 
corrected.   
 
General:  All articles are read blind by at least two reviewers. Because of the effort we 
ask from our reviewers, the journal cannot consider for publication manuscripts 
being considered by other journals.  A submission to the Yearbook will be taken as an 
implicit promise that the manuscript has not been concurrently submitted elsewhere, 
has not been accepted for publication elsewhere and will not be submitted elsewhere 
so long as it is under consideration by the Yearbook.  The copyright policy is stated in 
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INSTRUCTIONS AUX AUTEURS 
 
Le Recueil annuel de Windsor d’Accès à la Justice est une revue qui est publiée deux fois par 
année par la faculté et pour laquelle les articles soumis sont évalués par des pairs. Il 
est publié selon les normes les plus élevées et avec l’aide d’un comité consultatif 
prestigieux. Son champ d’intérêt, décrit en détails sur son site web 
(www.uwindsor.ca/wyaj), comprend les questions relatives à la justice et à l’accès à la 
justice traitées des points de vue d’une variété de disciplines. Le comité de rédaction 
du Recueil invite les auteurs à soumettre des manuscrits non sollicités, en anglais ou en 
français, en copie papier ou de format électronique. On les soumet au : Recueil 
annuel de Windsor d’Accès à la Justice, Faculté de Droit, Université de Windsor, 401 
avenue Sunset, Windsor, Ontario, N9B 3P4, Canada ou à l’adresse courriel 
wyaj@uwindsor.ca 
 
Préparation du Manuscrit: Les articles comptent généralement de 7 000 à 12 000 mots, 
quoique des articles plus longs peuvent être publiés à l’occasion. Il faut enlever du 
texte et des notes en bas de page toute forme d’identification de l’auteur et fournir le 
nom de l’auteur, son affiliation, son adressse postale et son adresse courriel sur une 
feuille séparée. Il faut soumettre un résumé de 100-250 mots, en anglais et/ou en 
français, ainsi qu’un titre raccourci à être utilisé comme titre courant (maximum de 35 
caractères). Les notes en bas de page doivent être conformes au Manuel canadien de la 
référence juridique, 7e édition, publié par le McGill Law Journal. Le Manuel dispense du style 
de citation des sciences sociales (y compris toute exigence de bibliographie). Les notes 
en bas de page devraient être au minimum et n’être utilisées que lorsque cela est 
nécessaire. Les commentaires de fond devraient faire partie du texte et ne pas être 
relégués aux notes en bas de page. On s’attend à ce que les auteurs d’articles qui sont 
acceptés s’assurent de se conformer au style du recueil. 
 
Révision et Correction des épreuves: De plus, les rédacteurs réviseront et corrigeront tous 
les articles acceptés en vue de leur publication. On consultera les auteurs au sujet de 
tout changement d’envergure. On enverra les épreuves de page à l’auteur principal 
mais seules les coquilles peuvent être corrigées.  
 
Général: Au moins deux évaluateurs font la lecture aveugle de tous les articles. Vu 
l’effort que nous exigeons de nos évaluateurs, le Recueil ne peut pas considérer en 
vue de publication des manuscrits qui sont en considération par d’autres revues. On 
tiendra pour acquis que la soumission d’un texte au Recueil est accompagnée d’une 
promesse implicite que le manuscrit n’a pas été soumis ailleurs en même temps, n’a 
pas été accepté pour être publié ailleurs et ne sera pas soumis ailleurs aussi longtemps 
qu’il sera en considération par le Recueil. La politique de droits d’auteur est énoncée 
en détail sur le site web du recueil.  
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